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I N T R O D U C T I O N :
T H E  P O P U L A R  A P P E A L  O F  T H E  F O O D  R E V O L U T I O N
Popular culture is one of the sites where th[e] struggle for  
and against a culture of the powerful is engaged: it is also  
the stake to be won or lost in that struggle.
—Stuart Hall1 
From Winos to Wine Snobs
My mother called me in the Spring of 2005, distressed about a conversation she'd 
had with one of her coworkers about wine. She had started “getting into” wine after I left 
home for college in  1999,  perhaps partially  in  celebration or mourning of  her  newly 
empty nest, but probably also because of the wine-drinking trend sweeping the nation at 
that  time.  Between  1991  and  2005, U.S.  wine  consumption  jumped  50%,2 “cocktail 
hours” were increasingly replaced by “wine and cheese receptions,” and words like Shiraz 
and terroir became part of the popular American vocabulary. My mother's participation 
in that trend was relatively casual. She purchased most of her wine at the supermarkets 
where she did the rest of her grocery shopping, she stuck mostly to a handful of varietals 
and national brands she knew she liked, and she rarely drank more than a glass or two 
per week. However, after one particularly stressful day at work, she had gone home and 
consumed  approximately  half  a  bottle  by  herself.  When  she  confessed  this  minor 
indiscretion to the librarian at the public elementary school where she does tech support,  
the woman asked what kind of wine she had been drinking. My mother told her it was a 
White Zinfandel—one of her favorites—and the coworker sneeered, “Oh no, that's the hot 
1 Stuart Hall, “Notes on Deconstructing the Popular,” People's History and Socialist Theory, ed. Raphael 
Samuel (London: Routledge, 1981: 239). 
2 According to The Wine Institute, a trade association that represents the California wine industry. Wine 
Institute/Gomberg, Fredrikson & Associates, “Wine Consumption in the U.S,” 5 April 2010, Wine 
Institute, Web (accessed 3 January 2011).
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dog of wines.”
“Well,” my mother said to me, “I didn't know that. Did you know that?" I did, as 
she must have known I would. Although I had not yet started studying food, I had also 
“gotten into”  wine after  I  left  home for college.  My interest  was driven more by my 
discovery of the pleasurable and socially-useful effects of intoxication; however, even as 
an undergraduate with little discretionary spending money, I favored wine over cheaper 
drinks like beer and vodka because it seemed to impart the kind of sophistication and 
worldliness I longed for. In pursuit of that sophistication, and largely thanks to a series 
of waitressing jobs at increasingly fancy restaurants, I learned to eschew not only White 
Zinfandel but also everything else sweet, Merlot and Chardonnay (too common), and any 
bottle with an animal on the label (pandering to the masses3). I had not anticipated that 
by looking the other way as my mother drank mass-produced California blush, I would 
let her embarass herself. 
Even though my mother never aspired to be a connoisseur and did most of her 
wine drinking in the privacy of her home with no one around to impress, her interest in 
wine and the pleasure she derived from it were inseparable from its cultural significance
—the idea that  wine is  a  refined pleasure,  something aesthetically  and perhaps  even 
morally superior to other kinds of food and drink. It's true that my mother probably liked 
the taste, too; her enjoyment of White Zinfandel was probably genuine. She may also 
have enjoyed the psychological effects of the alcohol, as suggested by the fact that she 
used it to relax after a stressful day. However, the idea that White Zinfandel was declassé 
overwhelmed whatever other pleasures she was deriving from it. I have never seen her 
drink  a  blush  wine  of  any  variety  since—in  fact,  she  stopped  drinking  wine  almost 
3 These are sometimes referred to as “critter wines.” Market research firm ACNielsen seems to have 
coined the term “critter label” in 2006 to describe the growing trend of wines marketed with animals. 
According to their study, approximately 18% of new wines released in the previous three years featured 
some kind of animal on the label, and the sales generated by new brands featuring a critter 
outperformed non-critter wines more than two to one. They estimated the annual sales of critter-branded 
wine in the U.S. at over $600 million. Rob Walker, “Animal Pragmatism,” The New York Times, 23 
April 2006, Web (accessed 27 January 2011).
3
entirely a few years later when her doctor told her that all forms of alcohol were merely 
empty  calories  she  ought  to  avoid.  The  idea  that  wine  is  sophisticated  and  that 
sophisticated foods and drinks are desirable may seem like common sense too obvious to 
merit further examination. However, the obviousness of those statements has less to do 
with anything inherent to wine or to sophistication than to historically and culturally-
contingent constructions of the meaning of wine and the desirability of sophistication. At 
least at the time of this writing, the belief that wine is a high class drink and that it is a  
good thing to have access to and knowledge about is widely believed to be true. It was not 
always so. 
From the repeal  of Prohibition through the early 1960s in the U.S.,  wine was 
associated primarily with impoverished alcoholics and immigrants. Inexpensive fortified 
wines made up the vast majority of the commercial wine market. Unlike table wine, they 
are produced by blending brandy or grain alcohol with cheap wine or sometimes just 
fruit juice and artificial coloring, resulting in a drink between 15-20 percent alcohol by 
volume (ABV). In 1940, the first year when sales reports differentiate between fortified 
or  dessert  wines4 and  table  wine—defined  as  non-sparkling  wines  with  less  than  14 
percent alcohol—the latter comprised less than a third of annual wine sales (27 million 
out of 90 million gallons total).5 National brands of fortified wine like Thunderbird, Wild 
Irish Rose, and Night Train first became popular during the Great Depression, due to 
their high alcohol content, low price, and sweet taste (which made them more palatable 
than grain alcohol on its own).6 Unfortified “table wine” was primarily consumed by 
immigrant families from Southern and Eastern Europe, who often made their own at 
home.  These associations  were reflected in  derogatory  terms like  “wino,”  and “Dago 
4 This category also includes more expensive fortified wines like port, sherry, and vermouth and 
sparkling wines; however, those were not as popular or widely-available as the lower-end fortified 
wines. 
5 Wine Institute/Gomberg, 2010.
6 Kevin Zraly, American Wine Guide (New York: Sterling, 2006: 38).
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red”.7 
In the same time period, Champagne and table wines imported from France still 
graced the tables of the American elite. However, there's little indication that wine was 
seen  as  a  luxury  that  less  affluent  Americans  were  eager  to  acquire;  instead,  its 
unfamiliarity and foreignness was widely seen as unappealing,  much like other foods 
associated with France like  frog legs  and escargots.  When the Gallup Polling agency 
asked Americans about their  idea of  the “perfect  meal”  in 1947, those who said they 
would start with an alcoholic beverage mostly said they'd prefer a “gin cocktail or plain 
Manhattan.” The same year,  approximately 60 percent of  Americans said they drank 
alcohol  at  least  occasionally,  and most  said  they  preferred  beer  or  liquor.8 By 1960, 
fortified and dessert wines were still outselling the more “sophisticated” table wines two 
to one.9
However, beginning in the 1960s, the consumption of table wine in the U.S. (both 
total and per capita) began to increase. By 1970, table wine sales made up nearly half of 
the  267  million  gallon  wine  market.  By 1980,  they  constituted  three-quarters  of  the 
market,  which as a whole had grown to 480 million gallons sold annually.10 In 1992, 
Gallup introduced a question in their annual survey of drinking habits about whether 
respondents who drank alcohol “most often” drank beer, wine, or spirits. In 1992, beer 
still had a significant lead over wine—47 percent of American drinkers preferred beer 
compared to 27 percent who preferred wine. But wine steadily ate away at beer's lead 
7 “Dago” is an ethnic slur originally derived from the name Diego and initially used as a disparaging term 
for any foreigner. By the 19th and 20th Centuries it was primarily used to refer to Italian immigrants. 
According to the OED, the first references to “Dago red” in the OED appear in 1906 and 1910, and 
feature the phrase in quotes: 'Dago red.” Later references dated in the 1960s drop the quotes and 
sometimes the capitalization, suggesting broader acceptance. “Dago,” n. Oxford English Dictionary  
Online, Oxford University Press, November 2010, Web (accessed 23 December 2010). 
8 For both questions, the published record does not provide detailed results, so the size of the majority is 
unknown. George Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 1935-1971 (Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Publishers, 1972: 
636). See also, Harvey Levenstein, Paradox of Plenty: A Social History of Eating in Modern America 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993: 119). 
9 Wine Institute/Gomberg, 2010.
10 Ibid.
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until 2005, when it surpassed beer as the national drink of choice.11 [Figure I.1] 
Figure I.1/ Sales of Table Wine and Fortified & Sparkling Wine12
The  growing  popularity  of  table  wine  was  accompanied  by  changes  in  the  cultural 
significance  of  wine.  The  association  with  immigrants  and  vagrants  faded  and  was 
replaced by a widespread belief that wine is  gourmet or sophisticated and that being 
“into” wine is a sign of admirable refinement instead of a likely indication of alcoholism 
or the lack of self-control and dangerous (if sometimes alluring) sensuality associated 
with  immigrants  and  their  foodways.13 After  a  60  Minutes episode  on  the  “French 
11 Beer recovered a slight lead the following year, but per capita consumption of the beer produced by the 
three breweries that dominate the U.S. market—Anheuser-Busch, Miller, and Coors—has been flat or 
falling since 1981. Imported beer began to claim an increasing share of the market in the late 1990s, and 
the fastest-growing segment of the beer market since 2000 has been microbrews, or beer produced in 
the U.S. by firms with annual production levels between 5,000 and 10,000 barrels. Martin H. Stack, “A 
Concise History of America's Brewing Industry,” 01 February 2010, EH.net (Economic History 
Services) Web (accessed 24 January 2011).
12 Original graph based on data published by Wine Institute/Gomberg, 2010. The dip in the late 80s and 
early 90s is usually attributed to the “baby bust” following the “baby boom,” which meant fewer people 
were reaching the legal drinking age during those years. 
13 This was especially reflected in Home Economists' writings and efforts to reform urban immigrant 
women's cooking and discourage the consumption of anything seen as “stimulating,” including pickles, 
alcohol, and spicy foods. See Donna R. Gabaccia, We Are What We Eat: Ethnic Food an the Making of  
Americans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000: 124).
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paradox” aired in 1991, which suggested that higher rates of red wine consumption were 
one of the reasons rates  of  heart  disease are lower in France despite higher rates  of 
saturated fat in their diets, wine also became associated with good health.14
Wine has never had just one meaning. Even in the 1940s, a small number of non-
immigrant  Americans  drank  unfortified  wine  on  a  regular  basis,  which  they  likely 
referred to as either “Bordeaux” or “Burgundy,” after the regions in France where they 
were produced rather than the grape varietals used. Those wine consumers may have 
seen drinking wine as a marker of their wealth and cultural sophistication, for there are 
some  indications  that  wine  was  already  seen  as  potentially  elitist.  For  example,  a 
cookbook called Dining for Moderns published by the New York Women's Exchange in 
1940 includes dinner menus with suggested wine pairings and criticizes hosts who serve 
wine “simply to show off” rather than carefully selecting them to complement the food.15 
The  broader  shift  in  popular  attitudes  towards  wine  could  be  seen  as  a  process  of 
democratization: both as a material commodity and as a signifier of sophistication, wine 
became more accessible for a wider demographic.16 However, the result was not a simple 
trickle-down  process  in  which  upper-class  beliefs  and  practices  involving  wine  were 
adopted by increasingly less  affluent  people.  Some people began to think of  wine as 
categorically sophisticated and desirable whereas others might have agreed that wine 
was  generally  more sophisticated than other alcoholic  beverages but that  there were 
important distinctions between styles and varietals.  Many others rebelled against the 
new trendiness of wine, an attitude that major American beer companies continue to 
14 I'm indebted to Solomon Katz for this insight.
15 Mrs. G. Edgar Hackey, Dining for Moderns with Menus and Recipes: They Why and When of Wining  
(New York: New York Women's Exchange, 1940) quoted in Megan J. Elias, Food in the United States,  
1890-1945 (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press, 2009: 38). Women's exchanges were commercial 
operations run by and for wealthy women who needed to earn money but wanted to avoid the stigma of 
working for wages or entering the “masculine” world of business. Kathleen Waters Sander, The 
Business of Charity: The Woman's Exchange Movement, 1832-1900 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1998). 
16 Owing in part to the growth of the domestic wine industry, especially in California. Thomas Pinney, A 
History of Wine in America: From Prohibition to the Present (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2005: 225). 
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cater to and cultivate by portraying wine and wine-drinkers as effeminate, elitist, boring, 
and un-American.17 However, by and large, the construction of wine as sophisticated and 
the construction of sophistication as desirable became dominant.
In this dissertation, I will attempt to account for some of the multifarious ways 
that  different  groups of  Americans adopted,  negotiated with,  or  pushed back against 
dominant food ideologies. However, my primary concern is explaining the elevation of 
particular cultural narratives to the status of common sense. When and why did the U.S. 
transform from a nation where alcoholics were called “winos” and table wine was called 
“Dago Red” to one of the world's leading consumers of table wine—a country where, at 
least  in  2005,  more  people  in  Gallup's  nationally-representative  sample  said  they 
preferred wine than beer? How did the ability to make distinctions not only between 
different styles of wine but also between previously-ignored grape varietals become a 
part of the social judgments that people who identify as “middle class” make about each 
other?  What  are  the  pleasures  and  rewards  of  investing  in  the  idea  that  wine  is 
sophisticated, especially for people whose knowledge about wine is relatively limited? 
What are the benefits of attempting to become a more sophisticated wine drinker and the 
consequences of resistance or failure? 
The case of wine is not unique. The shift in attitudes towards wine is part of a 
broader transformation in how people in the U.S. buy, cook, eat, and above all talk about 
and  imagine food. In mainstream American popular culture,  that  transformation has 
happened mostly since 1980. The danger in trying to explain a phenomenon that broad 
is that the complexity of individual experiences must be left out. However, extracting a 
single trend—the rise of wine or weight-loss diets or Thai food or cupcakes—might not 
17 For example, in a commercial that first aired during the 2010 Super Bowl, young couples arrive at a 
“wine and cheese” party. The men disappear into a kitchen where they reveal bottles and six-packs of 
Bud Light and small televisions for viewing “the game” hidden in wheels of cheese, baguettes, and 
cases of wine. Beer is portrayed as the fun, masculine Other to wine, which is portrayed as stuffy and 
feminine. “Bud Light Wine and Cheese Party,” Commercial. YouTube, uploaded 01 February 2008 by 
BudBowlXLII, Web (accessed 19 March 2011). 
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get  at  the  larger  forces  at  work.  Focusing on just  the  rise  of  “natural  foods” 18 might 
expose interesting aspects of the broader phenomenon, but would not explain why the 
rise of  “natural”  foods paralleled the rise of  gourmet foods,  the dramatic  increase  in 
weight-loss dieting and concern about obesity, and the growing interest in international, 
ethnic, and fusion cuisines. Journalists and popular writers have sometimes hailed these 
trends as separate revolutions (the “gourmet revolution,” the “weight-loss revolution,” 
the “Organic revolution,” etc.) but have also referred to them as a kind of gestalt: the 
“American  food  revolution.”19 This  dissertation  analyzes  the  discourses  that  have 
emerged as a part of that revolution, contextualizes some of its main preoccupations in 
the  longer  history  of  U.S.  foodways,  and  explains  why  all  of  these  competing  and 
contradictory ways of eating “better” simultaneously became mainstream beginning in 
the 1980s.
The Place of Food in American Studies: Methodology and Contribution
Food has historically been neglected by most scholars, especially in the humanities 
and social sciences. For centuries, philosophers and historians largely shared the attitude 
expressed by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C. that food was a debased bodily pleasure 
and thus less worthy of serious contemplation than the loftier pleasures of the  mind.20 
Food and foodways21 began to garner more scholarly attention after the mid-twentieth 
18  “Natural foods” is used in the poplar vernacular, marketing, and food industry literature to refer to a 
huge swath of products and their retailers from corporations like Whole Foods Market and Trader Joes 
to non-profit food co-operatives; from the pre-washed and bagged lettuces available nationwide from 
California producer Earthbound Farms to the heads of lettuce sold at farmers markets; from meat and 
dairy substitutes made from soy grown overseas to pastured beef and dairy; from tropical superfruit 
smoothies to eggs from backyard chicken coops, and etc. I will discuss the origins of the term and 
contradictions in its use at greater length in Chapters One and Two. 
19 See, for example, Andrew Martin, “Is a Food Revolution Now in Season?” The New York Times 22 
March 2009, Web (accessed May 26, 2009) or the article by political science professor Jerry 
Weinberger, “America's Food Revolution,” City Journal 2009. Web (accessed 07 February 2011). 
20 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume III: The Care of the Self, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1988: 40-1). See also Warren Belasco, Food: The Key Concepts (Oxford, UK: 
Berg, 2008: 2). 
21  “Foodways” is a term coined in the early 1960s by folklorist Don Yoder to refer to the entire range of 
food habits, behaviors, customs, stories, and practices associated with food production and 
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century “anthropological turn” in the humanities.22 However, the scholarly literature on 
the history, politics, and culture of food is still often seen as fluff. At a 2007 conference on 
food and gender at Harvard, culinary librarian Barbara Haber noted that even feminist 
scholars  remained  hesitant  to  devote  substantial  attention  to  foodways,  despite  their 
willingness to tackle other topics related to women's labor and the private sphere like 
child-rearing, sex work, romance novels, and cosmetics. There was a tacit understanding, 
she said, that “no one was going to get tenure by writing about cupcakes.”23 
Despite a lingering sense in the humanities that  food is  too mundane to merit 
scholarly attention or will eventually be dismissed as a fad, the academic literature about 
food is growing. So far, scholars have generally focused on only one kind of food, ethnic 
group, or region at a time, leaving the “big picture” to journalists and popular writers. The 
result is a divided literature with scholars producing nuanced accounts of particular foods 
and concepts like artificial sweeteners, the idea of “freshness,” and the role of chicken in 
African-American  communities24 while  journalists  produce  sweeping  accounts  about 
American fast food, gourmet food, and fatness.25 There have been no scholarly attempts to 
describe the phenomenon popularly recognized as the food revolution. 
My argument is that contemporary ideologies about food encapsulated in the food 
revolution answer needs produced by social relations, political structures, and economic 
consumption. Jennifer Berg, Marion Nestle, and Amy Bentley, “Food Studies.” Encyclopedia of Food 
and Culture, ed. Solomon H. Katz. Vol. 2 Gale Cengage, 2003. eNotes.com 2006 Web (accessed 9 Feb 
2011).
22 The move away from traditional canons and “high culture” and embrace of a wider range of texts and 
behaviors as legitimate objects of scholarship.
23 Barbara Haber, “Studying Gender, Studying Food: Intersections, Obstacles, Opportunities,” Women, 
Men and Food: Putting Gender on the Table, a conference held at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced 
Study. Radcliffe Yard, MA. 13 April 2007, Web  (accessed 16 February 2011). 
24 Respectively: Carolyn de la Pena, Empty Pleasures: The Story of Artificial Sweeteners From Saccharin  
to Splenda (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), Susanne Freidberg, Fresh: A 
Perishable History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), and Psyche A. Williams-Forson, 
Building Houses Out of Chicken Legs: Black Women, Food, and Power (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006). 
25 Eric Schlosser, Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the American Meal (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 
2001); David Kamp, The United States of Arugula: How We Became a Gourmet Nation (New York: 
Random House, 2006); Greg Critser, Fat Land: How Americans Became the Fattest People in the  
World (New York: Mariner Books, 2003).
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realities. I use an interdisciplinary approach that integrates methods and theories drawn 
from literary criticism, history, anthropology,  and communications studies. Using the 
tools  of  close  reading  and  deconstruction,  I  analyze  mass  media  texts,  including 
television shows, advertising campaigns, films, newspaper and magazine articles, best-
selling books and and highly-trafficked websites. I place those texts and the ideologies 
they reveal  in historical  context using a broad assemblage of  primary and secondary 
sources. I also read secondary historical sources and journalistic accounts of U.S. food 
culture critically, with an eye to their omissions and how they too have been shaped by 
dominant ideologies.  In order  to  supplement the picture of  recent trends painted by 
mass media, I analyze market research, public opinion polls, Nielsen ratings, blog entries 
and  comments,  discussions  in  online  communities  and  media  and  food  industry 
publications.  The  process  of  assembling  many  forms  of  evidence  about  how  media 
audiences and consumers are using,  creating,  and responding to representations and 
discourses  about  food  often  takes  the  form  of  ethnographic  description  or  “found” 
audience reception study.26 Throughout, I use theoretical frameworks drawn primarily 
from Critical  Theory and Cultural  Studies27 to  try  to  explain  how the rise of  food in 
26 I say “found” audience reception because rather than performing survey research or interviews with 
audience members, I use responses to texts that audience members are generating spontaneously online. 
One disadvantage of found audience reception data is that the responses are not generalizable. The 
people who participate in online forums, who review films on websites like IMDb, and who write and 
comment on blogs are probably not representative of the whole audience either demographically or in 
terms of how they watch and respond to mass media texts. They might, for example, watch more 
carefully and critically than most viewers or, as self-identified “fans,” be more likely to read the text in 
dominant or preferred ways. However, found reception data has the advantage of reflecting how people 
interpret texts on their own in whatever viewing communities they already participate in without the 
framing or prompting of a researcher's questions. 
27 Critical Theory represents two distinct intellectual traditions. The first is associated primarily with the 
Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt and characterized by 1) the insistence that truth, knowledge, 
and being are the products of specific human actors, not universal or infinite characteristics of 
humankind, 2) the moral commitment to human emancipation from all forms of oppression, and 3) the 
goal of unifying thought and practice by integrating philosophy and the empirical social sciences to 
produce theory that could both explain the whole of society and transform it. Martin Jay, The 
Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-
1950 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996: 45-81). The second tradition associated with 
Critical Theory is the rise of structuralist and post-structuralist theories focused on language, discourse, 
and the study of signs and symbols (or semiotics), which became widely influential in the humanities 
and especially literary criticism in the 1960s and 1970s. That tradition is “critical” in the sense that it 
seeks to expose biases in texts and discourses and often requires scholars to be self-reflexive about the 
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popular culture connects to historical changes in class formation, structures of power 
and oppression, and possibilities for resistance.
This approach bears the strong imprint of American Studies. Although the field 
theoretically embraces a wide range of disciplines and inter-disciplines, in practice it has 
largely  been  represented  by  the  intersection  of  literary  criticism  and  history  with  a 
particular  focus  on  the  texts  and  life  experiences  historically  excluded  from  the 
disciplines  of  English  and  History.  In  the  early  part  of  the  twentieth  century,  that 
included most American literature.28 More recently, the focus has been primarily on texts 
produced by marginalized racial and ethnic groups. Studying a debased subject like food 
thus follows in a long American Studies tradition of taking seriously what scholars in 
other disciplines have historically ignored. My theoretical debts reflect the turn towards 
Critical  Theory  and  British  Cultural  Studies  in  both  American  Studies  and  the 
Humanities more broadly the 1980s.29 In  American Studies in a Moment of Danger, 
limitations of their own norms and reliance on language. Critical Terms for Literary Study, 2nd edition, 
ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin, 1990 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995: 1-
3). Cultural Studies as a field was inaugurated in 1964 by the founding of the Birmingham Centre for 
Contemporary Culture where scholars like Stuart Hall and Dick Hebdige sought to understand and 
explain the relationships between culture and political economy, with a particular focus on the British 
working-class and youth subcultures. Their work and the broader intellectual movement inspired by the 
Birmingham School drew on both of the intellectual traditions associated with Critical Theory and on 
the writings of Antonio Gramsci. My scholarship and thinking has been shaped by ideas and scholarship 
from all three traditions, and especially the contributions of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, 
Jurgen Habermas, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Edward Said, Raymond Williams, 
and Stuart Hall. 
28 One of the hallmarks of early American Studies scholarship is the attempt to argue that American 
history and literature are worthy of study. A quintessential example is F.O. Matthiessen's American 
Renaissance, which argued that American writers like Emerson, Thoreau, Melville, Hawthorne, and 
Whitman represented true literary greatness on par with European literary canons, and that their work 
reflected and could thus illuminate the unique culture, politics, and history of the U.S. F. O. 
Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1941).
29 The relationship between Cultural Studies and American Studies is a matter of some debate. Michael 
Denning argues that American Studies is the U.S. analog of British Cultural Studies, but that American 
scholars shied away from overt Marxism especially before the 1980s because of the taint of Stalinism. 
He portrays the “myth and symbol” school of American Studies as a politically-sanitized version of 
British “ideology studies.” Michael Denning, “The Special American Conditions: Marxism and 
American Studies,” Culture in the Age of Three Worlds (New York: Verso, 2004: 169-192). Patrick 
Brantlinger, on the other hand, portrays American Studies and Cultural Studies as distinct fields. He 
defines Cultural Studies as an attempt to use and unite the various strains of Critical Theory, including 
Marxism, feminism, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, and ethnography without submitting to the 
“reification of the disciplines.” In contrast, he suggests that American Studies was a separate discipline 
that was similar to Cultural Studies in the sense that it attempted to do interdisciplinary or 
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George Lipsitz argues that that turn was largely a response to the Reagan revolution and 
conservative politicians successfully wielding cultural symbols for their political ends. 
Lipsitz is somewhat critical of how that shift has played out, arguing that since the 80s, 
"dominant paradigms have suffered from an overemphasis on what has been articulated 
from  within  the  profession,  and  a  consequent  underemphasis  on  the  voices,  power 
struggles,  and  ideological  conflicts  outside  it.”30 He  argues  that  American  Studies 
scholars should pay more attention to grassroots movements and take up the "important 
role [of] analyzing and interpreting the changes that are taking place around us."31 
Studying food and the “food revolution” may be one way to fulfill Lipsitz's mandate 
to produce academic research that is accessible and relevant to political movements and 
readers outside the traditional reach of the academy. The rise of Food Studies in the last 
decade or two32 is at least partially a response to the emergence of grassroots activism 
centered on sustainable  and ethical  food production and consumption.  Jamie Oliver, 
Alice Waters, and Michael Pollan have achieved celebrity status by attempting to reform 
counterdisciplinary work, but should serve as a “cautionary example” for Cultural Studies, suggesting 
the latter would not have the ability to reform the Humanities or “American life.” He notes that 
American Studies began to shift away from literary criticism and patriotic cultural history to producing 
more oppositional work in the 1980s, but suggests that was driven by the same factors that influenced 
the development of Cultural Studies, i.e. that American Studies changed in tandem with the rise of 
Cultural Studies, not as a result or primary institutional home for it. Patrick Brantlinger, Crusoe's  
Footprints: Cultural Studies in Britain and America. New York: Routledge, 1990: 15-33. The difference 
in these accounts probably owes to a difference in what Denning and Brantlinger count as “American 
Studies” scholarship. My graduate coursework in American Studies was influenced far more by the 
Cultural Studies tradition than by the American Studies tradition Brantlinger references (e.g. Henry 
Nash Smith and Leo Marx). The latter were part of a disputed canon that was occasionally gestured to 
as part of the field's history but generally not assigned.
30 George Lipsitz, American Studies in a Moment of Danger. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2001, 114).
31 Ibid., 229. 
32 Food Studies is an umbrella term for research on the historical, cultural, political, economic, and 
geographic aspects of food distinguished from the agricultural and nutritional sciences. Although 
scholarship that fits that description dates back to antiquity, the field is generally considered to be 15-25 
years old. The Association for the Study of Food and Society (ASFS), an professional organization run 
primarily by and for academic scholars, was founded in 1985 and began holding annual meetings in 
1987. Its flagship journal, Food, Culture, and Society was first published in 1997 and is now widely 
recognized as the benchmark journal in the field of Food Studies. The New York University Department 
of Nutrition, Food Studies, and Public Health established undergraduate and graduate degree-granting 
programs in “Food Studies” in 1996 and Boston University also established a Masters of Liberal Arts in 
Gastronomy in the 1990s. “Association for the Study of Food and Society: Home.” Food-culture.org, 
Web (accessed 08 February 2011). 
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public school lunch programs and calling on consumers to think of themselves as citizen-
eaters with the power to “vote with their forks” for the kind of communities they wish to 
inhabit.  Although this dissertation offers a critical analysis of the food revolution, which 
may at times seem to challenge some of its aims and tactics, I hope it will also serve as a 
resource for people who want to understand why food trends come and go and what has 
motivated so many Americans in the last three decades to want to eat “better,” perhaps to 
harness those energies for social change. 
Additionally,  I  hope  to  call  attention  to  the  continued  importance  of  class 
difference as both a source of inequality in the U.S. and as a useful analytical lens. Some 
scholars, most notably the sociologist Paul W. Kingston, have argued that classes do not 
exist  in  America  in  any  meaningful  way  because most  Americans  do  not  form stable 
identities around or engage in even a minimal level of collective political action based on 
shared  economic  positions.  Kingston  acknowledges  that  objective  economic  positions 
continue to shape Americans' life chances, but argues that in order for classes to be real, 
there must be statistical proof that class divisions “correspond to the collective realities 
that people experience and perceive.”33 As critics like Harold R. Kerbo have noted, that 
reasoning resembles the argument that cancer may have real consequences, but is not real 
unless and until the patient perceives it.34 Class consciousness in the U.S. may be low,35 but 
unequal economic conditions continue to reproduce unequal life chances and hierarchies 
in  ways  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  other  forms of  social  difference  like  race,  gender, 
ethnicity, sexuality, citizenship status, religious affiliation, age, or ability. Class analysis is 
necessary  to  identify  power  relationships  that  cut  across  racial  and  gender  divides, 
national borders, and ideological persuasions. 
33 Paul W. Kingston, The Classless Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000: 3).
34 Harold R. Kerbo. “Review: The Classess Society,” Contemporary Sociology 31.4 (2002): 267. 
35 As both Kingston and Kerbo note, survey data over the last three decades as consistently shown that 
most Americans are not aware of the fact that income inequality in the U.S. is higher than in almost any 
other industrialized nation, or that mobility between income quintiles is among the lowest, or that as a 
nation, Americans work more hours per year for lower wages and fewer benefits. Ibid. 
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Despite  the  apparent  lack  of  class  consciousness  or  organized  working-class 
politics, class distinctions continue to loom large in American popular culture. Concerns 
about elitism, access, democracy, what counts as “good taste,” and what it means to live 
“the good life”  are  all  expressions of  cultural  hierarchy related to class.  The declining 
emphasis on class in academia is exemplified by attempts by scholars like Erik Olin Wright 
to  “revitalize”  it.  Especially  since  the  rise  of  Critical  Race  theory  and  Critical  Ethnic 
Studies, class has frequently been reduced to a footnote in scholarship that focuses far 
more intently on race, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality.36 In light of the dramatic increases 
in income inequality and decreasing income mobility in the U.S. over the last thirty years, 
a renewed focus on class is overdue.37 
An Overview of the Argument and Chapters
My central argument is that the food revolution became mainstream in the 1980s 
primarily because it appealed to Americans whose income and wealth began to stagnate 
or decline in comparison to the soaring fortunes of the super-rich.38 As other markers of 
class mobility became harder to come by, foodways constructed as more sophisticated, 
healthier,  more  ethically  responsible,  and  more  cosmopolitan  became  increasingly 
important markers of middle class status. Everything from grocery shopping to cooking 
to entertaining to dining out to talking about food to private acts of consumption took on 
greater  significance.  Foodways  became charged  with  new anxieties,  and offered  new 
rewards and pleasures.  For many Americans who consider themselves “middle class” 
and culturally part of the mainstream, food became an arena of class aspiration. 
In  the  first  chapter,  “No  Culinary39 Enlightenment”  I  argue  that  the  food 
36 See Erik Olin Wright, Approaches to Class Analysis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2005: 2).
37 I discuss the changes in income structure and mobility in greater detail in Chapter Five, “Aspirational 
Eating.” 
38 Approximately the wealthiest one percent.
39 Although the term “culinary” typically refers to things that bear a relationship to cooking, I'm using it 
here and throughout the dissertation to refer to the broader conceptual and discursive fields 
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revolution is characterized by four main pillars: 1) gourmet food, 2) weight-loss dieting 
3) “natural” food, 4) cosmopolitan eating. Using the coverage of President Obama as an 
eater and potential food reformer in U.S. mass media and the food blogosphere during 
his 2008 campaign as an example of recent food discourse, I show how these four pillars 
provide an analytical  framework for analyzing the food revolution. Although the four 
pillars are often constructed as a gestalt, I show that they actually compete and conflict, 
undermining efforts  to  portray Obama as  an ideal  eater.  The conflicts  between (and 
within) the pillars  challenge the prevailing popular and scholarly explanation for the 
food  revolution,  which  I  call  the  “Culinary  Enlightenment  Thesis.”  According  to  the 
Culinary  Enlightenment  Thesis,  the  growing  interest  in  eating  “better”  is  due  to  the 
inevitable  forward  march  of  progress  in  food  production,  nutritional  science,  global 
trade, and respect for racial and ethnic diversity. I describe several manifestations of that 
thesis and its counterpart, the narrative of national Culinary Decline, and explain why I 
find both of them inadequate. Lastly, I explore how the representation of Obama as a 
model  eater,  and  sometimes  a  bad  role  model,  illuminate  the  role  of  food  in  the 
construction of the liberal elite. 
The second chapter, “The Rise, Fall, and Return of 'Enlightened' Eating” argues 
that all four pillars of the food revolution were also mainstream concerns at the turn of 
the twentieth century. After the Civil War—especially during the period from 1880-1920
—the elites who served as national taste leaders began holding dinner parties with plated 
encompassing food and drink and the practices of eating and drinking. A case could probably be made 
for the superiority of the term “alimentary,” which Michel Foucault favors in The History of Sexuality  
Volume II: The Use of Pleasure to refer to the realm of food and eating; however, that carries an equally 
undesirable connotation of nutrition or digestion, especially as its most common use is to refer to the 
digestive tract or “alimentary canal.” Alimentary is probably more appropriate to Foucault's discussion 
of the bodily pleasures of food and drink than to the concern with purchasing, preparing, and consuming 
food and drink. I also prefer culinary because I attempt to build on the work of Kathleen LeBesco and 
Dean Nacarrato, who use the term “culinary capital” rather than “alimentary capital” to refer to the 
value attached to particular kinds of foods and food practices, including but certainly not limited to 
cooking. Kathleen LeBesco and Dean Naccarato, “Julia Child, Martha Stewart, and the Rise of Culinary 
Capital,” Edible Ideologies: Representing Food & Meaning, eds. Kathleen LeBesco and Peter 
Naccarato (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007: 223-238)
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courses modeled on the cuisine developed by the Second Estate in France (also known as 
“dining  à la  Russe”),  following  slimming diets  in  pursuit  of  the  new bodily  ideal  of 
thinness, dabbling in the “natural” diets developed by people like John Harvey Kellogg to 
promote  spiritual  and  physical  well-being,  and  hosting  “exotic  entertainments” 
showcasing their  increasing knowledge about  the fringes  of  the  expanding American 
empire. These practices were emulated by the emerging professional-managerial class 
and portrayed as superior to the foods and practices associated with the working classes. 
All four trends and discourses receded in popularity during the Great Depression as the 
plain  foods  associated with the Home Economics movement  were  established as  the 
national cuisine. Thus, they seemed new when they re-emerged in the 1980s. 
In the third chapter, “Meritocracies of Taste and the Upwardly-Mobile Body,” I 
analyze the critically-acclaimed animated Disney Pixar film Ratatouille (dir. Brad Bird, 
2007) and NBC's competitive weight-loss reality series The Biggest Loser.  Both have 
been extraordinarily popular with American audiences but have received little attention 
from scholars.  I  argue that a large part of their popular appeal is  that they reinforce 
meritocratic ideologies that portray “enlightened” eating as something everyone can and 
should do. “The Biggest Loser” carefully constructs weight-loss as the result of individual 
willpower despite the fact that the show's contestants also have professional experts to 
assist them and still achieve inconsistent, short-lived results.  Ratatouille espouses the 
explicitly meritocratic motto “everyone can cook,” despite the fact that the protagonist's 
culinary skill is portrayed as largely dependent on his uniquely sensitive palate. Using 
audience reception data drawn primarily from online sources, I show how popular media 
texts about food get people to say “yes” to the idea that anyone can and everyone should 
be sophisticated, thin, healthy, and adventurous eaters. 
In the fourth chapter, “The Legitimation of Culinary Capital”40 I analyze how the 
40 The term “culinary capital” comes from LeBesco and Naccarato, see note 39. LeBesco and Naccarato, 
2007.
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famous Grey Poupon Rolls Royce advertising campaign, the film Sideways, and the rise 
of the term “foodie” negotiate with the specter of elitism that haunts the construction of 
meritocratic taste hierarchies. Elitism poses a serious threat to the four pillars and the 
Culinary Enlightenment Thesis because it implies that taste hierarchies are arbitrary and 
that people who invest in those hierarchies are dupes or social climbers rather than truly 
“enlightened”  eaters.  The  primary  strategies  for  neutralizing  this  challenge  and 
incorporating it into dominant ideologies are to distinguish bad snobbery from genuine 
connoisseurship and rely  on the low status of  food to ridicule the idea that  culinary 
practices could ever be truly elitist. I argue that one of the reasons food has become such 
a powerful form of cultural capital is, paradoxically, because of its low cultural status, 
which gives it plausible deniability as a source of social judgments and basis for class 
distinction. 
In the fifth chapter, “Food, Flourishing, and Class,” I explore the implications of 
my analysis of the food revolution for the scholarly literature on social class and Michel 
Foucault's theory of the desiring subject. I explore the role of self-denial in bourgeois 
constructions of the “good life,” and offer a critical review of the competing definitions of 
“class.”  I  argue  that  neither  materialist  nor  cultural  models  of  class  are  adequate  to 
account for the experience of class in late capitalism. Instead, I advocate a model of class  
difference that  acknowledges the social construction of class difference but also retains 
the notion of hierarchy as a defining characteristic. Food has been used to define social 
classes since the emergence of capitalism, but “aspirational eating,” or the use of food as 
a means of performing and embodying the “good life” is a quintessentially middle-class 
practice  that  emerged  in  Anglo-American  culture  in  the  18th Century.  Its  relative 
importance in different historical and cultural contexts has varied primarily based on the 
changing nature of middle-class status anxieties. I explore some of the implications of 
this alternative theory about the causes of the food revolution in the conclusion, “Stop 
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Feeling Good About Where You Shop.” 
The Class Politics of “The Popular”
I have been using a number of vague or contested terms as if their meanings are 
simply understood. In this section, I will explain what I mean by three of the terms that 
are the most important to my argument: popular culture, hegemony, and class. 
Popular Culture
Since  the  1960s,  it  has  become  the  norm  in  the  Humanities  to  use  an 
anthropological  definition  of  “culture”  referring  to  a  whole  way  of  life,  which 
encompasses  art,  knowledge,  beliefs,  morals,  laws,  habits,  customs,  institutions,  and 
commodities—in short, all the practices and objects through which humans create and 
convey meaning.  However,  popular culture  often relies  on a  competing definition of 
“culture,” referring to a superior reality or a certain standard of excellence in the arts, 
exemplified by the quote from Matthew Arnold's  Culture and Anarchy: “culture [is] a 
pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most 
concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world.”41 The term “popular 
culture” is often used to distinguish mass texts like reality television and Cosmopolitan 
magazine from highbrow culture like opera and Pride and Prejudice.42 
However, in the Cultural Studies tradition, “popular culture” has generally been 
used in a nearly-opposite sense to distinguish cultural forms that are not mass-produced 
41 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism (London: Smith, 
Elder & Co. 1869: vii). Digitized March 20, 2006 by Google, original from Harvard University 
(accessed 03 February 2011). See also Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 (New York: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1958).
42 This use of “popular” to essentially mean “mass produced” is also reflected in the use of “popular 
music” or “popular literature” to refer primarily to nationally-distributed recordings and publications. 
For example, a textbook designed for introductory undergraduate courses titled American Popular 
Music defines its subject as “music that is mass-produced and disseminated via the mass media,” and 
thus analytically distinct from musical practices that would be classified as classical, art, or folk. Larry 
Starr and Christopher Waterman, American Popular Music: From Minstrelsy to MTV (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003: 2). 
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(including vernacular or folk traditions, subcultural styles and practices, and the ways 
subordinated  groups  use cultural  commodities)  from  the  products  of  the  culture 
industries.43 According to this latter definition, reality television shows and pop songs 
would  not  count  as  “popular  culture,”  but  the  discussions  people  have  about  them, 
parodies of them, and ways of reading them against the grain would. John Fiske offers an 
example of the second definition in the introduction to Reading the Popular: 
Popular  culture  is  made  by  various  formations  of  subordinated  or 
disempowered people out of the resources, both discursive and material, 
that  are  provided  by  the  social  system  that  disempowers  them.  The 
resources—television, records, clothes, video games, language—carry the 
interests  of  the  economically  and  ideologically  dominant....  Popular 
culture is always a culture of conflict. It always involves the struggle to 
make social meanings that are in the interests of the subordinate and that 
are not those preferred by the dominant ideology.44
Fiske's definition follows in the Marxist cultural studies tradition of using “popular” to 
refer to the people, defined as anyone in the classes opposed to the power-bloc. Similarly, 
Stuart Hall's definition of “the popular” (from the same essay as the epigraph) is that 
which  pertains  to  the  oppressed  and  excluded  classes,  and  thus  for  him,  “popular 
culture” is the culture of those classes, constituted in continuing struggle with its Other, 
“dominant culture.”45 
 In practice, people rarely fit neatly into a single dominant or oppressed group. 
Most people have complicated relationships to white, patriarchal capitalism.46 As Hall 
notes,  there  is  no  necessary  relationship  between  class  position  and  oppositional 
meaning-making. The oppressed people who make up much of the audience for mass 
media texts  may  not  be  cultural  dupes  who uncritically  accept  the  version of  reality 
portrayed in those texts, but neither do they all subversively re-interpret mass media 
43 Although later scholars like John Fiske argue that all industries are “culture industries,” the term as 
originally coined by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkeimer referred specifically to industries devoted to 
the mass production of “high art” forms—music (radio), drama (film), literature (magazines), etc. Thus, 
their definition of “culture industries” also relies on the idea of culture as a separate sphere that dates to 
the Eighteenth Century (Williams 1958: xvi). 
44 John Fiske, Reading the Popular (Winchester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman 1989, p. 1-2).
45 Hall 1981: 235-8. 
46 “White patriarchal capitalism” is Fiske's description of the “dominant” culture. 1989: 1.
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texts and reject any ideologies that work to reinforce the system that subjugates them. 
Both the oppressed subjects of white, patriarchal capitalism and the people who make up 
the dominant classes (or Gramsci's “power bloc”) use mass-produced texts and objects in 
heterogeneous ways. Their myriad ways of using, creating, and deriving pleasure from 
culture may not always align with their personal class (or race or gender, etc.) interests. 
Although the power to create cultural meaning may still be concentrated in the 
hands of rich white, men,47 they do not have an absolute monopoly. Not only are there 
non-white, non-male, non-wealthy authors and producers of mass culture texts, but the 
masses respond selectively, often unpredictably to the products of the culture industries. 
As Fiske notes, “The culture industries, by which I mean all industries, have to produce a 
repertoire  of  products  from  which  the  people  choose.  And  choose  they  do;  most 
estimates  of  the  failure  rate  for  new  products—whether  primarily  cultural,  such  as 
movies or records, or more material commodities—are as high as 80-90 percent despite 
extensive advertising”48 Rather than excluding mass texts, elite audiences, or dominant 
readings, I use “popular culture” to encompass the whole range of texts, objects, and 
practices  encompassed  in  both  definitions:  mass  culture  (or  texts  and  commodities 
produced primarily for profit) as well as the myriad ways that people of all classes  use 
those  texts  and objects  and all  of  the  other  objects  and  practices  they  use  to  make 
meaning.  In  terms  of  food,  that  includes  representations  of  food  and  eating  in 
magazines,  television shows, films, songs,  newspapers,  and websites (which might be 
collectively called “food media”) and foodways.
47  For example, top-grossing films are almost all directed by white men. According to Martha Lauzen of 
San Diego State University, in 2008 only 9% of Hollywood directors were women. Kira Cochrane, “Why 
are there so few female film-makers,” The Guardian, 31 January 2010, Web (accessed 09 February 
2011). In 2001, People magazine reported that only 3.5 percent of the screen writers guild members 
identified as African-American and only 5.4 percent of guild directing jobs went to blacks, despite the 
fact that African-Americans make up 25 percent of moviegoers. Samantha Miller, “Hollywood Blackout: 
The Sequel” 02 April 2001 People, Web (accessed 09 February 2011). There are no statistics available on 
the number of directors born in the lowest two or three income quintiles or who identify as “working 
class,” but it seems probable that most come from middle or upper-class backgrounds. 
48 Fiske, 1989: 5.
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I believe this definition of “popular culture” has both practical and theoretical 
advantages. In practical terms, it is much closer to how the phrase is used outside of the 
scholarly literature, where the term “popular” is applied to anything that lots of people 
do or like, whether or not they are oppressed and whether or not their behaviors and 
pleasures reflect their class interests. Theoretically, it allows for a more diverse range of 
uses  and  responses  to  mass  texts  and  a  more  diverse  range  of  subject  positions, 
motivations, and pleasures. The definitions favored by Fiske and Hall suggest that only 
oppositional  readings  and resistant  cultural  forms  are  legitimate  or  authentic  to  the 
working classes. However, in many cases, the political valence of how someone responds 
to  a  text  might  be  unclear  or  ambivalent.  For  example,  when  someone  watching  a 
cooking show decides to make something instead of buying it ready-made, they may be 
resisting or evading consumer capitalism in some small way; however, that act may also 
reinforce pejorative beliefs about the morality or intelligence of people who do buy the 
ready-made product, which may reinforce social hierarchies. 
Like Hall, I believe that studying popular culture is important precisely because it 
is  one  of  the  primary  sites  of  struggle  between the interests  of  the  powerful,  which 
include  preserving  the  current  structures  and  prevailing  social  hierarchies,  and  the 
interests of the oppressed, including equality and justice. It is also, as Hall says in the 
quote in the epigraph, “the stake to be won or lost in that struggle.” Mass media forms 
play a significant role in creating common sense. Those beliefs usually support dominant 
groups and prevailing political and economic systems. However, popular culture is also 
an  arena  where  more  equitable  and  just  systems  could  be  imagined  and ideological 
support for them could be won. 
Hegemony
The role of culture in the creation and maintenance of power is expressed in the 
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terms “hegemony” and “ideology” as they were articulated by twentieth-century Marxist 
theorists who turned to the study of mass and popular culture to explain why the rise of 
industrial capitalism in Western Europe failed to produce an international working class 
revolution. Antonio Gramsci used the word “hegemony” to describe the consolidation of 
power  in  a  provisional  alliance  of  classes  achieved  by  eliciting  the  consent  of 
subordinated groups as opposed to using force or coercion. Hegemony is not universal or 
given.  It  faces  constant challenges from emergent cultural  forms,  which may include 
resistant working class groups or other forms of subversive subcultures, and must also 
incorporate residual forms that remain from previous social formations.49 For example, 
the hegemonic belief  that wine is sophisticated and sophistication is  desirable had to 
overcome the residual belief  that  wine was a low-class  drink consumed primarily by 
alcoholics and immigrants. The dominance of this belief continues to struggle against the 
oppositional belief that sophistication is elitist or unpatriotic. 
As described by Louis Althusser,  “ideology” is very similar to hegemony in its 
attempt to replace the Marxist theory of the state as a purely repressive force with a more 
nuanced model that includes the role of culture. Althusser argues that the state works 
not only through institutions like the military and police that  use violence to control 
people but also through institutions like schools and churches. The latter, which he calls 
Ideological State Apparatuses, operate by shaping the way people understand the world 
and their relationship to it; thus, he defined ideology as the “imaginary relationship of 
individuals  to  their  material  existence.”50 This  definition  departs  from older  Marxist 
models of Ideology as the lies devised by scheming authors intentionally conspiring to 
enslave the masses (the “false consciousness” or Priests and Despots theory) because it 
works “on its own” by producing subjects who “freely accept [their] subjection.”51 Where 
49 The idea of dominant, emergent, and residual cultures is further developed by Raymond Williams in 
Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977: 121-7). 
50 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster 1969 (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2001: 102-10).
51 Ibid., 123. 
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this  theory  differs  from the theory  of  hegemony is  in  its  insistence  that  there  is  no 
“outside” of Ideology and subjects are always-already interpellated—hailed, recognized, 
and constituted as subjects—within ideology. I prefer the theory of “hegemony” because 
it presupposes the active involvement of both the oppressed groups and the dominant 
classes and not only allows for, but depends on the possibility of resistance.52
I use the term “ideology,” too, but not in Althusser's sense of ideology proper, or 
the whole imaginary relationship of individuals to their material historical conditions. 
Instead, I use it in the more general sense of “a set of ideas or values.” For example, one 
of the ideologies I am the most interested in is meritocracy, which encapsulates both the 
moral conviction that hard work, talent, and virtue  should be rewarded and the belief 
that such a system actually prevails, perhaps with some qualifications, in a particular 
realm. Many of the characteristics of Ideology proper described by Althusser still apply: 
ideologies  generally  have  their  own  internal  logic;  they  consist  of  systems  of 
representations that are “instantiated” (or become real) in behaviors, institutions, and 
practices;  finally,  they  often  have  a  quality  of  “taken-for-granted-ness.”53 Although 
Ideology has no history, ideologies are always specific to the particular context in which 
they develop. 
Ideologies never displace each other neatly or emerge whole and fully-formed. 
Instead,  the  relative  weights  of  different  elements  in  ideologies  shift,  with  different 
aspects coming to the fore or receding in importance in different historical periods.54 
However, mere shifts of emphasis can result in major ideological transformations. The 
52 See, for example, the definition of “hegemony” in the glossary of The Gramsci Reader: Selected  
Writings, 1916-1935, ed. David Forgacs 1947 (New York, NY: New York University Press 2000: 422-
5).
53 Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster 1965 (New York, NY: Pantheon Press, 1969: 231). 
54  Hall quotes Gramsci on the process of transformations in the “collective will.”: “What matters is the 
criticism to which such an ideological complex is subjected by the first representatives of the new 
historical phase. This criticism makes possible a process of differentiation and change in the relative 
weight that the elements of old ideologies used to possess. What was previously secondary and 
subordinate, or even incidental is now taken to be primary—becomes the nexus of a new ideological 
and theoretical complex” (Hall 1981: 237).
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belief that body size is related to diet and health has existed in some form since antiquity, 
but  the  preference  for  thinness,  the  popularity  of  slimming  diets,  and  the  relative 
importance of different body parts—waist,  breasts,  hips,  thighs,  abdominal muscles—
have varied significantly over time and space. My primary concern is the transformation 
of dominant or hegemonic ideologies, terms I use interchangeably to refer to the sets of 
beliefs, values, and aesthetics that are so widely accepted they are taken for granted as 
“common sense.” Frank Lentricchia argues that “ideology...is revealed to us textually and 
therefore  must  be  grasped (read)  and attacked  (reread,  rewritten)  in  that  dimension” 
(emphasis original).55 As a literary critic, Lentricchia's focus is literary texts, but visual, 
material,  and audible texts also reveal ideologies. Indeed, the most revealing texts are 
often  non-literary  texts.  Shows  like  “The  Biggest  Loser,”  films  like  Sideways,  and 
advertising  campaigns  like  the  Grey  Poupon  Rolls  Royce  commercials  are  especially 
useful  for  revealing  the  process  by  which  the  masses  are  compelled  to  say  “yes”  to 
ideologies that might oppress them. Reception data can reveal oppositional readings, the 
contradictions  within dominant  ideologies,  and the struggle  for  popular  consent,  but 
they also reveal widespread assent to the preferred reading. Most successful commercial 
texts support the status quo, and their success implies that they have elicited assent for 
the ideologies that reinforce prevailing hierarchies. 
The Middle Class
Both  “popular  culture”  and  “hegemony”  are  related  in  complex  ways  to  the 
conflict  between  the  powerful  and  the  oppressed  represented  by  the  term  class, 
originally theorized by Karl Marx as the term for a group of people with shared interests  
based on their relationship to the prevailing means of economic production. He argued 
that  in  capitalist  societies,  the  critical  distinction  was  between  people  who  own  the 
55 Frank Lentricchia, Criticism and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983: 24).
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means  of  production  (the  bourgeoisie)  and  workers  who  own  only  their  labor  (the 
proletariat).56 Marx's bifurcated class structure does not characterize either the actual 
relationship of most Americans to the means of production or their perceptions of class 
hierarchy and their place in it. Since the mid-nineteenth century, many Americans who 
sell  their  labor  have had much more autonomy and economic  security  and a  higher 
standard  of  living  than  the  “proletariat”  Marx  described.  Especially  since  the  late 
nineteenth century, a growing number of Americans have been recognized and chosen to 
self-identify as  middle class. Some critics have argued that the middle class is not  real, 
either because the people who identify as middle class have no unifying experience or 
relationship to capital or because the lifestyle portrayed as middle class in most mass 
media  texts  is  out  of  reach  for  Americans  who  make  anything  close  to  the  median 
national income. Not only does that reflect a too-literal interpretation of middle, it also 
follows the same logic as saying blackness is not  real because people who identify as 
black have no unifying life experience or because blackness has no basis in genetics.  
Income and wealth are real, but like the physical characteristics associated with race, 
they are meaningless without context. 
I define class as an organizing principle of social relationships based on perceived 
differences in access to life chances. It operates at the micro-level as an identity category 
that structures individual behaviors and practices and at the macro-level as one of the 
structuring  logics  of  institutions  and  social  relations.  The  unequally-distributed 
determinants of life  chances are called “capital,” and come in many forms, including 
economic capital like wealth and income, social capital like relationships and access to 
networks,  and cultural  capital  like  skills,  credentials,  and forms of  knowledge.57 Like 
56 That includes both of the major definitions of “popular culture.” The Cultural Studies definition is 
entirely predicated on working class resistance, but even the definition of popular culture as “mass 
produced” culture relies on a division between highbrow and lowbrow that emerged in the late 
nineteenth century to distinguish cultural forms and public spaces belonging to the wealthy from the 
debased pursuits of the masses. See Lawrence W. Levine, Highbrow Lowbrow: The Emergence of  
Cultural Hierarchy in America, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
57 Pierre Bourdieu defines these in “The Forms of Capital,” Handbook of Theory and Research for the  
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other  categories  of  social  difference,  including  race  and  gender,  class  and  particular 
classes like the middle class are socially constructed, contested, and constantly shifting.58 
In an important sense,  then,  class  is  imaginary;  however it  is  real  in its  effects.  The 
construction  of  classes  is  itself  ideological—it  reflects  and  works  to  reinforce  the 
prevailing political  and economic systems—and class  also influences the construction 
and transformation of ideologies.
The  idea  of  “middling”  or  in-between  classes  predates  capitalism—in  Early 
Modern  Europe,  terms  like  “bourgeoisie”  and  “burgher”  referred  to  urban-dwelling 
craftsmen,  shopkeepers,  and  traders  with  more  capital  than  commoners  (servants, 
farmers, and craftsmen without property) but not as wealthy, influential, or privileged as 
the gentry.59 With the rise of capitalism, the number of people identified as middling 
increased and social ranks became more fluid. In Confidence Men and Painted Women, 
Karen Halttunen argues that  a new usage of the term “middle-class” emerged in the 
nineteenth century in the U.S. in conjunction with the cult of the self-made man: “by the 
1830s,  middle class  no longer meant a point  of  equilibrium between two other fixed 
classes; to be middle-class was to be, in theory, without fixed social status.”60 This new 
conception of the middle-class as liminal and mobile was expressed in a growing array of 
Sociology of Education, ed. J. Richardson 1983 (New York: Greenwood, 1986: 241-258). In Distinction, 
he proposes a fourth form that he calls symbolic capital, which he refers to as the resources available to 
people based on honor or prestige, like the political advantage that accrues to a war hero. Pierre 
Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste 1979 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1984: 291).
58 I offer an extended discussion of competing definitions of class in Chapter Five, “Aspirational Eating.” 
Although the definition I offer here is similar to E.P. Thompson's definition of class as a “process,” he 
claims that process arises out of the sphere of production rather than taking cultural determinants of 
class into account. My definition also departs from most “cultural” definitions of class in its insistence 
on stratified access to life chances. The idea of class as primarily an “organizing principle of social 
relationships” is based largely on Michael Omi and Howard Winant's definitions of race and racial 
formation in Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s (New York: 
Routledge, 1986: 66-9).
59 "burgher, n." Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford University Press, November 2010, Web 
(accessed 12 February 2011). The descriptions of pre-capitalist social ranks comes from the introduction 
to The Middling Sorts: Explorations in the History of the American Middle Class, ed. Burton J. 
Bledstein and Robert D. Johnston (New York: Routledge, 2001: 4).
60 Karen Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture in America,  
1830-1870 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986: 29). 
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folk stories that imagined the middle-class as the majority or default class identity in the 
U.S.  The American everyman was middle-class and imagined to be on an exclusively 
upward-moving  social  escalator,  even  though  in  reality,  Americans  who  identify  as 
middle-class have always been at least as likely to slip into poverty as they are to move 
into the elite.61 
The dominant representation of middle class Americans has long conflicted with 
the fantasy that it represents a majority of the population. In an editorial written in 1858, 
Walt Whitman describes the middle class as consisting of salaried, white-collar suburban 
men and their families. The editorial begins, “The most valuable class in any community 
is the middle class, the men of moderate means, living at the rate of a thousand dollars a 
year or thereabouts,” which Stuart Blumin notes was “a level of income denied to nearly 
all  who  worked  at  the  manual  trades  and  less  skilled  jobs  that  Whitman  so  often 
celebrated in his poetry.”62 When national mass media began to emerge at the turn of the 
twentieth century, they also represented the middle class as urban or suburban, white, 
home-owning, headed by a man employed in a white-collar job and probably wealthy 
enough  to  employ  at  least  one  domestic  servant  part-time.  Sentimental  literature, 
advertising-driven magazines, and radio programming that catered to that class reflected 
abiding concerns about propriety,  manners,  and emulating the lifestyle of the super-
rich.63 This  contradiction  between  the  construction  of  the  middle  class  as  vast  and 
inclusive or relatively wealthy and exclusive is part of what makes it difficult to define 
61 Noting the gap between the fantasy of the “middle class” and statistics about mobility in antebellum 
Philadelphia, Stuart Blumin argues that “the American Dream [of upward mobility] is fed, not by such 
mundane matters as mobility matrices but by isolated cases of spectacular success.” (Quoted in 
Halttunen, 1986: 29). For more recent examples, see Katherine S. Newman, Falling From Grace: The 
Experience of Downward Mobility in the American Middle Class (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1989) 
or Daniel Aaronson and Bhashkar Mazumder, “Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the United 
States,” Journal of Human Resources 43 (1) 2008: 139-172. 
62 Stuart Blumin, The Emergence of the Middle Class: Social Experience in the American City 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989: 1-2). 
63 Richard Ohmann calls this demographic the Professional-Managerial Class (or PMC) and argues they 
were the main audience for national, advertising-driven magazines, which he claims constitute the first 
truly national mass culture form. Selling Culture: Magazines, Markets, and Class at the Turn of the  
Century (New York, NY: Verso, 1996: 11-31). 
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and analyze. 
Despite its elusiveness, the idea of the middle class has a powerful hold over how 
many Americans imagine themselves, their culture, and the United States as a nation. As 
Blumin argues, Whitman's adulation was characteristic of the popular attitude towards 
the middle class that has prevailed for most of the last century and a half. In most public  
polling data since the 1930s, a majority of Americans have identified as middle class.64 
The  Wikipedia entry on the “American middle class” claims that they “encompass the 
majority of voters,  writers,  teachers,  journalists,  and editors” and that  “most societal 
trends in the U.S. originate within the middle classes.”65 In her 1989 book about middle-
class status anxiety, Barbara Ehrenreich argues that the middle-class stands in for the 
nation: 
Most  books,  and  especially  those  which  make  large  claims  about  the 
American character and culture, are in fact about this class and about it 
alone.... in our culture, the professional, and largely white, middle class is 
taken as  a  social  norm—a bland and neutral  mainstream—from which 
every  other  group  or  class  is  ultimately  a  kind  of  deviation....  Their 
lifestyles,  habits,  tastes,  and attitudes  are  everywhere,  and inescapably 
before us.66 
In  other  words,  the  middle  class  is  hegemonic  in  U.S.  popular  culture.  Its  beliefs, 
assumptions, tastes and habits are normative; its values constitute the “common sense” 
of the nation. However, the middle class is also heterogenous, shifting, and potentially 
vast.  Transformations  in  the  popular  representation  of  the  middle  class  and  the 
64 Bledstein and Johnston, 2001: 1. 
65 Wikipedia contributors, "American middle class," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia 12 Feb. 2011, Web 
(accessed 14 Feb. 2011). 
66 Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class (New York, NY: Pantheon 
Books, 1989: 3). She excoriates the middle class for developing a “meaner, more selfish outlook, hostile 
to the aspirations of those less fortunate.” Although opposed to the generally favorable opinion of the 
middle class in the general public, Ehrenreich's book represents a long tradition of intellectual attacks 
on the middle class. Robert Johnston describes scholarship on the middle class as a remarkably one 
dimensional “trashing” dating back to 1908 when Rives La Monte described the American middle class 
as “sycophants and vampires.” All the most notable studies of the middle class by people like C. Wright 
Mills, Sinclair Lewis, Max Weber, and Robert Bellah portray the middle class as  at best “cheerful 
robots” and at worst as ignorant, racist, irrational, politically backwards, morally and spiritually 
bankrupt yuppies. Johnston suggests that this tradition may reflect intellectuals' “guilt over their 
privileged backgrounds” or their “lack of democratic faith.” Robert Johnston, The Radical Middle  
Class: Populist Democracy and the Question of Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2003: 1-5). 
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aesthetics,  values,  and  practices  associated  with  it  reflect  structural  changes  in  the 
distribution of capital.67 
Confessions of an Aspirational Eater
I began with the “hot dog of wines” anecdote because I hoped it would provide a 
concrete example of how taste (in the literal sense of what people like to eat or drink) can 
form the basis for social judgments that in turn influence how people perceive and use 
foods and beverages. However, I also wanted to start with a personal story because I  
agree with the claim Warren Belasco makes in the introduction to Appetite for Change: 
“food virtually  demands self-disclosure.”68 Everyone  has  a  personal  relationship  with 
food. Everyone eats, has opinions about food, and makes choices every day about what 
and how to feed themselves. Just as this dissertation has been shaped by my education 
and my position in intersecting social hierarchies,69 it has also been shaped by who I am 
as an eater. 
I was born in 1981, so in many ways I grew up with the food revolution. As a child 
growing  up in  rural  Nebraska  and Wyoming,  my favorite  foods  included  Campbell's 
Tomato Soup, Kraft Macaroni and Cheese, and short-grained Japanese sticky rice with 
soy  sauce  or  ochazuke  nori70—reflecting  the  continued  influence  of  industrial  food 
67 My focus on social class formation also partially explains my exclusive focus on U.S. culture, despite 
the fact that the food revolution is global in scope, and the histories of all diets and foods are 
fundamentally trans-national and poly-cultural. Some of the key factors that have shaped class in the 
U.S. are specific to the electoral politics and federal policies that affect U.S. citizens and U.S. popular 
culture in particular ways. Those factors are not necessarily unique, and a comparative study of class 
formation and popular food culture in other countries—particularly Australia and the UK, where income 
inequality has also increased and mobility decreased since the 1980s or between different groups in the 
U.S. like the black middle class versus the Asian middle class—would likely provide additional insights 
about the relationship between mobility, inequality, and aspirational practices; however, that kind of 
comparative inquiry was beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
68 Warren Belasco, Appetite for Change: How the Counterculture Took on the Food Industry, 2nd ed. 1989 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007: 5). 
69  In the interest of situating my knowledge: I am a fourth-generation, heterosexual, abled, non-religious, 
Japanese and Irish-American woman, and I identify as upper middle-class now but my background is 
working/lower-middle class. 
70 A dehydrated green tea and seaweed soup mix that often includes rice crackers and pieces of dried fish. 
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products and ethnic heritage in most Americans diets. Most nights, my mother cooked 
dinner using mostly “from scratch” ingredients, relying heavily on the Better Homes and 
Gardens Cookbook she had received as a wedding present and tried-and-true recipes she 
learned from her mother or got from other women in her family and social circle. For 
most of the 1980s, the only aspect of the vast changes in American foodways gathering 
steam on the coasts and cities that reached us in the rural Mountain West was the diet 
and fitness craze. The year I was born, Olivia Newton-John's single, “Physical” reached 
the top of the Billboard charts and was made into a music video that showed Newton-
John  working  out  in  a  gym  with  overweight  men  who  transform  into  muscular 
hardbodies.71 Some of my earliest memories involve tagging along with my mother to her 
aerobics classes when I was three or four years old, at which point I had probably already 
developed a nascent sense of the great importance of being thin.
As a teenager in the 1990s heyday of low-fat dieting, I subsisted largely on lean 
turkey  breast,  plain  bagels,  and  sugary  breakfast  cereals—which  my  mother  had 
forbidden when I was a child,  except as an occasional treat.  However, I  also enjoyed 
baking rich, sweet treats, largely to give them away. Beggining in my junior year of high 
school, I began making elaborate holiday cookie baking plans involving at least a dozen 
different  recipes,  including  favorites  handed  down  from  my grandmother  and  novel 
“gourmet” and “traditional” recipes I found online. I also began to develop other new 
tastes, like an affection for coffee I carefully cultivated despite initially finding the taste 
repulsive. I eased myself in with sweet, milky espresso-based drinks at the newly-popular 
Starbucks and eventually “graduated” to black coffee at Denny's, where my friends and I 
would spend hours on weekend evenings, smoking cigarettes and imagining ourselves to 
71 The men act indifferent to Newton-John's sexually-suggestive dancing, which is “explained” at the end 
by interactions suggesting that they are gay. The video was banned by some Canadian and British 
broadcasters, and MTV generally cut the ending. Despite—or perhaps because of—the controversy, it 
won the Grammy Award for Video of the Year in 1983. Soraya Roberts, “Olivia Newton-John tried to 
stop 'Physical' music video from being released in 1981,” New York Daily News 20 April 2010, Web 
(accessed 17 February 2011). 
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be rebels. Food choices offered the possibility of projecting a whole range of identities—
childish or adult, provincial or worldly, self-indulgent or disciplined. 
Towards the end of high school, inspired in part by the lessons of biology classes 
that  impressed  upon  me  that  plants  are  machines  for  storing  solar  energy  whereas 
animals are machines for burning it, I began to contemplate the ethics of eating meat.72 
When I got to college, I decided to try following a vegetarian diet on the vague hunch that 
it  might  be better  for  the  environment,  less  likely  to  promote  animal  suffering,  and 
healthier.  Besides which, the meat in the cafeteria was nowhere near as tempting (or 
obligatory) as my mother's superb stir-fries and fried chicken. I met other vegetarians, 
and tried Thai  and Indian foods for the first  time.  I  began attending and eventually 
hosting potlucks where bringing meat was a definite faux-pas and we idealized foods that 
evoked “authenticity,” a quality we were as likely to see in “white trash casserole” (frozen 
vegetables  coated in  margarine  and processed cheese  and baked under  a  topping of 
crumbled  saltines  coated  in  more  margarine)  as  in  Indian  curries  or  the  seemingly-
ubiquitous hummus. Relying on a combination of knowledge and skill passed down from 
my mother, tricks I learned in restaurant kitchens, the growing array of mass media texts 
about food, and lots of trial and error, I gradually became a more confident cook. I also  
72 The caloric inefficiency of animal protein compared to vegetable sources of food is one of the most 
common arguments in favor of vegetarianism, articulated most famously by Frances Moore Lappé in 
Diet for a Small Planet. When Lappé started doing the research for Diet at the library at UC Berkeley, 
she discovered that it takes 21.4 pounds of feed protein to produce 1 pound of beef protein, 8 pounds of 
feed to produce 1 pound of pork, 5.5: 1 for chicken, and 4.4: 1 for milk. Lappé 1971, paraphrased in 
Warren Belasco, Meals to Come: The History of the Future of Food (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2006: 4). Since then, others have argued that these calculations are based on the 
assumption that animals are raised on food that would be suitable for human consumption, which is a 
fairly recent development in animal agriculture. For example, Simon Fairlie argues in Meat: A Benign 
Extravagance that instead of comparing the amount of food animals in concentrated animal feeding 
operations (CAFOs) consume to the calories of meat produced, we should be comparing the amount of 
land required to grow meat with the land needed to grow plant products of the same nutritional value to 
humans. He argues that if pigs were fed on residues and waste, and cattle on straw and grass from 
fallows and rangelands, meat becomes a very efficient means of food production in many ecosystems. 
According to his calculations, if people stopped feeding edible grain to animals, they could still produce 
around half the current global meat supply with no loss to human nutrition: in fact it would be a 
significant net gain compared to a vegetarian system that would not have a way to turn those crop 
residues and food waste into edible protein. Simon Fairlie, Meat: A Benign Extravagance (White River 
Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co., 2010: 35-44). 
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gained five or ten pounds more than I had weighed in high school, so I started counting 
calories and exercising regularly until I lost them and then proceeded to regain and re-
lose the same five to ten pounds for most of the next decade. 
In  my  first  year  of  graduate  school  in  New  York  City,  I  took  the  leap  into 
veganism, cutting out all remaining animal products, which had the immediate effect of 
turning cheese and ice cream into fetish objects. Although I was convinced that veganism 
was  the  most  humane  and  sustainable  way  of  eating,  I  endeavored  not  to  be  self-
righteous  or  sanctimonious.  The  only  form  of  evangelism  I  engaged  in  was  feeding 
people baked goods designed to elicit what became the highest form of culinary praise: “I 
wouldn't have even known it was vegan.” A few years later, I gave up veganism and then 
vegetarianism when I could no longer reconcile the nutritional and ethical implications 
of eating processed soy, tropical fruit, vegetable oils, and chocolate grown in the third 
world but avoiding grass-fed dairy, oysters, and local pastured eggs. I was also sick of 
feeling like a constant inconvenience and implicit scold at social get-togethers involving 
food. Although my restrictions on animal products relaxed, I continued to pay more for 
eggs labeled "free range" and sometimes for products with the USDA Organic label. I 
tried to shop at farmers markets when it was convenient (which wasn't very often), and 
eventually joined a Community Supported Agriculture program, which involved getting a 
box of seasonal, locally-grown produce once a week in the summer, at least half of which 
always seemed to be kale.
As  someone  who has  participated  to  some  degree  in  all  four  of  the  pillars  of 
aspirational eating, I was surprised by many of the things that I discovered in the process 
of writing this dissertation. Some of the surprises were delightful, like finding out that one 
of Campbell's first canned soup flavors—introduced at the turn of the last century—was 
“Mulligatawny.”73 [Figure I.2] 
73 Although Mulligatawny soup had become a part of British cuisine due to their colonial presence in 
India, Hoganson argues that it was still seen as “exotic,” and included ingredients like coconut, chutney, 
mangoes, curry sauce, and cayenne pepper that were not a part of standard British-inspired American 
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Figure I.2 /1911 Advertisement in Everybody's Magazine with Mulligatawny Soup74
Until  reading  about  the  cosmopolitan  tastes  of  the  antebellum  upper-middle  class  in 
Kristin Hoganson's  Consumer's Imperium, I thought the popular interest in exotic and 
ethnic food was exclusively a recent development in American culture. 
Other surprises were more difficult to swallow. As a serial weight loss dieter, I was 
especially  resistant  to  the  literature  that  challenges  the  popular  associations  between 
dieting, self-control, thinness, and health. When I first encountered the statistical evidence 
in Paul Campos' The Obesity Myth that Americans in the BMI range currently defined as 
“overweight” actually live  longer than people in the range defined as “normal” and that 
being “underweight” is associated with greater mortality risk than being “obese,” I refused 
to believe it. But then I encountered the same claim in J. Eric Oliver's  Fat Politics and 
Michael Gard and Jan Wright's The Obesity Epidemic, and I was eventually convinced by 
their exhaustively-researched, rigorous, and remarkably similar accounts of the political, 
economic, and cultural factors at work in the manufacture of the “obesity crisis.”75 
fare. Kristin Hoganson, Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity 
(Chapel Hill, NC: 2007, 192). The 1911 advertisement below also lists French-inspired flavors like 
“Mock Turtle” and “Consommé” and a nod to Louisiana creole, “Chicken Gumbo (Okra).” 
74 Reproduced from a digital photograph published online as “1911 Print Ad CAMBPELL'S Soup 21 Kinds 
10 Cents a Can,” by Ebay seller “wanewrld” and TheVintagePaperGuy, Ebay Item No. 190500797686, 
Ebay February 2011, Web (accessed 26 February 2011). 
75 Which is not to say people are not getting fatter, on average—both in the U.S. and globally—or that the 
average increase in weight has no consequences for public health. However, the evidence about the causes 
and consequences of national and global fatness is complex and contradictory and does not explain or 
justify the ferocity of anti-fat stigma and or the tenor of the discourse in the “war on fat” by U.S. 
nutritional authorities like the Surgeon General's Office. I return to the issue of fatness and obesity in 
Chapters Two and Three, but I do not reprise the entire case against the description of obesity as an 
“epidemic” or “crisis.” For more on that, see Glenn Gaesser, Big Fat Lies: The Truth About Your Weight  
and Your Health (Carlsbad, CA: Gürze Books, 2002); Paul Campos, The Obesity Myth:Why America's  
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I am still negotiating with the implications of other challenges to the dominant 
ideologies  about  food  that  I  had  internalized,  like  the  studies  showing  that  even  the 
judgments of trained sommeliers are vulnerable to manipulations of color and price,76 or 
that lamb imported from New Zealand by plane77 and produce driven halfway across the 
country in a truck78 may have lower carbon footprints and lifecycle inputs than locally-
grown meat and fruit. I have had to admit that my taste perceptions may be shaped more 
by expectation and contextual clues than objective, material properties of the food I eat.79 
However, I still believe that I can taste differences based on objective qualities of foods and 
beverages, appreciate a creative or skillfully prepared meal, and learn to select foods and 
cook in ways that that will genuinely give me more pleasure. I am more skeptical now than 
I  used to be about claims regarding the “sustainability”  or ethical  superiority of local, 
“natural” and organic foods, but I also remain skeptical that global, industrial agriculture 
and especially industrial animal agriculture is the only or best way to feed the world's 
growing population.
So to clarify: I am not arguing that the personal decisions people make about what 
to  eat  have  no effects  on their  health,  body size,  climate  change,  biodiversity,  animal 
welfare, labor conditions, or the pleasure they derive from food. Nor do I argue that food 
choices serve only to reinforce prevailing social hierarchies and never represent genuine 
resistance to the status quo or attempts to create social change. However, beliefs about 
what constitutes “superior” eating and broader societal eating trends are driven by factors 
Obsession with Weight is Hazardous to Your Health (New York, NY: Gotham, 2004); Michael Gard and 
Jan Wright, The Obesity Epidemic: Science, morality and ideology (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005); J. 
Eric Oliver, Fat Politics: The Real Story Behind America's Obesity Epidemic (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), or Esther Rothblum et al, eds. The Fat Studies Reader (New York: New York 
University Press, 2009). 
76 See Gil Morot, Frédéric Brochet and Denis Dubourdieu, “The Color of Odors,” Brain and Language 79 
(2001): 309-320 and Jamie Goode, The Science of Wine: From Vine to Glass (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2006: 182).
77 James McWilliams, Just Food: Where Locavores Get It Wrong and How We Can Truly Eat Responsibly 
(New York, NY: Little, Brown, and Company, 2009: 26). 
78 Christopher L. Weber and H. Scott Matthews, “Food Miles and the Relative Climate Impact of Food 
Choices in the United States.” Environmental Science & Technology 42 (2008): 3508-3513, Web 
(accessed 14 February 2011). 
79 See the Conclusion for more on the example of eggs.
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other than empirical evidence, and in the last three decades, attempts to eat “better” have 
been driven  more by anxieties about status and the pleasures of class distinction than 
objective, rational choice. The clearest case of this is probably in the historically-variable 
panic  about  fatness;  as  I  will  show  in  Chapter  Two,  the  medical  rationale  for  the 
superiority of thinness developed only after weight-loss dieting and the preference for the 
slender body had already become widespread. The same is also true of many claims about 
better-tasting, healthier, more ethical, and authentic foods: the belief in their superiority 
often precedes the search for evidence to support the claim and frames how the evidence is 
gathered and evaluated. 
Social,  cultural,  political,  and  economic  forces  always  influence  how  people 
construct the “common sense” that guides how they eat. My goal is to show that although 
eating is an inherently political act, it is not always political in precisely or exclusively the 
way the eater intends. Food is one of the arenas of popular culture where the struggle for 
domination and resistance to the culture that serves the powerful takes place. The story of 
aspirational  eating  is  largely  a  story  about  how  class  anxiety  and  the  pleasures  and 
pressures  of  distinction  can  twist  politically  progressive  impulses  into  behaviors  that 
ultimately  reinforce  class  hierarchy.  That  process  illustrates,  once  again,  how 
extraordinarily adept hegemonic culture is at co-opting oppositional impulses. I admit I 
am generally pessimistic about the potential for the food revolution to create significant or 
lasting social change, especially when it manifests primarily as a set of prescriptions for 
reforming  individual  consumption  habits.  However,  the  mere  existence  of  politically 
progressive and egalitarian impulses in the discourse and practice of aspirational eating 
may be grounds for cautious optimism. The struggle for popular culture is ongoing—it is 
possible that food will become an arena where a culture of equality and justice could be 
forged. 
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C H A P T E R  O N E :  
N O  C U L I N A R Y  E N L I G H T E N M E N T :  T H E  P O L I T I C S  O F  T H E
F O O D  R E V O L U T I O N
Must we stereotype those who disagree with us? Do we  
truly  believe  that  ALL red-state  residents  are  ignorant  
racist  fascist  knuckle-dragging  NASCAR-  obsessed  
cousin-marrying  roadkill-eating  tobacco-juice-dribbling  
gun-fondling religious fanatic rednecks; or that ALL blue-
state  residents  are  godless  unpatriotic  pierced-nose  
Volvo-driving  France-loving  left-wing  communist  latte-
sucking  tofu-chomping  holistic-wacko  neurotic  vegan  
weenie perverts? Yes. This is called “diversity,” and it is  
why we are such a great nation — a nation that has given  
the  world  both  nuclear  weapons  and SpongeBob 
SquarePants. 
—Dave Barry, “Blue State Blues” 20041
Obama Foodorama and the Politics of “Enlightened” Eating
At 8:15 PM Pacific time November 4, 2008, just moments after CNN officially 
called  the  presidential  election  for  Democratic  party  nominee  Barack  Obama,  Eddie 
Gehman Kohan launched a blog named  Obama Foodorama.2 Since then,  Kohan has 
posted new content every day,3 typically in the form of multiple 500-1000 word articles 
covering everything from whimsical, star-struck reporting about where and what the first 
family has been seen eating to culinary tributes (like a home-brewed beer called “The 
1 Dave Barry, “Blue State Blues: An Off-Color Rift,” The Washington Post, 19 December 2004 Web 
(accessed 01 March 2011). 
2 Kohan, a self-described “food writer and agricultural policy wonkette based in Los Angeles” had 
already attracted an avid readership for The Haphazard Gourmet Girls, a blog she and her two sisters 
started in 2008 named after their father's 1966 cookbook The Haphazard Gourmet. She told the The 
Washington Post that she started the new Obama-centric blog because “Hap Girls would've turned into a 
Barackanalia anyway if we didn't separate the blogs; it's amazing how much Obama Foodorama 
material there is.” Kim O'Donnel, “Q&A: The Voice of Obama Foodorama,” What's Cooking: A Mighty  
Appetite with Kim O'Donnel, 21 January 2009, The Washington Post, Web (accessed 18 June 2009). 
3 Still being updated daily as of 22 February 2011. 
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Audacity of Hops”4) to serious, often critical assessments of Obama's positions on food 
policy issues. [Figure 1.1]
Figure 1.1/ Obama Foodorama Screen shot5
Kohan declined to provide specifics about her site's traffic, but said that as of March 
2009 she was getting far more page views than many other popular food blogs like Civil  
Eats and  The Ethicurean.6 Her blog has attracted the attention of  mainstream news 
media; Kohan has been interviewed by The New York Times, The Washington Post, the 
Associated Press, “The Today Show,” and MSNBC. She told the Associated Press that on 
the day after the Obamas' May 2009 “date night” in Manhattan, when they dined at Blue 
Hill,  a  trendy  farm-to-table  restaurant  in  the  West  Village,  Obama  Foodorama  got 
“millions of hits.”7 
4 A play on the title of the keynote address Obama gave at the 2004 Democratic national convention, 
which catapulted him to national prominence, and the title of his second book, which reached #1 on 
both the New York Times and Amazon.com bestseller lists in 2006. Garrett M. Graff, “Could Oprah Help 
Elect Obama?” Washingtonian, 01 December 2006, Web (accessed 22 February 2011). 
5 Screenshot by the author featuring Obama portrait in cupcakes by Zilly Rosen, from Eddie Gehman 
Kohan, Obama Foodorama, 12 November 2008. Web (accessed 26 February 2011). 
6 Eddie Gehman Kohan, “Re: Traffic Stats?” E-mail to S. Margot Finn dated 11 March 2009. Her 
estimate may have been hyperbole.
7 Jocelyn Novek, Associated Press, “Capital Culture: World Hangs on Obama's Every Bite,” The 
Washington Post, 08 June 2009, Web (accessed 18 June 2009).
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News  media  generally  frame  Kohan's  blog  as  an  illustration  of  the  slightly-
hysterical celebrity fan response Obama attracted from many supporters, but her site 
offers more than a breathless, teen magazine run-down on his likes and dislikes. The 
blog  feeds  a  voracious  curiosity  about  Obama's  eating  habits  and  food  politics  also 
reflected  in  mass  media  coverage  and  popular  practice.  Throughout  his  campaign, 
restaurants  where  he  was  seen  eating  and  brands  he  expressed  public  affection  for 
reported surges in business.  On the day of his inauguration, the most visited section of 
the inaugural website was the lunch menu.8 Even before his nomination, farmers, chefs, 
food writers,  environmental  activists,  and many people simply identifying as “eaters” 
began calling on Obama for change (the key word in his campaign) in U.S. food policy. 
Presidential  eating habits have attracted attention in the past—the first  White House 
Cookbook published in 1887 was a popular gift for new brides at the turn of the century 
and remained in print until 1996.9 The first George Bush's antipathy for broccoli became 
infamous.  However,  the intensity of popular interest  in presidential  food preferences 
catalyzed by Obama's nomination and election is unprecedented. 
When asked by The New York Times to explain the proliferation of food-related 
activism  and  anticipation  of  food  policy  reform  inspired  by  Obama's  candidacy  and 
election, Kohan said: “He is the first president who might actually have eaten organic 
food, or at least he eats at great restaurants.”10 Her conflation of eating organic food, 
eating at “great restaurants,” and presumed support for a particular political agenda is 
emblematic  of  an  imagined  gestalt:  the  movement  hailed  as  the  American  food 
revolution is widely believed to represent a recognizable aesthetics, ethics, and politics—
a unified cuisine. Like their predecessors in the 1960s counterculture, many of whom are 
8 According to Senator Diane Feinstein, chair of the inauguration committee. Katharine Q. Seelye, “Live 
Blog: The Inauguration of Barak Obama,” The New York Times: The Caucus, 20 January 2009, Web 
(accessed 10 September 2009).
9 “Gilette, Fanny Lemira,” Feeding America: The Historic American Cookbook Project, Michigan State 
University Libraries: DMC: Digital Collections, 21 May 2004, Web (accessed 22 February 2011). 
10 Kim Severson,“How Caramel Developed a Taste for Salt,” The New York Times 31 December 2008. 
Web (accessed 27 May 2009).
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part  of  the  new  food  revolution,  contemporary  food  activists  and foodies11 are  often 
motivated by the conviction that their quotidian individual choices about what and how 
to eat are integral to political and cultural reform. The idea that every time you make a 
decision about what and how to eat, you cast a vote with your fork 12 suggests that even 
seemingly private decisions like whether or not to eat a piece of chocolate are part of  
complex webs of power encompassing international labor conditions, massive industries 
devoted to food production, and the vexed cultural politics of desire, pleasure, and body 
size.  The result is a hybrid of the maxim attributed to eighteenth century epicure Jean 
Anthelme Brillat-Savarin, “you are what you eat,” and the second-wave feminist mantra 
“the personal is political”: what you eat is political. 
As in the feminist mantra, “political” here refers to “the broad sense of the word, 
as in having to do with power relationships, not the narrow sense of electoral politics.”13 
However, Obama's candidacy inspired many people whose participation in the politics of 
food  was  previously  limited  to  voting  with  their  forks  to  engage  in  formal  political 
activism—campaigning for Obama, writing direct appeals to him and candidates in state 
and  local  elections,  gathering  signatures  for  petitions,  etc.14 Meanwhile,  pundits  and 
participants in online communities used Obama's eating habits and opinions as the basis 
for assumptions about his politics and personality. Because of the interest in Obama as 
11 I use this term to refer to people who take an interest in food that they or others perceive as notable or in 
excess of “normal” interest in food. There is an extended discussion of the origins, significance, and 
debates about the term “foodie” in Chapter Four. I use it because it has been embraced by both the mass 
media and many people who write and comment on food blogs, message boards, and recipe databases 
and has more contemporary resonance than alternatives like “gourmet” or “epicure.” For more how the 
term is debated among people who self-identify as highly interested in food, see Josée Johnston and 
Shyon Bauman, Foodies: Democracy and Distinction in the Gourmet Foodscape (London: Routledge, 
2010: 54, 197). Of particular interest is their finding that approximately half of the Toronto “foodies” 
they interviewed rejected the term as either elitist or demeaning and approximately half embraced it as a 
better, less elitist alternative to terms like “gourmet.”
12  A metaphor largely popularized by journalist Michael Pollan, reminiscent of the popular European 
bumper sticker slogan, “Eat Your View.” Michael Pollan, The Omnivore's Dilemma: A Natural History  
of Four Meals (New York, NY: Penguin, 2006: 258).
13 Carol Hanisch, “New Intro to 'The Personal is Political',” Women and Social Movements in the United  
States, 1600-2000: The “Second Wave” and Beyond, ed. Sherri Barnes, Judith Ezekiel, and Stephanie 
Gilmore. Center for the Historical Study of Women and Gender, State University of New York at 
Binghamton, 2006, Web (accessed 12 March 2009). 
14  Martin, 2009. 
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both an eater whose food habits presumably reflect his identity and a celebrity politician 
in  the  position  to  make  major  changes  in  the  American  food  system  whether  by 
legislation  or  example,  discourses  about  Obama  and  food  provide  a  particularly 
productive site for examining the contours and fissures of the recent food revolution. 
In  this  chapter,  I  outline  the four  themes  that  dominate  the discourse  about 
Obama as an eater and potential reformer of the U.S. food system. These themes also 
represent the four pillars of the food revolution. The conflicts that  emerged over the 
representation of  Obama as a  model  eater  and the occasional  criticism of  his  eating 
choices  reveal  cracks  in  the  presumed  gestalt  of  the  new  food  politics.  Instead,  the 
popular  discourse  about  food  consists  of  a  wide  range  of  conflicting  and  competing 
ideologies. Those conflicts challenge the prevailing explanation for the food revolution, 
the  culinary  enlightenment  thesis  I  described  briefly  in  the  introduction.  I  examine 
several manifestations of that thesis in both popular and scholarly accounts of the food 
revolution and its counterpart, a narrative of national culinary decline. 
The  reason  that  Obama's  food  preferences  and  politics  were  scrutinized  and 
celebrated more than those of  previous  presidents  or  his  competitors  is  because the 
beliefs  and  practices  associated  with  the  food  revolution  have  become  a  way  to 
distinguish the “liberal elite,” a particular demographic of Americans with left-leaning 
politics and college degrees who mostly live in cities and/or on the coasts and identify as 
“upper  middle  class.”15 Although  the  liberal  elite  is  often  portrayed  as  small  and 
unrepresentative,  their  tastes are broadly influential  and portrayed as  “normative” in 
mass media.  The widespread perception of Obama as liberal  and his embodiment of 
upward mobility encouraged people to see him as a model eater in ways they did not see 
15 The anxieties and pleasures associated with the food revolution are especially strong for women, both 
because they perform a disproportionate share of food-related labor like grocery shopping and cooking, 
are subject to greater scrutiny of their food choices and bodies, and are more likely to be the primary 
caregiver for children. Like many aspects of “elite” culture, the choices and practices associated with 
the “food revolution” like vegetarianism, the “natural” foods movement and organic/local/sustainable 
foods, and gourmet cooking are also culturally feminized.
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his  predecessors  and  opponents.  However,  these  expectations  were  often  frustrated. 
Obama defied stereotypically “enlightened” choices, often in favor of populist foods and 
behaviors. The conflicted discourse about Obama and food suggests that what unites the 
disparate  ideologies  of  “superior”  eating is  not  a  true culinary  enlightenment—which 
would  be  represented  by  real  improvements  in  knowledge  and  access  to  objectively 
better  foods—but  instead  a  construction  of  superiority  that  appeals  to  historically-
specific class anxieties and aggravates class injuries.  The construction of Obama as a 
model  eater  and  the  food  politics  projected  onto  his  campaign,  largely  without  his 
encouragement, also exemplify the rise of food as a form of cultural capital. 
The Four Pillars of the “Food Revolution”
The central  concerns  in  the popular  discourse  about  Obama and food are:  1) 
sophistication, or the extent to which his tastes can be considered gourmet;16 2) thinness, 
expressed not only in assessments of his body size but also how his food choices might  
affect his weight and model “good” eating behaviors (i.e., ones that promote thinness); 3) 
natural foods, primarily represented by the terms organic, local, and sustainable; and 4) 
cosmopolitanism,  or  the  extent  to  which Obama demonstrates  knowledge about  and 
respect  for  diverse  cuisines  and  especially  “authentic”  versions.  These  pillars  aren't 
discrete or mutually exclusive. There's a lot of overlap, for example, in the belief that 
thinness is an indicator of good health and the belief that a diet rich in organic fruits and 
vegetables can help maintain a healthy weight.17 However, many foods that people eat 
16  Even within the food industry, “gourmet” is a contested term. According to Packaged Facts, a market 
research firm that puts out an annual report on titled Gourmet, Specialty, and Premium Foods,  
Beverages, and Consumer Trends in the U.S., “Because the terms 'gourmet,' 'specialty,' and 'premium' 
are all subjective definitions, Packaged Facts has opted to use a broad brush in defining the scope of this 
market, to encompass premium products sold in mass-market channels such as supermarkets, as well as 
traditional gourmet products sold through gourmet/specialty retail channels.” Russ Eustice, “Packaged 
Facts – Response to your request,” E-mail to S. Margot Finn dated 25 February 2011. 
17 “Health” is another vague and contested term; for some people, the primary factors are disease and 
longevity. For some, it also includes physical attributes related to beauty like body size, vitality or some 
other measure of energy, mental well-being, physical strength and/or flexibility, etc. At the 2009 
meeting of the American Studies Association, Amy Bentley proposed that “health” be defined as a 
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specifically to promote weight loss, like diet soft drinks or the chocolate-roasted peanut 
MET-Rx  protein  bars  Obama  favored  on  the  campaign  trail  as  occasional  meal 
replacements, are clearly at odds with the idealization of whole, unprocessed, natural 
foods.18 
Although sophistication and cosmopolitanism are frequently compatible, as both 
tend  to  privilege  rarefied,  novel,  or  labor-intensive  foods  and  pleasurable  dining 
experiences,  they do sometimes conflict.  The desire for culinary  experiences that  are 
authentic to a particular geographical location or historical tradition is different than the 
pursuit of expensive or avant-garde cooking.19 Similarly,  while proponents of organic, 
local foods often claim they are better-tasting or more authentic to a particular location 
or  culinary  tradition,  it's  just  as  often  the  case  that  gourmet  or  ethnic  foods  are 
incompatible with the priorities that govern the natural foods movement—particularly 
when they must be imported.  Legal  and cultural  wars have erupted over  foie  gras.20 
There  are  conflicts  within  each  of  the  categories,  too,  partially  because  they  are 
constantly shifting. New trends are always emerging and others being declared passé, as 
anyone who has  attempted to  keep up with what  qualifies  as  sophisticated,  healthy, 
measure of a person's ability to do all the things they want to do. Amy Bentley, “Food Politics, 
Sustainability, and Citizenship: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue,” ASA Annual Meeting 6 November 2009 
Washington, D.C. The Renaissance DC Hotel. 
18  “Obama's Likes and Dislikes: Hold the Mayo,” The New York Times, 27 May 2008, Web (accessed 23 
June 2009).
19 Philosopher Lisa Heldke offers an example of this in her description of the difference between her 
approach to cooking dinner for guests and her mother's: “I never know what to cook when I invite 
people over for dinner. Sometimes I get paralyzed with indecision. The night before the event, the floor 
of my living room is covered with cookbooks bristling with book-marks. There are cookbooks by my 
bed and next to the bathtub, even some actually in the kitchen. I've sketched out five possible menus, 
each featuring foods of a different nationality, most of them consisting of several dishes I've never 
cooked before. My mom doesn't do this. When she invites guests for dinner, she selects a menu from 
among her standards, preparing food she's prepared and enjoyed countless times before, knowing that 
once again they will turn out well and everyone will enjoy the meal. I miss that. I envy that—especially 
when I spend three hours trying to decide on a menu, or when I try a new dish for company and it turns 
out to be awful and everyone at the meal has to try to pretend they are enjoying it.” Lisa Heldke, “Let's 
Cook Thai: Recipes for Colonialism,” Pilaf, Pozole, and Pad Thai: American Women and Ethnic Food, 
ed. Sherrie Inness (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000: 175-6). 
20 See Mark Caro, The Foie Gras Wars: How A 5,000-year-old Delicacy Inspired The World's Fiercest  
Food Fight (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2009). 
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ethical, or exotic food can attest.21 Nevertheless, these pillars, each of which represents 
ideals that transcend any single food or trend, provide a useful framework for thinking 
about the different, often contradictory, ideologies that make up the “food revolution.” 
Sophistication
The popular perception of Obama as a culinary sophisticate centered largely on a 
quote  that  had  nothing  to  do  with  his  own  eating  habits.  In  2007,  his  campaign 
organized a “Rural Issues Forum” at the Van Fossen Farm located about 30 minutes 
outside of Des Moines, Iowa. Obama spent about an hour there, speaking with a group of 
local  residents about a wide range of  issues,  and one of  the recurring themes in the 
conversation was farming. After noting that the price of most crops had not increased 
despite rising food prices, Obama said: “Anyone gone into Whole Foods lately and see 
what they charge for arugula? I mean, they're charging a lot of money for that stuff.” The 
Caucus, a New York Times blog, reported that the line “landed a little flat,” which it 
suggested may have been due to the fact that the closest Whole Foods Markets were 
across state lines in Minneapolis or Kansas City.22 Arugula, also known as “rocket,” has 
been grown in the U.S.  for  centuries,  primarily for use as  a salad green and Italian-
inspired cooking; however, it has only been available in grocery stores and on the menus 
at national restaurant chains since the 1990s. It is still unfamiliar to many Americans. 
Among those who do know what it is, it is generally seen as exotic or gourmet.23 Obama 
may  have  been  attempting  to  criticize Whole  Foods,  or  commiserate  with  voters 
21 The ever-changing wisdom about what kinds of foods are “good for you” was also parodied by a 1999 
headline in The Onion declaring, “Eggs Good For You This Week,” The Onion, 28 April 1999, Web 
(accessed 02 April 2011). 
22 Jeff Zeleny, “Obama's Down on the Farm,” The New York Times: The Caucus, 27 July 2007, Web 
(accessed 23 June 2009). 
23 Arugula is listed among the “exotics” that became popular between 1980 and 1985 in The Oxford 
Encyclopedia of Food and Drink in America, along with things like kiwi, blood oranges, lemongrass, 
and Tahitian vanilla. Silvia Lovegren, “Historical Overview: From the 1960s to the Present” The Oxford 
Encylopedia of Food and Drink in America, ed. Andrew F. Smith (e-reference edition), Oxford 
University Press,Web (accessed 26 February 2011). 
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frustrated by rising grocery bills, but his remarks were perceived as evidence that he was 
“out of touch” with struggling families and an indicator that his tastes were snobbish. 
Washington Post columnist George Will cited the arugula quote on ABC's “This 
Week” when he denounced Obama for being “elitist.”24 Wall Street Journal columnist 
John Fund referred to it  as evidence of  Obama's “condescension towards salt-of-the-
earth Democrats.”25 Tulsa-area blogger Michael Bates wrote about the incident under the 
headline,  “Typical  Liberal  Arugulance,”  which  conservative  pundit  Michelle  Malkin 
linked to repeatedly on her blog in an attempt to turn the phrase into a meme.26 Even 
Obama's  supporters  generally  interpreted  the  arugula  comment  as  an  embarrassing 
gaffe. In a Huffington Post27 article titled “Obama Eats Arugula” (notably not an accurate 
description  of  the  quote),  Joan  Williams,  a  progressive  law professor  suggested  that 
Obama and his campaign ought to “recognize the ways Obama is sending out alienating 
signals of class privilege in an entirely unselfconscious way.”28 
Those who defended Obama's comments largely did so by attempting to re-cast 
arugula  as  humble  and non-elitist.  In  response  to  Williams'  Huffington  Post article, 
Bertha40869” wrote: “I'm not rich and I love arugula! I also know what bruschetta is,  
know what a panini press is, and risotto is. The problem with a lot of Americans is that 
they have no sense of culture,”29 paradoxically reinforcing the association of arugula with 
an implicitly hierarchical notion of “culture” even while denying its connection to class: 
24 John Tomasic, “George Will, Man of the People, Misquotes Obama, Pushing the Elitist Tag,” The 
Huffington Post 14 April 2008, Web (accessed 26 February 2011). 
25 John Fund, “Obama's Flaws Multiply,” The Wall Street Journal, 15 April 2008, Web (accessed 25 
February 2011). 
26 Michelle Malkin, “Flashback: More Obamessiah Fancy Foodie Follies,” Michelle Malkin, 4 April 2008, 
Web (accessed 26 February 2011). Michelle Malkin, “Cracker-quiddick Fallout Continues to Haunt 
SnObama” Michelle Malkin, 15 April 2008, Web (accessed 26 February 2011). Michelle Malkin, 
“Introducing Barack 'Arugula' Obama; Update: CafePress says, 'No, you can't,'” Michelle Malkin, 15 
April 2008, Web (accessed 23 June 2009).
27 A website launched by Arianna Huffington, Kenneth Lerer, and Jonah Peretti in 2005 as a source of 
news and commentary, usually considered politically liberal or progressive. Wikipedia contributors, 
"The Huffington Post,'” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 24 Feb. 2011, Web (26 Feb 2011).
28 Joan Williams, “Obama Eats Arugula,” The Huffington Post, 09 June 2008, Web (accessed 26 February 
2011). 
29 All quotes from online sources are reproduced as published unless otherwise indicated. I have opted not 
to mark potential departures from MLA style “[sic]” so as not to imply ridicule. 
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“I'm not  rich.”  “AxelDC” replied to “Bertha40869”:  “They sell  that  stuff  at  the  Olive 
Garden, which is not exactly upscale dining. We are not talking Grey Goose vodka and 
crème brulee here. We are talking about salad and bread,” implying that arugula would 
be  excluded from his  definition  of  upscale  dining—apparently  based  on  brand-name 
liquor  and French desserts.  Several  others  noted that  arugula  had earned a place  in 
traditional Italian peasant cuisine because it grows “like a weed,” thus proving its low 
status. One commenter even speculated that you can probably buy it at Walmart, the 
epitome of accessible and inexpensive grocery shopping.30 
Obama  himself  argued  that  his  quote  wasn't  elitist;  instead,  the  people  who 
criticized  it  were  for  assuming  that  Iowans  would  not  be  familiar  with  arugula. 
Addressing a crowd in Independence, Iowa later that year, Obama said, “All the national 
press, they said, 'Oh, look at Obama. He's talking about arugula in Iowa. People in Iowa 
don't know what arugula is.' People in Iowa know what arugula is. They may not eat it,  
but  you  know  what  it  is."31 However  irrational,  the  belief  that  arugula  is  “gourmet” 
persisted and the media and blogosphere coverage of Obama's arugula quote contributed 
to a lasting association between the president and the leafy green.
Almost a year after the initial forum, a  Newsweek cover story titled “Obama's 
Bubba Gap” was represented by cluster of leaves labeled “(a-ru-gu-la)” counter-balanced 
by a frothing mug of golden liquid labeled “(bîr).” In an introductory note, the issue's 
editor  referred to  the popular  impression that  Obama is  out  of  touch  with common 
voters as “the arugula factor.”32 Although Obama never claimed to eat or enjoy the taste 
of  arugula,  the  general  impression  conveyed  by  the  Rural  Issues  Forum  quote  was 
reinforced by anecdotes suggesting he might have personal proclivities for “gourmet” 
food. On blogs like “Grub Street,” people generally expressed approval of the Obamas' 
30 Huffington Post contributors, “Obama Eats Arugula: Comments,” The Huffington Post, 09 June 2008, 
Web (accessed 26 February 2011). 
31 John McCormick, “Obama Talks Arugula—again--in Iowa,” The Chicago Tribune: The Swamp, 05 
October 2007, Web (accessed 28 February 2011). 
32 Jon Mecham, “The Editor's Desk” Newsweek 26 April 2008, Web (accessed 26 February 2011). 
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alleged affection for high-end restaurants like Topolobampo and Spiaggia, citing them as 
evidence of good taste.33 [Figure 1.2]
Figure 1.2/ Arugula on the cover of Newsweek, April 26, 200834
Meanwhile,  his  political  opponents  exploited every  opportunity  to  charge him 
with elitism. The  Philadelphia Daily News reported that during his campaign stop in 
their city, Obama did not eat a cheesesteak, instead sampling Spanish ham that retails 
for $99.99 a pound from a specialty importer at the Italian Market. He later promised a 
crowd of supporters, “I'm going to get a cheesesteak next time I come.” On her blog,  
Malkin sniped: “Too late, Mr. Dainty Fingers. You only get one chance to make a first 
impression. The odor of elitism is like onion breath: Quick to acquire, hard to get rid of.  
Not that Obama would know anything about onion breath...”35 An article in USA Today 
cited Obama's reported affection for caramels with gray smoked sea salt from Fran's in 
33 Nick Kindelsperger, “Obama Makes Surprise Visit at Topolobampo,” Grub Street Chicago, 01 
November 2010, Web (accessed 27 February 2011). 
34 Reproduced from a digital photograph taken by Flickr user “sdobie,” dated 08 May 2008, Web 
(accessed 26 February 2011).
35 Michelle Malkin, “Obama's cheesesteak snobbery: Shades of Jawn “Swiss” Carry.” Michelle Malkin, 04 
April 2008, Web (accessed 26 February 2011). 
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Seattle,  which were included in a gift  basket he received when he visited the city,  as 
evidence  of  his  “upscale”  tastes.36 Responding  to  a  New  York  Times  article  about 
Obama's “likes and dislikes,” including Fran's chocolates, the Adweek blog Adfreak said, 
“on the whole, the faves list skews a bit more upscale than seems ideal for a candidate 
who's trying to strengthen his appeal to blue-collar voters.”37 
Even Obama's taste in burger joints—in particular a visit to Ray's Hell Burger that 
attracted  mass  media  attention—was  portrayed  as  evidence  of  that  he  was  a  more 
sophisticated eater than his political predecessors. A slideshow on the  U.S. News and 
World Report website titled “What Makes Obama a Gourmet President” was introduced 
thusly:
After eight years of boots and barbecue in the White House, the Obamas 
have  introduced  a  gourmet  atmosphere  not  seen  in  several  recent 
presidencies.  George  H.W.  Bush  liked  Chinese  food  from  a  northern 
Virginia neighborhood. Bill Clinton has a reputation for Big Macs. George 
W. Bush liked his grill. But the Obama's have instead hired their own chef 
and dined at the best restaurants Chicago and Washington have to offer. 
Even  President  Obama's  choice  of  burger  joints,  Ray's  Hell  Burger  in 
nearby Arlington, Va., only serves gourmet sandwiches.38
 
Conservative pundits  also portrayed his  request  for a spicy or Dijon mustard on the 
burger he ordered at  Ray's  as evidence of  elitism. On his  Fox News talk show, Sean 
Hannity  showed a clip from a Grey Poupon commercial  featuring men with affected 
accents talking about Dijon mustard while sitting in adjacent Rolls Royce limousines, 
and then quipped “I hope you enjoyed that fancy burger,  Mr. President.”39 The other 
examples highlighted in the U.S. News and World Report slideshow included the fact 
that the Obamas had been spotted dining at expensive restaurants, started a vegetable 
garden on the White House grounds, and had invited celebrity chefs like Rick Bayless to 
36  “Obama's favorite things—which will you buy?” The Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted from USA Today 
06 November 2008, Web (accessed 27 May 2009).
37 Mark Dolliver, “A few of Barack Obama's favorite things,” AdWeek: AdFreak, 29 May 2008, Web 
(accessed 26 February 2011). 
38 Paul Bedard, “A Tour of the White House Menu: What Makes Obama a Gourmet President,” U.S. News 
and World Report, 3 September 2010, Web (accessed 27 February 2011). 
39  E.H.H. “Dijon Derangement Syndrome: Conservative media attack Obama for burger order,” Media 
Matters for America, 07 May 2009, Web (accessed 20 June 2009). 
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cook  state  dinners.40 Especially  because  vegetable  gardens  and burger  joints  are  not 
typically  portrayed  as  gourmet,  their  inclusion  helps  illuminate  the  construction  of 
culinary sophistication. 
Obama's  tastes are called gourmet or upscale when they can be distinguished 
from the “norm” by price, novelty, rarity, and the idea that they offer a higher-quality or 
more enjoyable taste experience. Starting a garden and eating at Ray's Hell Burger are 
“gourmet”  in  comparison  to  barbeque  and  McDonald's  because  the  latter  are  more 
common.  State  dinners  under  Presidents  Bush  and  Clinton  undoubtedly  involved 
expensive,  high-quality  catering,  but  that  constitutes  the  “norm”  for  a  formal  White 
House affair; hiring a high-profile celebrity chef to oversee the menu constitutes a mark 
of distinction that makes it seem more sophisticated. Similarly, in the debate about the 
meaning of arugula, the idea that the leafy green was “gourmet” was based on the claim 
that most people—especially the Iowa farmers he was addressing—would not know what 
it was or how much Whole Foods was charging for it; those who attempted to argue that 
it was not gourmet emphasized its commonality and cheapness, its prominence in Italian 
“peasant” cuisine, and the possibility that it could be purchased at Walmart.
The discourse about Obama's culinary sophistication also suggests that although 
culinary sophistication may elide with concerns about fatness, health, the environment, 
and authenticity, those are tertiary to the central concern, which is the pursuit a superior 
taste experience. The problem with arugula was that it was “hoity toity,”41 not that it was 
seen as healthier or better for the environment than normal lettuce. Snubbing the Philly 
cheesesteak  for  Spanish  ham  and  ordering  a  burger  at  an  independently-owned 
restaurant with Dijon mustard were taken as evidence of sophistication (or snobbery) 
because they suggested the pursuit  of  a better-than-average culinary experience.  The 
40 Bedard, 2010. 
41 As Maureen Dowd wrote, “Barack Obama never again wants to be seen as the hoity toity guy fretting 
over the price of arugula at Whole Foods.” Maureen Dowd, “Hold the Fries,” The New York Times, 17 
June 2009, Web (accessed 20 June 2009).
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criteria of superior taste is complicated by the fact that taste is deeply subjective. Many 
people probably would genuinely prefer the cheesesteak or Big Mac; however, according 
to the way most people use the word “gourmet,” only the latter would count. 
The implication that there is some objective standard of excellence a food must 
meet to qualify as sophisticated is also reflected in a discussion thread on Chowhound42 
in  response to the question,  “How would you define gourmet?” The first  post  in the 
thread,  submitted by “Lemoncaper”  in  January  2009,  asked people  not  to  rely  on  a 
dictionary and to instead use their “own words.” The primary point of agreement among 
the roughly two dozen people who replied was that this was a difficult or even impossible 
task.  Many of  them declared  that  the  word  had been  “abused”  and might  have  had 
meaning in the past, but had either been co-opted by commercial interests or diluted by 
indiscriminate popular use. Several people suggested that the word was so completely 
subjective and individual that it could not be defined. However, a few contributors noted 
that however slippery it might be, “gourmet” has widespread currency and pushed for a 
descriptive rather than prescriptive definition. Writing in that vein, “Kajikit” argued that 
gourmet generally refers to a specific kind of culinary excellence:
It can be good food without being 'gourmet'... gourmet equals the finest 
quality  ingredients  (therefore  usually,  but  not  always,  expensive!)No 
shortcuts [. . . .] Macaroni and cheese made with velveeta or out of a box = 
NOT  gourmet.  Macaroni  cheese  made  with  hand  grated  pecorino 
cheese.... = totally gourmet. Regular made-from-scratch macaroni cheese 
= not gourmet but still delicious.”43 
Kajikit's definition seems to reflect what most people who portrayed Obama as someone 
with gourmet tastes were getting at.  Culinary sophistication and the word “gourmet” 
42 Now referred to merely as “Chow,” this online message board community focused on food was founded 
in 1997 by Jim Leff and associated with particularly fanatic food enthusiasts in pursuit of novel and 
superlative food experiences and recipes. In 2006, Leff sold the site to CNET Networks, a larger 
internet media company known primarily for reviews of consumer technology products. Richard Siklos, 
“Death by Smiley Face: When Rivals Disdain Profit,” The New York Times, 02 April 2006, Web 
(accessed 27 February 2011). In 2008, Chowhound was acquired, along with the rest of CNET, by CBS 
Interactive, the division of CBS devoted to online content. “About,” Chow, Web (accessed 27 February 
2011). 
43 Chowhound contributors, “How would you define gourmet and...” Chowhound, 01 January 2009, Web 
(accessed 27 February 2011). 
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refer to the pursuit of foods constructed as objectively superior to normal, familiar, and 
accessible foods on the basis of taste and, usually but not always, price.
Thinness
Obama's body size and its relationship to his diet also attracted the attention of 
news  media  and  elicited  commentary  in  online  communities.  Given  the  extent  of 
contemporary  anti-fat  stigma,  Obama's  slender  physique  should  have  been  an 
unqualified advantage.44 Paparazzi photos of him shirtless on a beach while vacationing 
in Hawai'i  were circulated widely to general admiration and featured on the cover of 
Washingtonian magazine with the headline “26 Reasons to Love Living Here: Reason #2 
Our New Neighbor is Hot.”45 [Figure 1.3]
Figure 1.3/ Obama Shirtless on Washingtonian Magazine46
44 Fatness is widely associated with laziness, ignorance, lack of self-control, and excess sensuality. 
Children as young as five are less likely to want to be friends with people who appear in images to be 
“overweight,” and even show a bias against people who are portrayed in mere proximity to overweight 
people. Helen Penny and Geoffrey Haddock, “Anti-fat prejudice among children: The 'mere proximity' 
effect.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology v.43: 4 July 2007: 678-683. 
45 “What Do You Think of the May Obama Cover of Washingtonian?” Capital Comment Blog, 21 April 
2009, Web (accessed 27 February 2011). 
46 Reproduced from Capital Comment Blog, 2009, Web (accessed 27 February 2011). 
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Comments  on  the  shirtless  pictures  when they  were  posted on  The  Huffington Post 
ranged from, “Someone has been hitting the gym – way to go—so great to have a fit  
pres!” to “Hopefully, he'll be as interested in the well-being of our country as he is in his 
own "fitness". We don't need a playboy-looking type of person, we need a wise, deep-
thinking, God-fearing person.”47 Even comments of the second type almost universally 
praise Obama's thinness as pleasant to look at, and the oblique accusation of narcissism 
was rare; in general his thinness is portrayed a reflection of good health, good moral 
character, and good leadership qualities.
Indeed,  his  political  opponents'  attempts  to  turn  his  thinness  against  him 
provoked mostly negative reactions. At a rally for Republican candidate Senator John 
McCain,  California  Governor  Arnold  Schwarzenegger  said,  “I  want  to  invite  Senator 
Obama to the gym.... We have to do something about his skinny legs,” appealing to the 
“hard body” aesthetic of the late Cold War era when Schwarzenegger and other hyper-
muscular men starred in Hollywood blockbusters  like  The Terminator and  Rambo.48 
Besides  seeming  dated,  the  quip  made  little  sense  to  voters  familiar  with  Obama's 
reputation for exercising frequently (which also made its way into national news stories 
with some frequency, in large part due to the criticism that also drew from the McCain 
campaign).49 In response to a story about Schwarzenegger's comments on  Front Row 
Washington,  the  blog  run  by  the  Reuters  news  agency's  Washington  bureau, 
47 Katherine Thomson,“Obama Shirtless in Hawaii,” The Huffington Post, 22 December 2008, Web 
(accessed 27 February 2011). 
48 Carl Campanile,“Arnold Kicks Sand in 'Skinny' Obama's Face,” New York Post, 01 November 2008, 
Web (accessed 26 May 2009). For more on the hard body aesthetic and Reagan-era Hollywood 
masculinity, see Susan Jeffords, Hard Bodies: Hollywood Masculinity in the Reagan Era (Piscataway, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993).
49 When the McCain campaign was criticized for a television ad campaign that compared Obama to 
celebrities like Britney Spears and Paris Hilton, his campaign manager said, “only celebrities like 
Obama have the time to go to the gym three times a day,” seemingly referring to an AP article titled 
“Obama Becomes a Gym Rat” which reported that he had made three stops at Chicago gyms in one day. 
However, the “rat” in the title was a double entendre, as the article also noted that he may have been 
using “workouts” as a pretext for meetings with potential vice-presidential candidates he wished to keep 
confidential. Further lending support to that theory, he apparently showed up at one gym in slacks and a 
blazer. Amy Chozick, “Too Fit to Be President: Facing an Overweight Electorate, Barack Obama Might 
Find Low Body Fat a Drawback,” The Wall Street Journal, 01 August 2008, Web (accessed 18 June 
2009). 
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commenters  universally  rejected  the  idea  that  Obama  should  gain  weight.  A  reader 
named “Beth”  said,  “Obama can  whip Arnold's  thick  ass  any time on  the basketball 
court” and “Mari” said, “Arnold is just a fake. Obama has a healthier look, very trim and 
climbs stairs with grace and strenght.” The respondents also rejected Schwarzenegger's 
metaphorical  play  on  the  “thinness”  of  Obama's  policy.  Turning  Schwarzenegger's 
suggestion  that  Obama  needed  to  “put  some  meat  on  his  ideas”  against  him,  a 
respondent named “Willie Reigh,” said “California is worse off financially and other ways 
than before Arnold came on as Gov. Where's the Beef Arnold?”50
Obama  defended  his  physique  against  Schwarzenegger's  comments,  saying 
“Listen, I'm skinny, but I'm tough.”51 However, he also seems to have felt the pressure to 
mitigate  the  potentially  alienating  effects  of  his  thinness  by  calling  attention  to  his 
“unhealthy” eating choices. At a campaign stop in Lebanon, Missouri where he visited 
with voters at a restaurant called Bell's Diner one of the first things he said upon his 
arrival was, “Well, I've had lunch today but I'm thinking maybe there is some pie.” He 
ultimately ordered the fried chicken, telling the waitress, “The healthy people, we'll give 
them the breasts. I'll eat the wings.”52 While he might have been responding in part to the 
pressure  on  politicians  to  show their  appreciation  for  the  local  cuisine,  wings  aren't 
especially  identified with Missouri.  He also he explicitly  identifies  his  food choice  as 
unhealthy. Differentiating between the dark meat and skin of the chicken wing and the 
leaner,  often  skinless  breast  meat  invokes  the  idea  of  “health”  associated  with  the 
dominant  mode  of  weight-loss  dieting,  in  which  high-fat  and  high-calorie  foods  are 
considered  “unhealthy”  because  they  supposedly  cause  weight  gain.53 Choosing  the 
50 “Republican Schwarzenegger says Obama needs to bulk up,” Front Row Washington, Reuters News 
Agency, 31 October 2008, Web (accessed 27 February 2011). 
51 Chozick, 2008. 
52 Ibid.
53 The primary contender in U.S. diet culture is “low-carb” or “paleo” dieting; however there are many 
other constructions of “health.” Proponents of “natural” diets are often more concerned with whole or 
unprocessed and unrefined foods, avoiding synthetic agro-chemicals and food additives, and seeking 
foods rich in particular micro-nutrients like anti-oxidants. Some people advocate vegetarian or 
macrobiotic diets as healthier, sometimes in part based on the idea that thinness is healthier, but usually 
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“fattening” choice seems like an attempt to  counter the idea that his thin physique is 
evidence of an abnormal degree of self-restraint. 
However, the idea that Obama's thinness might prevent overweight people from 
identifying with him gained slightly more traction than the idea that he needed to “beef 
up.”  The concern was initially  raised  by an August  2008  Wall Street  Journal article 
written by Amy Chozick, who had posted a query on the Yahoo! politics message board 
asking if  Obama's thinness would affect  anyone's vote.  Several  self-identified Clinton 
supporters said yes, that Obama “needs to put some meat on his bones,” and “I won't 
vote for any beanpole guy.”54 Chozick noted that the footage of Bill Clinton rolling into a 
McDonalds  for  a  Big  Mac  and fries,  still  drenched in  sweat  from  a  jog,  was  widely 
believed to have helped him connect to voters in conservative-leaning states like Georgia 
and Tennessee,  which have higher  percentages  of  overweight  and obese people  than 
many “blue”  states.55 Chosick's  article  was picked up by  The Huffington Post,  where 
commenters largely replied that they'd rather have a “skinny guy that's in shape” than a 
septugenarian melanoma cancer survivor, referring to McCain.56 
Nonetheless, other articles in  The Huffington Post portrayed Obama's attempts 
to avoid some of the “fattening” foods he was offered on the campaign trail as “cheating.” 
A  video of  Obama handing off  a brownie  to  his  aide,  Reggie  Love made the rounds 
online, and The Huffington Post gave it the headline: “How Obama Cheats on Eats Meet 
'n' Greets,” in an ironic twist on the typical notion of what it means to “cheat” on a diet.57 
New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd criticized him for refusing a slice of chocolate 
cake at a Pennsylvania chocolate shop, and reportedly not liking ice cream, calling his  
also based on an idea of health as avoidance of disease, especially heart disease and cancer. 
54 Chozick, 2008. 
55 Ibid.
56 Rachel Weiner, “WSJ: Obama May Be Too Thin To Be President,” The Huffington Post, 01 August 
2008, Web (accessed 27 February 2011). 
57  Kerry Trueman, “How Obama Cheats on Eats at Meet 'n' Greets,” The Huffington Post, 26 January 
2009, Web (accessed 18 June 2009). 
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eating  habits  “finicky”  and  “abstemious.”58 Additionally,  in  segment  on  MSNBC's 
Hardball called “Is Obama too cool?” Bloomberg News columnist Margaret Carlson said, 
“sometimes you just want to tell the guy, 'Eat the doughnut.'”59 
The idealization of thinness and dieting in pursuit of a particular body shape may 
seem like the odd man out in among the pillars because it is simultaneously far more 
widespread than practices like vegetarianism or eating at expensive restaurants and also 
seemingly less important to most self-identified foodies.60 However, the emergence of 
weight-loss  dieting  as  a  mainstream  practice  in  America  not  only  corresponds 
historically with the other trends, it has also become implicated in the moral judgments 
and status distinctions. Fat Americans have become the primary symbol of everything 
wrong with the homogenous, unsophisticated, bland industrial food often assumed to be 
congruent with bad, unenlightened national cuisine.61 Fatness is also associated with the 
58  Maureen Dowd, “The Hillary Waltz,” The New York Times, 02 April 2008, Web (accessed 27 May 
2009).
59  Maureen Dowd, “No Ice Cream, Senator?” The New York Times, 13 July 2008, Web (accessed 27 May 
2009).
60 This probably also reflects the shame or stigma attached to weight-loss dieting, not an actual lack of 
concern on the part of people who identify as foodies in achieving and maintaining a thin body. The 
idea that “dieting” is a separate pursuit from the kinds of cooking and eating most often associated with 
the food revolution is also reflected in a separation between journalistic writing about diet and weight-
loss and writing about cooking and eating at restaurants. Many professional food critics have written 
about their efforts to lose weight and struggles with eating disorders, but they usually do so in an 
explicitly confessional mode cordoned off from their “real” food writing. For example, the food critic 
who launched the popular food website Serious Eats, began a weekly series called “Ed Levine's Serious 
Diet” in January 2008. The “diet” posts often refer and link to restaurants and recipes that have been 
featured in other writing on the site, but those restaurant reviews and recipes very rarely acknowledge 
his on-going attempts to lose weight. Marlena Spieler, a food columnist for the San Francisco 
Chronicle, detailed how she lost over 100 pounds in a special, confessional column that explicitly noted 
that she had previously avoided mentioning her weight-loss. New York Times food columnist and best-
selling cookbook author Mark Bittman has written about the “vegan until dinner” diet he adopted in an 
attempt to lose weight and combat high blood cholesterol and sleep apnea, but only for the more 
informal NYTimes.com blogs, not for his more formal columns. Frank Bruni, who served as the chief 
restaurant critic for The New York Times from 2002-2009, wrote articles for Men's Health about his 
struggle to find exercise routines that would burn off the calories he consumed as a food writer and 
retired from his post as restaurant critic shortly before the release of a memoir chronicling his struggles 
with food addiction and bulimia, which was excerpted in the New York Times Magazine, not “The Food 
Section.” Sources: Ed Levine, “Ed Levine's Serious Diet,” Serious Eats, January 2008-February 2011, 
Web (accessed 22 February 2011). Marlena Spieler, “Roving Feast Columnist Becomes Diet Outlaw,” 
The San Francisco Chronicle, 01 October 2008, Web (accessed 26 June 2009). Tara Parker-Pope, 
“Vegan Before Dinnertime.” The New York Times: Well Blog, 27 February 2009, Web (accessed 26 June 
2009). Frank Bruni, “I Was a Baby Bulimic,” The New York Times Magazine 15 July 2009, Web 
(accessed 22 February 2011). 
61 See, for example, shots of fat bodies used to establish the “problem” with food in the U.S. in 
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masses,  the  poor,  and stereotypes that  have long been associated with the poor  like 
laziness, ignorance, lack of self-control, and sexual promiscuity.62 The dominant belief 
that an ideal body size corresponds with making the “right” food choices is pervasive in 
the discourses about sophisticated, cosmopolitan, and natural foods. 
Like the other pillars,  thinness and the diet  popularly understood to promote 
weight-loss  are  shifting  social  constructions.  The  rapidity  of  those  changes  is 
demonstrated in Schwartzenegger's disparaging comments about Obama's skinny legs 
and body, which reflect beliefs about the significance of body size that were dominant 
less than two decades ago but now fail to resonate. As some scholars have suggested, 
thinness is so idealized, especially for women, that it's unclear if there's such a thing as  
“too thin” anymore.63 The same is increasingly becoming true for men. Nonetheless, the 
suspicion that Obama's thinness might prevent him from relating to the masses or reflect 
abstemious, elitist habits suggest some of the ways that body size and diet-conscious 
eating choices are implicated in social judgments about class. 
Natural Foods
The Obama Foodorama writer's suggestion that many people thought of Obama 
documentaries like Super Size Me, dir. Morgan Spurlock, Kathbur Pictures: 2004. and Food, Inc., dir. 
Robert Kenner, Magnolia Pictures, 2008. 
62 See Abigail C. Saguy and Kjerstin Gruys, “Morality and Health: News Media Constructions of 
Overweight and Eating Disorders,” Social Problems 57: 2 (2010): 231-250.
63 See Campos 2004, 147-152; oan Jacobs Brumberg, The Body Project: An Intimate History of American  
Girls (New York, NY: Random House, 1997: 95-139); Roberta Pollack Seid, Never Too Thin: Why 
Women Are at War with Their Bodies (New York, NY: Prentice Hall Press: 1989); Hillel Schwartz, 
Never Satisfied: A Cultural History of Diets, Fantasies, and Fat (London, UK: The Free Press, 1986). 
The maxim “You can never be too rich or too thin,” probably originated with Truman Capote in an 
interview on The David Susskind show in the late 1950s, and may have been popularized in the 1960s 
by Babe Paley, the famously tart-tongued wife of CBS founder William Paley. It is sometimes attributed 
to the America-born Duchess of Windsor, Wallis Simpson, who allegedly had the saying embroidered 
on a pillow in the 1970s. Ralph Keyes, The Quote Verifier: Who Said What, Where, and When (New 
York, NY: Macmillan, 2006: 180). The preference for extreme thinness may have developed in the very 
wealthy classes in the mid-twentieth century U.S., but Brumberg, Schwartz and others document a 
continuing idealization of large breasts, plumpness, and hourglass figures in the middle and working 
classes during the 1930s-1970s. The more widespread sense that there's no such thing as “too thin” 
seems to have developed in the 1980s and after. For a recent example, see the Yahoo! Answers thread, 
“What is considered too skinny? Is there such a thing?” Yahoo! Answers, June 2010, Web (accessed 02 
March 2011). 
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as the “first president to have eaten organic food” was driven by his widely-publicized 
affection for brands like Honest Tea, a USDA Organic-certified version of Lipton (whose 
slogan is “Nature got it right. We put it in a bottle.”64) and his reference to Whole Foods, 
the  world's  largest  natural  foods  retail  chain,  in  the  infamous  arugula  incident.  The 
assumption that Obama was on board with the “natural foods” agenda was reinforced by 
his response to an opinion piece by Michael Pollan published in  The New York Times 
about a month before the general election titled “Farmer in Chief.” In it, Pollan exhorted 
the winner of the election, whether Obama or McCain, to promote “sun-based” rather 
than  oil-dependent  agriculture.  Bloggers  and  commenters  across  the  natural  foods 
blogosphere were delighted when Obama referenced the letter in an interview on NPR 
with Joe Klein. Comments on the website Treehugger.com are fairly representative of the 
response on food and green blogs: a user registered as “Bodie” says,“It makes me pretty 
excited  that  Obama has  read  Pollan,”  and  “Patrick”  says  “Michael  Pollan  should  be 
appointed  as  an  Obama  Agricultural  consultant  asap.  GOBAMA!!!” Blogosphere 
coverage of Pollan's letter frequently framed it as a “letter to Obama” and interpreted 
Obama's response as an embrace of Pollan's agenda.65 
Additionally, Michelle Obama's public advocacy of natural foods, most famously 
in her decision to establish a pesticide and fertilizer-free vegetable garden on the White 
House lawn led some people to make assumptions about Obama's food policy agenda.66 
64 “Honest Tea,” Honest Tea,Web, (accessed 02 March 2011). 
65 Jeff Nield, et al, “Obama Cites Michael Pollan's Sun-Food Agenda,” Treehuger, 03 November 2008, 
Web (accessed 23 June 2009). Obama's citation of Pollan received similar coverage and comments on 
many other blogs and online communities, including Civil Eats, Ethicurean, Obama Foodorama,  
GreenDaily, Capital Press, Chow.com, and the People's Food Co-Op Bulletin Board. 
66  The Mid America Croplife Association, an industry group representing agro-chemical companies, sent 
a letter to the First Lady appealing to her to “recognize the role conventional agriculture plays in the 
U.S.,” and forwarded it to their supporters. The letter was mocked on The Daily Show and several 
sources of news and advocacy of sustainable agriculture, like Sustainablog. Ms. Obama has declined to 
incorporate agro-chemicals into the garden. Elizabeth Balkan, “Pesticide Lobby Bugged by Michelle 
Obama's White House Organic Garden,” Sustainablog, 11 April 2009, Web (accessed 28 February 
2011). 
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He did take partial credit and ownership for the garden at the Annual Conference of the 
American  Medical  Association,  claiming  that  “we started  a  White  House  vegetable 
garden  [emphasis  added].”67 However,  Obama  himself  has  mostly  kept  silent  about 
priorities for the organic and natural foods movement like reforming the Farm Bill, and 
many  of  his  appointees  to  the  FDA  and  USDA  had  connections  to  large  industrial 
agricultural interests.68 
The belief that the Obamas preferred natural foods and supported the natural 
food movement  is  exemplified by a  letter  written by celebrity  chef  and activist  Alice 
Waters published in Gourmet magazine. In the letter, Waters offered her services to the 
Obamas to “help with your selection of a White House chef. A person with integrity and 
devotion to the ideals of environmentalism, health, and conservation.”69 The implication, 
of course, was that whoever had served the Bush White House could not possibly be that 
kind of person. Former White House Chef Walter Scheib came forward to set the record 
straight,  telling  both  Obama  Foodorama and  the  New  York  Times that  Chef  Cris 
Comerford, who he had personally hired and promoted to executive chef when he left the 
White House in 2005, was not only a very talented cook and kitchen manager but was 
also committed to providing locally-sourced, healthy food for the first family and their 
guests. Scheib also noted that former First Lady Laura Bush had “insisted” on organic 
produce. NPR food critic Todd Kliman reported that Waters and Scheib had reached a 
detente, and then claimed, “But that's [the detente] not the news here. What is? The fact 
that  someone  finally  had  the  guts  to  stand  up  to  Waters'  inflexible  brand  of 
gastronomical correctness.”70 
67 Barack Obama, “Remarks By the President At the Annual Conference of the American Medical 
Association,” The White House: Office of the Press Secretary 15 June 2009, Web (accessed 24 June 
2009).
68 Tom Philpott, “Another Monsanto Man in a Key USDA Post? Obama's Ag Policy's Giving Me 
Whiplash,” Grist, 24 September 2009, Web (accessed 01 March 2011). 
69  Alice Waters,“Alice Waters's Open Letter to the Obamas,” Gourmet: Food Politics, 15 January 2009, 
Web (accessed 10 September 2009).
70 Todd Kliman,“Alice Waters Was a Foodie Hero. Now She's the Food Police,” NPR, 23 January 2009, 
Web (accessed 24 June 2009). 
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These examples help illuminate the distinguishing features of the pillar of natural 
foods.  Elsewhere,  Waters  and  Pollan  often  gesture  to  how  pleasurable eating  fresh, 
whole  foods  are  and claim that  they combat  overweight  and obesity.  In  their  public 
appeals to Obama, they focused primarily on the social and environmental consequences 
of “natural” foods. Waters' letter refers to the ideals of “environmentalism, health, and 
conservation.”  Even  Scheib's  reply  reinforced  the  idea  that  locally-sourced,  organic 
produce  is  morally  superior  by  defending  Chef  Comerford  on  the  grounds  that  she 
already  uses  those  ingredients.  Pollan's  “Farmer  in  Chief”  argued  that  reforming 
agriculture would combat climate change, help the U.S. achieve energy independence, 
and the promote the health of many regional U.S. economies. The inherently moral basis 
of  “natural”  foods  is  also what  Kliman chafes  against  in his  accusations  that  Waters 
represents an “inflexible brand of gastronomical correctness.” Although frequently tied 
to superior taste, thinness, and authenticity, “natural food” is ultimately constituted by a 
concern with the ethical implications of food.
Cosmopolitanism
The last of the four major themes in the discourse about Obama and food is how 
adventurous he is as an eater. Patronizing restaurants like Topolobampo, whose menu is 
based on Mexican cuisine and passages in  The Audacity of Hope about his affinity for 
soul  food helped bolster Obama's  image as  an omnivore  with diverse tastes. 71 NPR's 
Kliman  portrayed  Obama's  taste  as  “eclectic”  with  aspects  of  an  “aesthete”  (like  the 
1000-bottle wine cellar at his Hyde Park home) balanced by a “pragmatism” reflected in 
burger runs and his affection for a a cheap take-out pizza joint near his Chicago home.72 
The  incidents  that  were  seized  on  as  evidence  of  Obama's  omnivorousness73 were 
71 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (New York, NY: 
Random House, 2006: 249).
72 Traci Vogel, “Predicting Obama, the First Eater,” Chow: Top Stories: Food Media, 07 November 2008 
Web (accessed 28 February 2011). 
73 Johnston and Baumann argue that this is one of the defining characteristics of contemporary foodie 
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primarily  examples  of  him  eating  food  portrayed  as  populist,  likely  because  of  the 
contrast they provided for his upscale tastes. 
In particular, both news media and blogs seized on his first public restaurant visit  
in Washington, D.C. which involved meeting Mayor Adrian Fenty at Ben's Chili Bowl, a 
restaurant with deep cultural and historical significance for Washington, D.C. and the 
African-American community.  Ben's  is  famous not  only  for  chili-smothered  sausages 
called half-smokes, but also for serving musicians like Duke Ellington, Nat King Cole,  
and Ella Fitzgerald when they used to perform at neighboring U Street venues. It also 
served as  a gathering place for community and political  action,  especially  during the 
1968  riots  that  followed  Martin  Luther  King  Jr.'s  assassination.  Food  blog 
Chomposaurus covered Obama's visit to Ben's in an entry tellingly subtitled, “Our New 
President Knows How To Eat,”74 and on  Obama Foodorama,  Kohan  said,  “We kinda 
adore the fact that Barack's first public restaurant outing in Washington was to a joint 
that's entirely of the people, and also very historic [emphasis original].”75 [Figure 1.4] 
Figure 1.4/ Who Eats Free At Ben's, Before and After76
culture. I think cosmopolitan better captures the longer history of interest in international, ethnic, and 
exotic cuisines, and in Chapter Four will challenge the assumption that foodie culture is truly 
omnivorous. I argue that it merely uses omnivorousness to ideologically legitimate the use of food as a 
form of cultural capital. Johnston and Baumann, 2010: 35.
74 “Obama at Ben's Chili Bowl: Our New President Knows How to Eat,” Chomposaurus: The Meat Blog, 
13 January 2009, Web (accessed 22 February 2011). 
75 Eddie Gehman Kohan, “President-Elect Obama Visits Ben's Chili Bowl in DC...A Legendary Joint 
That's All About Change,” Obama Foodorama, 10 January 2009, Web (accessed 22 February 2011). 
76 Reproduced from Serious Eats and Flickr users “aliciagriffin” and “Travir.” Originally published by 
60
Obama's visit was prefaced by a change in the landscape of the restaurant, which 
also attracted media attention. For years, a sign hanging behind the counter at Ben's 
read: “List of who Eats Free at Ben's/ Bill Cosby/ NO ONE ELSE/ -MANAGEMENT” but 
the day after Obama was elected, the management hung a new sign reading: “Who Eats 
Free at Ben's: *Bill Cosby/ *The Obama Family.” The MSNBC program Meet the Press 
invited Cosby to participate in a round table on the day of Obama's visit to Ben's, and 
upon hearing that Obama had asked for an explanation of what a half-smoke is when he 
got to the counter, Cosby joked, “I'm taking my vote back.” He also suggested that while  
the first lady and her mother might “deserve” free eats at Ben's, the president himself 
hadn't “earned” the privilege.77 Cosby's ribbing plays on anxieties about Obama's racial 
and class identity (i.e. Is he really black? Is he black enough?), but despite that and his 
half-smoke faux pas, Obama's visit to Ben's was widely portrayed as a sign of his respect 
for  the  unique  culinary  traditions  of  his  new  home  and  African-American  people. 
However, his failure to “pass” suggests the touristic nature of his visit to Ben's. Eating a 
chili dog was not seen as a behavior that was authentic to Obama's identity, it was seen 
an  example  of  an  admirable  willingness  to  seek  out  novel  or  exotic  and “authentic” 
culinary  experiences.  Cosmopolitanism departs  from the  other  pillars  in  its  primary 
concern  with  demonstrations  of  omnivorous  or  adventurous  appreciation  of  cuisines 
marked Other.
The Four Pillars
The  mass  media  and  popular  coverage  of  Obama  and  food  reveals  both  the 
convergences and the fissures between the ideal of thinness and the other pillars of the 
“food  revolution.”  Thinness  and  the  dominant  form  of  weight-loss  dieting  do  often 
Erin Zimmer,“Obama Family Makes the 'Eat Free' List at Ben's Chili Bowl,” Serious Eats, 27 
December 2008, Web (accessed 27 February 2011). 
77 “Meet the Press Transcript for Jan. 11, 2009: Cosby, Poussaint, Fenty, Waters, roundtable,” MSNBC, 
Web (accessed 23 June 2009).
61
conflict with what people believe to be sophisticated or cosmopolitan dining.  A  New 
York Times article on the taste trend of salt and caramel which credited Obama with 
some of the taste trend's success noted, “one thing salted caramels conspicuously lack is 
a  health  and  wellness  angle.”78 The  menu  for  Topolobampo  features  the  rich  foods 
characteristic of restaurants at its price point, which generally are not compatible with 
most people's ideas about health and dietary restraint—like the ribeye steak served with 
cheesy chilaquiles and a bacon-laced salad on the Spring 2009 menu.79 
In  addition  to  the  questions  asked  (mostly  in  jest)  about  the  authenticity  of 
Obama's performance at Ben's, a few people asked whether or not Obama was setting a 
good example by eating such “unhealthy” food, exemplifying the conflicts between health 
and cosmopolitanism. An article  by Alicia Villarosa in the online magazine  The Root 
specifically juxtaposed his trip to Ben's with the “healthful” choices she hoped he and 
Michelle would adopt both for their own sake and to “set the tone for our nation”:
We know the new president likes half-smokes from Ben's Chili Bowl and 
his mother-in-law's sweet potato pie, but how much does he eat veggie-
centered  meals?  Stocking  the  White  house  kitchen  with  organic  food 
could  help,  too.  Even  though  in  these  tough  economic  times  many 
Americans  cannot  shop  organic,  nudging  people  toward  food  full  of 
natural nutrients minus the chemical pollutants would be an enormous 
boost to our national health.80 
Similar comments followed the media coverage of his visits to D.C.-area burger joints; in 
78 Severson, 2008.
79 “Topolobampo Dinner: June 16-July 11, 2009,” Frontera: Restaurants: Menus, Web (accessed 19 June 
2009).This is not meant to imply that Topolobampo's food is objectively unhealthy; some people would 
certainly view even the ribeye entree as “healthful” and the entree might even fit within the guidelines 
of low-carbohydrate weight-loss diets like Atkins or South Beach; however, it would not fit current 
FDA recommendations for achieving and maintaining a “healthy” weight. Another example that 
illustrates the conflicts between official nutrition advice and “gourmet” dining: in 2007, a reporter for 
New York Magazine had the famed nine-course tasting menu at the three-Michelin-starred restaurant Per 
Se analyzed by a nutritional-testing lab and found that the entire meal, including the amuse-bouche, 
wine, dinner rolls with butter, and chocolate candies, contained 2,416 calories and 107.8 grams of fat. 
The FDA recommends that the typical adult consume 2,000 calories per day and only 60 grams of fat. 
Charles Stuart Platkin, “Per Se, Per Calorie: Never Mind the $250 Bill, What Price Will Your Waistline 
Pay For the City's Most Extravagant Meal?” New York Magazine, 29 April 2007, Web (accessed 20 June 
2009). 
80 Alicia Villarosa, “The Obama Health Challenge: How Barack and Michelle Can Make the Country 
Healthier,” The Root, 27 January 2009, Web (accessed 27 May 2009). 
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June 2009, the D.C. insider newspaper  Politico  featured as their question of the week: 
“Are Obama's burger runs a bad example to be setting for America's citizens?” The online 
version included a video interview with musician and fashion mogul Russell Simmons 
suggesting that Obama look into healthier, vegetarian options like falafel.81 In a reversal 
of her previous critique, Maureen Dowd suggested that Obama should stop using burger 
runs to “beef up his average Joe image.” Instead, she recommended that he “forgo the 
photo-op of the grease-stained bovine bag and take the TV stars [Charlie Gibson and 
Diane Sawyer, who were in Washington D.C. to broadcast a special on health care from 
the White House the following week] out for what he really wants and America really 
needs: some steamed fish with a side of snap peas.”82 
Given the ribbing—friendly and not—that Obama had gotten for not putting in 
wholly adequate performances at both Ben's Chili Bowl and Ray's Hell Burger, one can 
only imagine how negative the response might have been if he had dared to order the 
nutritional equivalent of steamed fish and peas.  Jokes about the president's failure to 
pass  made  by  both  conservative  pundits  and  supporters  also  highlight  the  conflicts 
between  gourmet,  cosmopolitan,  and  healthful  eating.  Ben's  and  Ray's  are  both 
constructed as sources of “authentic” and delicious food that is nevertheless assumed to 
be  unhealthy  and  unsophisticated.  Obama's  thinness  and  stronger  association  with 
gourmet prevent him from being a convincing half-smoke or burger eater. 
In a Gourmet magazine article, “The War on Alice Waters,” food historian Laura 
Shapiro argues that the controversies concerning the woman hailed as the mother of the 
natural  foods  movement  and  the  doctrine  she  preaches  boil  down  to  a  charge  of 
“elitism.”83 In fact, the discourse about Obama and food reveals that all four of the pillars  
81 Eddie Gehman Kohan, “'Politico' Asks Russell Simmons And Ob Fo The Same Question About Obama 
Folk Foodways. Natch, The Answers Are Wildly Different...” Obama Foodorama, 12 June 2009, Web 
(accessed 12 February 2011). 
82 Dowd, 2009b.
83  Laura Shapiro, “The War on Alice Waters,” Gourmet, 06 May 2009, Web (accessed 02 July 2009). 
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of the food revolution are vulnerable to charges of elitism or food snobbery.84 The idea 
that Obama's thinness might distance him from the masses reflects both the real inverse 
correlation between income and obesity and the cultural  association of thinness with 
class privilege.85 For example,  Gawker's post about the shirtless paparazzi photos was 
titled “Barack Obama Shames Americans With His Elitist Body.”86 The tastes that both 
his  political  supporters  and  opponents  identified  as  upscale  like  his  affection  for 
caramels with sea salt, Topolobampo, and Dijon mustard similarly reflect real trends in 
the target demographic and the belief (based at least partially in reality) that gourmet 
foods and upscale dining are the exclusive provenance of the wealthy. 
Obama's visit to Ben's Chili Bowl was notable not only for the significance of the 
diner in black history and culture,  but also for the class  status of its  customer base. 
Obama Foodorama's celebration of his decision to make his first public restaurant visit 
to a restaurant “of the people,” referred not to just to black people, but to the chili-dog-
eating masses as opposed to the Blue Hill elite. Of course, Obama isn't really a part of the  
masses,  as  Cosby's  and Hannity's  jokes  pointed  out,  so  his  trips  to  Ben's  and Ray's 
seemed to many like as a form of “slumming,” the quintessentially upper-middle class 
practice of patronizing establishments whose target market is people of a lower socio-
economic  status.  Slumming,  just  like  buying  organic  or  gourmet  food,  ultimately 
reinforces class hierarchies by affirming that the elite patron is out of place in the “slum” 
and  can  leave  it  behind.87 The  contradictions  within  and  between  the  four  pillars 
84 I discuss the idea of snobbery in greater length in Chapter Four. 
85 Campos, 2004: 68-9. 
86 Richard Lawson, “Barack Obama Shames Americans With His Elitist Body,” Gawker, 15 August 2008, 
Web (accessed 27 February 2011). 
87 Slumming is only one part of cosmopolitan eating, which is, by definition, consuming foods that are not 
part of familiar habits and traditions, and especially marked by the search for “authenticity.” 
Cosmopolitanism most often refers to geographic breadth and diversity (as in a “cosmopolitan 
traveler”), and culinary “authenticity” is often ratified by a food's ties to a particular nation or region. 
However, people also seek and find “authentic” otherness by crossing social boundaries like race, class, 
ethnicity, and religion or temporal boundaries—finding foods that are rooted in historical traditions or 
“authentic” to the past. Often, one or more forms of “authenticity” converge: Southern American 
cooking is portrayed as “authentic” by virtue of its regional specificity, its associations with blackness, 
practices seen as traditional or true to the past, and the sense that it is the food “of the people” rather 
than elite or institutional. “Slumming” itself has historical roots in Victorian-era London and nineteenth-
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challenge both the idea that there's an unproblematic consensus about what it means to 
eat  well and the prevailing scholarly and popular explanation for the proliferation of 
popular interest in and anxiety about food. The anxieties about how each of the pillars 
map onto social class hierarchies suggest that what actually unites the four pillars is their 
construction  of  an  ideology  of  “enlightened”  eating  associated  with  the  liberal  elite, 
which has made eating well a valuable form of cultural capital. 
Enlightened  Eaters  in  a  Fast  Food  Nation:  Culinary  Enlightenment  and 
Decline
Two  conditions  are  necessary  to  the  cultivation  of  the  
science  of  gastronomy,  national  peace  and  individual  
taste.  Wherever  these  have  existed,  the  science  has  
progressed,  with  more  or  less  credit,  limited  by  
temperance  and  rational  festivity  where  men  were  
refined, and degraded into fantastic gluttony where they  
were licentious.
—Thomas Carlyle, “Gastronomy and Civilization” (1851)88
Both popular and scholarly accounts of the various trends that make up the food 
revolution typically offer a standard progressive narrative. According to this narrative,  
most Americans didn't care as much about dieting or gourmet food thirty years ago, or 
even ten years ago, because they either didn't know any better (a deficit of information), 
didn't care enough (a moral deficiency, because the importance of food is normative), or 
didn't have sufficient resources (a lack of money, energy, time, or access). The Culinary 
Enlightenment Thesis proposes that these deficits have been reduced in recent decades 
by  advances  in  the  production  and  circulation  of  knowledge  and  products,  the 
development of  new technologies,  and the accumulation or freeing up of  resources—
century American metropolises, where wealthy people traveled to the slums both in the spirit of 
benevolent reform and seeking entertainment and adventure. Seth Koven, Slumming: Sexual and Social  
Politics in Victorian London (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) and Chad Heap, 
Slumming: Sexual and Racial Encounters in American Nightlife, 1885-1940 (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009).
88 Thomas Carlyle, “Gastronomy and Civilization,” Fraser's magazine Volume 44, ed. James Anthony 
Froude and John Tulloch London: J. Fraser, 1851, Digitized by Google 30 August 2005, Web (accessed 
18 June 2009). 
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time, money, and skills. In short, the forward march of progress in multiple realms led 
naturally to a revolution in the way many Americans eat and think about food.
For example, in the introduction to The Gospel of Food, a book that is otherwise 
quite critical of many of the prescriptions and proscriptions about food that began to 
proliferate in the 1980s, sociologist Barry Glassner writes: “The good news about our 
food-obsessed age is the quality and variety of foods that have become available and the 
delight many Americans take in exploring new tastes.” According to Glassner, the factor 
that prevents Americans from enjoying that quality and variety (compared to the French, 
who play the role of the good and happy hedonists in his account) is that “rather than let 
our palates be our guides, we let others tell us what to eat and how to think about what  
we  eat.”89 On  the  one  hand,  he  acknowledges  that  the  new  food  aesthetics  are 
historically-contingent  and  do  not  necessarily  lead  to  Americans  in  general  deriving 
greater pleasure from food; on the other hand, he reaffirms the notion that the “quality 
and variety” of food in America has objectively increased. Furthermore, he reinforces the 
myth of French culinary superiority.90 
In a later chapter, Glassner critiques the advice available on the growing number 
of online food discussion websites like Chowhound, noting that “few of the other ethnic 
places I have tried on the recommendation of chowhounds have merited a second visit,” 
and  suggesting  that  the  criteria  chowhounds  privilege,  like  “deliciousness”  and 
89 Barry Glassner, The Gospel of Food: Everything You Think You Know About Food Is Wrong (New York: 
Harper Collins, 2007: x-xi). 
90 According to T. Sarah Peterson, this dates to the seventeenth century, when François Pierre La Varenne's 
cookbooks codified the emerging cuisine that inaugurated the modern dichotomy between salty-acidic 
main courses and sweet desserts and downplayed the emphasis on golden hues and aromatic spices 
formerly associated with luxury and the divine. Early Modern and Renaissance cuisine emphasized the 
spiritual and magical powers of food and flavor and elevated the culinary trinity of sugar, saffron, and 
spice. The new cuisine invented by Varenne and other chefs in the employ of Second Estate nobles was 
based on secular ideas about the natural essence of individual ingredients, the physiology of appetite 
stimulation, and the goal of bringing flavors into harmonious balance. Varenne's worked as a chef in the 
kitchens of Marie de Médici (of the Florentine Medici dynasty), the second wife of King Henry IV of 
France, and Nicolas Chalon du Ble, Marquis of Uxelles. The cuisine of the French nobility eventually 
spread throughout Europe, along with other Enlightenment beliefs, but the French remain the primary 
arbiters of superior cuisine. T. Sarah Peterson, Acquired Taste: The French Origins of Modern Cuisine 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994: 161-84). 
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“authenticity,”  are  inherently  elusive.  However,  he  heartily  endorses  the  “informed 
restaurant recommendations” of “connoisseurs” who “pound a lot of pavement, eat a lot 
of lousy food, make a serious study of the diverse cuisines they write about, and unlike 
their  colleagues who review high-end establishments,  almost never get  recognized or 
catered to by restauranteurs.”91 His defense of connoisseurship reinforces the notion that 
superior food is more available and sought-after in America today than ever before, even 
if only a small minority of hard-working critics are qualified to discern it.  Ultimately, 
Glassner  argues  that  the  major  improvements  in  American  cuisine  are  due  to 
immigration: 
Until recently, Americans were unlikely to explore the great cuisines of 
the  world  unless  they  lived  in  ethnic  enclaves.  And even  then,  people 
tended to have access only to the food of their own ethnic group, or to 
bastardized dishes like chop suey.  Today, most every major city in the 
U.S. boasts dozens of serious ethnic eateries; New York and Los Angeles 
are  home  to  hundreds.  Many  serve  primarily  their  own  ethnic 
communities,  but  a  substantial  number  live  off  a  group  of  restaurant 
goers on a flavor quest of their own....  Anyone who is open to trying a 
range of ethnic cuisines can eat out well in America, and for little money.92
However, as historians like Donna Gabaccia and Kristin Hoganson have documented, 
that's simply untrue. Immigrants have been shaping mainstream American cuisine for 
centuries, and for most of U.S. history, many Americans have been quite eager to explore 
the cuisines of the world and of the ethnic enclaves in their own backyards.93 
Even historians sometimes invest in and reproduce the culinary enlightenment 
thesis. In Paradox of Plenty: A Social History of Eating in Modern America,  historian 
Harvey Levenstein suggests that mid-century American food was objectively bad and the 
subsequent rise of natural, ethnic, and gourmet foods was not just a change, but a real 
improvement.  According  to  Levenstein,  despite  the  midcentury  revolution  in  food 
processing, “one of the most striking aspects of the new food technology was how little it  
91 Ibid, 121-2. 
92 Ibid, 116-7. 
93 I discuss their arguments in more detail in Chapter Two.
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altered basic American food tastes.”94 Aside from a few exceptions like Italo-American 
spaghetti  with  meat  sauce  and  Chinese-inspired  “chop  suey,”  the  average  post-war 
American  was  trapped in  what  he  calls  a  “culinary  straightjacket.”95 Even  those  few 
immigrant-inspired  dishes  were  usually  domesticated  with  industrial  products  like 
ketchup  and  Worcestershire  sauce.  He  endorses  restaurant  reviewer  Gael  Green's 
description of Americans as wrapped in a “Velveeta cocoon.”96
Indeed,  according to Levenstein,  the central  paradox of  American food in the 
post-war era is the culinary nationalism exemplified by the notion that Americans were 
“the  best-fed  people  the  world  has  ever  seen”  and  their  culinary  provincialism;  the 
“paradox” of  plenty in  the sense of  volume but  paucity in the sense of  quality.  This 
juxtaposition implies  that  being well-fed  should encompass  not  just  food security  or 
access to plentiful food, but also a quality of food that he suggests can be measured by 
the  sophistication  and  cosmopolitanism  of  cookbooks,  Gallup  polling  data  about 
Americans' ideal meal, and restaurant menus. Levenstein describes the consistency in 
the cookbooks and the ideal menus reported to Gallup between the 1930s and 1960s as 
“unfortunate”  and laments that  “American restaurants  hardly  picked up the culinary 
slack.”97 He calls the the forces that promoted consistency and conservatism in American 
eating  “mediocritizing  influences,”  although  those  forces  turn  out  to  be  largely 
tautological—he  claims  that  “national  provincialism”  was  driven  by  restaurants' 
“conservative clientele” and the “gastronomically insensitive public.”98 In other words, 
the  cause  of  America's  widespread  culinary  conservatism  was  America's  widespread 
culinary conservatism. 
Although Levenstein's description of the foodies who developed a reverence for 
“French nouvelle, 'Northern Italian,' ethnic, American regional, and of course, healthy 
94 Levenstein, 1993: 119. 
95 Ibid, 123. 
96 Ibid, 130. 
97 Ibid, 125. 
98 Ibid, 127-8. 
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foods” in the 1960s is often gently mocking, he implies that the trends they pioneered 
made the national cuisine not just different, but better. The chapter title “Darling, Where 
Did You Put  the Cardamom?” and his  description of  the  “imitators”  of  Alice  Waters 
“fanning out on both coasts and into mid-America, mesquite supplies in hand, visions of 
Waters's nasturtium butter in their heads” seem deliberately arch, invoking now-familiar 
stereotypes about the food snob.99 But he lauds their effect on the national cuisine: “the 
greater variety ethnicity and regionalism added to the American menu obviously helped 
counter  the  social,  economic,  and  technological  forces  that  had  been  tending  to 
standardize and homogenize the national diet.”100 
The culinary enlightenment thesis essentially reprises the archetypal version of 
the progressive narrative developed by seventeenth and eighteenth-century intellectuals 
in  Western  Europe.  Philosophers  like  Rene  Descartes  and  John  Locke  argued  that 
beliefs, institutions, and practices based on empirically-verifiable, objective “reason” and 
the “natural” rights of man would necessarily  replace the authoritarian, monarchical,  
theocratic ones that preceded them in an inexorable forward march of progress. 101 They 
believed  (as  many people  still  do)  that  the  intellectual,  cultural,  political,  and  social 
changes they advocated, collectively referred to as “The Enlightenment,” represented not 
just a transformation but a principled improvement, that their ideologies were not just 
different from religious dogmatism or fatalistic  acquiescence to authority,  but  better. 
The term “enlightenment” itself  refers to idea that reason would cast an illuminating 
light, banishing the darkness of ignorance and dogma and revealing the immanent truth. 
Similarly, the four pillars of superior eating are widely believed to be based on objective 
truths that have been revealed by superior evidence and reason and are unquestionably 
better  than  the  ignorant,  backwards  practices  of  the  past—ergo,  a  Culinary 
99 Ibid, 223.
100 Ibid, 222. 
101 The debates about the chronological and geographic span of “The Enlightenment” are not relevant here 




There are multiple possible dates for the dawn of the Culinary Enlightenment, 
depending on which of the four pillars is privileged, but most of them locate the first 
glimmers in the post-World War II era.  The 1940s and 1950s are widely seen as the 
culinary  dark  ages,  when  American  cuisine  (so  maligned  people  sometimes  express 
doubts about whether it even merits the name “cuisine”) was dominated by the fattening, 
bland,  processed,  oil  energy-dependent,  chemically-tainted,  nutrient-deprived, 
homogeneous, inauthentic food produced by large-scale agriculture and the industrial 
food  production  system.  That  was  the  monolith  confronted  by  early  vanguards  like 
James  Beard (the “father  of  American cookery”)  and Julia  Child  in  the 1950s.  Their 
cookbooks and cooking shows introduced Americans to the possibility and pleasure of 
preparing fresh, sophisticated, delicious, and nutritious foods at home. Still, most people 
remained unconverted, which helped pave the way for the 1960s counterculture to take 
their rebellion into their backyards and kitchens when they discovered—thanks largely to 
writers and restauranteur-chefs like Francis Lappe and Alice Waters—that gardening, 
cooking,  and eating  differently  was  another  way  to  pursue  many of  their  social  and 
political agendas. 
According  to  other  food  historians,  participants  in  the  new  trends  of 
countercuisine and weight-loss  diets  remained on the margins until  the 1980s,  when 
some iconoclastic entrepreneurs, many of whom participated in or were influenced by 
the 1960s counterculture, began to realize the commercial potential of foods marketed as 
“gourmet”  or  “natural.”102 They  founded  companies  like  Whole  Foods  Market  and 
Williams-Sonoma,  whose  commercial  success  was  boosted  by  the  proliferation  of 
nutritional  advice  from public  health  authorities,  lifestyle  programming on television 
and in magazines, pesticide scares and concern about environmental toxicity and decay, 
102 Belasco, 1989: 208-9. See also Schwartz, 1986: 238.
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and immigrants who introduced native-born Americans to novel and “exotic” cuisines.103 
Even  the  monolithic  food  industry  eventually  got  on  board  once  they  sensed  an 
opportunity to profit.104 The revolution achieved a critical mass in the late nineties and by 
the early twenty-first century, trends like drinking wine, buying USDA Organic-certified 
products, and eating imported cheeses had moved from the fringes of American culture 
into the mainstream. Some advocates of the culinary enlightenment thesis note that this 
triumphant  trajectory  was  not  without  pitfalls,  like  the potential  “watering down” of 
some of the ideologies and practices in their movement from the cultural periphery to 
the  center,  but  the  essence  of  the  thesis  is  that  the  overall  narrative  arc  represents 
progress: the new trends are inherently better, and both the demand for and availability 
of those better foods suggests that many Americans have finally “seen the light.” 
The  archetypal  progressive  narrative  has  largely  fallen  out  of  favor  in  the 
humanities and some of the social sciences,105 but even academics in those fields invoke 
the  principles  of  the  culinary  enlightenment  thesis  when  attempting  to  explain  the 
increasing  visibility  of  university  course  offerings,  academic  concentrations,  and 
publications about food. In a Washington Post article titled “Field Studies: In Exploring 
Culture, Politics and the Environment, Food Programs Hit the Academic Mainstream,” 
103 Fromartz, 2004.
104 There is a tension between the “entrepreneurial” account of the rise of natural foods, promoted by 
journalists like Samuel Fromartz, and the “capitalist co-optation” account promoted by Belasco, 1989. I 
find the latter far more convincing, as the former takes a “build it and they will come” approach, as if 
the market for natural foods existed always just waiting for some enterprising former hippies to 
discover and exploit it. 
105 This is due largely to influential critiques by theorists like Michel Foucault, Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer. They argue that “reason” and “natural” law were never objective, and instead of producing 
greater freedom, equality, and well-being, they worked to legitimate unprecedented state violence and 
oppression, including vast material and social inequalities and the imperial conquest of “backwards” 
peoples. According to Foucault, the modern state and institutions like schools, prisons, and the medical 
profession actually extend far greater control over subjects than pre-modern political systems did, 
largely through increased surveillance. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
trans. Alan Sheridan, 1975 (New York: Vintage Books, 1977). Adorno and Horkheimer argue that 
modern capitalism produces only an illusion of freedom and choice while actually exploiting and 
oppressing workers and producing homogeneous products, particularly in the entertainment industries. 
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkeheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1944 (New York, NY: 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 1976). The belief that these changes represent “progress” is 
a myth, and one that serves powerful interests. 
71
the  director  of  the  Yale  Sustainable  Food  Project  was  quoted  saying,  “There's  a 
generation  of  students  that  understand  that  the  modern  world  has  been  shaped  by 
agriculture, and they are turning to their curriculum to understand those connections,” 
suggesting that  previous generations  didn't  understand the importance of  agriculture 
(again, a deficit of information or mis-evaluation of the available information). In the 
same article, writing instructor Stephanie Hartman from George Washington University 
added: “Once you have gone from ignorance to a greater understanding of how your 
choices  impact the food system, you can't  go back.”106 Barbara Haber,  the curator  at 
Radcliffe College's Schlesinger Library who spearheaded their culinary collection, told 
the  Chronicle  of  Higher  Education that  when she  first  started  collecting  cookbooks, 
people  thought  she  was  “trying  to  send  women  back  to  the  kitchen,”  but  “women's 
studies  is  now  a  mature  enough  field  to  accept  food  studies  as  legitimate.”107 The 
underlying  assumption  is  that  food  studies  has  become  legitimate  because  it  is 
inherently legitimate,  so  its  acceptance  is  a  sign  of  “maturity,”  and  its  previous 
marginalization was the folly of a less mature, less enlightened time.
Some proponents of culinary enlightenment aren't  convinced that the culinary 
dark ages have been entirely relegated to the past. Evidence that  unenlightened eating 
not only continues, but by some indicators has steadily increased fuels the counterpoint 
to  the  culinary  enlightenment  thesis:  a  narrative  of  culinary  decline.  Despite  being 
antithetical,  the  two stories  have  a  lot  in  common.  Both  portray  the  American  food 
industry  developed after  the world wars as  the source of  unsophisticated,  unhealthy, 
unnatural,  inauthentic  food,  and both are  invested in  the four  pillars  of  enlightened 
eating.  However,  the  decline  thesis  reaches  a  different  conclusion  about  the 
contemporary state of American food: instead of getting better, American eating habits 
106  Jane Black, “Field Studies: In Exploring Culture, Politics, and the Environment, Food Programs Hit the 
Academic Mainstream,” The Washington Post, 20 August 2008 Web (29 June 2009). 
107 Jennifer K. Ruark, “A Place at the Table: More Scholars Focus on Historical, Social, and Cultural 
Meanings of Food, but Some Critics Say It's Scholarship-Lite,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 09 
July 1999, Web (accessed 29 June 2009). 
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have generally gotten  worse. Rather than seeing new technologies and globalization as 
the  source  of  healthier,  safer,  fresher,  better-tasting,  more  varied,  and  more 
environmentally-friendly foods, the story of culinary decline argues that industrialization 
and capitalism have distanced people from their food sources, corrupted the food supply 
and environment  with toxic  chemicals,  destroyed traditional foodways and the social 
values and institutions they supported (especially “the family” and “family values”) 108, 
and made people fat and unhealthy. 
108 For example, there is a widespread belief that the “family meal” has declined, but little evidence to back 
up that claim, and precious little clarity on how to define it—some who lament its loss imply that a 
“family meal” must be home-cooked and eaten at a table without distractions like television or texting 
and last at least twenty minutes; others set a lower bar of nuclear families simply eating at the same 
time, whether at home, in a restaurant, or even in a car. Levenstein argues that the idea of the “family 
meal” first became a preoccupation in the U.S. and England during the Victorian Era among bourgeois 
families, for whom eating “correctly” and training their children to do so became a crucial way of 
distinguishing themselves from the working classes. Before that, children in the upper classes would 
customarily dine in the nursery with a nanny, governess, or other servants until they were considered 
adult enough to join their parents. In the lower classes, meal time did not become a formal affair until 
sometime in the twentieth century. According to Time magazine contributor Nancy Gibbs, most families 
in the U.S. did not have a separate “dining” area until the twentieth century, and most families did not 
settle into the Victorian workday rhythms until the 1940s or 1950s. However, concerns about the 
“decline” of the family meal are almost as old as the practice itself. According to nutrition policy 
analyst Paul Fieldhouse, the “nuclear concept of the family meal is a fairly modern phenomenon... and 
there is evidence that every generation has lamented its demise. Already in the 1920s there were worries 
being expressed about how leisure activities and the rise of the car were undermining family 
mealtimes.” There is some evidence that nuclear families ate dinner together more often in the 1970s 
than in the 1990s. In Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam notes, “The fraction of married Americans who say 
'definitely' that 'our whole family usually eats dinner together' has declined by a third over the last 
twenty years, from about 50 percent to 34 percent. . . . The ratio of families who customarily dine 
together to those who customarily dine apart has dropped from more than three to one in 1977-78 to 
half that in 1998-99.” The phenomenon of nuclear families eating together probably peaked sometime 
between the 1940s and 1970s, but it was still habitual for less than half of the American population and 
probably mostly limited to relatively affluent, dual-parent, single-income households. And despite how 
much more free time Americans supposedly had to cook, and how much harder-working they were back 
then, we know that most of those households relied on domestic servants, restaurant meals, take-out, 
and/or industrially-processed convenience foods at least some of the time. By the 1990s, the percent of 
families “usually” eating together had declined by 16%, which is significant. However, recent trends 
point towards a revival since the 1990s, not further decline. According to the National Center on 
Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) at Columbia University, the number of adolescents who 
reported eating with their families “most nights” increased 23% between 1998 and 2005. In CASA’s 
2010 of over 2000 teens and 456 parents, 60% said they eat dinner with their families at least five times 
a week. Sources: Harvey Levenstein, Revolution at the Table: The Transformation of the American Diet 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Nancy Gibbs, “The Magic of the Family Meal,” Time 
magazine, 04 June 2006, Web (accessed 02 March 2011). Paul Fieldhouse, “Eating Together: The 
Culture of the Family Meal,” Transition 37.4 (Winter 2007-8), The Vanier Institute of the Family, Web 
(accessed 02 March 2011). Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American  
Community (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2001: 100). The National Center on Addiction and 
Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA), The Importance of Family Dinners IV, September 
2010 <http://www.casacolumbia.org/download.aspx?path=/UploadedFiles/1intfzad.pdf> (accessed 02 
March 2011). 
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Instead of putting faith in progress to ameliorate these problems, culinary decline 
narratives often promote a return to the imagined foodways of the past. For example, 
one of Michael Pollan's heuristics for making better food choices is, “Don't eat anything 
your great-grandmother wouldn't recognize as food.”109 The Culinary Decline Thesis that 
celebrates  the  foodways  of  the  past—real  or  imagined—echoes  many  aspects  of  the 
antimodernist movement that developed at turn of the nineteenth century. In No Place 
of Grace, T.J. Jackson Lears argues that the educated American bourgeoisie embraced 
the  Arts  and  Craft  movement  associated  with  William  Morris,  the  Strenuous  Life 
(especially  associated with Theodore Roosevelt),  and medieval  and Oriental  religious 
practices, all in search of more intense, authentic experiences. According to Lears, the 
cultural  elite  were  reacting  against  a  spiritual  sterility  caused  by  the  increasing 
technological and bureaucratic rationalization of their lives. They rejected the dominant 
embrace of progress. Instead of setting their chins to the future, they “recoil[ed] from an 
'overcivilized' modern existence” and turned towards the past “supposedly embodied in 
medieval  and Oriental  cultures.”110 Like  fin-de-siecle antimodernism,  the narrative  of 
culinary decline leads in a variety of sometimes-contradictory directions. 
Industrial  food  production  often  seems  complex  and  opaque,  from  deceptive 
labeling  to  the notorious  secrecy of  the  slaughterhouse.  In  contrast,  the  ideal  of  the 
family farm,111 home cooking, and “whole” foods offer simplicity and transparency. At the 
109 Michael Pollan, Food Rules: An Eater's Manifesto (New York, NY: Penguin, 2009: 2). 
110 T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1981: xv). 
111  The myth of the “family farm,” imagined as a small, self-sustaining operation with free-ranging 
livestock and a cornucopia of different crops is the idealized “other” to big, bad industrial agriculture. In 
the book Family Farming, Marty Strange says, “this idealistic description of family farming... has never 
existed anywhere, certainly not in North America,” at least not as the norm or primary source of 
agricultural production. Mary Weaks-Baxter notes in Reclaiming the American Farmer that even 
Thomas Jefferson, perhaps the yeoman farmer's most renowned cheerleader and one of the primary 
historical authorities people turn to when they advocate for small, independent farms, cultivated 
thousands of acres and relied on slave labor to make a profit on cash crops. There's also also no 
evidence that preindustrial agriculture was any safer, more efficient, or more ecologically-minded. 
Nonetheless, many proponents of organic farming and farmer's markets appeal to a widespread 
nostalgia for the myth of preindustrial farming represented by the “family farm.” Some agricultural 
scientists argue that organic methods and a properly managed balance of different crops and animals 
can produce higher yields than synthetic-dependent monoculture; however that's not necessarily how 
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same time, the labor involved in making food from scratch, gardening, and seeking out 
rare ingredients and little hole-in-the-wall restaurants might be refreshingly difficult in 
comparison with the ease and blandness of prepared foods and chain restaurants. What 
unifies the sometimes-contradictory threads of the culinary decline thesis is the belief 
that the forces of capitalism have a destructive influence, and people would be better off 
returning to the foodways of the past.  What the culinary enlightenment and culinary 
decline theses share is an implicit investment in the same class hierarchy constructed 
and reinforced by the four pillars of the food revolution. They are both fundamentally 
elitist. 
The  dueling  narratives  of  culinary  enlightenment  and  culinary  decline  are 
exemplified by two book titles published in the last decade, both of which made the New 
York  Times bestseller  list:  David  Kamp's  The  United  States  of  Arugula:  How  We 
Became a Gourmet Nation and Eric Schlosser's Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the  
All-American  Meal.  Kamp  argues  that  the  increasing  variety  and  quality  of  foods 
available  across  the  country  and growing  interest  in  sophisticated  foods  inspired  by 
visionaries  like  Julia  Child  and  Alice  Waters  represent  a  “gourmet  revolution.”  He 
suggests that they have become so wholly mainstream that the U.S. can be considered, as 
his  title  suggests,  a  “gourmet  nation.”112 Schlosser,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  that 
changes in the American landscape, economy, workforce, and popular culture since the 
1970s are better represented by, and in many cases were driven by, the proliferation of 
people used to farm. There is a broad consensus that synthetic inputs enabled farmers to produce 
exponentially greater yields with fewer workers over the course of the twentieth century. What concerns 
me here is not the future sustainability of commercial versus organic methods, but the romantic 
idealization of imagined historical practices. Sources: Marty Strange. Family Farming: A New 
Economic Vision (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1988: 35). Mary Weaks-Baxter, 
Reclaiming the American Farmer: The Reinvention of a Regional Mythology in Twentieth-Century  
Southern Writing (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 2006). Catherine Badgley et al, “Organic agriculture 
and the global food supply,” Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems 22 (2007): 86-108. Gilbert Gaul, 
et al, “Federal Subsidies Turn Farms Into Big Business,” The Washington Post, 21 December 2006, Web 
(accessed 23 July 2009). 
112  Kamp, 2006.
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fast food restaurants.113 These accounts aren't mutually exclusive, and both are invested 
in the same four pillars of “enlightened” eating. They simply reach different verdicts. 
Sometimes writers argue that  the narratives are connected. Michael Ruhlman, 
the author of multiple cookbooks and food memoirs, wrote the following in a blog entry 
titled “Cook! Celebrate! Happy Thanksgiving!”: 
We live in a time of unprecedented interest in, and care for, food and all  
the  issues  that  surround  its  growing,  harvesting,  purveyance,  and  its 
cooking. This interest happened because we were on the brink of losing 
good  food  altogether,  with  farmers  disappearing  and  the  masses 
abandoning  the  kitchen,  handing  over  our  farming  to  Monsanto  and 
giving our most fundamental and exclusively human act, cooking, over to 
the ConAgras and McDonalds.114
Ruhlman suggests that culinary enlightenment was caused by culinary decline, as if no 
one realized that industrial farming and fast food were bad until they had pushed “good 
food” to the brink of extinction. 
Some scholars have also sought to accommodate both narratives, claiming that 
American  eating  has  diversified  with  fast  food  flourishing  alongside  Whole  Foods. 
Although his  account is  invested in enlightenment logic,  Levenstein argues that  both 
gourmet  cooking  and fast  food  represent  a  departure  from a  Cold  War-era  culinary 
consensus culture.115 He refers  to the early signs of  malaise and disillusionment with 
middle-class  suburban  conformity  that  appeared  in  the  mid-1960s  as  “cracks  in  the 
façade.” Those cracks eventually widened with the rise of specialty foods that became de 
rigeur for the upper and urban middle-classes and the fast food franchises that became 
ubiquitous and came to define American food to the world, both of which represented a 
departure from the standard roster of 1950s dinners pulled from the Better Homes and 
Gardens  Cookbook.116 Warren  Belasco  offers  another  explanation  for  how  these 
113  Schlosser, 2001.
114  Michael Ruhlman, “Cook! Celebrate! Happy Thanksgiving!” Michael Rulhman: Translating the Chef's  
Craft for Every Kitchen, 25 November 2010, Web (accessed 03 March 2011). 
115  This argument is reminiscent of other accounts Cold War consensus culture, like Elaine Tyler May's 
Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era, 1988 (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008). 
116  Levenstein, 1993.
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seemingly  divergent  trends might be related:  mass marketers  seeking to  cater  to the 
seemingly contradictory desires of the “Woodstock Generation” succeeded in many cases 
by co-opting aspects of what he calls the “countercuisine,” the culinary arm of the 1960s 
counterculture and vanguard of the food revolution. Their oppositional foodways were 
absorbed  and  politically  neturalized  by  the  food  industry  to  appeal  to  the  post-60s 
consumer.117
Whether  someone  judges  the  changes  in  American  eating  over  the  last  few 
decades to be good or bad ultimately depends on whose eating habits they take to be 
representative  of  the  nation.  The  culinary  enlightenment  thesis  takes  the  rise  of 
“superior” practices in the norm-setting middle classes as a sign of collective national 
progress. Narratives of culinary decline use increasing national rates of obesity and fast 
food consumption as evidence that unenlightened practices have not only continued in 
spite  of  the  growing  consensus  that  people  ought  to  eat  “better,”  they've  actually 
increased. Some of that is undoubtedly due to what food industry market research has 
called “schizophrenic” eating, like the simultaneous rise in the popularity of skim milk 
and triple-cream brie. To some extent this schizophrenia has to be expected given the 
contradictions between the ideological pillars of superior eating. However, most of the 
pernicious persistence of “unenlightened” eating is due to significant gaps between the 
foodways of the masses and those of the elite. 
Food and the Liberal Elite
Of all the presidential candidates in the 2008 election, only Obama was singled 
out  by participants  in the food revolution.  They projected hopes and anxieties  about 
what it means to be an “enlightened” eater onto him, even when the choices he made 
were contradictory. Nothing in the popular discourse about his political opponents even 
came close, despite the fact that virtually all the presidential candidates and especially 
117  Belasco, 1989. 
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Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and Senator John McCain would be considered elite by 
virtually any definition of the word.118 However, Obama was seen as a different kind of 
elite—part of a younger generation, less a beneficiary of wealth than someone who had 
risen through the ranks.  Since its  mainstream emergence in the 1980s, “enlightened” 
eating has been specifically associated not just with the elite but with the liberal elite, 
defined as much by their  lifestyle  and upward mobility as their relationship to capital 
and political ideologies. Food has always been central to the social construction of that 
demographic.
Since  the  1980s,  the  liberal  elite  has  been  essentially  synonymous  with  the 
yuppie. Both groups were the target of withering critique from the first moment they 
were identified as distinct entities. The cover of a jokey “manual” or field guid published 
in 1984, titled The Yuppie Handbook, shows two quintessential specimens on the cover, 
carrying fresh pasta in a “gourmet shopping bag” and wearing designer-brand business 
suits  with Tennis  shoes and L.L.  Bean Duck Hunting Boots  to represent their  active 
lifestyles.  Despite the widespread disdain and occasional vitriol directed at yuppies,119 
market analysts took them seriously because they saw them as taste leaders. As Belasco 
118 McCain's father and paternal grandfather were four-star generals in the U.S. Navy, and he was educated 
at an elite boarding high school in Alexandria and the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis. In 
1980, he married a woman who inherited a multi-million dollar fortune. Due to a pre-nuptial contract, 
they file taxes separately so the family's wealth is private; together, they own eight residential properties 
for their private family use. Clinton attended public high schools in the suburbs of Chicago, Wellesley 
College, and Yale Law School. She was the first female partner at Rose Law Firm in Arkansas where 
her husband was elected Governor in 1979. In 2008, the family's wealth was reported to be $109 
million, accumulated primarily through books, speaking fees, and investments. The Clintons' 
cumulative annual income has been at least $7.9 million every year since 2001. Paul Alexander, Man of  
the People: The Life of John McCain (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2002): 28, 22, 93. Peter 
Nicholas, et al. “Clintons Disclose Wealth,” Los Angeles Times, 05 April 2008, Web (accessed 28 
February 2011). 
119  Most critics of the yuppie settled for sardonic eye-rolling at their conspicuous consumption and 
superficiality. However, the phrase “Die Yuppie Scum” was widely deployed, and even became the 
rallying cry in protests against gentrification, like the 1988 riot in New York's East Village, where bricks 
were hurled at a new luxury condo that had replaced a community center for poor immigrants. One of 
the most famous critiques is Bret Easton Ellis's novel American Psycho, which is widely read as an 
indictment of yuppie culture for being shallow, materialistic, and dehumanizing. Jeremiah Moss, 
“Happy 20th Die Yuppie Scum,” Vanishing New York, 16 June 2008, Web (accessed 01 March 2011). 
Julian Murphet, Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho: A Reader (New York: Continuum International 
Publishing, 2002: 15). 
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explains in Appetite for Change,  “According to Market Facts, a Chicago-based research 
company,  the 'true yuppies'  were just  the tip of  an iceberg composed of  people  who 
watched 'Cheers,' 'St. Elsewhere,' and 'Hill Street Blues' and aspired to grind fresh coffee 
beans, drink imported beer or wine, own a personal computer, and use automatic teller 
machines.”120 [Figure 1.5]
Figure 1.5/The Yuppie Handbook121
Although those television shows are all off the air or in syndication now, similar 
representations of the upwardly-mobile, urban, professional class and their lifestyle have 
become ubiquitous. Reviewing  The Yuppie Handbook in 2006 for an article in  Details 
magazine, Jeff Gordinier argues that the lifestyle portrayed as bizarre in 1984 has since 
become de rigueur (at least for the demographic reading Details magazine): 
The yuppie could be found working off stress with a shiatsu massage and a 
facial, learning as much as possible about fine wine, traveling around the 
world on vacation. . . racking up gobs of debt on his credit card, and—the 
120 Belasco, 1989: 208-9. 
121  Photograph by the author 26 March 2011. Marissa Piesman and Marilee Hartley, The Yuppie 
Handbook: The State-of-the Art Manual for Young Urban Professionals (New York, NY: Long Shadow 
Books, 1984), book design by Jacques Chazaud. 
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clincher—eating tuna sashimi for lunch!. . . .  All of which means that the 
archetypal yuppie of the eighties sounds precisely like, um, everyone you 
know. . . . By now, the entire manuscript comes across as nothing more 
than  a  rote  annotation of  urbane American  life.  .  .  . If  anything,  your 
average  upwardly  mobile  young  professional  has  so  outstripped  and 
outclassed the mid-eighties yuppie that if Gordon Gekko himself were to 
show up in polite society in 2006, he would look kind of provincial. (These 
days, no host worth his fleur de sel would serve brie at a cocktail party—
not  when there  are  hundreds  of  obscure  cheeses  on  display  at  Trader 
Joe’s.)122
Again, food features prominently in the description of the lifestyle—wine, sushi, fleur de 
sel, brie, and Trader Joes are key elements of the once-strange and now “rote” practices 
of the yuppie.  As Gordinier notes, some of the details  have changed, but the guiding 
ethos of upscale, cosmopolitan consumption has remained essentially the same. 
In  Bobos in Paradise David Brooks coins his own term for the group of people 
distinguished by exotic,  upscale consumption habits and liberal attitudes towards sex 
and  morality,  the  “Bobos,”  a  portmanteau  of  bourgeois and  bohemian.123 Brooks' 
description of the habits and social manners of the urban elite helps to explain both the 
association between the food revolution and left-leaning politics and the use of liberal 
elite foodways as a form of political character assassination. According to Brooks, the 
central tension in Bobo culture is how to reconcile their egalitarian ideals with their class 
pretensions.  The  primary  strategies  they  use  are  1)  investing  deeply  in  the  myth  of 
meritocracy,  which enables them to believe that their status is  the result of skill  and 
effort  rather  than  systematic  economic  inequality,  and  2)  using  their  consumption 
choices as opportunities to express their political beliefs, fetishizing products that are 
“Made  in  America,”  Fair  Trade  certified,  organic,  or  otherwise  marked  as  socially 
122 Jeff Gordinier, “The Return of the Yuppie,” Details magazine, November 2006, Web (accessed 01 
March 2011). 
123  According to Brooks, there was a significant shift from 1980s Yuppie culture to 1990s Bobos. 
However, that supposed shift relies on a characterization of the yuppie as considerably more politically 
conservative and socially straight-laced than the demographic is portrayed in texts like The Yuppie 
Handbook and American Psycho. If yuppies were not just corporate strivers, but instead were also 
invested in being “hip,” tolerant of drug use, and socially liberal—as seems to be the case—his 
argument for the distinctiveness of “Bobos” becomes much weaker. David Brooks, Bobos in Paradise:  
The New Upper Class and How They Got There (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2000: 11-12). 
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responsible to express their distinction from the established mainstream. 
The result is that the taste hierarchy constructed by the liberal elite carries the 
stink of hypocrisy. They claim to believe in equality, yet spurn the tastes of the masses. 
They pursue markers of status distinction predicated on helping the poor as a means to 
distinguish themselves further from them. The politically conservative elite might also 
engage in conspicuous consumption, but as they are less invested in egalitarianism, it 
has been less likely to raise populist hackles. Concern about the liberal elite intensified 
after the 2000 presidential election, when the stark contrasts in the electoral map gave 
rise to intense speculation about the cultural differences between “red states” and “blue 
states.” As with the yuppie and the Bobo, the definition of the liberal elite relied heavily 
on food. For example, in a 2000 essay in the Atlantic Monthly, “One Nation, Slightly 
Divisible,”  Brooks  wrote:  “Different  sorts  of  institutions  dominate  life  in  these  two 
places. In Red America churches are everywhere. In Blue America Thai restaurants are 
everywhere.” The same dichotomy is represented in the epigraph, riddled with references 
to  food  stereotypes  used  to  caricature  conservatives  (“roadkill-eating”)  and  liberals 
(“latte-sucking tofu-chomping holistic-wacko neurotic vegan. . .”).124 If the Bobos were 
the 1990s version of the Yuppies,  the liberal elite would be their twenty-first century 
incarnation.125 
Mark Ames, the author of Going Postal, wrote in an essay published in 2004 by 
New York Press, “Republican elites don't set off the spite gland in the same way.”126 The 
tension  inherent  in  the “liberal  elite”  and its  earlier  manifestations  like  yuppies  and 
bobos is like the inverse of the problem of the culturally conservative working class that 
Thomas Frank describes in  What's the Matter With Kansas? According to Frank, over 
the second half of the twentieth century, the Republican Party attracted white working-
124  Barry, 2004. 
125  I'm actually not sure either the Bobos or liberal elite are meaningfully distinct categories, and suspect 
they all refer to the same demographic, which I believe emerged in the 1980s as a result of middle-class 
stagnation. See Chapter Five.
126 Mark Ames, “Spite the Vote,” New York Press, 15 June 2004, Web (accessed 01 March 2011). 
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class voters by appealing to cultural wedge issues like abortion and guns, thus inducing 
them to vote “against their interests.”127 The contradictions in the liberal elite might be 
summed up, “What's the matter with California?” Why do people who seem insulated 
from the negative consequences of inequality support political agendas that appear to be 
“against their economic interests”? Even more peculiar, or infuriating, why do they do it 
while simultaneously flaunting their privilege? 
 The idea of the hypocritical liberal elite distinguished by its personal taste is not 
new or unique to the U.S. In Australia, the term “chardonnay liberal” emerged in the late 
1980s to describe the the “guilt-ridden rich and bleeding hearts” who support the left-
leaning Labor Party.128 In Britain “champagne socialist” has the same connotation, and in 
2002, Ireland's Labour Party leader Ruairi Quinn sought to dispel the label of “smoked 
salmon socialist.”129 However, the political trope of the “blue state” liberal with upscale 
tastes has intensified in the last three decades, culminating in the portrayal of Obama as 
an “enlightened eater.” What Brooks' account of Bobos doesn't explain is why the tastes 
of a group so popularly reviled also became normative, why the practices associated with 
“yuppie  scum”  became  “rote”  in  “urbane  American  life.”  Why  have  so  many  people 
embraced the four pillars, despite their contradictions and the stain of hypocrisy that 
haunts  them? Why did the idea of  the latte-sipping,  weight-conscious,  Whole Foods-
shopping, sushi-eating city dweller became a political trope in the 1980s? 
One possible answer is suggested by Paul Fussell's somewhat-irreverent 1983 book, 
127 Critics like Larry M. Bartels have demonstrated that based on presidential voting behavior, white 
working-class voters (defined either as white voters without a college education or white voters in the 
bottom third of income earners) have not migrated to the Republican party en masse outside of the 
South, where the shift is due entirely to the demise of the South as a bastion of Democratic support in 
the wake of major shifts on civil rights issues within the Democratic Party in the 1960s. White working-
class voters claim to place more importance on economic issues than cultural ones and see themselves 
as closer to the Democratic Party on the so-called “cultural wedge issues.” Larry M. Bartels, “Whats the 
Matter with What's the Matter with Kansas?” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2006, 1: 201-226. 
128 Mark Rolfe, “Days of Wine and Poseurs: Stereotypes of Class, Consumption, and Competition in 
Democratic Discourse,” Paper delivered to the Australasian Political Studies Association Annual 
Conference 24-26 September 2007, Monash University, Melbourne,Victoria, Web (accessed 01 March 
2011). 
129  John Downing, “Quinn Bids to Banish 'Smoked Salmon Socialist' Image,” Irish Examiner, 23 Saturday 
2002, Web (accessed 01 March 2011). 
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Class:  A  Guide  Through the  American  Status  System.  He describes  a  nine-tier  class 
hierarchy,  poking  fun  at  every  rung,  and  argues  that  everyone,  even  the  truly  rich 
positioned  above  the  upper-middle  class,  really  want  to  be  upper-middle  class,  even 
though they might not admit it.130 Although he doesn't explain why, I suspect that the key 
is  that  the  upper-middle  class  and  the  various  demographics  that  have  become 
synonymous  with  it,  including  the  yuppie,  the  Bobo,  and  the  liberal  elite  were 
distinguished primarily  by  their  upward  mobility.  The  desire  to  be  like  them,  and in 
particular to consume like them, was less a function of simply wanting to be powerful or 
wealthy (in which case why not aspire to be “rich”?) but to be doing well, to be advancing, 
and to have the potential to rise farther. The upper-middle class, far more than a group 
defined by their income, has become the cultural repository of the fantasy of mobility and 
its  lifestyle  trappings.  Furthermore,  the  meritocratic  ideologies  that  anyone  can  and 
everyone  should  strive  to  be  more  sophisticated,  thin,  socially  and  environmentally 
responsible, and cosmopolitan obscures the structural differences in access to the four 
pillars. In order to examine where those ideas about “enlightened” eating came from, I 
turn in the next chapter to the longer history of the four pillars. 
130  Paul Fussell, Class: A Guide Through the American Status System (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1983: 
20). 
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C H A P T E R  T W O
T H E  R I S E ,  F A L L ,  A N D  R E T U R N  O F  E N L I G H T E N E D  E A T I N G
The Food Re-volution
The culinary  enlightenment  thesis,  or  the  argument  that  the  changes  in  U.S. 
foodways since the 1980s are an improvement on older ones reinforces many Americans' 
personal experiences. Many people still remember when national grocery store chains 
began to sell gourmet cheese, often in a separate display in the produce section along 
with  pâté and hummus (also new additions to the inventory). The bricks of Colby and 
individually-wrapped single slices of American cheese remained in the Dairy aisle. Some 
people will recall a time when none of the major soft drink brands had diet versions and 
the only artificially-sweetened soda were niche brands like Tab and Diet  Rite.  Foods 
labeled “natural” have become far common, both at specialty chains like Whole Foods 
and  Trader  Joe's  and  regular  supermarkets.  Additionally,  even  outside  of  major 
metropolitan areas, restaurant-goers and adventurous cooks have been able to sample a 
widening array of ethnic foods and purchase imported ingredients without leaving their 
hometowns. 
While some of the trends and products that  represent the food revolution are 
actually new, like Diet Coke, and USDA Organic certification, the four pillars of the food 
revolution—1) sophistication, 2) thinness, 3) purity, and 4) cosmopolitanism—are not. 
They were not new in the 1960s, when Julia Child first appeared on television, or in the 
1980s,  when the first  Whole Foods Market opened.  Looking at  the longer history  of  
American  foodways  reveals  a  surprising  coincidence  most  accounts  of  the  food 
revolution have missed: all four of the pillars were mainstream concerns in the U.S. at 
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the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century.  Between  approximately  1880  and  1930  French 
cooking,  slimming  diets,  natural  diets,  the  campaign  for  Pure  Foods,  and  ethnic 
entertainments all became popular in the urban middle class.1 Their tastes and practices 
were also then becoming normative in the emerging national mass culture.  Although 
some of the manifestations of the four pillars have changed over time, the longer history 
of the ideals of “enlightened” eating challenges the popular notion that Americans only 
recently realized the virtues and pleasures of gourmet food, thinness, “natural” foods, 
and ethnic cuisines.
After  the  1920s,  rather  than  continuing  to  increase  in  popularity  the  way 
enlightenment theories would predict, all four pillars receded from prominence. None of 
them completely disappeared; weight-loss dieting in particular remained more popular 
throughout  the  twentieth  century  than  gourmet,  natural,  or  ethnic  foods.  However, 
histories of slimming diets and beauty ideals also note a shift from the idealization of 
thinness at the turn of the century to a mid-century belief in intransigent body types and 
a  glorification  of  larger  bodies,  especially  for  women.  French  restaurants  that  were 
shuttered during Prohibition and the Great Depression didn't re-open even during the 
post-World War II boom. Meanwhile supermarkets and chain restaurants that offered 
standardized menus and products spread across the country. Advertisements began to 
emphasize  value,  familiarity,  and  Americanness  rather  than  sophistication  or 
foreignness. By the 1980s, when Americans who considered themselves middle-class and 
mainstream began to drink wine,  buy low-fat milk and triple-creme cheeses,  eat  Pad 
Thai and shop for local produce, it all seemed brand new. 
1 Which referred, at that time, to the roughly ten to fifteen percent of Americans who lived in single-
income households in urban areas and could afford to employ a least one servant. Richard Ohmann uses 
the term “professional-managerial class” to refer to the target market for the advertising-driven 
magazines that first appeared at the turn of the twentieth cenutry. He argues that those magazines, which 
were much less expensive and aimed at a slightly less-educated and affluent audience than older 
subscription-driven magazines, were the first instance of national mass culture in the U.S. and that they 
succeeded because they responded to the changing needs of industrial capitalism, particularly the need 
to cultivate consumption. Ohmann, 1996. For an extended discussion on competing definitions of 
“class,” see Chapter Five. 
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As the longer history of the four pillars shows, the American food revolution isn't 
revolutionary in the sense of something radically new that opposes the prevailing order—
as in a break with the past or turn away from it—but might be revolutionary in the sense 
of a cyclical rotation. The changes that have been widely called a revolution represent a 
rebellion  against  the  culinary  status  quo that  developed during  and after  the  World 
Wars,  but rather than staking out  new ground, it  represents a return to the kinds of 
culinary discourses popular in the past.2 This is a different kind of return than the one 
sometimes invoked by major interlocutors of the food revolution like Michael Pollan and 
Eric Schlosser when they equate organic farming and eating fresh, local, seasonal food 
prepared at home to imagined pre-industrial foodways.3 The recent food revolution looks 
very  much  like  a  re-emergence  of  foodways  that  were  popular  with  American  taste 
leaders at the turn of the twentieth century.  Like recent foodies, they elevated foods, 
constructed as sophisticated, slimming, natural, and Other (ethnic or exotic) above their 
diametrical opposites—foods constructed as humble, fattening, industrial, and familiar. 
Many accounts miss the earlier flowering of “enlightened” eating because they 
don't  look back far  enough,  usually  taking World War II  as  their  starting point.  For 
example, the section on “historical perspective in Josée Johnston and Shyon Baumann's 
recent book Foodies: Democracy and Distinction in the Gourmet Foodscape begins with 
the launch of  Gourmet  magazine in 1941. An exception to this trend, which illustrates 
how a taking a longer historical view challenges the triumphant progressive narrative of 
culinary enlightenment is Waverly Root and Richard de Rochemont's 1976  Eating in 
America: A History.4 [Figure 2.1] 
2 The movements were not identical by any means. It is a return with a difference, and I'm sure there 
would be much to learn from a more detailed comparison of the differences between the earlier middle-
class interest in eating “better” and the recent food revolution. Here, I focus on the similarities because 
they pose a significant challenge to the culinary enlightenment thesis and because their simultaneous 
emergence in both periods is striking and has seemingly gone unnoticed by scholars and popular food 
writers. 
3 Like the romanticized myths of the “family farm” and “family meal.” See Chapter One notes 108 and 
111.
4 Waverly Root and Richard de Rochemont, Eating in America: A History (New York, NY: William 
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Figure 2.1/The Foodies Timeline5
Root and de Rochemont attempt to chronicle the whole history of American food from 
indigenous traditions and the first European encounters to their present moment. They 
were not historians by training—Root was a journalist and de Rochemont primarily a 
documentary filmmaker—and their breezy, sweeping history often reveals more about 
their own racism, elitism, and Franco-American/expatriate chauvinism than the actual 
history of eating in America.6 Nevertheless, their assessment of the state of American 
eating in the mid-70s and their predictions for the future reflect a longer historical arc 
than accounts that begin in the 1940s. Their book challenges the popular notion that 
Morrow and Company, 1976). 
5 Reproduced from Johsnton and Baumann, 2010: 6. 
6 Both men were world travelers and committed Francophiles. Waverley Root moved to Paris in 1927 and 
took a job as a foreign correspondent for The Chicago Tribune. He remained there for the rest of his life, 
even after he retired from journalism in 1957 and turned his full attention to writing books, mostly 
about the food of France and Italy. Richard de Rochemont was one of the original members of France 
Forever, a pro-de Gaulle organization formed during World War II. He was also an Academy Award-
winning documentary filmmaker who worked on Time, Inc.'s March of Time newsreel series in the 
1940s, which took him around the world to film on-location shots and dramatic reenactments. This 
probably shaped their own tastes, and may also have made the speed and extent of the industrialization 
and homogenization of the American diet seem even more dramatic and pervasive and obscured the 
evidence or prevalence of marginal and counter-cultural tastes and practices they would have 
recognized as simpatico. Sources: “Obituary: Waverly L. Root, 79, Journalist,” The New York Times, 01 
November 1982, Web (accessed 07 April 2011). “Richard de Rochemont,” IMDb, Web (accessed 07 
April 2011). Richard de Rochemont, “France Forever,” France-Libre, January 1975, Web (accessed 07 
April 2011). 
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American foodways have been on an upward arc since the 1940s, offering an alternative 
view of the last century. 
In the penultimate chapter of Eating in America, titled “Where We Are Now,” the 
authors describe widespread ignorance and indifference to food and especially the kinds 
of food they favor—fresh, made from scratch, and especially French:7 “We may conclude 
that  the  American  gourmet,  if  we  may  assume his  existence  as  a  group  or  even  an 
attitude, is not today enjoying any real renaissance. . . food has been gradually becoming 
more banal for several decades.”8 They gesture to the “seeds of a new recovery and the 
birth of an American cuisine suited to our own times,” but claim those seeds are “not yet 
sufficient in strength to stand up against the flood of glop and slop which flows like slime 
through the supermarkets.”9 Root and de Rochemont's insistence that there was no “real 
renaissance” of gourmet suggests that there must have been at least enough interest in 
gourmet food to create some perception a renaissance was possible. Furthermore, their 
book itself  and the criteria  they use  to  evaluate  American  eating,  which presage the 
values  and aesthetics  of  the  food  revolution,  are  themselves  evidence of  the  nascent 
7 They spell out their criteria, which notably privilege not just “gourmet” or French food, but hit on all 
four pillars of the “food revolution”: “The authors, in attempting to evaluate the present state of 
American eating, have recourse to some simple criteria (it has been the fashion to call these things 
“guidelines”) which they have not concealed: They believe that fresh food is preferable to preserved, 
and that food grown not too far from the place of consumption is best, even if it is only available in 
season. They believe that variety in ingredients and in ways of preparation of dishes makes eating more 
enjoyable and probably more healthful. Choice of foods should be, within reason, up to the consumer 
instead of reflecting the wishes of agribusiness and the food industry giants (i.e. the “hard-ripe” 
tomato). Most industry-created foods, such as the sugared breakfast foods, “potato chips” synthesized 
from powdered dessicated potatoes, synthetic fruit drinks notably shy on fruit, dry soup mixes, and meat 
and fish “extenders,” are in the opinion of the authors properly called junk and should be so regarded. 
They believe that mankind is meant to drink milk (for a starter), water, wine, beer, tea, coffee, and some 
spirits if desired, but never should we sluice down pop, crushes, colas, “un-colas,” or milk-shakes which 
must be called simply “shakes” since they contain no verifiable quantity of milk. They fancy the idea of 
eating with a certain decorum, preferably while seated in a quiet place with or without company, and 
taking their time. The idea of talking about food at table does not shock them. While they admire quality 
and diversity of food, they deplore its conspicuous waste as evidenced in over-large servings. The steak 
house which grossly overcharges its clients for more than they can eat does not atone by offering a 
“doggie bag” for the uneaten portion. Restraint is appropriate in home cooking, too, unless the cook is a 




movement to improve American food.10 However, as their use of the words “renaissance” 
and “recovery” suggest, even if they thought American foodways  were improving, that 
wouldn't  be  a  new development,  but  a  return  to  the  kinds  of  food  and  tastes  that 
prevailed before the post-war decline.
Although they express doubts about the existence of, or prospects for, culinary 
enlightenment,  they  were  proponents  of  many  of  the  central  tenets  of  the  culinary 
enlightenment  thesis.  They  portray  their  ideals  as  objectively  superior  according  to 
empirical  evidence  and  reason.  The  contrasting  food  choices  and  preferences  of  the 
American  masses  are  the  product  of  ignorance,  apathy,  and  the  brainwashing  of 
advertisers, which they think consumers are largely powerless to resist.11 
What  distinguishes  them  from  contemporary  proponents  of  the  culinary 
enlightenment  thesis,  who assume the food  revolution  first  introduced Americans  to 
better  food  is  that  Root  and de  Rochemont  knew that  Americans  had  chosen mass-
produced “glop” over the fresh, local, and gourmet.12 They were both chroniclers of and 
personal witnesses to the elevation of a kind of “home cooking” both in actual homes and 
in restaurants that increasingly relied on prepared items like canned soups and instant,  
gelatin  over  traditional  cooking  from-scratch  cooking  and  and  gourmet  foods, 
increasingly rejected as un-American fancy business. Rather than assuming Americans 
10 This seems more likely than the alternative, which is that their criteria were purely idiosyncratic and the 
similarity to the tastes and practices of the ensuing “food revolution” merely coincidental.
11 For example, they say: “A critic of the British system of government once nastily said that it was 
'designed to give the Englishman the sensation of self-government.' It will be many a year before the 
American consumer is rid of the highly advertised and skillfully merchandised foods and drinks which 
at best provide principally the sensation of nourishment.” Comments like that are reminiscent of the 
Frankfurt School critics who, despite their critique of Enlightenment and the faith in “reason” and 
“natural law,” were perhaps too quick to dismiss all mass culture as empty propaganda and all mass 
culture consumers as dupes who are incapable of resistance, implicitly relying on and privileging their 
own reason and aesthetic preferences as if they were the only ones capable of critique. Root and de 
Rochemont's argument that even the “gourmet societies” that had recently grown in popularity in cities 
across the country only created the illusion of choice and sophistication that enabled the food industry 
to continue pumping out the same “slop and glop” to the masses also echoes Adorno and Horkheimer's 
argument that even the avant-garde was a calculated mutation designed to produce the illusion of choice 
and agency. Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944: 129. 
12  This also probably has something to do with their lived historical memory. They were both born in 
1903, and witnessed much of the rise of industrial agriculture and food processing, especially between 
1940 and 1970, the decades that now often get portrayed as America's culinary Dark Ages. 
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would inevitably be enlightened about how much better fresh, local, natural, homemade 
food (especially French) was, they knew that Americans had already been acquainted 
with all of those things, and actively chose the glop instead. 
Decline  narratives  are  seductive  for  many  of  the  same  reasons  progressive 
narratives are. The ability to attribute historical changes to the loss of “family values,” a 
decline in religious faith, or increasing corporate greed often seems like common sense 
or  serves  a  particular  ideological  project.  Foodways  are  especially  vulnerable  to 
ideological distortion because they are so diverse. Root and de Rochemont claim, “the 
field of food production and use is so vast that everything one can say about it is provably 
true and provably false at the same time.”13 What I might say instead is that the diversity 
of American foodways enables people to select evidence to fit a wide range of narratives. 
The story that Root and de Rochemont choose to construct is a quintessentially 
Romantic  cautionary  tale  about  the  dangers  of  too  much  industrialism,  too  much 
science, and too much capitalism—of Progress in general going “too far.” They posit an 
inverse  relationship  between Progress  in  general  and progress  in  the  realm of  food, 
exemplified by their fondness for an Andy Warhol quotation: “Progress is very important 
and exciting in everything but food. When you say you want an orange, you don't want 
someone  asking  you,  'An  orange  what?'”14 With  no  reason  to  expect  capitalism  or 
industrialism to decline, and no reason to believe Americans who had willfully rejected 
what  they  saw  as  inherently  superior  food  to  suddenly  embrace  it,  Root  and  de 
Rochemont were effectively blinded to what did, in fact, turn out to be a real renaissance 
of gourmet, along with fresh, natural, cosmopolitan, and especially French food. 
Root and de Rochemont's pessimism serves as a useful corrective to the idea that 
the  “food  revolution”  was  the  inevitable  result  of  the  forward  march  of  Progress. 
Although the kinds of food that they valued have become more available and popular 
13 Ibid, 458. 
14 Ibid, 460. 
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since their book was published, the longer history of the ideals that became dominant in 
the 1980s can no more be characterized by an ascending arc of progress than it can by a 
descending arc of decline. The history of “enlightened” eating in mainstream American 
culture is more complicated than they (or many of the other people who've written about 
U.S.  food  history  since)  have  accounted  for.  This  chapter  addresses  those  gaps  and 
challenges both the progressive and decline narratives by offering a synthetic survey of 
the secondary literature on food in the U.S. divided into four sections—one for each of 
the four pillars I described in Chapter One. In addition to showing that the ideals that 
constitute the four pillars are not new or even newly popular, the longer history of the 
four pillars reveals a shared pattern of rise, fall, and return. I supplement the secondary 
literature on the recent “food revolution” with market research and corporate histories 
that offer a clearer picture of the timing and extent of the mainstream permeation of the 
four pillars in U.S. popular culture. 
It  is  not  my intention to minimize the differences between the four pillars or 
between their initial flowering at the turn of the twentieth century and their recent re-
emergence as mainstream trends. Nor am I seeking to offer a comprehensive account of 
any of these trends. The growing literature on U.S. food history offers many nuanced 
accounts  of  how  Americans  in  particular  times  and  places  have  grown,  purchased, 
prepared,  eaten,  shared,  and  talked  about  their  food.  I  rely  largely  other  scholars'  
evaluations of how popular or marginal the four pillars of “enlightened” eating were at 
different historical moments. Similarities between the longer histories of the four pillars 
has been obscured by the tendency to study only one of them at a pillars time. There are 
real conflicts between the ideals that define the four pillars—e.g. sophisticated foods like 
foie gras and bluefin tuna are incompatible with the ideal of thinness the ideal of purity. 
However,  the  similarities  between  their  twentieth  century  chronologies  suggest  a 
commonality. 
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Scholars have attributed various aspects of the food revolution to changes in race 
and  gender  ideologies,  advances  in  science  and  technology,  immigration  patterns, 
domestic  and international politics  and policies,  advances in medicine,  food industry 
lobbying,  advertising,  mass  media,  global  trade,  changes  in  the  natural  world,  and 
“human nature.”15 All of those factors undoubtedly shape popular food trends. However, 
none  of  them  explain  the  rise,  fall,  and  return  of  all  four  pillars,  with  all  their 
contradictions. It is my theory that the broader pattern is due to changes in middle class 
anxiety resulting from shifts in income inequality and class mobility. [Figure 2.2]
Figure 2.2/Income Share for top decile of American households16
Between 1880-1930 and again from the 1980 to the present, federal polices that favored 
the wealthy created vast gulfs between the super-elite at the top of the income ladder and 
the middling professional and managerial classes. From 1929 to 1980, policies like the GI 
Bill and minimum wage law and the high demand for unskilled labor contributed to what 
15 See references in Chapter One and throughout this chapter.
16 Reproduced from Gwen Sharp, “The Great Income Divergence,” Sociological Images, 07 September 
2010, Web (accessed 08 April 2011), adapted from Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “The 
Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International Perspective,” Measuring and Interpreting 
Trends in Income Inequality 96.2 (2006): 200-205
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economists  Claudia  Goldin  and  Robert  Margo  dubbed  the  “Great  Compression”  in 
American wage structures.17 During periods of greater income inequality and relatively 
low mobility, interest in and anxiety about eating “better” becomes more important to 
the middle classes. Although they are a minority, their tastes are normative and reflected 
in mass media and market trends. “Enlightened” eating not only serves to distinguish the 
middle class from the working and lower classes in the Bourdieuian or Veblenian sense 
of  cultural  capital  and  conspicuous  consumption,  it  also  operates  as  a  form  of 
compensatory mobility. The four pillars elevate certain foods and practices over others 
without reliable evidence, but they nevertheless offer real pleasures and rewards that 
make them especially compelling for the middle classes when they are not advancing 
materially.18 
The secondary sources surveyed in this chapter hint at the relationship between 
changing foodways and social  class.  At the turn of the twentieth century,  trends like 
French food and slimming diets were portrayed as not just better, but also “genteel” or 
“respectable,”  code  words  for  the  elite  and aspiring  middle  classes.  From the  1930s 
through the 1970s,  similar trends were generally portrayed as  elitist.19 The dominant 
culinary aesthetic shifted, elevating foodways specifically characterized as unpretentious 
and unlike the practices associated with the wealthy. And as I discussed in Chapter One, 
17 Claudia Golden and Robert Margo, “The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the United States 
at Mid-Century,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3817 (August 1991). 
18 See Chapter Five.
19 Or just strange, like Julia Child, who was described even by fans of her first show, The French Chef, as 
“eccentric.” According to a brief biography by Marilyn Mellows, the 1983 series Dinner at Julia's 
faltered because it cast her in the role of glamorous hostess, which was disconcerting and disappointing 
to long-time fans. Her popularity in the 1960s has likely been exaggerated by the rise of gourmet, which 
makes her seem like a forerunner rather than a historical oddity, and the recent interest in her prompted 
by the film based on the best-selling book Julie and Julia (dir. Nora Ephron, 2009). In the 1960s, her 
cookbooks never competed with stalwart sellers like The Joy of Cooking or the The I Hate to Cook 
Cookbook (the best-selling cookbook of the 1960s). According to the publisher of Mastering the Art of  
French Cooking , it sold 22,000 copies in a single week after Nora Ephron's 2009 film Julie and Julia 
debuted. Before then, it hadn't sold that many copies in any full year since its original publication in 
1963. Marilyn Mellowes, “About Julia Child,” PBS American Masters, 15 June 2005, Web (accessed 08 
April 2011). Stephanie Clifford, “After 48 Years, Julia Child Has a Big Best Seller, Butter and All,” The 
New York Times, 23 August 2009, Web (accessed 08 April 2011). See also: Jessamyn Neuhaus, Manly 
Meals and Mom's Home Cooking: Cookbooks and Gender in Modern America (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
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when the ideals of “enlightened” eating became popular again in the 1980s, they were 
immediately associated with the yuppie,  a group specifically  defined by their  upward 
mobility.20 The longer history of the four pillars suggests that food has been an important 
way  for  Americans  to  negotiate,  perform,  and  embody  class  status  throughout  the 
twentieth century.
I :  G o u r m e t  F o o d  a n d  t h e  I d e a l  o f  S o p h i s t i c a t i o n  
A Theoretical Interest in Food 
Although the pursuit of culinary refinement in the West dates back at least to 
ancient Greece,21 the history of the word “gourmet” represents the emergence of a new 
concern about the relationship between sophisticated food and social class in the early 
nineteenth  century.  English  speakers  adopted  the  word  “gourmet”  after  a  poem 
published  in  1820  suggested  that  it  could  fill  a  semantic  gap.  The  first  citation  for 
“gourmet” in the OED is Ange Denis Macquin's “Tabella Cibaria,  The Bill of Fare: A 
Latin  Poem,  Implicitly  Translated  and  Fully  Explained  in  Copious  and  Interesting 
Notes.”22 In the preface, Macquin explains that the poem and accompanying notes are 
intended as both a “jeu d'esprit” and an “elucidation of many of the mysteries in which 
the curious art of cookery in this [France] and other countries generally consists.”23 His 
20 Later chapters explore this tension between the embrace of the “middle class” as inclusive and its values 
and tastes as universal and normative versus the rejection of the “middle class” as exclusive and its 
values and tastes as elitist. 
21 Probably earlier, and not just in the West. I mention ancient Greece because accounts about the seventh 
century B.C. onward about lavish banquets, daily and celebratory culinary practices, and the pleasures 
of food and drink suggest that the Greeks were concerned with eating “well” in multiple senses of the 
word. I know by invoking “the West,” I'm reproducing a questionable dualism, but there are two reasons 
for my choice: 1) I don't think complicating that dualism would significantly affect the story I'm telling 
or the argument I'm making and there is a literature concerning the influences of ancient Greece on the 
culture and thought of Europe and its colonies that is relevant to my account and 2) while I suspect 
there are also signs of culinary sophistication in ancient non-Western texts, I am ignorant about them.
22 “Gourmet” OED Online, March 2011, Oxford University Press. Web. (accessed 09 April 2011)
23  Ange Denis Macquin “Tabella Cibaria, The Bill of Fare: A Latin Poem, Implicitly Translated and Fully 
Explained in Copious and Interesting Notes.” London: Sherwood, Neely, and Jones, Paternoster Row; J. 
Robins and Co. Ivy Lane, Paternoster Row 1820 Original from Harvard University Digitized by 
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definition of  gourmet is  somewhat tongue-in-cheek, but is  also a genuine attempt to 
distinguish between the  gourmet who has a “merely theoretical” interest in food, the 
glutton who simply loves to eat, and the  gourmand who “unites theory with practice.” 
Macquin claims that  the French term  gourmand is  equivalent to “epicure  in the full 
sense  of  the  word,  as  we  use  it  in  English,”  but  that  no  existing  term  in  English 
corresponds  to gourmet. So  from  the  beginning  “gourmet”  carried  a  connotation  of 
affectation: someone who pretends to appreciate food because of what it represents but 
has no appreciation for the bodily (and historically debased) pleasures of eating. 
Macquin notes the French also lacked a word with that meaning until  gourmet 
“acquired a greater latitude of signification,” implied to be a recent development. The 
term had previously referred to a wine-merchant's assistant, and according to Macquin 
the new meaning was based on the old: “a man who, by sipping a few drops out of the 
silver cup of the vintner, can instantly tell from what country the wine comes, and its  
age.”24 The existing association between French food and sophistication in the English-
speaking world25 may have been more responsible than Macquin's poem for the rapid 
adoption of the term, and might also explain why  gourmand was also adopted in the 
same  period  despite  its  redundancy.26 Nevertheless,  Macquin's  distinction  between 
gourmets and people who actually like to eat prevailed in its early use.
In 1835, Washington Irving described people in the American West eating “with 
an appetite unknown to the gourmets of the cities” without defining the term or even 
italicizing it.27 An 1851 article titled “Gastronomy and Civilization” in Fraser's Magazine 
Google Jul 9, 2007 (accessed May 04, 2010): iv.
24 Ibid, 16.
25 See Chapter One note 90 or Peterson, 1994: 161-84.
26 Or rather, re-adopted. The word had been used in English since the 15th C. as a pejorative term for 
someone who eats too much or figuratively for anything large or greedy, e.g. Byron's “How shall I get 
this gourmand stanza through?” However, in the 19th C., people began to use it synonymously with 
“epicure,” to refer to “one who is fond of delicate fare” or “a judge of good eating,” the way Macquin 
claims the French used the word at the time. Notably, this meaning was accompanied by a shift in 
pronunciation to the more French-like gurmᾰ rather than the Anglicized 'gʊəmənd (OED). 
27 The reference is from A Tour on the Prairies, the travelogue about his tour of the territories of the West 
published in 1835.
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associates the term with the elite: “Paul de Kock represents an age when the pretension 
to gastronomical enjoyment is as universal as liberty, equality, and fraternity; from the 
discriminating gourmetise of the young nobleman, to the expansive gourmandise of the 
voracious grisette, all more or less gastrological.”28 Although united by their “pretension 
to  gastronomical  enjoyment,”  gourmand  and  gourmet  are  separate  ends  of  the 
gastrological continuum, respectively represented by the hungry working-class girl and 
fastidious nobleman.29
The dual  purposes  of  Macquin's  poem  demonstrate  the  conflicted  status  of 
culinary sophistication in America. “Tabella Cibaria” mocks the “hardly intelligible Bills  
of Fare” displayed at French eating-houses and hotels; its publication suggests that there 
was an English-speaking audience for satire that poked fun at culinary pretentiousness. 
However, as Macquin's preface promises, it also seems designed to  educate readers to 
appreciate  that  pretentious  food.  A  favorable  review  published  in  Blackwood's 
Edinburgh Magazine suggests that Macquin was successful on both fronts:
We have seldom met a greater display of elegance and ingenuity than the 
versification  of  the  poem itself  exhibits;  nor  with a  more  easy  vein  of 
amusement than in the notes.... The quantity of information conveyed in 
this  last  part  of  the  work is  really  quite  astonishing;  and we  are  sure 
Gourmand,  Gourmet,  and  Glutton,  must  be  equally  grateful  to  the 
author.30
The bourgeois audience for  Blackwood's might well have been torn about whether to 
laugh at the pretensions of the “gourmetise” or to aspire to more “discriminating” tastes. 
For  the broader  public,  French food and the new word “gourmet”  initially  had little 
appeal.  
28 Thomas Carlyle, “Gastronomy and Civilization” Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country Vol. XLIV 
(December 1851): pp. 605, published by J. Fraser West Strand, London, Original from the University of 
Michigan digitized August 20, 2005, Web (accessed 05 May 2010).
29 In keeping with the original sense of the word, “gourmet” was exclusively used as a noun until the early 
twentieth century. The first citation for “gourmet” used as an adjective is from the Westminster Gazette 
in 1904: “The public in the matter of jokes is gourmand rather than gourmet.” 
30  Christopher North, “Remarks on Tabella Cibaria ; Or, The Bill of Fare,” Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Magazine, Vol. VII (April-Sept. 1820): 667-674, published by William Blackwood, Edinburgh and T. 
Cadell and W. Davies, Strand, London, Web (accessed 04 May 2010).
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The Rise: America's First Gourmets
Cookbook author Hilde Lee hails Thomas Jefferson as “America's first gourmet,” 
saying he was responsible for “bringing the European refinements of food to America.” 
Jefferson changed American cooking from “mundane meat and potatoes and stews and 
open-hearth  cooking  of  Colonial  times  to  the  beginnings  of  a  more  sophisticated 
cuisine.”31 The  reverence  for  French  food  Jefferson  developed  during  his  diplomatic 
service  in  France  is  well-documented  and the lavish dinners  he served at  the  White 
House  are  legendary,  but  to  say  he  changed  “our  cooking”  overstates  his  influence. 
According to Harvey Levenstein's  Revolution at the Table, Jefferson's taste for French 
dishes was shared by some wealthy Americans but “never entered the mainstream.”32 For 
much of the nineteenth century, French food was an object of populist derision because 
of its association with the elite. During Martin Van Buren's bid for re-election in 1840, 
the opposition Whig party used the fact that he had hired a French chef for the White 
House  against  him  “in  a  smear  campaign  labeling  him  an  aristocrat  intent  on  the 
restoration of monarchy.”33 Additionally, in their 1869  American Women's Home, the 
Beecher sisters refer to the American distaste for “French whim-whams.”34
The  prejudice  against  French  cooking  was  so  widespread  that  mid-century 
cookbook authors  who included ingredients  or  dishes  with French associations  were 
defensive about them. In her 1864  House and Home Papers, Harriet  Beecher Stowe 
claims  she  ought  to  be  able  to  take  some  leaves  from  foreign  cookbooks  “without 
accusations of foreign foppery”.35 “Foppery,” refers specifically to an over-concern with 
31 Ellen Koteff, “Thomas Jefferson,” Nation's Restaurant News (February 1996) BNET, CBS Interactive 
Business Network, Web (accessed 08 April 2011). 
32 Levenstein, 1988: 11. 
33 Ibid.
34 Catherine E. Beecher and Harriet Beecher Stowe, The American Woman's Home: Or, Principles of  
Domestic Science (New York, NY: J. B. Ford & Co, 1869: 179) Original from the University of 
Michigan, digitized by Google, 29 November 2006, Web (accessed 08 April 2011). 
35 Hoganson, 2007: 106. 
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appearances.  Juliet  Corson's  1877  Cooking  Manual,  extolls  the  thriftiness  of  French 
home cooks to counter the idea that French cooking was inherently fancy or profligate.36
Despite Corson's efforts,  French food was never seen as “thrifty,”  but popular 
attitudes towards foppery and whim-whams changed significantly towards the end of the 
nineteenth cenutry. The first signs of a more widespread acceptance of French cooking, 
according to Levenstein, are “menus that survive from the upper and upper-middle-class 
hotels of the post-war era.”37 Levenstein argues that the cuisine developed by the French 
upper-class of the Second Empire was especially well-suited to be a distinguishing form 
of  conspicuous  consumption  for  the  postbellum  upper  classes.  While  most  of  the 
ingredients were familiar and readily available, the “elaborate methods of preparation, 
foreign code-words, and complex dining rituals” served as a “refuge from those trying to 
scale the ramparts of their newly acquired status.”38 In the 1880s, the trend began to 
spread to the roughly fifteen percent of Americans—a quarter of all urban and suburban 
households—who Levenstein defines as “middle class” in that period. These were people 
who weren't manual laborers and employed at least one servant. The French food fad 
was largely responsible for the growing obsession with what popular publications at the 
time called “the servant problem.”39
The “servant problem” was exacerbated by service à la Russe—serving meals in 
sequential courses—which became popular first in France and then the U.S. in the late 
nineteenth century. According to etiquette writer Mary Sherwood, a dinner party with 
36 Levenstein, 1988: 8.
37 Ibid, 15.
38 Ibid, 14.
39 Letters in magazines like Good Housekeeping frequently groused about the “servant problem” and the 
magazine frequently ran articles about it, including one commissioned from the socialist writer Edward 
Bellamy on how cooperative housekeeping of the kind described in his Looking Backward might help 
alleviate the stresses of finding, training, and retaining good servants. The wealthy, Levenstein says, 
were “hardly affected by the problem,” because they were able to afford servants trained in Europe. He 
quotes Mary Hinman Abel, who wrote in 1903 that “The house service question is concerned with the 
small household only.” Some middle-class women tried to set up training courses and one of the goals 
of the home economics movement as to “elevate domestic service to a more skilled level” but most of 
their efforts were short-lived. Ibid, 63-65.
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service à la Russe  required at least one servant for every three guests. However, even 
“young couples with small means” could achieve a modified version by serving the same 
basic order of dishes,  putting the meat carving in the hands of the host, and serving 
champagne and claret throughout the meal rather than pairing a different beverage with 
each  course.  After  recounting  one  of  the  elaborate  bills  of  fare  suggested  by  Maria 
Parola's popular 1881 cookbook aimed at the middle class, Levenstein notes: 
We will  never know if anyone ever served exactly that meal [the menu 
described  by  Maria  Parola],  although  given  the  popularity  of  Parola's 
books,  it  is  likely that some did.  However, what is  interesting is  that a 
mere fifteen years earlier it would have been inconceivable for anyone to 
even suggest that a dinner of this sophistication could or indeed should be 
cooked and serve in a middle-class home.40 
Kristin  Hoganson  makes  a  similar  argument  in  Consumer's  Imperium:  The 
Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920. By the end of the nineteenth 
century,  American  cookbook  writers  had  stopped  being  defensive  about  French 
influences and instead “assumed that foreignness had cachet.”41 Foods and fashions from 
France became popular among the upper middle-class women who were national taste 
leaders during the postbellum period42 because cultivating sophisticated tastes was both 
a way for women to distinguish their homes from lower classes and a socially-acceptable 
way for women to enjoy the bounty of the growing U.S.  empire.  Whereas Levenstein 
focuses on the anxieties generated by the social expectations of postbellum entertaining, 
Hoganson  emphasizes  the  pleasures  women  derived  from  demonstrating  their 
sophistication.  Those  anxieties  and  pleasures  were  mutually  constitutive.  As  advice 
columns about “the servant problem” testify, pulling off a successful dinner party with 
modified service à la Russe was stressful, but it wouldn't have been a powerful form of 
distinction if anyone could do it. 
Hoganson  talks  about  sophisticated  and  cosmopolitan  consumption 
40 Ibid, 20.
41 Hoganson, 2007: 106.
42 Apparently describing the same population as Levenstein and Ohmann. 
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interchangeably,  suggesting  that  there  was  then—as  now—a  lot  of  overlap  between 
interest  in  food  constructed  as  gourmet  and  foreign.  However,  it's  worth  making  a 
conceptual distinction between foreignness and the aesthetic superiority implied by the 
word “gourmet.” The latter was associated almost exclusively with French cooking until 
the  later  part  of  the  twentieth  century.  Hoganson notes  several  times  that  although 
culinary internationalism ranged from Hungary to Jamaica to the Philippines, French 
traditions were uniquely privileged: 
The great exception to the tendency to publish a narrow range of dishes 
from any given place was France.  'It  cannot be denied that  the French 
excel all nations in the excellence of their cuisine,' wrote Fannie Merritt 
Farmer  in  The  Boston  Cooking-School  Cook  Book,  and  many  of  her 
contemporaries agreed.... Besides inserting the word 'French' into recipe 
names, food writers conveyed French origins through nomenclature—as 
in hors d'oeuvres, bouquet de corsage, consommé, and filet de boeuf.43
Hoganson conflates the exceptional reputation of French food with the overall 
trend towards cosmopolitanism seen in internationally-themed dinners and Japanese 
teas:
Society and cooking pages alike reported on the preferences of the rich—
sometimes  printing  the  recipes  favored  by  their  French  chefs....  As  a 
result,  continental  and  especially  French  food  became  thoroughly 
associated  with  luxury.  If  home  cooking  smelled  of  middle-class 
provincialism,  European  cuisine  evoked  the  cosmopolitanism  of  high 
society.44
However, French food was associated with luxury long before the turn of the twentieth 
century. What changed was not the reputation of French food, but its popularity. In the 
antebellum period, “luxury” was widely regarded with suspicion. The Japanese teas and 
filet de boeuf aux champignons that became popular in the post-bellum period may both 
have  evoked  cosmopolitanism,  but  when  eating  the  latter,  people  didn't  don  ethnic 
costumes to play at a kind of foreignness they could subsequently disavow. The middle-
class struggle to perform service à la Russe was driven by the desire to meet new social 
expectations for genteel entertaining, not to experience something exotic or learn about 
43 Hoganson, 2007: 107.
44 Ibid., 111. 
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the people of France. 
The Fall: Many Different Homes, All “Home-Style”
From our contemporary vantage-point, it can be difficult to understand how food 
essentially  constructed as  better could ever go out  of  style.  Who doesn't  want  better 
food? But “gourmet” doesn't designate  objectively  superior food; it's an aesthetic that, 
from the  beginning,  was  marked primarily  by  a  particular  kind of  attention  to  food 
associated with pretension. “Gourmet” isn't inherent superiority itself, it's signaled by a 
claim to superiority (and especially a claim associated with wealth). Gourmet connotes 
luxury,  sophistication  and  refinement;  it  is  not  the  “better”  of  home  cooking  or 
authenticity or healthfulness or social responsibility. After the initial flowering of interest 
in the gourmet aesthetic at the turn of the twentieth century, it faded from popularity. 
Like an outdated clothing, it didn't disappear entirely, but towards the end of the 1920s, 
“gourmet” ceased to be a mainstream preoccupation.
According to Levenstein's Paradox of Plenty:
By 1930 the ranks of  the French restaurants  had been decimated,  and 
many  of  the  others  had  either  passed  away  or  sunk  into  mediocrity. 
Moreover,  a  general  prejudice  against  French  cooking  seemed to  have 
reemerged,  alongside  widespread  ignorance  of  what  it  was.  In  a  1929 
experiment,  the  Fred  Harvey  System,  which  ran  the  dining  cars  for  a 
number of railroads, discovered that even the well-heeled patrons of the 
Santa  Fe  Railroad's  crack  California  Limited  would  order  much  more 
steak when it was called “Small Tenderloin, Mushrooms” than when it was 
labeled “Filet Mignon, Champignons.”45
As the Fred Harvey System experiment example shows, the change was not simply the 
result  of  people  having less  money to  spend on food.  Prohibition contributed to  the 
demise of some restaurants by eliminating one of their primary sources of profit, but 
Levenstein notes that even after Prohibition was lifted, fine dining didn't recover. Even 
among the elite,  the dominant aesthetic  shifted to “home-style” foods—those seen as 
simple, economical, wholesome, and wholly American. 
45 Levenstein,1993: 45.
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In 1947 the Gallup polling organization asked a random sampling of American 
adults, “If cost were no factor and you could have absolutely anything that you wanted to 
eat, what would you choose for a perfect meal?” They didn't publish the complete results 
of the poll, but compiled the answers into one “perfect meal”: 
Approximately one person in every four polled would start with a drink of 
some kind. The chief preferences are for some variety of gin cocktail or a 
plain Manhattan. Here's the complete menu for the perfect meal: 
Fruit or shrimp cocktail
Vegetable soup or chicken broth
Steak




Apple pie a la mode
Coffee
Second choice in meat is roast beef, third choice roast chicken.46
Levenstein cites these survey results as evidence of the unchanging nature of American 
tastes. Food historian Amy Bentley, on the other hand, uses them as evidence of the rise 
of the “ordered meal” consisting of a large portion of a high-status food like meat and 
smaller portions of complementary foods, usually vegetables.47 Bentley argues that this 
structure became more important during the Second World War as a response to general 
cultural  instability,  particularly  the  fear  of  food shortages.  According  to  Bentley,  the 
perceived superiority of ordered meals to one-pot soups was especially important to the 
middle classes,  “who were more anxious about their status and the structure of their 
meals than those below (or above) them on the socioeconomic scale.”48 When the Army 
polled its enlisted ranks about their food preferences in 1963, the favorites were largely 
the same: steak, french fries, corn on the cob, sliced tomatoes, hot rolls or biscuits, and 
46 Gallup, 1972: 636 qtd. in Levenstein, 1993: 119. 
47 She also refers to this as the A+2B meal structure, following anthropologist Mary Douglas. The “A” is a 
high-status food, usually protein, prepared and served separately from two lower-status 
accompaniments. This is contrasted with casseroles or stews. Bentley notes that “until recently middle 
America has been prejudiced against “mixed” or spicy foods. One-pot soups and stews, and anything 
containing garlic or chili pepper, were reminiscent of peasant status.” Amy Bentley, “Islands of 
Serenity: Gender, Race, and Ordered Meals During World War II,” Food in the U.S.A: A Reader, ed. 
Carole M. Counihan (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002: 179). 
48  Ibid.
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strawberry shortcake (which barely  beat  apple  pie).  Although the industry developed 
during the wars dramatically changed how food was produced, Levenstein says, “one of 
the striking aspects of the new food technology was how little it altered basic American 
food tastes.”49 
The homogeneity and mediocrity now associated with the 1950s and the rise of 
processed foods shouldn't be overstated. Laura Shapiro argues in Something from the 
Oven: Reinventing Dinner in 1950s America that home cooks continued to devote a lot 
of time, derive a lot of pleasure, and take a lot of pride in feeding their families. Food 
manufacturers had to entice women to buy their products by offering ways for them to 
put their own personal touches on ready-mix or prepared food. Boxed cake mixes that 
included every ingredient necessary and only required that  the baker add water sold 
poorly because they seemed like a way of “cheating” at the emotionally-charged task of 
cooking for one's family. So consumer researcher Ernest Dichter came up with “the egg 
theory.” Mixes that required bakers to add an egg enabled them to take advantage of the 
convenience and reliability of the mix without removing themselves from the process 
entirely. Sales soared.50 However, adding an egg to a boxed mix or even baking a cake 
from scratch was different from attempting to make something gourmet.  The simple, 
wholesome, and American aesthetic dominated between the 1930s and the mid-1970s, 
especially among the growing number of Americans who considered themselves middle 
class. 
What  simple,  wholesome,  and  American  meant  varied.  Regional  differences 
persisted despite the rise of industrial agriculture, national brands, restaurants chains, 
and mass media. Regional variation in American foodways is the primary subject of the 
America Eats project started in 1939 by the Federal Writer's Project, one of the New 
Deal arts programs started as part of the WPA. America Eats was initially conceived of 
49 Levenstein, 1993: 119. 
50 Shapiro, 2004:75.
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as a follow-up to the FWP's unexpectedly successful series of guidebooks, which were 
somewhere  between  essay  collections  and  travel  guides  with  a  historical  and 
anthropological bent.  The editors planned to produce one for each of the existing 48 
states, Puerto Rico, Alaska, Washington, D.C. and about thirty other cities, regions, and 
small towns.51 Every guidebook included a section on black history and culture, which 
Mark Kurlansky claims was part of the inspiration for America Eats: “It [America Eats] 
came out  of  the ethnic books,  which in turn came out of  the 'Negro'  sections of  the 
guidebooks.”52 What's just as striking as the variation in local ingredients, recipes, and 
traditions is the similarity in what people across the country prided themselves in and 
wanted to share with the writers.
Donna Gabaccia says in  We Are What We Eat  that the project's administrators 
and  editors  encouraged  writers  to  focus  on  “traditional  American  celebrations  of 
community through food,” instead of “mongrel” or “commercial” foods and events, but 
the  writers  were  not  always  compliant.53 They  sent  in  submissions  about  hot  dogs, 
machine-cut Suzi-Q potatoes invented in Oklahoma City, Coca-Cola parties in Atlanta, 
and drive-in restaurants in Colorado, all of which were “marked for exclusion from the 
final publication.”54 The project ended abruptly when the U.S. entered World War II and 
most of the submissions remained unpublished until 2009. Kurlansky selected about five 
dozen of the original articles, including many of the ones marked for exclusion, for a 
collection  titled  The  Food  of  a  Younger  Land.  Given  the  biases  of  the  project's 
administrators and the fact that the editors encouraged writers to “liven up” their pieces 
with fiction, the book is hardly the “untouched paper trail into the past” that Kurlansky 
makes it out to be.55 As Laura Shapiro suggests in her review: “Is this how America ate? 
Who knows? But it's how America chose to imagine itself at history's table, comfortably 
51  Mark Kurlansky, The Food of a Younger Land (New York: Riverhead Books, 2009: 2).
52 Ibid, 14.
53 Gabaccia,1998: 144. 
54 Ibid.
55 Kurlansky, 2009: 22. 
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surrounded  by  like-minded  neighbors  and  the  endless  bounty  of  the  land.”56 The 
diversity of foodways in America and conflicts between America Eats writers and editors 
belie the appeals to national unity and “like-mindedness.”57
An article on the “Italian feeds” of  Barre,  Vermont opens with the claim that 
“government official, professional, clerk, or truck driver” (Yankees from all walks of life) 
could appreciate the home-cooking served by Italian immigrant widows trying to make a 
living after  their  husbands succumbed to “occupational sickness” at  the local  granite 
quarry.58 That kind of ethnic “home cooking” was how most of the writers and people 
who  contributed  their  stories  and  recipes  to  America  Eats “chose  to  imagine 
[themselves] at history's table.”59 They primarily featured the kind of holiday fare that 
they couldn't afford to eat daily in either Depression-era America or the “Old World.” 
When the University of Iowa decided to publish the America Eats manuscript in 1992, 
they contacted Louis I. Szathmáry II, the Chicago restauranteur who had donated it. He 
volunteered to try making all the recipes in the collection and edit them as necessary to  
make them “enjoyable eating.” His preface notes: 
There isn't one vegetable dish among the group or not even one that is 
predominantly  vegetable....  All  immigrants  from all  parts  of  the  world 
arriving  in  the  United  States  start  to  replace  their  everyday  national 
dishes  with  their  homeland's  special  holiday  and  festival  dishes  and 
Sunday meals. Germans in America don't eat daily German food, rather 
German Sunday fare.... I think it is natural that sixty years ago, when the 
United  States  was  an  active  'melting  pot,'  a  young  American  writer 
exploring the traditional national dishes of his fellow Americans of Dutch, 
Russian,  Italian,  Mexican,  and  other  origins  overwhelmingly  received 
recipes for national holiday feast dishes.60
Their Sunday fare idealized tradition and home, not French-inspired gourmet.
Even the few descriptions of high society in America Eats are worlds apart from 
56 Laura Shapiro, “Down-Home-Cooking Nation: Did you know the Federal Writers Project funded 
foodies?” Slate, 02 June 2009, Web (accessed 07 May 2010).
57 Shapiro says the project reveals “how America chose to imagine itself at history's table, comfortably 
surrounded by like-minded neighbors and the endless bounty of the land.” Kurlansky appears to take 
this at face value. 
58 Kurlansky, 2009: 53.
59 Ibid.
60 Louis Szathmáry, “Preface,” America Eats, by Nelson Algren (Iowa City, IA: 1992: xvi). 
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the anxiously aspirational “modified  service à la Russe” and costumed ethnic dinners 
Americans engaged in at the turn of the century. In a short piece by children's book 
author Jerry Felsheim about the “New York Literary Tea,” he explains that the literary 
tea had only lately transformed from an event for women's “study clubs” to a cocktail  
party  and  “informal  gathering  place  for  intellectual  sophisticates  on  their  way  to 
dinner.”61 Felsheim says, “The conventional beverages are dry martini and Manhattan 
cocktails,  with  scotch  for  those  who insist....Food receives  little  attention.  Usually  it 
consists of a few uninteresting canapés passed haphazardly about,  with few takers.”62 
While  not  all  wealthy,  the  people  in  attendance  were  part  of  the  intelligentsia  and 
cultural elite. Although the word “canapé” suggests the lingering influence French food 
on aspirational catering, the party-goers' indifference to the food and cocktails instead of 
wine reflect the changed attitude towards the gourmet aesthetic. 
The Return: From Sonoma to Safeway 
Foodways  associated  with  pretension  and  sophistication  never  went  away 
entirely, which is one reason there are so many theories about when gourmet started its 
comeback. In The United States of Arugula, David Kamp dates the first sign of gourmet's 
revival to 1939. In that year James Beard, “Dean of American gastronomy,” co-founded 
the catering company that launched his career and Henri Soulé traveled from France to 
America to serve as the maitre d' of the restaurant in the French Pavilion at the New 
York World's Fair. The restaurant served over a hundred thousand meals over the course 
of  the  Fair's  two  summers.  Kamp  admits  that  the  mere  arrival  of  both  men in  the 
American food industry didn't have immediate effects. He corroborates claims that until 
the 1980s, most middle class Americans favored the “meat and potatoes” cuisine still 
identified  as  quintessentially  American.  Kamp  says,  “the  very  unprestigiousness  of 
61 Kurlansky, 2009: 40. 
62 Ibid, 41.
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America's food culture was what left the door open for people like Beard, [Julia] Child, 
and [Craig] Claiborne [the New York Times' first food critic] to come in and make it their 
own.”63 
Kamp  dates  the  real  transformation  of  American  eating  to  1971,  when  Chez 
Panisse opened in Berkeley, California. However, most Americans who appreciate the 
“California cuisine” Alice Waters is often credited with popularizing have never been to 
the landmark restaurant or even heard of her. Alice Waters and Chez Panisse catered to 
a growing demand; they didn't  create it. Nora Ephron claims the first sign of the the 
coming “gourmet explosion” was in the 1950s. In an essay originally published in New 
York Magazine titled “The Food Establishment,” she describes the sudden popularity of 
what she calls the “first fashionable international food”64: 
In the 1950s, suddenly, no one knew quite why or how, everyone began to 
serve curry. Dinner parties in fashionable homes featured curried lobster. 
Dinner parties in middle-income homes featured curried chicken. Diner 
parties in frozen-food compartments featured curried rice. And with the 
arrival of curry, the first fashionable international food, food acquired a 
chic, a gloss of snobbery it had hitherto possessed only in certain upper-
income groups. Hostesses were expected to know that iceberg lettuce was 
declasse and  tuna  fish  casseroles  de  trop.  Lancers  sparkling  rose  and 
Manschewitz were replaced on the table by Bourdeaux. Overnight rumaki 
had a fling and became a cliché.65 
The new concern with “chic” foods Ephron describes did emerge earlier in her native 
New York than in the rest of the country, but probably not as early as the 1950s. The 
curry craze she describes was prompted by a recipe for “Country Captain” popularized by 
Associated Press food columnist Cecily Brownstone in the 1963. At that time Country 
Captain  was  “widely  regarded  as  a  specialty  of  the  southern  United  States,”  not  an 
63 Kamp, 2006: 10. 
64 As noted in the introduction, although “sophisticated” and “cosmopolitan” eating sometimes reflect 
conceptually distinct values and desires, they are also very frequently intertwined especially in the 
popular discourse on food trends. Although some effort will be made to distinguish between the 
competing and even sometimes conflicting discourses of gourmet and ethnic or international foods, at 
other times it will be difficult or impossible to separate them. 
65 Nora Ephron, “The Food Establishment,” Wallflower at the Orgy 1968 (New York, NY: Random House, 
2007: 6). 
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international dish.66 Rumaki, an appetizer usually consisting of chicken livers and water 
chestnuts  wrapped in bacon and then broiled,  first  appeared in a  cookbook in 1965. 
Anyone attempting to cook gourmet food in the 1950s or 1960s would have been an 
outlier, not part of a mainstream trend.67 
Even in New York City, a journalist who surveyed 200 Manhattan shoppers in 
1961 concluded that “most Manhattanites eat well...if unimaginatively.”68 Aside from a 
few exceptions,69 the journalist says, “when asked for a typical dinner menu, a majority of 
those asked listed steaks  or chops,  a  green or  yellow vegetable,  salad and gelatin  or 
canned or fresh fruit for dessert. In moderate to upper income homes, pot roast, beef 
stew, roast lamb, pork or beef, and roasted chicken are some other popular meat dishes.” 
Only  the  couple  interviewed  in  Greenwich  Village  expressed  “cosmopolitan  tastes,” 
including the French, Italian, and German foods they came to know and like when they 
traveled in Europe, “Arabic dishes” prepared by the wife who was originally from Egypt, 
and the “chopped liver, borscht, and gefuellte[sic] fish” the husband grew up eating. The 
article's  tone  foreshadowed  the  changes  to  come,  applying  the  pejorative  adjectives 
“monotonous  and  uninspired”  to  the  meals  most  New  Yorkers  eat  and  praising  the 
couple from the village who “take advantage of  one of  New York's  best  attractions—
foreign restaurants and food shops that offer delicacies from every corner of the globe.” 
However,  the mainstream palate was reflected better by the woman from Stuyvesant 
town, which the article describes as populated by “predominantly young, middle-income 
66 Molly O'Neill, “Long Ago Smitten, She Remains True to the Country Captain,” The New York Times, 17 
April 1991, Web (accessed 08 April 2011).
67 Brownstone began to investigate the dish in 1960, and discovered that it had first appeared in an 1867 
cookbook by the Philadelphia writer Eliza Leslie, who in turn had speculated that it was introduced to 
the English by an Indian or “Sepoy” officer—who were sometimes referred to as “country captains.” 
The rumaki she mentions, which is an appetizer usually consisting of chicken livers and water chestnuts 
wrapped in bacon and then broiled appears on the menu from Victor “Trader Vic” Bergeron's restaurant 
Don the Beachcomber as early as 1941 and may have appeared in some fashionable homes in the 1950s, 
but likely wasn't something many middle-class people were serving or enjoying until the 1960s. 
68 June Owen, “How New Yorkers Eat: Rich and Poor Have Monotonous Diets,” The New York Times, 16 
March 1961, p. 40, ProQuest Historical Newspapers (retrieved 08 April 2011). 
69 In the African-American neighborhood of Harlem, cooks made use of cheaper cuts of meat and adopted 
a more casual attitude towards the time of the evening meal and recent Puerto Rican immigrants 
reported a preference for rice and bean dishes. Ibid.
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families,” who says “My husband likes plain food.... Give him steak and he's happy. If I 
try a new dish, he looks as if he thought I was trying to poison him.”70
Americans' limited exposure to gourmet food in the mid-century was what made 
Julia  Child  seem  like  such  a  revelation  when  she  first  appeared  on  Boston  public 
television in 1962, demonstrating how to prepare unfamiliar and sophisticated-seeming 
French  dishes  with  her  peculiar  charm.71 The  French  Chef quickly  became  the  most 
popular show on WGBH Boston and was picked up by public television stations across 
the country. From the vantage point of 2010, the nationwide broadcast of her show may 
seem to mark the “arrival” of gourmet in the national consciousness, but as influential as 
Julia Child may have been, the extent of her popularity is often exaggerated.72 A better 
indication of the mainstream popularity of foodways constructed as sophisticated is the 
rise of wine and the kitchen equipment associated with gourmet cooking. 
The  history  of  Williams-Sonoma,  whose  website  describes  it  as  “the  premier 
specialty  retailer  of  home furnishings  and gourmet  cookware  in  the  United  States”73 
provides a useful index. Charles Williams was another member of what Kamp calls the 
“first wave” of the “gourmet revolution.” He  got the idea for a “gourmet” kitchenwares 
store after visiting France in 1953, where he observed the differences between French 
and American home cooking.  As he told  Fortune magazine in 2003:  “There were so 
many things we didn't have in this country, such as heavy sauté pans, huge stockpots, 
fish poachers, and an endless array of bakeware. There [in France] was no difference 
between what home cooks and restaurants used. But in this country, what home cooks 
could buy were relatively inexpensive pots  and pans,  made out  of  thin aluminum or 
70 Ibid.
71 The French Chef aired on PBS from 1963 to 1966 (in black and white) and 1970 to 1972 (in color) and 
then in re-runs for many years afterward. Child's first television appearance was on I've Been Reading, a 
book chat program hosted by Albert Duhamel, a professor of English at Boston College. According to 
Kamp, she brought the equipment she needed to make an omelet to “merry up the proceedings. . . 
correctly deducing that programs of this sort tended to be dull static affairs.” Kamp, 2006: 93.
72 See note 19. 
73 “About Us,” Williams-Sonoma Website, 2009, Web (accessed 08 April 2011). 
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tin.”74 He began selling imported pots out of a defunct hardware store in Sonoma in 
1956. His business was particularly successful with wealthy San Franciscans who had 
summer  homes  there;  they  eventually  convinced  him  to  move  into  the  city,  but  he 
retained  the  name  that  evoked  his  pastoral  beginnings.  His  business  flourished, 
particularly after the San Francisco public television station picked up The French Chef. 
He says they never knew what Julia Child was going to make on the show that week, but 
the next day customers would come in looking for soufflé dishes or charlotte molds like 
the ones they had seen her use. With the help of other luminaries like Beard and food 
writer Elizabeth David, Williams-Sonoma quickly positioned itself as the discerning Bay 
area cook's source for gourmet kitchen goods.
Williams began  expanding  his  customer  base  in  1971  with the first  Williams-
Sonoma catalog. Despite its humble beginnings—the first one was printed in black and 
white and fit into standard business envelopes—the catalog was immediately successful, 
probably because the product descriptions gave Williams the opportunity to educate his 
clients about the tools and ingredients he discovered during his annual trips to Europe. 
The business continued to grow throughout the 1970s. In 1973, Williams incorporated 
with the help of a few business partners and opened a second store in Beverly Hills. The 
year after that, they opened another store in an upscale retail area of Palo Alto and then a 
fourth  in  Costa  Mesa.75 Meanwhile,  the  number  of  Americans  experimenting  with 
different  kinds  of  foods  was  growing,  exemplified  by  the  increasing  interest  in  the 
beverage most associated with French food and sophistication: wine. 
A  1970s  radio  campaign  for  Blue  Nun,  a  brand  of  sweet  white  wine  from 
Germany, starring Jerry Stiller  and Anne Meara reflects both the growing interest in 
wine and anxiety about how to drink it. The tag line for the campaign was “the wine that 
74 Arlyn Tobias Gajilan, “From Pots to Poachers, I Searched for Tools That Would Transform American 
Kitchens. Along The Way, I Discovered That Good Taste Can Build a Business,” Fortune, 01 
September 2003, CNN Money, Web (accessed 08 April 2011). 
75 “Company Overview,” Williams Sonoma Website, 2007, Web (accessed 08 April 2011). 
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goes as well with meat as it does with fish.”76 Along with some “Who's on first?” style 
banter involving the brand name, the spots generally sought to take the stress out of 
selecting wine. In one of the spots, Stiller and Meara play strangers assigned to the same 
table on an ocean cruise:
Jerry Stiller speaks: “Would you like to share a bottle of wine? I noticed a 
little Blue Nun at the captain's table.”
“Poor thing, replies Anne Meara. “Maybe she's seasick.” 
“No,” puts in Stiller. “Blue Nun is a wine. A delicious white wine.
“Oh,  we can't  have a  white  wine if  you're  having meat  and I'm 
having fish,” Meara says firmly.
But Stiller persists: “Sure we can. Blue Nun is a white wine that's 
correct with any dish. Your filet of soul. My filet of mignon. 
“Oh, it's so nice to meet a man who knows the finer things,” Meara 
says. “You must be a gourmet.” 
“No, as a matter of fact I'm an accountant.”77 
Stiller described the concept of the campaign as “two idiots, two nudnicks” discussing 
wines, but apparently even an “idiot” in the 1970s would have known it was “incorrect” 
to drink white wine with red meat or red wine with fish.78 The reassurance that Blue Nun 
was “correct with any dish” and the vaudeville-style repartee sought to make Blue Nun 
seem approachable compared to imported wines whose foreign names were printed in 
forbidding  Gothic  script.  However,  as  an  imported  table  wine,  Blue  Nun  was  still  a 
sophisticated choice compared to jug wines and Night Train. Sales of Blue Nun increased 
every year the Stiller and Meara commercials were on the air and by 1976, Blue Nun was 
the best-selling white wine in America.79 
Although the niche markets for gourmet foods, kitchenwares, and wine expanded 
in  the  1970s,  they  remained  confined  mostly  to  the  coasts  and  super-elite.  Most 
Americans stuck to familiar, “home-style” foods, albeit in new forms developed by the 
post-war food industries. Kamp recounts an anecdote from Judy Rodgers, chef of the 
76 Larry Oakner, And Now a Few Laughs from Our Sponsor: The Best Fifty Years of Radio Commercials 
(New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2002: 65). 
77 “Humor Helps Change U.S. Tastes in Wine,” Nation's Business (pre-1986), 01 April 1976, p. 41 
ProQuest (retrieved 26 August 2009). 
78 Nadine Brozan, “Chronicle,” The New York Times, 04 March 1995, Web (accessed 08 April 2011). 
79 Oakner, 2002: 67. 
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famed Zuni Cafe in San Francisco. Rogers returned to St. Louis in 1974 after spending a 
year in France in an exchange with the daughter of Jean Troisgros, owner of the Hotel  
Troigros in Roanne: 
The first thing I ever tried to cook, the summer after I got home from 
France, was Jean's little salad of green beans. . . Just little velvety green 
beans coated with a little crème fraiche and he would put little ribbons of 
champignons de Paris [button mushrooms] in it. . . . I thought 'Heck, I can 
make this.' But I found out that I wasn't gonna find these ingredients in 
St. Louis in 1974. The green beans in the supermarket in St. Louis were 
like Lincoln Logs. And I made the salad, and it was just dreadful.80 
In most cities, there were no specialty markets selling imported cheese or haricots verts 
or the Bordeaux Ephron claimed had supplanted Manischewitz in the 1950s. It wasn't 
until the 1980s that gourmet food and wine truly became popular nationwide. 
Williams-Sonoma opened its first store outside of California in 1983, and by 1991 
there were 91 locations across the country. Both total and per capita wine sales in the 
U.S. increased steadily until 1987 (see Figure I.1 on page 5). There were a few years of 
decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which wine market analysts usually attribute to 
continued contractions in the fortified wine market and the dramatic  drop-off  in the 
number of people reaching the legal drinking age (due to the “baby bust” that followed 
the  “baby  boom”).81 However,  even  in  those  leaner  years,  the  circulation  of  Wine 
Spectator continued to increase,  suggesting that  there was still  a  growing interest in 
learning about wine. 
Wine  Spectator started  off  as  a  tabloid-style  semi-weekly  paper  on  the  wine 
industry in Northern California in 1976. With a circulation of less than 1,000, it was on 
the verge of folding when an investment banker named Marvin Shanken purchased it in 
1979. The next year, Wine Spectator  began publishing scores on a 100-point scale,  a 
practice the influential wine critic Robert Parker had pioneered a few years earlier in his 
80 Kamp, 2000: 239. 
81 Sumner et al, An Economic Survey of the Wine and Winegrape Industry in the United States and  
Canada, University of California at Davis Agricultural Issues Center White Papers, 02 December 2001: 
7, Web (accessed 08 April 2011). 
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newsletter  Wine Advocate.82 Parker's system was designed to get away from confusing 
subjective descriptions and inflated reviews from writers with an investment in the wines 
they were rating. By adopting the seemingly objective scoring system,  Wine Spectator 
sought  readers  seeking a  clear  guide to  making “correct”  wine choices.  By 1987,  the 
magazine was publishing scores for over 1,000 wines per year,  circulation was up to 
65,000, and Shanken had the publication redesigned as a glossy magazine.83 Despite the 
early 1990s slump in wine sales, by 1993, the audited circulation of Wine Spectator had 
risen to 120,000 and its revenues approached $11 million.84 
By  the  1980s,  culinary  sophistication  had  again  become  a  dominant  culinary 
aesthetic instead of the exclusive provenance of an urban elite. The French restaurant 
also returned, first in cities on the coasts and eventually nationwide. In 1982, the French-
trained chef Wolfgang Puck opened the restaurant Spago on Sunset Strip in Los Angeles; 
Spago  is  now  the  flagship  of  a  culinary  empire  that  includes  twenty  fine  dining 
establishments,  more  than  eighty  quick-casual  “Wolfgang  Puck  Express”  locations,  a 
premium  catering  service,  kitchen  wares,  cookbooks,  a  line  of  prepared  foods,  and 
occasional cameo appearances in television shows and movies.85 The national successes 
of  Wolfgang  Puck,  Williams-Sonoma  and  Wine  Spectator reflect  the  sea  change  in 
mainstream taste between 1961 when even Manhattanites preferred “monotonous and 
uninspired” meals and 1981, when  Business Week reported that Safeway—the nation's 
largest supermarket chain—had equipped 75 percent of their stores with a “gourmet” 
section.86
82 Kevin Zraly, Windows on the World: Complete Wine Course (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 
2007: 207). 
83 Linda Moss, “Wine Magazine Tries to Drink from Deeper Advertising Cup,” Crain's New York  
Business, 3.44L p. 28, 02 November 1987, ABI/INFORM Dateline, Document ID: 5476815 (retrieved 
08 April 2011). 
84 Joshua Levine, “The Good Life," Forbes, 18 January 1993:103. 
85 The word “empire” comes directly from the biography on his official website. “Meet Wolfgang,” 
Wolfgang Puck, 2011, Web (accessed 08 April 2011). 
86 “A New Twist: Supermarkets with All the Frills,” Business Week, 2701: p. 122, 17 August 1981, 
ABI/INFORM Global Document ID: 1363541 (retrieved 08 April 2011). 
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I I :  W e i g h t - l o s s  D i e t i n g  a n d  t h e  I d e a l  o f  T h i n n e s s
Weight is a cultural condition. A scale does not make it  
more  or  less  real.  Fatness  too  is  a  cultural  condition.  
Calipers  are  a  pretext  and  pretense.  There  can  be  no  
timelessly perfect diet because the act of losing weight or  
shedding fat, like the desire itself, is culturally bounded.
—Hillel Schwartz87
Unholy Appetites: Food and the Body
Like  the  broader  concern  with  culinary  sophistication  invoked  by  the  word 
gourmet,  the  concern  about  the  moral  and  medical  significance  of  excessive 
consumption and its relationship to the body has a long history.88 In the fifth century BC, 
Hippocrates observed that extreme fatness was correlated with infertility and premature 
death and outlined elaborate weight-loss regimens:
Obese people and those desiring to lose weight should perform hard work 
before food. Meals should be taken after exertion and while still panting 
from fatigue  and with  no  other  refreshment  before  meals  except  only 
wine,  diluted and slightly cold.  Their meals should be prepared with a 
sesame or seasoning and other similar substances and be of a fatty nature 
as people get thus satiated with little food. They should, moreover, eat 
only once a day and take no baths and sleep on a hard bed and walk naked 
as long as possible.89
 
Representations  of  extreme  fatness  in  pre-modern  literature  and  art  tend  to  be 
somewhat  pejorative;  characters  who  are  merely  plump  may  be  jolly,  but  the 
exceptionally large tend to be tragic.90 In Shakespeare's Henry IV, King Harry attempts 
87 Schwartz, 1986: 8. 
88 The language here is deliberately vague because it wouldn't be accurate to say that the Ancient Greeks 
were concerned about “fatness,” or to assume that “fatness” had the same meaning—either physically 
or symbolically. 
89 J. Mann Chadwick, The Medical Works of Hippocrates (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific, 1950: 205).
90 Attempting to infer information about how people thought about fatness, what size people actually 
were, or what people thought of as ideal or beautiful based on paintings and literature is complicated for 
many reasons—paintings of religious and mythical figures may use body size to represent power, 
abundance, spiritual purity, or health in ways that may or may not be related to prevailing beauty ideals. 
Even portraits of living humans were often designed flatter or offer a symbolic representation of their 
subjects rather than capture them in a photo-realistic way. Similar issues trouble the recent attempts to 
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to dismiss the corpulent Falstaff with a pun that suggests fatness was also associated 
with premature mortality in seventeenth century England: “Make less thy body hence, 
and more thy grace/ Leave gormandizing. Know the grave doth gape/ For thee thrice 
wider than for other men.”91 Early Christian texts define gluttony as a sin,  and some 
scholars argue that religious fasting and the sometimes-skeletal thinness it could lead to 
was  an even more important  marker  of  piety  than chastity,  especially  for  women in 
medieval Europe.92 Many contemporary accounts of the “obesity epidemic” gesture to 
these precursors as evidence that humans have always considered fatness medically and 
morally  dangerous  and  understood  the  “common  sense”  relationship  between 
overeating, fatness, and health.93 
However, historical accounts of slimming practices reveal significant differences 
in attitudes towards body size in different times and places. Just in the last century the 
U.S. has seen dramatic shifts in beliefs about how fat or thin people should be, how they 
ought to go about achieving an “ideal” weight, and what their failure to do so might say 
about  them.  Although  there  are  conflicting  accounts  about  the  development  of 
mainstream  dieting,  historians  generally  agree  that  dieting  specifically  to  achieve 
“thinness” first became widespread in America during the 1880s and 1920s. Before that,  
bodily  regimens  were  concerned  more  with  spiritual  purity  and  discomforts  like 
indigestion and constipation than achieving a particular body size. 
Francine Prose argues in her book on gluttony for the Oxford series on the “seven 
make inferences about eating practices and portion sizes based on paintings of the “Last Supper” 
through the ages. Wansink, B and C. S. Wansink, “The Largest Last Supper: Depictions of Portion Size 
and Plate Size Increased Over the Millennium,” The International Journal of Obesity 34 (March 2010) 
Web (accessed 13 May 2011).
91 William Shakespeare, Henry IV Part II Act V:Scene 5: 50-3, The Norton Shakespeare ed. Stephen 
Greenblatt (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1997: 1374.
92 Caroline Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987: 24).
93 See W. M. Ayers, “Changing Attitudes Towards Overweight and Reducing,” Journalof the American 
Dietetic Association 34 (January 1958): 23-9; George A. Bray et al, Handbook of Obesity: Etiology and 
Pathophysiology (New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1998: 17); AJ Stunkard et al, “Stigmatization of 
Obesity in Medieval Times: Asia and Europe,” International Journal of Obesity 22 (1998): 1141-1144. 
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deadly sins” that theologians like Evagrius of Pontus and St. Augustine were concerned 
primarily with the spiritual significance of the  act of over-eating and the worse sins it 
might  lead  to,  not  the  resulting  corpulence.  Sermons  against  gluttony  declared  it  a 
cardinal vice because it represented an impious worship of the senses and weakened the 
defenses against drunkenness and lustful acts. Overeating was a gateway sin that might 
lead to more serious transgressions. Manuals of penance offered stricter penalties for the 
“arrogance  of  excessive  fasting”  than  for  overindulgence  in  food.94 Although 
representations  of  atypical  fatness  in  Western  literature  and  visual  art  tend  to  be 
unflattering,95 the historical  scarcity  and unequal  distribution  of  food  also  generated 
associations  between  moderate  fatness  and  wealth,  generosity,  health,  and  prestige. 
Those associations prevailed in the United States until the late nineteenth century.
Contrary to the popular notion that the American obsession with thinness has 
increased steadily since then, more nuanced accounts show that its rise over the course 
of the twentieth century was slow and uneven. Like the gourmet aesthetic, there was no 
consistent or inevitable progression from the emergence of dieting at the turn of the 
twentieth  century  to  the  1980s  diet  revolution  and  the  rise  of  an  extreme  ideal  of 
thinness  exemplified  by  1990s  “heroin  chic.”96 The  belief  that  thinness  is  beautiful, 
admirable, and directly related to self-control and virtuous effort was considerably more 
widespread at the turn of the twentieth century than during the period from the 1930s 
through the 1970s. The growing national obsession with weight-loss in the 1980s widely 
heralded as a new phenomenon actually signaled a re-emergence. 
94 Francine Prose, Gluttony (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006: 13-4).
95 Even that tendency isn't universal. Art historians debate the significance of artwork from the Ice Age to 
Early Modern periods that portray bodies that appear large by contemporary standards. In Revolting 
Bodies, Kathleen LeBesco analyzes the debate over fat Aphrodites and what they say about Hellenistic 
beauty norms. She also notes that there are modern examples of fat being idealized, primarily in non-
Western cultures “namely the Mediterranean/North African region and some Polynesian locales.” 
Kathleen LeBesco, Revolting Bodies: The Struggle to Redefine Fat Identity (University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2004: 20-2). 
96 See Thomas C. Shevory, Body/Politics: Studies in Reproduction, Production, and (Re)Construction 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000:188).
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In  Never  Satisfied:  A  Cultural  History  of  Diets,  Fantasies,  and  Fat,  a 
foundational text in the field of Fat Studies, Hillel Schwartz claims “the first American 
weight  watchers”  were  disciples  of  the  Presbyterian minister  Rev.  Sylvester  Graham. 
Graham designed a  dietary  program to restore  “wholesome”  appetite  to  a  nation he 
described as gluttonous in the early nineteenth century.97 However, his followers did not 
watch their weight in hopes that it would decrease. Although Graham's diet is similar to 
some  contemporary  weight-loss  prescriptions—consisting  mostly  of  whole  fruits, 
vegetables, and grains—Graham and his followers desired to be “robust,” not thin: “Their 
comparatively slender diet was meant to yield handsome, robust bodies. Thinness was 
never  the  goal;  wholesome  appetite  was....They  yearned  not  for  leanness  but  for  a 
'natural' weight, a tempered and temperate life.”98 Grahamites weighed themselves and 
the  food  they  ate  regularly  in  order  to  prove  they  were  not  losing  weight  despite 
following an abstemious diet. 
Although  Graham  and  his  ideas  were  popular  enough  that  a  high-fiber  flour 
marketed for health came to bear his name (as did the crackers made from it), neither 
Grahamism nor any other fringe nineteenth century diets designed to promote physical, 
moral, and spiritual well-being became widespread. Shortly after Graham's retirement in 
the  1840s,  his  followers  joined  up  with  others  moral  crusaders  and  concerns  about 
corsets  and tobacco  eclipsed the  nutritional  agenda.  In  the 1930s,  historian Richard 
Shryock called Graham a failure because his name “is recalled today—if recalled at all—
only in connection with such prosaic foods as bread and crackers.”99 Both Shryock and 
Schwartz  note  that  even  in  his  heyday,  Graham  was  widely  mocked  and  his  diet 
considered  extreme.  According  to  Schwartz,  Graham's  asceticism and  the  thin  body 
“bespoke lack of charity and a denial of a rightful American abundance.”100 
97 Schwartz, 1986: 21. 
98 Ibid, 27. 
99 Richard Shryock, “Sylvester Graham and the Popular Health Movement, 1830-1870,” The Mississippi  
Valley Historical Review Vol. 18 No. 2 (Sept. 1931):172.
100 Schwartz, 21. 
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Nineteenth century beauty ideals celebrated abundance, especially in the form of 
the voluptuous female body. According to fashion historian Valerie Steele, for most of 
the Victorian Era, “except for the waist (and the hands and feet) the entire body was 
supposed to be well-padded with flesh.”101 Corsets could be used to cinch the waist, but 
nothing could substitute for the desired fullness of the bust and hips. A late nineteenth 
century instructional book titled Beauty and How to Keep It claims, “extreme thinness is 
a  much more  cruel  enemy  to  beauty  than  extreme stoutness.”102 Lillian  Russell,  the 
highest-paid entertainer at the height of her popularity was celebrated as much for her 
voluptuous figure as for her voice.  Newspapers reported admiringly on her voracious 
appetite and dining exploits with millionaire “Diamond Jim” Brady. According to one 
biographer: 
Together, they achieved great gourmand triumphs in Chicago restaurants, 
high-lighted by contests to determine who, at one sitting, could eat the 
most  corn-on-the-cob,  Brady's  favorite  food.  Reporters  covering  these 
contests would bet among themselves about how many ears of corn might 
be consumed by the contestants. Brady would always win (legend had it 
that  he  possessed  an  enlarged  stomach),  but  Lillian  proved  fiercely 
competitive.103
But as the new ideal of thinness emerged, critics began to question Russell's reputation 
for being “America's Beauty.”
By  1894  the  worm  had  turned.  A  review  of  a  comic  opera  starring  Russell 
describes  her  beauty  as  “the  doughy  sort  that  ravishes  the  fancy  of  the  half-baked 
worshippers  of  pink-and-white  pudginess.”104 According  to  feminist  historian  Lois 
Banner, Russel began to diet after reviews began comparing her to a white elephant and 
“for the next decade or so her diet regimen was as much publicized by the press as any 
other detail of her life.”105 Russell wrote an occasional advice column for  The Chicago 
101 Valerie Steele, Fashion and Eroticism: Ideals of Feminine Beauty from the Victorian Era to the Jazz  
Age (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1985: 108). 
102 A Professional Beauty, Beauty and How to Keep It (London: Brentano's, 1889: 47) qtd. Steele, 1985: 
108). 
103 Armond Fields, A Biography of America's Beauty (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., Inc.: 1999: 85. 
104 Fields, 1999: 98. 
105  Lois Banner, American Beauty:A Social History (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983: 151).
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Tribune, which began to focus on the slimming virtues of bicycling and the dangers of 
“intemperance  in  eating”  which  was  “almost  as  fatal  to  beauty  as  intemperance  in 
drinking.”106 Banner also notes that actresses oncedescribed as ugly because they were 
too  thin,  like  Sarah  Bernhardt  and  Lillie  Langtry,  became  beautiful  seemingly 
“overnight” around 1900.107 
The Rise: The Slender Ideal and the Body as a Machine 
Like the simultaneous rise of gourmet, thinness was initially a preoccupation of 
the bourgeois, but it quickly spread to the urban and suburban middle classes thanks to 
the  emerging  national  magazine  market.  The  transition  was  marked  by  a  period  of 
ambivalence. Schwartz notes that during Grover Cleveland's 1882 gubernatorial run, his 
supporters  proudly  advertised  their  candidate's  large  frame  and  inclination  to 
corpulence  while  his  opponents  portrayed  his  250  pounds  as  a  sign  of  weakness. 
However, admiration of corpulence was on the way out. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the Gibson Girls drawn by illustrator Charles Dana Gibson set the 
first national standard for feminine beauty specifically described as slender and active. 108 
The Gibson Girl gave way to the even thinner “flapper” exemplified by Mary Pickford 
and Clara Bow, who were frequently described as “small and boyish.”109 
Many diets and medicines that had previously been touted as cures for dyspepsia 
or  neurasthenia  were  recuperated  as  “slimming”  regimens.  Additionally,  four  new 
techniques specifically designed to promote weight loss emerged: fasting, slow-chewing, 
calorie-counting, and thyroid medication.110 Unlike the ascetic diets and water cures of 
106 Lillian Russell, “ Lillian Russell's Beauty Secrets: Do You Eat Properly?” Chicago Daily Tribune, 07 
August 1911 p. 4. ProQuest Historical Newspapers Chicago Tribune (1849 – 1987), Document ID: 
386906921 (retrieved 15 June 2010).
107  Banner, 1983: 151.
108  Angelika Köhler, “Charged With Ambiguity: The Image of the New Woman in American Cartoons,” 
New Woman Hybridities, ed. Ann Heilmann and Margaret Bettham: 158-78. 
109 Angela J. Latham, Posing a Threat: Flappers, Chorus Girls, and Other Brazen Performers of the  
American 1920s (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan Universtiy Press, 2000:10).
110  Schwartz, 1986: 113. Slow-chewing was often called “Fletcherism,” after one of its primary advocates. 
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the past that sought to purify the body, the first weight-loss diets were based on the idea 
that the body could be regulated and balanced based on the new science of metabolism. 
Before the late nineteenth century, food was measured by weight. The nutritional calorie 
(or Kcal),  which offered a measure both of food energy and human metabolism, was 
introduced to the American public by W. O. Atwater in a series of articles in  Century 
magazine in 1887. It quickly became the dominant measure used in dietetic science. 111 
Schwartz  claims  that  the  appeal  of  the  calorie  was  that  it  “promised  precision  and 
essence in the same breath. It should have been as easy to put the body in order as it was 
to put the books in order for a factory.”112 Calorie deficits were created using fasting, 
calorie-counting, slow-chewing (to prevent overeating), and thyroid medication to speed 
up the metabolism. All were embraced as new, “scientific” methods that could make any 
body thinner by shifting the balance between calories in and calories out.
In “The Inner Corset: A Brief History of Fat in the United States,” Laura Fraser 
also identifies 1880-1920 as the period in American history when the popular perception 
of fat shifted from a sign of health and beauty to a sign of disease and moral weakness. 
Fraser highlights the shift in the columns Woods Hutchinson, a medical professor, wrote 
for popular magazines.  In 1894,  he responded to the nascent demonization of  fat  in 
Cosmopolitan by attempting to reassure readers that fat is both medically benign and 
attractive. He describes fat as “a most harmless, healthful, innocent tissue” and claims 
There were earlier “mastication” diets aimed at alleviating indigestion, but Fletcher's “industrious 
chewing” was focused on the time involved in chewing, not the mechanical process of breaking down 
food. According to Schwartz, it caught on because it “made the eating of less food into the formidable 
pretense of eating more” (1986: 126). Although that may seem strange now, some contemporary dieters 
echo Fletcher's method. For example, in a 2008 article in her magazine, Oprah says, “in order not to 
abuse food, I have to stay fully conscious and aware, of every bite, of taking time and chewing slowly.” 
Oprah Winfrey, “How Did I Let This Happen Again?” Oprah.com, 10 December 2008, Web (accessed 
26 March 2011).
111  James Hargrove, “History of the Calorie in Nutrition,” The Journal of Nutrition 136 (December 2006): 
2957-2961 Web (accessed 17 June 2010). Contrary to popular wisdom, which suggests that the calorie 
was already used as a measure of heat in the metric system and adapted to help measure human energy 
needs and food energy values, James Hargrove also argues that, “The thermal calorie was not fully 
defined until the 20th century, by which time the nutritional Calorie was embedded in U.S. popular 
culture and nutritional policy” (2958). 
112  Schwartz, 1986: 135. 
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that “if a poll of beautiful women were taken in any city, there would be at least three  
times as many plump ones as slender ones.”113 He also warns against starving or exercise 
as  means  of  weight  control,  practices  which  Fraser  claims  were  “just  becoming 
popular.”114 
Hutchinson  was  fighting  a  losing  battle.  Thirty-two  years  later,  a  Saturday 
Evening  Post  article  sounds  resigned  to  a  pursuit  of  thinness  that  was  by  then 
hegemonic: 
In this present onslaught upon one of the most peaceable, useful and law-
abiding  of  all  our  tissues,  fashion  has  apparently  the  backing of  grave 
physicians,  of  food  reformers  and physical  trainers,  and  even  of  great 
insurance companies, all  chanting in unison the new commandment of 
fashion: 'Thou shalt be thin!”115 
Hutchinson  says  the  fashion  preceded the  medical  rationale,  which  was  only  later 
supplied by “grave physicians” and “great insurance companies” with whom he clearly 
did not agree.  Similarly,  a  physician quoted by Schwartz  wrote in 1927: “Concerning 
obesity, the amount of scientific information which we have regarding it is in marked 
contrast to the large amount of public opinion on this subject.”116 Fatness did not come to 
be seen as unattractive because it was discovered to be unhealthy; instead, the idea that 
fatness was unhealthy gained popular credence only after fatness had been constructed 
as unattractive. 
The  shift  to  a  thinner  ideal  represented  a  dramatic  change  in  what  was 
considered beautiful, with implications for clothing fashion too. In addition to dieting for 
weight  loss,  women  began  to  wear  “flat”  brassieres  or  bind  their  breasts.  The  “new 
woman” promoted in mass media was exemplified by the heroine of Aldous Huxley's 
novel  Antic  Hay,  who he  described  as  “flexible  and tubular,  like  a  section  of  a  boa 
113 Laura Fraser “The Inner Corset: A Brief History of Fat in the United States,” The Fat Studies Reader, 
ed. Esther Rothblum, Sondra Solovay, and Marilyn Wann (New York University Press 2009: 11). 
114  Ibid., 11. 
115  Ibid., 12. 
116  Schwartz, 1986: 204.
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constrictor.  .  .  dressed in  clothes  that  emphasized her  serpentine  slimness.”117 Steele 
argues that  womens'  bodies probably changed very little,  but how they attempted to 
shape them changed dramatically.118
Many historians attribute the ideal of thinness to the fact that as food got cheaper 
and more  abundant,  fatness  ceased  to  be  a  sign of  prestige.  Quoting  anthropologist 
Margaret Mackenzie, Fraser says, “the status symbols flipped: it became chic to be thin 
and all too ordinary to be over-weight.”119 However, the shift was too rapid to attribute to 
agricultural  productivity  or  a  decline  in  the  price  of  food.  America  may  have  been 
portrayed as a “land of plenty” by European settlers since the sixteenth century, but just 
like those settlers eking out an existence, the working classes whose labor fueled the 
industrial revolution struggled to afford sufficient or reliable sustenance. Additionally, 
records from military conscription, college physical exams, and weights measured on 
public scales at state fairs show that there was little change in the average height-to-
weight ratio from the early nineteenth century to the twentieth century.  According to 
Schwartz:
The intolerance of overweight was growing faster than bodies themselves. 
American college students, for example, had grown 1 inch and 3 lbs in fifty 
years, according to R. Tait McKenzie in the American Physical Education  
Review  in  1913....  Young women during the same general  period grew 
from 5 feet 2 inches and 115 lbs (1875) to 5 feet 3 inches and 114 lbs (1893) 
to 5 feet 4 inches and 121 lbs (1933).120
By World War II, white soldiers in their twenties were on average one inch taller and half 
a pound heavier than the average white soldier in his twenties in the Civil War. Based on 
records of scales at public fairs from 1859 to 1933, the average height increased by about 
two inches and average weight increased by about ten pounds over those seventy years.121 
The attitude towards fatness did not reflect any real change in Americans' bodies. 
117  Aldous Huxley, Antic Hay (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1997[1923]: 82), qtd. in Valerie Steele, 
The Corset: A Cultural History (Yale University Press, 2003: 154) 
118  Steele. 1985: 240. 
119  Mackenzie 1996, qtd. in Fraser, 2009: 12.
120  Schwartz, 1986: 168. 
121  Ibid, 170. 
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Instead  of  bodies  getting  bigger,  Schwartz  suggests  the  new  prioritization  of 
thinness resulted from “a shift in economic models from scarcity to abundance.”122 He 
connects  the  new  fretting  about  “overnutrition”  to  Veblen's  critique  of  conspicuous 
consumption in the leisure class  and the idea that  fatness  represented an outmoded 
hoarding. Instead, to be modern was to be unburdened and exuberant. Purging flesh was 
a way to purge the anxiety about excess.123 T. J. Jackson Lears echoes this argument in 
Fables of  Abundance,  where he argues slimness was part  of a broader “perfectionist 
project.”  He  connects  a  wave  of  advertisements  for  intestinal  cleansing,  soap,  and 
deodorants in the early twentieth century to a mechanistic view of the body and growing 
disgust for anything that would make it less efficient. He says, “The most immediate and 
obvious impact of this mechanistic style of thought was a slimming down of body types. 
Fat became unfashionable. . . . Fat was not a bank account but a burden. What was to be 
stored was not embodied in flesh but was a more evanescent quality: sheer energy, the 
capacity for intense, sustained activity.”124 
The “fear of abundance” theory relies on the premise that thinness was a constant 
through the twentieth century.  However,  thinness became less  prevalent  in  the mid-
twentieth century. In Fat Politics, J. Eric Oliver claims the “idealization of thinness was 
largely suspended during the privations of the Great Depression and World War II.”125 
The  idealization  of  a  more  voluptuous  female  body  continued  through  the  recovery 
spurred by World War II and remained prevalent during some of the most productive 
and  abundant  decades  in  American  economic  history,  even  as  declining  income 
inequality  and  increasing  income  mobility  enabled  more  people  to  partake  in  that 
abundance. Slimming practices never wholly disappeared, but they did become marginal 
122  Ibid, 86. 
123  Also echoed by Joseph Roach's argument about performances of waste deflecting the “anxieties 
produce by having too much of everything—including material goods and human beings” in Cities of  
the Dead:Circum-Atlantic Peformance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 123).
124 Lears, 1994: 167-8. 
125  Oliver, 2005: 70. 
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enough that their  re-emergence as dominant trends in the 1980s was widely seen as 
notable and new.
The Fall: Buxom Beauties and Biology as Destiny
Francis  G.  Benedict,  the  director  of  Carnegie  Institute's  Nutrition Laboratory, 
wrote in 1931 that the popular interest in weight reduction had finally “receded a bit,” 
although the Institute's lectures on the topic still attracted “an eager, agitated, expectant 
band of zealots.”126 Some Americans, mostly women, continued trying to losing weight 
throughout  the twentieth century.  However,  beginning  in  the 1930s,  Americans  also 
began to embrace a new theory that there were fundamentally different body shapes (or 
“somatotypes”) that determined how much a given individual was likely to weigh.127 This 
new attitude corresponded with a shift in beauty norms. Thin was still “in,” albeit a more 
curvaceous thinness than the tube-like flapper, but the voluptuous woman returned in 
“bosom  mania.”  The  hourglass  figure  epitomized  by  actresses  like  Marilyn  Monroe, 
Sophia Loren, and Elizabeth Taylor was the dominant symbol of sex appeal. 
Somatotype  theory  was  developed  by  William  Sheldon,  a  psychologist  and 
leading  expert  in  the  science  of  anthropometry,  the  science  of  measuring  human 
bodies.128 The categories he identified—the thin “ectomorph,” the fat “endomorph,” and 
126  Schwartz, 1986: 183. 
127  Schwartz acknowledges the rise of somatotype theory, claiming it reflects a complex set of anxieties 
about abundance: “The aggressive, glutted consumer took on the exogenous form of obesity, while the 
fearful, inundated consumer took on the endogenous form. The two types represented the double-edged 
threat of economic abundance: the exogenous fat man was the figure of overproduction, gluttony lured 
on by and economy run wild; the endogenous fat woman was the figure of underconsumption, domestic 
inefficiency in the midst of a flood tide of goods. In each case, abundance led to fatness but not to 
satisfaction.” Ibid, 136. 
128 This included craniometry, phrenology, physiognomy, and comparative anatomy, which Barbara 
Stafford argues reflected the shift from a text-based to a visually-dependent culture and growing 
embrace of empiricism in the Enlightenment. Anthropometry sought to identify and quantify objective 
external measurements that would enable them to “read” the inner nature of the person from the outside. 
Sheldon's somatotype theory emerged out of his doctoral research and was first published in a 1936 
book titled Psychology and the Promethean Will. It was further popularized by both non-fiction and 
fiction by Sheldon and others, including his friend Aldous Huxley, that appeared in publications like 
Harper's Weekly, Time, Life, Esquire, and Popular Science in the 1930s and 1940s. Patricia Vertinsky, 
“Physique as Destiny: William H. Sheldon, Barbara Honeyman Heath and the Struggle for Hegemony 
in the Science of Somatotyping,” Canadian Bulletin of Medical History Volume 24:2 (2007): 296. 
124
the muscular “mesomorph”—were supposed to predict personality types and behaviors, 
like criminality, and were part of a broader project of identifying correlations between 
physical traits and more ephemeral ones.129 However, the aspect that people embraced 
was the idea that people are essentially stuck with the bodies they're born with. 
According  to  Patricia  Vertinsky,  a  professor  of  Human  Kinetics,  “In  his 
[Sheldon's] view, the type of body one was born with (and its corresponding levels of  
beauty and symmetry) could not be much changed as the physical educators believed 
with  good training  and exercise.  To  him physique  was  indeed,  destiny.”130 Although 
similarities between Sheldon's somatotypes and eugenics attracted some criticism after 
World War II, the idea of the body as destiny remained widely popular. In 1951,  Life 
claimed that Sheldon's influence rivaled Freud's or Hippocrates':
On the basis of his work up to now, many workers in the psychiatric field 
and in the allied sciences of  sociology and anthropology are convinced 
that Dr. Sheldon has done what Hippocrates tried to do 2500 years ago: 
he has shown that character and physique are closely related, and that the 
first, like the second is to a considerable extent a product of heredity.131
Somatotype  theory  held  that  that  some  people  were  naturally  slender  and  others 
naturally plump and there were limits to how much diet and exercise could change that. 
This was in diametric opposition to the earlier paradigm of the body as a machine that 
would reliably process calories like factory inputs. Notably, in recent years, somatotype 
129 Taxonomies of body types thought to correspond to personality, disposition to disease, criminality, 
moral character, complexion, and all manner of other variable traits were nothing new. Ancient Greeks 
and Romans developed a set of types based on the theory of the four humors, often attributed originally 
to Theophrastus: plump, ruddy, cheerful, hot, moist people were thought to have too much blood 
(sanguine); thin, angry, hot, dry people were thought to have too much yellow bile (choleric); fat, pale, 
stupid, cold, moist people were thought to have too much phelgm (phlegmatic); and thin, sad, cold, dry 
people were thought to have too much black bile (melancholic). By the nineteenth century, the idea that 
the differences were due to imbalances in bodily fluids had largely been discarded, but the four body 
types persisted, recast slightly as sanguine, bilious, lymphatic, and nervous. Unlike those systems that 
confined bodies one of the four types, Sheldon proposed a three-dimensional system—within each 
component (fatness and sphericity, muscularity, and linearity), there was a ranking system from 1(little) 
to 7(a lot) that would sum between 9 and 12, for example a very fat person with little muscle or height 
would be a 7-1-1, the most extreme endomorph. The precise midpoint of the scale would be a 3-3-3 or 
4-4-4. Vertinsky, 2002: 110. 
130  Ibid, 300. 
131  Ibid, 308.
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theory has been used to customize weight loss  and body-building plans,  so the mid-
century interpretation that it explained intractable bodily difference was not a natural or 
inevitable result of Sheldon's theory. 
Although a wider range of body types were represented as beautiful in the 1930s, 
the dominant ideal featured enhanced breasts and hips. The increasing importance of 
breasts and growing preference for large breasts was noted by scholars of sex in every 
decade from the 1930s through the 1970s.132 The return of the “voluptuous” ideal was 
also reflected in the measurements of  Miss America contestants,  whose average bust 
measurement  grew  continually  from  1940  until  1965  when  it  achieved  parity  with 
average hip measurement  (35”) and in fashion trends like  the rise of  the girdle  and 
“falsies.”133 The shift is clearly visible in the paintings and illustrations of Alberto Vargas, 
one of the most famous pin-up artists of the twentieth century. In 1919, Vargas was hired  
by Florenz Ziegfeld to paint portraits of the chorus girls whose reputation for beauty was 
the  primary  attraction  of  his  Broadway  revues.  Vargas'  Ziegfeld  era  work  showcase 
quintessential flapper beauty: slender and youthful-looking girls. In the 1930s, Vargas 
began painting movie posters and star portraits for major motion picture studios. The 
poster for  The Sin of Nora Moran offers a telling contrast to “Smoke Dreams” (Figure 
2.3 center). Like the Ziegfeld girl, the woman in the movie poster is hunched over and 
her breasts are only half-covered with a diaphanous material. However, her breasts and 
thighs are much larger and her body forms a smooth arc, unlike the awkward, girlish 
angles of the earlier image. Notably, the movie poster was not based on the actress who 
played the role of Nora Moran, the dark-haired Zita Johann. In 1940, Vargas was hired 
by Esquire magazine and began producing the artwork he is best remembered for—curvy 
pin-up  girls  with  prominently  displayed  breasts,  whether  nude  or  clothed,  like  the 
132  A. Mazur, “US Trends in Feminine Beauty and Overadaptation,” Journal of Sex Research 22 (1986): 
281-303 and references therein (Laver 1937, Kinsey Pomeroy & Martin 1948, Winch 1952, Morrison 
1965, and Jesser 1971). 
133  Ibid, 291. 
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“Apple Girl” (Figure 2.4 right). [Figures 2.3 and 2.4]
Figure 2.3/Vargas Pin-ups from the 1920s134
Figure 2.4/Vargas Pin-ups from the 1930s-1950s135
A version of the “slender” ideal lived on through the mid-century, represented by 
actresses like Grace Kelly and Audrey Hepburn who “symbolized a subdued and classy 
sensuality,  often  associated  with  the  aristocrat  and  high  fashion.”136 The  association 
between slender model and high fashion was cemented in the 1960s by the emergence of 
Jean Shrimpton and Twiggy, whose fame was inextricable from their extreme thinness. 
Lois Banner attributes the association between thinness and fashion modeling to “the 
134  “Queen of Hearts” (1922), “Smoke Dreams” (1927), and “Behind the Scenes” (122) originally 
published in Shadowlands, reproduced from, “Pin Up Art: Vargas Early Works,” Multiply, Submitted by 
“obb1esso,” Web (accessed 21 June 2010). 
135  “The Sin of Nora Moran” (1934), “The Green Room” (1938), and “The Apple Girl” (1955), reproduced 
from “Pin Up Art: Vargas Early Works,” Multiply, Submitted by “obb1esso,” Web (accessed 21 June 
2010). 
136  Mazur, 1986: 299. 
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professionalization  of  fashion  photography  in  the  early  century,”  when  it  became 
“canonical  that  clothes are  best  displayed on lean bodies,  which do not compete  for 
viewer  attention with the model's  attire.”137 Banner  also claims that  as  the  modeling 
industry became more competitive,  thinness became a way to winnow the legions of  
aspiring  models  and  claims,  “Americans  have  always  responded  to  challenges  that 
require hard work and self-control; dieting for women is comparable to sports expertise 
or professional success for men.”138 
According to a national survey conducted in 1950, only 7 percent of men and 14 
percent of women were on a diet.139 Joan Jacobs Brumberg argues that “breasts,  not 
weight, were the primary point of comparison among high school girls in the 1950s.” A 
common refrain in adolescent girls'  diaries was,  “I must, I must, I  must increase my 
bust!”140 Despite that, Brumberg characterizes the twentieth century as the  century of  
svelte.141 Brumberg's primary argument is that as doctors and marketers took over the 
educational functions previously handled by mothers, “scientific medicine, movies, and 
advertising created a new, more exacting ideal of physical perfection.”142 However,  as 
somatotype theory and Vargas' pin-ups suggest, neither science nor mass media have 
provided consistent messages about what “perfection” looks like or how to achieve it. 
Nor were mothers and other familial figures incapable of creating exacting ideals, as her 
own work in  Fasting Girls demonstrates. Perhaps the best evidence that the twentieth 
century was not just one long  century of  svelte is  the broad consensus that  the diet 
137  This explanation seems insufficient, as it would have made just as much sense for a canonical view to 
develop that clothes are best displayed on bodies the typical shopper would identify with or be most 
appealing on bodies with the idealized hourglass figure. I suspect it has something to do with a latent or 
nascent belief in the relationship between self-denial and thinness, which made thinness “aspirational” 
even when it was not as hegemonic a beauty ideal. 
138  She offers no evidence for this claim, for reasons that may be obvious. Banner, 1983: 121-2.
139  Schwartz, 1986: 246.
140  Brumberg, 1997:116. 
141  Similarly, in Fasting Girls, her history of anxoreia nervosa, she notes that the disease was first 
identified in the late nineteenth century and became an issue of popular concern again in the 1980s, but 
makes no attempt to explain the long gap in between. Joan Jacobs Brumberg, Fasting Girls: The 
History of Anorexia Nervosa, 1988 (New York: Vintage Books, 2000:134). 
142  Brumberg, 1997: xxv.
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culture that emerged in the 1980s was a significant departure from the past. 
The Return: The Fitness Craze and “Obesity Epidemic”
Scholars agree that  weight-loss dieting became a national phenomenon in the 
1980s. Schwartz claims the 1980s saw thinness became “a national way of life.”143 News 
media began to report breathlessly on the latest diet fads and the “man-made epidemic” 
of fatness. Food manufacturers responded to the changes with a stunning array of new 
products marketed as diet and low-cal (starting in the 1980s), low-fat (starting in the 
1990s), and low-carb (starting around 2003). People who wanted to lose weight were 
also increasingly participating in the “fitness craze.” A 1981 Time magazine cover story 
reported that “on any given day in the Republic this year, a record 70 million Americans
—almost  half  the  adult  population—will  practice  some  form  of  corporeal  self-
betterment” while “in 1960 only 24% worked out.”144
The unanticipated  success  of  Diet  Coke,  which  debuted  July  4,  1982  was  a 
watershed event. Diet Coke was the first new brand since 1886 to be baptized with Coca-
Cola's  trademark wave,  which worried some invested parties.  A Pennsylvania  bottler 
quoted in The Wall Street Journal said, “If they adulterate the name of Coke, they have 
lost their minds.”145 At the time, Philip Morris's Pepsi products, especially the new 7-Up, 
were seen as potential threats to Coca-Cola's dominance in the soft drink market. Op-ed 
columns in the trade press debated whether it was a good time to do anything that might 
dilute the brand, which was seen as their one indisputable advantage. Diet sodas had 
already been on the market for a decade. Diet Rite and Tab—advertised with the tagline 
“Tab cola, for beautiful people”—had attracted a loyal following in what was seen as a 
relatively small niche market of dieters. Diet Coke proved naysayers wrong. Within six 
143  Schwartz, 1986: 238. 
144  J.D. Reed, “America Shapes Up,” Time magazine, 02 November 1981, Web (accessed 08 April 2011).
145 Janet Guyon and Jody Long, “Coke to Put Much-Cherished Trademark on Diet Cola, in a $100 Million 
Campaign,”The Wall Street Journal, 09 July 1982: 5.
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months of its release, it had surpassed Tab to become the third best-selling soft drink in 
New York. Coca-Cola C.E.O. Roberto C. Goizueta said it had not only surpassed every 
sales target they had set, but “may well be the most successful new product in the history  
of the soft drink industry.”146 The Diet Coke debut provides a useful reminder that food 
marketers are not always right about what products will succeed and how well. Coca-
Cola managed to tap into the growing desire for diet products, but even they did not 
realize how well the strategy would work. 
Diet  products  owed  their  success  to  the  growing  population  of  people  who 
thought that they were overweight and felt an obligation to do something about it. In 
1950,  only  21  percent  of  men  and  44  percent  of  women  believed  themselves  to  be 
overweight;  by  1980,  70  percent  of  college-age  women  thought  that  they  were 
overweight,  despite the fact that  only 39 percent fit  the criteria set  by life  insurance 
companies. The diet craze was not prompted by a dramatic increase in average weight. 147 
Even  people  defined  as  “normal”  by  the  medical  and  insurance  industries  were 
increasingly likely to see themselves as “fat” and believe that dieting was the appropriate 
solution. 
The new weight-loss culture was at least in part social; the 1981 Time cover story 
noted that corporate health plans could be routes to faster promotion and the boom in 
tennis  shoes  was  as  much a  product  of  fashion  as  a  necessity  for  doing  aerobics.148 
However,  more  Americans  were  also taking  steps  in  private  to  lose  weight  with  the 
assistance of new technologies like the VCR. In 1981, a small firm named Karl Video 
released  a  workout  tape  starring  Jane  Fonda.  VCRs  were  not  yet  ubiquitous  and 
videotape distribution had until then been dominated by the rental industry, but Fonda's 
146 Eric Morgenthaler, “Diet Coke is a Big Success in Early Going, Spurring a Gush of Optimism at Coca-
Cola,” The Wall Street Journal, 22 December 1982, p. 17.
147 The small average increases in Americans' weight during this time period were not actually recognized 
by the medical and nutritional establishments until 1994, at which point they came as a surprise, and 
most of the increases associated with the “obesity epidemic” occurred after 1980, not before. SeeGard 
and Wright 2005:81. 
148  Reed, 1981. 
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workout sold an unprecedented 250,000 copies in its first year. It even prompted many 
people to purchase their first VCRs.149 Jane Fonda's  Workout was still the best-selling 
videotape on the market two years laster, beating out box office hits like  Star Trek II:  
The Wrath of Khan and An Officer and a Gentleman.150 
New diet trends were often attributed to a growing awareness of the supposed 
medical dangers of fatness.151 However, the idea that fatness was medically dangerous 
was  far  from  new.  The  original  MetLife  Tables  that  posited  an  inverse  relationship 
between weight and health were developed by Louis Dublin in the 1940s. According to 
Glenn Gaesser, Dublin concluded that weight was correlated with mortality because he 
attributed  the  low mortality  rates  of  people  in  their  twenties  to  their  lower  average 
weight.152 The  tables  never  corresponded  with  actual  rates  of  disease  or  mortality. 
MetLife released its last version of the recommended weight tables in 1983 with a new 
disclaimer that the weights recommended by the tables “are not weights that minimize 
illness or the incidence of disease. These weights are not used for underwriting or in the 
computation of premiums.”153 
The “obesity epidemic”  followed, rather than  preceded, the increase in weight-
loss dieting. In the early 1990s, a group of researchers at the Centers for Disease Control  
(CDC) led by Robert J. Kuczmarski, set out to determine whether or not the fitness craze 
of the 1980s had translated into anything measurable. They used the data gathered in the 
four National Health and Nutrition Examination surveys (NHANES) between 1960 and 
149  Betsy Sharkey, “Video Visionary Stuart Karl Sees 1st-Run Programming,” AdWeek, 08 July 1985.
150  Judy Klemesrud, “Self-Help Videotapes, From Cooking to Car Repair,” The New York Times, 03 
August 1983 (Late Edition) p. C.1 National Newspaper Abstracts (3) (Document ID: 949766531 
(retrieved 08 April 2011). 
151  Reed, 1981. 
152 Gaesser, 2002: 106.
153 Campos, 2004: 9. The 1983 MetLife tables cite the 1979 “Build Study” as the basis for the revised 
table; however, the recommended weight ranges in the tables do not correspond with the mortality rates 
observed. For example, the MetLife tables indicate that the recommended weight for a 55 year old 
woman who is 5’4” tall and has a “small frame” is between 114-138 lbs; according to the Build Study, 
the weight range at which women of that age, height and build have the lowest mortality is between 
185-194 lbs, which would make her medically “obese.” Similar discrepancies occur across genders, age 
groups, and build types in the MetLife tables. Gaesser, 2002: 107. 
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1991, each of which involved a nationally representative cross-sectional survey of 6,000 
to  13,000  adults,  along  with  an  in-person  interview  and  medical  exam.  The  CDC 
researchers hoped and expected to find that Americans were getting thinner.  Instead 
they found that the percent of overweight people had increased in every racial, gender, 
and age  group.  Furthermore,  the  increases  had  occurred  over  all  three  decades;  the 
weight gain wasn't just a residual effect of the “bad old days” before weight-loss dieting 
became popular. In the period between NHANES II (1976 and 1980), and NHANES III, 
(1988 and 1991), the prevalence of overweight increased from 25 percent of adults to 33 
percent.154 Albert Stunkard professor of psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania and 
founder of the Center for Weight and Eating Disorders spoke for the medical community  
and for the public at large when he told  Time magazine: “All of us were stunned.... It 
runs counter to what we as a nation seem to be doing.”155 The renewed popularity of 
dieting preceded the declaration of a “war on fat” by over a decade.
The continued popularity of weight-loss dieting is not a result of public health 
authorities urging Americans to lose weight to live longer, healthier lives. While doing 
research for The Obesity Myth, Paul Campos conducted a survey of 273 people who self-
identified as currently trying to lose weight (94 percent female, 88 percent white, with an 
average  age  of  34).  One  of  the  questions  was,  “If  you  could  take  a  pill  that  would 
guarantee  you  would  achieve,  and/or  continue  to  maintain,  whatever  weight  you 
consider most desirable, would you take such a pill if it lowered your life expectancy? If 
the answer is 'yes,' how much life expectancy would you be willing to forgo?” 78 percent 
of the respondents said yes, and the mean number of years they were willing to forgo was 
5.7 (with a range of 1-15 years).156 
154  RJ Kuczmarski, et al, “Increasing Prevalence of Overweight Among US Adults: The National Health 
and Nutrition Examination Surveys, 1960 to 1991,” JAMA 272: 3 (1994): 205-211. 
155  Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, “Fat Times,” Time magazine, 16 January 1995: 59. 
156  Campos, 2004: 142. Sampling and survey method unknown. A recent study in Britain involving a 
random sample of college-aged women found that approximately one-third would trade at least a year 
of life “to have a perfect body,” with ten percent willing to trade between two to five years, two percent 
willing to give up ten years, and one percent willing to give up 21+ years. Stephanie Pappas, “Many 
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There are many competing theories about why dieting and thinness became so 
popular in the 1980s. Schwartz claims the diet industry of the 1980s was built on fears 
dating to the Depression and Cold War about a world that seemed to offer so much, but 
guarantee  so little.  That doesn't  explain  the dramatic  shift  between the 1950s to  the 
1980s. Campos claims fatness and fat people have been stigmatized to make up for the 
disappearance of other socially acceptable pariah groups in the wake of the social justice 
movements  of  the  1960s.  According  to  Campos,  correlations  between  higher  body 
weights and lower class status have caused people to transfer residual disgust about poor 
and non-white people onto fat bodies and/or substituted fat people as the primary out-
group that the dominant culture uses toratify its superiority.157 However, fatness has not 
replaced other “pariah” groups (as documented by scholars who analyze the continuing 
racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, and other forms of bias in American culture). 
Rather than replacing other stigmas, the widespread fat phobia that has developed since 
the 1980s interacts in complicated ways with other forms of bias.158 
Neither of those theories accounts for the earlier flowering of slimming diets. I 
suspect that in both periods, the ideal of thinness and popularity of weight-loss dieting 
answered cultural needs produced by middle class income stagnation. The middle class 
embraced ideologies that equated desirable characteristics like health and beauty with 
self-denial and hard work, actively creating meritocracy of thinness. That meritocracy 
offered the stagnating middle class a compensatory arena of aspiration. The meritocacy 
of thinness  drives,  rather than  results from the popular belief  that America is in the 
midst of a national “obesity epidemic.” This meritocracy became dominant at the same 
time  as  the  ideals  of  gourmet,  natural,  and  cosmopolitan  dining  because  they  all 
functioned as compensatory forms of mobility for the stagnating middle classes. 
Women Would Trade a Year of Life to Be Thin,” MSNBC, 05 April 2011, Web (accessed 09 April 2011). 
157  Campos, 2004: 67-8. 
158  See Rothblum et al, 2009. 
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I I I :  N a t u r a l  F o o d  a n d  t h e  I d e a l  o f  P u r i t y
Origins, Essence, and Purity 
The popular interest in “natural food” encompasses a wider range of concerns 
than gourmet food or weight-loss dieting. The interest in gourmet food is primarily a 
concern with  good taste, or the idea that some foods are more delicious. Weight-loss 
dieting and the ideal of thinness are justified by concerns about beauty and nutrition, or 
good looks and good health. The field of “natural food,” on the other hand, appeals to all 
three of those—taste, beauty, and health—as well as concerns about how food relates to 
the environment, animal welfare, labor conditions, and a more holistic view of health.  
The  beliefs  and desires  gathered  under  the banner  of  “natural  food”  are  not  always 
compatible:  many  vegans  do  not  find  grass-fed  beef  to  be  an  acceptably  ethical 
alternative to the industrial corn-fattened variety and even Fair Trade-certified coffee 
from Peru is problematic for people attempting to eat local.
The ambiguity of the word “natural” itself reflects some of the challenges involved 
in characterizing a discourse that includes so many different concerns. “Natural” is often 
used to mean “as found in nature.” Since the development of agriculture and settled 
populations, very little of the food most people have eaten has been truly “natural” in 
that way; however, the same notion is at work in the distinction between conventional 
and  organic  food.  The  latter  designates  foods  grown  without  man-made  fertilizers, 
pesticides, and chemicals. Everything used in the production of the food can be found in 
nature rather than produced in a laboratory. “Natural” is also used to mean “in keeping 
with its nature,” in the sense of an essence or origin. When applied to food, that identifes 
something that  hasn't  been adulterated or refined—i.e.  nothing added, nothing taken 
away.  So  even  hand-ground  and  sifted  flour  would  be  “unnatural”  by  that  criteria 
because it would be missing the chaff that is essential to the wholeness of the grain. 
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If the latter seems marginal in an era when organic is the more important term, 
the popular response to a recent marketing campaign suggests the second definition is 
still  salient.  When  the  Corn  Refiners  Association  launched  their  “Sweet  Surprise” 
campaign in August 2008 to reclaim high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) as “natural,” the 
reaction  was  overwhelmingly  negative.  The  campaign  directly  followed  the  FDA's 
decision that (HFCS) could be called “natural” because the synthetic enzymes used in its 
production don't end up in the final product. The FDA ruled that HFCS is natural in the 
first sense: everything in HFCS is found in nature. In one of the “Sweet Surprise” print 
ads, two women are shown mid-conversation. The first says, “My hairdresser says sugar 
is natural and high fructose corn syrup isn't.” The second responds, “Wow! You get your 
hair done by a registered dietician?” Underneath, the ad copy reads, “Wonder what the 
facts are about high fructose corn syrup? Well,  you're in for a sweet surprise.  That's 
because it is natural, with no artificial ingredients—it's simply a kind of corn sugar.”159
Some consumers disagreed with the FDA's ruling and the claims made by the 
“Sweet Surprise” campaign on the grounds that even if everything in HFCS is natural, it's 
what's  missing that matters. Shortly after the campaign began, Gena Haskett wrote an 
article criticizing the ads on the women's blogging community BlogHer. Haskett quotes 
the CRA website's explanation of how HFCS is produced: 
High  fructose  corn  sweeteners  begin  with  enzymes  which  isomerize 
dextrose  to  produce  a  42  percent  fructose  syrup.  By  passing  42-HFCS 
through a  column which retains fructose,  refiners  draw off  90 percent 
HFCS  and  blend  it  with  42-HFCS  to  make  a  third  syrup,  55-HFCS. 
Further processing produces crystalline fructose. 160
Then she adds sarcastically, “Yeah, that sounds like it was plucked off the tree.” The idea 
that something “natural” must be not only found in nature, but found in the same form—
unrefined and unadulterated—was echoed across the food and nutrition blogosphere. 
The author of the blog Fresno Famous says, “HFCS is nothing like sugar. It's a synthetic 
159  Corn Refiners Association, “Hairdresser,” Sweet Surprise, 2009, Web (accessed 09 April 2011). 
160  Gena Haskett, “High Fructose Corn Syrup and Evaluating Information,” BlogHer 10 September 2008, 
Web (accessed 09 April 2011). 
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chemical so it isn't 'natural' in the sense that grows in the ground.”161 In response to a 
post  about the “Sweet Surprise” campaign on  FitSugar162 from “Francoisehard”  says, 
“the process which it  takes is  why it's not natural and it's a processed ingredient for 
processed food.”163
While  many  of  the  concerns  surrounding  natural  food  are  relatively  recent 
developments, there is also long history of anxiety about adulteration, refining, and the 
consequences  of  industrially-produced  food  in  the  U.S.  Particularly  in  the  late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an interest in natural diets and concerns about 
“pure” food, drink, and drugs attracted nationwide attention. Histories of “natural” food 
movements  characterize  the  concern  with  nature  and  purity  as  a  relatively  recent 
phenomenon only when they fail to recognize the earlier movements as their historical 
antecedents. 
There are striking parallels between the crusades for pure food and the natural 
diets that flourished between 1880 and 1929 and the natural food revolution launched by 
the  1960s  counterculture  that  became  mainstream  in  the  1980s.  Both  movements 
positioned themselves in opposition to industrialization and gained popular support due 
to widespread anxieties about shifts in American eating habits. For both, the fear was 
that the food supply was compromised by the growth of massive companies with largely 
unregulated  control  of  national  food  production.  Demographically,  both  were  led 
primarily by white, urban, middle-class women with progressive political leanings; but 
both attempted to build coalitions across traditional racial and class divides. In terms of 
practice,  both of them manifest in 1) dietary prescriptions 2) investigative journalism 
aimed  at  uncovering  unfair  and  disgusting  conditions  in  the  food  industry,  and  3) 
grassroots activism aimed at improving the food supply. Ideologically, both movements 
161  “High-fructose corn syrup: Sweet surprise, you're fatter now!” Fresno Famous, 20 April 2010, Web 
(accessed 30 August 2010). 
162 The health blog run by Sugar, Inc., a network of sites targeting “Generation Y” women.
163 FitSugar, “Speak Up: Are You Surprised by the Sweet Surprise Ads?” FitSugar, 08 September 2008, 
Web (accessed 09 April 2011). 
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rely on discourses about nutrition and the past that have more to do with their own fears 
and desires than scientific or historical evidence.
The movements are also unified by their common interest in purity. “Purity” in 
food overlaps with the use of the term “natural” to mean something unadulterated, or 
free of impurities. “Purity” also evokes moral or ethical superiority, innocence, and being 
unmarred by sin or  harm.  Both turn-of-the century “Pure Food” crusaders,  and late 
twentieth-century  vegetarians  and  locavores  frame  their  food  choices  in  terms  of 
righteousness. Many also pursue it with a quasi-religious zeal. Although “natural” has 
largely come to replace “pure” in mainstream discourse, the movement is still marked by 
a concern about the wholeness, healthfulness,  and goodness of food. While there are 
differences between the ways the ideal of purity manifested in the two historical periods, 
treating them as entirely separate obscures the similarities between them. It also enables 
the Enlightenment myth that “natural” food has become more popular in recent years 
because it  is inherently superior and the more people learn about nutrition and food 
production, the more likely they are to make join the cause.
The movement for less-adulterated, better-regulated food became popular in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century fell from popularity around the beginning of the 
Great Depression, and remained a niche practice generally regarded as strange at best 
and  possibly  dangerously  un-American  at  worst  until  the  1980s.  This  trajectory 
challenges the idea that Americans became concerned about “natural” foods primarily 
because of actual changes in the food system. The industrialization of food production 
logn preceded the Pure Foods movement and continued, even intensifying, during the 
decades between 1930 and 1980 when pure and “natural” foods largely dropped off the 
mainstream radar. Again, the correspondence between the middle-class concern with 
this form of eating “better” and the changing patterns in income distribution is more 
than coincidental. As with gourmet and weight-loss dieting, the ideal of culinary purity 
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in American history has always been inextricable from the performance of a middle- 
class identity. 
The Rise and Fall  of  Pure Foods:  Righteous Crusaders,  Agitated Women, 
and the Disenfranchised Middle
Some historians date the older campaigns for “pure” and “natural” foods to the 
early  1900s  and  suggest  that  popular  interest  in  food  quality  and  regulation  was 
prompted by the publication of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle in 1905.164 Lorine Swainston 
Goodwin disputes that chronology (and the implied causality): “dating the beginning of 
the fight for pure food and drugs after the turn of the twentieth century is clearly too 
late.”165 Using  records  left  by  organizations  active  in  the  Pure  Food  movement,  she 
documents the simultaneous emergence of grassroots campaigns in the late 1870s and 
early 1880s calling for more education about natural health practices, protesting the sale 
of adulterated food, and demanding safeguards against unsanitary practices in the food 
industries.  She  suggests  other  historians  have  erred  in  believing  the  politicians, 
bureaucrats, and journalists who later wrote about food and drug adulteration “as if it 
was their  exclusive discovery.”166 The real  vanguards were white,  urban, middle-class 
women. 
She identifies  three campaigns as representative of  the national emergence of 
Pure  Foods  activism:  1)  Mary  Hackett  Hunt's  campaign  against  substance  abuse, 
especially alcohol, which began with a town hall meeting in Massachusetts on Easter 
164 See Paul Starr The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic, 1982); Peter Temin 
Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1980); Robert Crunden Ministers of Reform: The Progressives' Achievement in American Civilization,  
1889-1920 (New York: Basic, 1982); and Arthur and Lila Weinberg The Muckrakers (New York, NY: 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1964). 
165 Lorine Swainston Goodwin, The Pure Food, Drink, and Drug Crusaders, 1879-1914 (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Co., Inc., 1999: 15). 
166  Ibid., 17. 
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Sunday in 1879, 2) Ella Kellogg's “Health and Heredity Normal Institute” founded in 
Battle Creek, Michigan in 1884 that sought to teach women how to avoid “diseased” 
foods like refined sugar, white flour, and spicy or pungent condiments, and 3) the Ladies' 
Health  Protective  Association  (LHPA),  started  by  women who lived  in  the  exclusive 
Manhattan  neighborhood  of  Beekman  Place  to  pressure  the  city  to  make  a  nearby 
slaughterhouse  and  fertilizer  dealer  clean  up  its  act.  According  to  Goodwin,  the 
muckraking  journalists  often  credited  with  calling  Americans'  attention  to  food 
adulteration were only as effective as they were because these “organized women had 
laid the infrastructure...during the preceding three decades.”167 
There  were  significant  differences between the goals  of  those “representative” 
initiatives. While Hunt was advocating the legal prohibition of alcohol, Goodwin groups 
her with the same groups complaining that “first class barrooms” sold an “adulterated 
article”  instead of  real  beer or  whiskey and urged Congress  to  pass  laws to give the 
country “pure licker”168 Like her husband, Kellogg advocated a vegetarian diet, arguing 
that  “man  is  not  naturally  a  flesh-eater,”  whereas  the  LHPA  was  concerned  with 
ensuring that  the meat they fed their  families was clean and safe.  Hunt and Kellogg 
targeted individual consumers; the LHPA went directly to regulatory agencies and the 
political  bodies  that  administered  them.  Goodwin  doesn't  specify  what  she  thought 
united their efforts, or why she chose to focus on Pure Food activism instead of the anti-
corset  movement,  settlement  house  movement,  or  cultural  societies  spearheaded 
primarily by the same organizations (and sometimes the same women). What seems to 
unite the conflicting movements Goodwin focuses on is a concern with purity—purity of 
the body achieved by avoiding poisonous, enslaving, unnatural, or diseased foods; purity 
of food signified by a lack of adulterants, additives, and stimulants; and purity of the 
growing  industries  producing  food  and  drugs.  There  are  three  primary  schools  of 
167  Ibid., 15. 
168  Ibid., 71. 
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thought  about  why  so  many  Americans,  especially  women,  began  campaigning  for 
consumers to purify their diets, for the food industry to purify their factories, and for the 
government to purify the food industry at the turn of the century: 1) the bad food theory, 
2) the covert feminism theory, and 3) the status anxiety theory. 
The bad food theory takes the motivations cited by turn-of-the-century crusaders 
at face value: they were motivated by increasing rates of food adulteration, alcoholism 
and poor diets, and the decline of traditional safeguards like consumers being able to see 
for  themselves  how  clean  the  butcher's  shop  was.  This  theory  is  most  prevalent  in 
popular  accounts  of  American  history.  Most  purvey  a  triumphant  narrative  of  how 
muckrakers exposed the dangers, noble crusaders fought the corporations, and Teddy 
Roosevelt signed the historic legislation that corrected the worst abusess. The second 
theory, largely advanced by feminist historians, claims that impure or unsafe food was 
merely one of many kinds of social reform women seized on to advance a broader agenda 
of political equality. The third theory, which prevails among American historians, claims 
crusades for pure  food,  drink,  and drugs were the fragmented result  of  middle-class 
status anxiety. The “Pure food” crusades have been portrayed by many historians as a 
prototypical example of the perversion of participatory democracy to serve far less noble 
projects  of  class  distinction  and  the  consolidation  of  power  by  bureaucrats  and  big 
business. 
Despite the profound differences in how people in those three camps interpret 
and explain the rise of Pure Food crusades, there is widespread agreement that they 
were inextricable from other Progressive Era reform movements. Like those movements, 
Pure Food activism emerged in the 1880s and 1890s and then largely disappeared after 
the 1920s. 
The Bad Food Theory
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The “bad food” theory claims the movements appeared all went away at the same 
time because things were bad, but then the reformers won. It is based on the premise 
that the safety of available food deteriorated at exactly the same time that alcoholism 
and tobacco use became public problems and reformers were just stepping up to the 
plate to fix society's ills. The coincidence between so many different social ills appearing 
at once is generally attributed to other structural changes, like the growth of big cities, 
railroads,  factories,  an  industrial  working  class  composed largely  of  immigrants  and 
former slaves or their descendants, and corporations as the dominant form of enterprise. 
However,  there's  little  evidence  that  those  things  actually  caused  changes  in  the 
problems  the  reformers  cared  about.  The  “bad  food”  theory  relies  entirely  on  the 
reformers' own evaluations of both how bad things were at the turn of the century and 
how  much  better  they  were  before  the  1880s.  Goodwin's  account  notes,  “reliable 
morbidity and mortality statistics were not available. The few existing estimates lacked 
documentation and were probably exaggerated or biased.”169 Nonetheless, she concludes 
that the reformers were responding to real changes, and claims:
Before 1870, consumers had felt little need for outside protection. In a 
predominately agricultural society, people raised much of their own food, 
bought most of the rest from local merchants, and depended on simple 
and  tried  remedies  to  treat  their  maladies.  Consumers  could  observe 
conditions under which their food and medical supplies were produced, 
handled,  and  marketed,  and  a  tradesman's  social  and  business  future 
depended on his reputation for cleanliness and honesty.170 
However,  the  shift  to  commercial  farming  long  predated  the  Pure  Foods 
movement. According to Richard Hofstadter, one of the primary architects of the “status 
theory,” the transition from independent yeomans to cash crop farmers dependent on 
the country store for their supplies was “complete in Ohio by about 1830 and twenty 
years later in Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan...in so far as this process was unfinished in 
1860, the demands of the Civil War brought it to completion.”171 In the industrializing 
169  Ibid, 43. 
170  Ibid, 47-8. 
171  Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965: 
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cities of the North, consumers had been reliant on food transported, handled, packaged, 
and  marketed  by  anonymous  businesses  for  the  better  part  of  a  century  before 
muckraking journalists and crusading women took up the cause of Pure Food.
Nor were conditions on the farm necessarily superior. As Isaac Williams Brewer 
noted  in  a  1909  handbook  on  rural  hygiene,  deaths  from  many  infectious  diseases 
popularly associated with cities, like influenza and dysentery,  were actually higher in 
rural districts than urban centers.172 Rural areas were plagued by disease and sanitation 
problems caused by the contamination of  drinking water  and clean soil  with animal 
manure and the vulnerability of large stores of food to vermin. Rather than uncritically 
accepting  the  reformers'  reports  that  food  adulteration  were  new  or  newly-pressing 
concerns in the 1880s, most historians suggest that poor food, alcohol use, and drugs 
had  always been  problems.  What  changed  in  the  late  nineteenth  century  was  the 
popular sentiment about those problems and the rise of  organized efforts  to change 
them. 
The Covert Feminism Theory
Some feminist  scholars  have attributed  the changing  sentiment  among upper 
middle-class women to universal manhood suffrage and the construction of the “Cult of 
True Womanhood.”173 Paula Baker argues in “The Domestication of Politics: Women and 
American Political Society, 1780-1920” that one of the results of the nineteenth century 
bifurcation of the public and private spheres was that women's reform societies were 
39). 
172  Isaac Williams Brewer, Rural Hygiene (Philadelphia, PA: 1909: 13). 
173  A phrase that comes from Barbara Welter's 1966 article “The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860,” 
American Quarterly 18 No. 2 (Summer 1966): 151-74. Welter argues that the idea of “separate spheres” 
of influence for men and women, and the idea that women's proper place was the home emerged at the 
same time as male egalitarianism and universal manhood suffrage. Welter suggests that the elimination 
of property qualifications for suffrage made gender into the most salient political division and turned 
womanhood into a sort of negative referent that united all white men. At the same time, the construction 
of “public” politics and the control of businesses and state money in the hands of white men relied on 
the increased emphasis on women as the arbiters of the moral and spiritual health of their families and 
the nation.
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constructed  as  crucial  to  the  production  of  virtuous  citizens  and  applauded even  as 
women's agitation for privileges constructed as exclusively male like suffrage, met with 
great  resistance.  Women's  reform societies  were  constructed as  outside of  and often 
above  politics,  even  when  they  were  pushing  for  legislative  reforms.174 Women's 
historians  broadly  agree  that  white,  middle-class  American  women  learned  to  work 
within and simultaneously expand the “separate sphere” constructed in the nineteenth 
century by pursing public action through their accepted roles as mothers, caretakers, and 
managers of the home (including, crucially, the kitchen). Many of the women involved in 
reform  societies  rejected  woman  suffrage  because  it  threatened  to  undermine  their 
moral authority. Scholars like Karen Blair argue that the proliferation of women's clubs 
ranging  from  literary  societies  to  temperance  unions  exemplified  what  she  calls 
“domestic feminism.” According to Blair, the overt acceptance of traditional roles gave 
women “ideological  cover” for  their  more radical  sentiments  and agendas—including 
greater equality in the public sphere.175 
The covert feminists theory grew out of an attempt to address the exclusion of 
women from U.S.  history.  For decades most scholarship on the Progressive Era was 
based primarily on the published writings of middlebrow journalists like Upton Sinclair, 
the campaign speeches of  politicians like Teddy Roosevelt,  leaders of  new regulatory 
agencies like Harvey W. Wiley, and the records kept by corporations, political parties,  
and  professional  organizations  like  the  American  Medical  Association.  All  of  which 
exclude women. However, the theory that the Pure Foods movement was the product of 
gender ideologies and only incidentally about food fails to explain the simultaneous rise 
of  Progressive  reform  sentiment  among  white  urban  professional  men.  How  do  we 
explain  both  Mary  Hackett  Hunt  and  Upton  Sinclair?  Additionally,  as  Goodwin 
174  Paula Baker, “The Domestication of Politics: Women and American Political Society, 1780-1920,” The 
American Historical Review 89 No. 3 (June 1984): 620-647. 
175  Karen Blair, The Clubwoman as Feminist: True Womanhood Redefined, 1868-1914 (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1980:1).
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documents,  participants  in  the  Pure  Foods  movement  were  divided  about  suffrage; 
rather than serving as ideological cover, the Pure Food activism was eventually “eroded 
by the suffrage movement.” Gender politics undoubtedly shaped the strategies and that 
both women's organizations and male politicians and journalists used to agitate for food 
and drug reform,  but  the  participants  in  the Pure  Foods  movement  were  ultimately 
unified less by gender than by race and class. 
The Status Anxiety Theory
The status anxiety theory argues that both middle-class men and women who 
took up social causes at the turn of the twentieth century were driven not by objective 
changes in the severity of the nation's social ills,  nor by shifts in gender politics, but 
instead by an upheaval in the distribution of deference and power. In  Age of Reform, 
Hofstadter argues that Progressivism was led primarily by “Mugwumps”—the college-
educated class of doctors, lawyers, and business owners who were active members in 
societies  for  civic  betterment  and  local  political  leaders.  In  the  last  decades  of  the 
nineteenth century, they found themselves eclipsed by the rise of a new super-elite:
In  their  personal  careers,  as  in  their  community  activities,  they  found 
themselves  checked,  hampered,  and  overridden  by  the  agents  of  new 
corporations, the corrupters of legislatures, the buyers of franchises, the 
allies of political bosses.... In a strictly economic sense these men were not 
growing poorer as a class, but their wealth and power were being dwarfed 
by comparison with the new eminences of wealth and power. They were 
less important and they knew it.176
Men who were used to being big fish in small ponds suddenly found themselves in an  
ocean full of sharks. According to Hofstadter, they responded to the expropriation of 
their moral authority by becoming active in reform movements that challenged the new 
corporations and the new social order that had disenfranchised them. 
Hofstadter  underestimates  the  role  that  women  played  in  those  reform 
movements, but that doesn't necessarily undermine his theory. Status upheaval can also 
176  Hofstadter, 1965: 137. 
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explain why middle-class women took up the mantle of reform. Goodwin insists that 
“activism for pure food, drink, and drugs extended across lines of class, sex, religion, and 
ethnic origin that had divided people in the past,” but she offers little evidence that the 
movement  was  more  widespread  than  other  historians  suggest.177 The  General 
Federation of  Women's  Clubs (G.F.W.C.),  a  national  organization formed in  1890 to 
coordinate the efforts of clubs nationwide, encouraged member clubs to welcome every 
woman  regardless  of  her  “station  in  life.”  However,  the  admonition  offers  clearer 
evidence that the early clubs excluded members based on class than proof that working 
women, immigrants, or African-Americans ever joined in significant numbers. 
Nearly all the women activists she profiles were either professionals themselves—
like all the women involved in Sorosis—or, more commonly, the wives of professional 
men. Sarah Sophia Chase Harris Platt Decker of Denver Colorado, the first president of  
the G.F.W.C. was married first to a business tycoon active in politics and then to Judge 
W.S. Decker. Eva Perry Moore, the first vice-president, was a Vassar graduate who had 
traveled in Europe between graduation and marriage. Helen Miller, the first chair of the 
G.F.W.C.'s Pure Food Subcommittee was a home economist at the Agricultural College 
in Columbia Missouri and married to another academic. 
Goodwin claims that the size and influence of the movement and official open 
membership policies suggest that Pure Foods activism was “truly a mass movement that 
began in the grassroots of America.”178 For example, she claims:
The obvious advantage of open membership increased the potential of the 
crusade by bringing greater numbers and a wider heterogeneity of women 
in to the club movement. By 1900 Federation membership rose to more 
than 150,000 women, organized into 595 clubs and 30 state federations. 
By 1905 the numbers more than doubled. In Illinois, alone, 242 federated 
clubs  represented  24,000  women....  Open  membership  also  served  to 
bridge  the  religious,  sectional,  ethnic,  and  social  barriers  which  had 
prevented women from uniting in the past.179 
177  Goodwin, 1999: 133.
178  Ibid, 291. 
179  Ibid, 133-4. 
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However,  she  provides  no  evidence  that  those  150,000  women  were  actually 
heterogeneous beyond their  formal declaration of  inclusivity.  Not  only  does she lack 
demographic  data,  she doesn't  provide  a  single  anecdote  about  any  non-white,  non-
middle-class women taking part. Instead, her anecdotes reinforce the clubs' functional 
(if not intentional) exclusivity. For example, Decker visited a club in Denver that met in a 
“wealthy and handsome clubhouse” in a room with a decorative inlaid border on the 
floor.  The president told  her  that  there were 200 members and as  many more on a 
waiting list. Decker asked why the membership was restricted, and was told that only 
200 chairs would fit within the border. Setting chairs on the border itself was not to be 
considered.180
What makes the status anxiety theory especially compelling is that it explains not 
only the sudden rise of food reform sentiment in the upper-middle classes, but also why 
it disappeared just as suddenly after the 1920s. As even proponents of the “bad food” 
theory admit, the Pure Food movement didn't stop with the passage of the Pure Food 
and Drug Act—on the contrary, it was energized by the victory.181 Nor were there any 
notable changes in food production or distribution in the 1920s to guarantee a safer food 
supply at that point. Many recent critics of the food industry argue that the continued 
growth and consolidation of the national food supply during and after the World Wars 
exacerbated the unresolved problems that ostensibly motivated the first food movement. 
The Nineteenth Amendment did alter women's political power, but proponents of the 
covert feminism theory note that women continued to participate in activism outside of 
formal politics even after the ratification of the Amendment in even greater numbers. 
What did change during the Great Depression and World War II was the relative status 
and power of the American middle classes.
180  Ibid, 133. 
181 According to Goodwin, “an extraordinary explosion of activism accompanied attempts to implement 
the law,” and the same organizations that had pushed for its passage now organized around the 
conviction that “the Augean stables are still unclean” (266). 
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The Return of “Natural” Foods: From Woodstock to Whole Foods Market 
By the time the freaks and hippies of the 1960s counterculture discovered natural 
foods, the quest for purity in whole grains and meat-free diets had been firmly relegated 
to the cultural margins. Warren Belasco describes how “young bohemians often shared 
the conventional  view of  'heath food nuts'  as  hypochondriacs  who dipped desiccated 
wheat germ crackers into yeast carrot juice cocktails”182 when they first began to venture 
into natural food stores in the late 1960s. By now the association between hippies and 
natural food is so pervasive, some people assume that it was inevitable that politically 
left-leaning freaks would come to question and ultimately reject the fast food, TV-dinner, 
Wonderbread cuisine developed by the industrial food system. However, the few people 
in the counterculture who attempted to call attention to food before 1969 had had little 
success. The Diggers distributed free meals in the Haight-Ashbury district made from 
ingredients  grown  or  scavenged  in  San  Francisco;  they  were  seen  by  others  in  the 
counterculture as  “an 'anonymous group of stubborn moralists,  probably stiff-necked 
primitive Christians in sackcloth'.”183 When Alice Waters returned to Berkeley in 1966 
after spending her junior year in France, she began serving elaborate French meals to the 
Free Speech Movement activists who would gather in the apartment she shared with 
fellow activist Jeremy Goines.  However,  she faced resistance from other activists like 
Jerry Rubin, a leader of the Youth International Party, who insisted on eating bologna 
and white bread sandwiches because that's what the “masses” ate.184 
According  to  Belasco,  “ecology”  emerged  as  a  powerful  buzzword  practically 
overnight in 1968 and 1969. As a “subversive science” that spoke to concerns about the 
environment  and  offered  personal  methods  of  taking  action  against  the  military-
182  Belasco, 1989: 16. 
183 Charles Perry, The Haight-Ashbury: A History (New York, NY: Rolling Stone Press, 1985), qtd. in 
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industrial complex,  ecology was the driving philosophy behind what Belasco calls  the 
“countercuisine”  –  “a  coherent  set  of  dietary  beliefs  and practices”  based in  part  on 
avoiding processed “plastic” food. He notes that as late as 1968, leftist literature featured 
seemingly proletarian recipes involving ingredients like instant coffee, nondairy creamer, 
bologna,  and  canned  soups.  After  1969  “no  counter-cultural  food  writer  mentioned 
processed food—unless in contempt.”185 A number of factors set the stage for the creation 
of  the  countercuisine:  the  Kennedy  and King  assassinations,  intensifying  violence  in 
Vietnam, and riots from Detroit to Paris caused a widespread sense that social order was 
disintegrating. A spate of environmental crises including an oil spill off Santa Barbara 
and the Cuyahoga River  in  Cleveland catching fire  were  followed by a  rash of  news 
stories about DDT, world hunger, and overpopulation. Additionally, there was a growing 
sense of futility or disenfranchisement on the left—antiwar rallies seemed increasingly 
futile, and many on the left felt that the movement had been “taken over by Great Society  
bureaucrats  and  exclusionary  Black  Power  advocates.”186 Ecology  combined  a 
transcendent  vision  of  a  radically  restructured  society  with  immediate  ways  to 
participate: plant a garden, stop eating meat.
It was not inevitable that the “natural” foods movement would go mainstream, 
either. Many other aspects of the counterculture didn't. Some popular accounts of the 
rise of the organic market portray it as a pre-existing consumer desire simply waiting for 
entrepreneurs to tap into it. For example, in Organic, Inc. Samuel Fromartz argues that 
the  “organic  revolution”  was  driven  by  a  handful  of  “iconoclasts”  influenced  by  the 
radical thinking of  the 1960s but willing to drop their “countercultural  baggage” and 
make nice with capitalism in order to natural foods to the waiting consumer.187 Fromartz 
mentions the Alar panic in the early 1990s as a driving factor, but the market for organic  
185  Belasco, 1989: 27. 
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foods had been expanding rapidly for at least a decade before that. By 1989, when the 60 
minutes episode about Alar aired, Whole Foods Market had already begun to expand 
nationwide, with successful stores in Austin, Palo Alto, and New Orleans.188 
Belasco  identifies  the  key  moment  when  natural  foods  emerged  in  the 
mainstream as the early 1980s. According to Belasco, the Kellogg company “generally 
followed  food  industry  conventions  that  'nutrition  doesn't  sell'—until  1981,  when  it 
introduced  Nutri-Grain  vitamin-fortified,  sugar-and-preservative-free  flakes.  ”  The 
flakes were incorporated into a variety of cold cereals, frozen waffles, and fruit-filled bars 
marketed at “well-trimmed yuppies.” Belasco further argues that even in the 1980s, the 
new,  health  food  trends  were  largely  limited  to  the  wealthiest  25-40  percent  of  the 
population.  Their  tastes  were  increasingly  portrayed  as  normative.  A  decade  earlier, 
hippie  foods  were  popularly  derided  as  “nuts  and  twigs,”  unpalatable  at  best  and 
unpatriotic at worst. However, in the 1980s, the food industry found it could appeal to 
even respectable Reaganites with a diversified array of foods given a healthy imprimatur 
with words like “granola.” 
Granola was originally the name of a single brand of cereal trademarked in 1886 
by W. K. Kellogg.189 A similar cereal called “Granula” was first developed by Dr. James 
Caleb Jackson in 1863 at his health spa in Danville, New York. Granula was made from a 
paste of graham flour combined with water baked in thin sheets until crisp and crumbled 
into pieces. The serving suggestions recommended reconstituting the bean-sized nuggets 
in liquid for at least twenty minutes before consuming. Kellogg began selling his own 
version of Granula using whole wheat, oatmeal, and corn meal in the 1870s, but renamed 
it  “Granola”  after  Dr.  Jackson  sued  him  in  1881.  By  1889,  Kellogg's  Sanitas  Food 
Company was selling approximately two tons of Granola every week. Kellogg's Granola 
was eventually surpassed in popularity by Grape Nuts, a similar cereal developed by one 
188 “Company History,” Whole Foods Market, 2011, Web (accessed 09 April 2011). 
189 "granola, n." Oxford English Dictionary Online, March 2011, Oxford University Press (accessed 09 
April 2011).
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of  Kellogg's former patients,  Charles Williams Post.  The bran-nugget genre was later 
surpassed by the flaked, sugared, and puffed cereals developed in the twentieth century 
(including the Kellogg Company's iconic Toasted Corn Flakes). Still, the Granola brand 
name lived on as the generic term for toasted whole-grain cereals.190
Generic  granola  remained  a  staple  of  small  health  foods  stores.  It  took  on 
additional  significance  as  a  slang  term  for  the  culture,  politics,  and  food  of  the 
counterculture, probably due to the role it played at Woodstock. Nathan's hot dogs was 
originally  lined  up  to  provide  concessions  for  the  festival,  but  they  pulled  out  over 
disagreements about wages and the festival's location. Instead, the organizers hired a trio 
called Food for Love. Despite what the name connotes today, Food for Love exemplified 
a pre-1969 culinary aesthetic: they sold conventional concession fare like hot dogs and 
hamburgers. However, they—like everyone else involved in the festival—were completely 
unprepared to deal with the size of the crowd that showed up. Facing dwindling supplies 
and long lines on Saturday night, they raised their prices. Angry crowds burned two of 
their concession stands down. The next morning, members of the Hog Farm Collective, 
who had been hired to help with security, set up free food lines serving brown rice and 
vegetables and arranged to distribute thousands of cups of granola to the people close to 
the stage, some of whom hadn't eaten in nearly two days because they didn't want to give  
up their spots.191 
In  the  1980s,  granola  was  still  associated  with  the  counterculture  (and  often 
deployed  derisively;  Reagan  supporters  described  Jerry  Brown  of  California  as  “the 
granola governor,  appealing to flakes and nuts”192).  But it  also became a mainstream 
190 Joy Santlofer, “Cereal, Cold,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of Food and Drink in America, ed. Andrew F. 
Smith (e-reference edition) University of Michigan - Ann Arbor, Web (accessed 9 April 2011).
191 Michael Lang, The Road to Woodstock (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009: 155), referenced in Lisa 
Bramen, “Woodstock—How to Feed 400,000 Hungry Hippies,” Smithsonian Magazine: Food & Think, 
14 August 2009, Web (accessed 09 April 2011). 
192 “Jokes, and Echoes, in New Hampshire,” The New York Times, 20 February 1980, ProQuest Historical 
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150
cereal and snack bar ingredient, especially for the middle class.193 In Saul Bellow's 1984 
short story, “What Kind of Day Did You Have?” suburban divorced mom Katrina Goliger 
feeds her daughters granola as part of a typical morning routine: “Katrina woke the girls 
and told them to dress and come downstairs for their granola. Mother had to go to a 
meeting. . . . When Katrina, ready to go, came into the kitchen in her fleece-lined coat, 
the  girls  were  till  sitting  over  their  granola.  The  milk  had  turned brown  while  they 
dawdled. 'I'm leaving a list on the bulletin board, tell Ysole.'”194 The granola is as much of 
a marker of their class status as the reference to the housekeeper or Katrina's affair with 
a “world-class intellectual, big in the art world.” “Granola” is still used to identify left-
wing politics and lifestyle markers associated with the 1960s counterculture, but it is also 
associated with the particular kind of health-savvy and wholesomeness that became a 
middle-class preoccupation again in the 1980s. 
P a r t  I V :  E t h n i c  F o o d  a n d  t h e  I d e a l  o f  C o s m o p o l i t a n i s m
Food from Another Place and Time
In the introduction to Pilaf, Pozole, and Pad Thai: American Women and Ethnic  
Food, Sherrie Inness acknowledges the difficulty of defining ethnic food: “ethnic food is a 
label that many Americans apply to those foods from cultures most clearly demarcated 
as 'foreign.' Thus sashimi will be labeled ethnic more readily than dishes that have been 
assimilated into U.S. culture, such as British fish and chips or the omnipresent spaghetti 
and meatballs.”195 However, even those assimilated foods may be presented in a way that 
renders  them foreign.  At  the  Manhattan eatery  A Salt  & Battery,  for  example,  signs 
proclaim that it is “New York's only truly authentic fish & chip shop.” [Figure 2.5] 
193  Again, meaning the idea of the middle-class, not “the masses.” 
194 Saul Bellow, “What Kind of Day Did You Have,” Him With His Foot in His Mouth and Other Stories  
1984 (New York, NY: Penguin Books 1998: 90). 
195 Sherrie A. Inness, “Introduction,” Pilaf, Pozole, and Pad Thai: American Women and Ethnic Food 
(Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001). 
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Figure 2.5/A Salt and Battery home page Screen shot196 
The source  of  A Salt  & Battery's  “authenticity”  is  their  fidelity  to a  particular 
construction of Britishness as foreign, not assimilated. In addition to their hot food, they 
also sell a variety of imported UK-brand groceries like HP Sauce, Branston Pickle, PG 
Tips Teabags, and cans of Batchelors Mushy Peas. They sell merchandise emblazoned 
with logos like “Cod Save the Queen,” and display black and white photographs of what 
appear to be real British people on the walls. The menu features soft drinks from the UK 
like Dandellion & Burdock, Vimto, and Irn Bru and declares “Chips! No French Fries 
Here!” Their sister restaurant, Tea & Sympathy, similarly trades the foreignness of many 
British culinary traditions. They serve afternoon tea with scones and clotted cream and 
the  dinner  menu  includes  roast  beef  with  Yorkshire  pudding,  welsh  rarebit,  treacle 
pudding,  and  rhubarb  with  custard.  Both  restaurants  assume,  like  the  cookbooks 
Hoganson writes about, that “foreignness has cachet,” even when it comes to a cuisine 
often declared “the worst in the world.”197
196  Screen shot by the author from “A Salt and Battery,” 2011, Web (accessed 09 April 2011). 
197  See for example, George Orwell, “In Defence of English Cooking” (1945), The Collected Essays,  
Journalism and Letters of George Orwell: In front of your Nose, 1945-50 (London: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1968). Thanks to Ken Albala for calling that essay to my attention. 
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Inness ultimately decides “the best approach is a broad one. Numerous factors, 
including  social  class,  ethnicity,  race,  language,  age,  religion,  and  regional  location, 
influence people's reactions to what they perceive as ethnic cuisine.”198 Essentially, she 
suggests,  ethnic  food  is  whatever  people  think it  is.  The collection  offers  a  series  of 
examples: Paul Christensen says his Sicilian-born mother's ritual preparation of pasta 
and tomato sauce (“mac and gravy”) affirms a romantic, passionate “counterpoint to the 
killing dullness of her life” in the United States; Arlene Voski Avakian writes about how 
she  wins  over  her  lesbian  partner's  disapproving  Aunt  Elizabeth  with  Armenian 
fassoulia199 and rice pilaf; Lisa Heldke interrogates the “racial/ethnic and class privilege” 
represented by her penchant for cooking foods from Southeast Asia and Africa.200 Like A 
Salt & Battery's construction of an authentic British foreignness, these examples point to 
the characteristics that people tend to perceive as ethnic. 
As Christensen's essay suggests, ethnic food is not only a designation that people 
apply to cuisines they are not personally familiar with. For many immigrants and their 
descendants,  eating “ethnic”  is  a  way  to  affirm their  identities,  but  only  when those 
identities  are  associated  with  a  different  place.  Heldke  differentiates  between  the 
Thanksgiving meal she prepares the same way every year just like her mother did and the 
ethnic cooking she does when she invites people over for dinner and plans an elaborate 
menu with foods from different nationalities, “most of them consisting of several dishes 
I've  never  cooked  before.”201 The  traditional  Thanksgiving  meal  is  her  equivalent  of 
Christensen's mothers “mac and gravy,” but as its imagined referent is (white) America 
instead of Sicily, only the latter is ethnic. 
The distinction may have more to do with power than actual geographic origin. 
198  Inness, 2001: 4. 
199  Green beans cooked in a sauce of tomato and onions, which prompts Aunt Elizabeth to note that she 
also used to make them that way and hadn't for the longest time, suggesting the ways in which ethnic 
food can be a source of affinity as well as difference.
200  Christensen 37; Avakian 113-5; Heldke, 177-8, in Inness 2001. 
201  Heldke, 176.
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Donna Gabaccia  notes  that  Native  Americans  participated  in  the  “new  ethnicity” 
movements of the 1970s and their foodways are likely to be recognized as ethnic even if  
they are also rooted in America. Similarly, soul food is constructed as both Other and 
American. However, the power relationships involved in designating something Other 
may  be  complex,  as  the  example  of  A Salt  &  Battery  demonstrates.  The  appeal  of 
culinary foreignness is not always expressed as a desire for foods that are exotic (which 
usually connotes non-whiteness and is often associated with sensuality, primitivism, and 
danger–in American culinary terms, assertive flavors, spiciness, and “mixed” foods)202.  I 
use the word cosmopolitanism both as a nod to Hoganson's  Consumers Imperium  and 
because it seems to capture the essential characteristic of Otherness at stake.203
The other key characteristic of culinary cosmopolitanism is the word invoked by 
A Salt  & Battery:  authenticity.  The appeal of ethnic and foreign foods almost always 
depends on the idea that they are faithful to a particular place or tradition and have not 
been adapted to  fit  mainstream tastes.  Those places do not  always have to  be other 
countries—seeking out an authentic New York bagel, a specific style of barbeque, or New 
Mexico  green  chile  also  appeal  to  the  kind  of  desirable  Otherness  popular  with  the 
middle-class today.204 The mainstream appreciation for authentically Other foodways is 
not a historical constant. According to Gabaccia, for much of U.S. history, immigrants 
cultivated  culinary  practices  they  brought  with  them  in  relatively  isolated  ethnic 
202  See Bentley, 2002: 179.
203  Invoking the Ulrich Beck sense of the word “cosmopolitanism” as a recognition of otherness, rather 
than the Immanuel Kant sense of universal moral law. 
204 These two concerns—otherness and authenticity—are also associated with tourism. Anthropologist 
Dean MacCannell defines the tourist as “a temporarily leisured person who voluntarily visits a place 
away from home for the purpose of experiencing a change” and argues that the “touristic consciousness 
is motivated by its desire for authentic experience.” Folklorist Lucy Long coined the term “culinary 
tourism” to refer to the use of food itself as a vehicle for experiencing another culture and the growing 
use of food as a rationale for choice of destination and trip itineraries. Culinary tourism is definitely one 
form of culinary cosmopolitanism, but the latter is slightly broader—encompassing not only the 
exploration of foods other to the self, but also foods from your own past that are other to the 
mainstream, like Christensen's mother's “mac & gravy.” Lucy M. Long, “Introduction,” Culinary 
Tourism, ed. Lucy M. Long (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004:15). 
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enclaves. Markets, restaurants, bars, butchers, and bakeries run by immigrants catered 
to immigrants from the same country or region. She also notes that “the boundaries 
around ethnic enclaves in the United States have never been firm or impermeable,”205 
but whether mainstream, middle-class Americans thought it was a good thing to cross 
them has varied greatly over the last century
The Rise and Fall: Foreign Entertainments to Frito Lay
As  noted  in  Part  I,  cosmopolitanism  has  often  been  intertwined  with 
sophistication.  The  same postbellum women  worrying  about  service  à la  Russe also 
threw  “foreign  entertainments”  with  international  themes.  According  to  Hoganson, 
guests  at  those  entertainments  were  often  instructed  to  dress  in  traditional  ethnic 
costume;  in  addition  to  the  internationally-inspired  food,  they  played  games  that 
encouraged people to cultivate their knowledge about the world: “At a Japanese party,  
guests might encounter envelopes containing jumbled letters of some of the largest cities 
on the islands. The task was to determine the names by straightening out the mixtures.  
At a Dutch party, guests might be asked to write down as many interesting facts about 
the  Netherlands  and  its  people  as  they  could  recall.”206 Recipes  provided  lessons  in 
foreignness,  like  how to eat  spaghetti  in  the traditional  Italian fashion by twirling it 
around a fork rather than cutting it or how to eat with chopsticks. The texts assume that 
middle-class  women  and  their  guests  would  want  to  enjoy  their  foreign  foods  as 
authentically as possible 
Gabbacia describes the first decades of the twentieth century as a particularly 
“intensive phase of cross-cultural borrowing” for American ethnic foods. She describes 
the  rise  of  Delmonico's  in  New  York,  which  adopted  a  French  menu  in  the  mid-
nineteenth  century  and  in  the  1870s  became  the  most  conspicuously  extravagant 
205  Gabaccia, 1998: 94.
206  Hoganson, 2007: 145. 
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restaurant  in  the  city.  For  people  with  slightly  less  money,  Italian  restaurants  in 
Greenwich Village offered something “far more expensive than a typical workingman's 
dinner but well below the prices of a restaurant like Delmonico's.”207 The owners and 
staff played up their foreignness for crossover consumers, performing a sort of Italian 
drag to create a “dining experience” that was about far more than just the food. A 1883 
guidebook for tourists in San Francisco suggests that people with enough money to travel 
could be expected to have an interest in Chinese food, recommending “four restaurants 
where they could safely eat—all above street level, of course.”208 
Gabaccia argues the attitude towards immigrant foods did not diminish with the 
onset of the Depression; however, the dominant tone changed. The wider acceptance of 
immigrant foodways outside of ethnic enclaves and middle class culinary tourism during 
and after  the 1930s was driven largely by their  practical  advantages.  Due to wartime 
shortages, the privations of the Great Depression, and the gradual assimilation of the 
immigrant populations they were associated with, dishes like spaghetti and chop suey 
were increasingly  portrayed as  patriotic  and accessible,  not  novel  or  sophisticated.209 
Ethnic foods were celebrated for being cheap to make. They required far less meat than 
the  “ordered  meal,”  or  sometimes  even  no  meat  at  all.  Gabaccia  welcomes  this  as 
“culinary pluralism,” but it was no longer culinary cosmopolitanism. Ethnic dishes were 
celebrated for being familiar and economical, not Other and authentic. 
Gabaccia  also  notes  that  many  of  the  key  entrepreneurs  of  the  growing  food 
industry  during  the  post-war  years  were  first  or  second-generation  Americans.  Carl 
Swanson  of  Swanson's  TV  dinners  moved  from  Sweden  to  the  U.S.  in  1896;  Chef 
Boyardee originated with a chef from Piacenza, Italy named Hector Boiardi; Henry J. 
Heinz  was  the  son  of  German  immigrants.  All  of  them  succeeded  by  “selling  their 
products  with no ethnic labels  attached.”  She also points  to  the example  of  Doritos,  
207  Gabaccia, 1999: 100.
208  Gabaccia, 1999: 103. 
209  Gabaccia, 1998: 147. 
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which were developed to “taste more like 'authentic' tostadas” and became tremendously 
popular. However, there's no evidence that they were seen as ethnically marked. Just two 
years  earlier  the  Frito  Lay  company  was  accused  of  insensitivity,  stereotyping,  and 
racism by the Mexican-American Anti-Defamation Committee when they switched their 
mascot  from  the  cowboy-clad  Frito  Kid  to  the  Frito  Bandito,  so  they  dropped  the 
“Mexican”  imagery.  Processed  foods  reflected  the  diversity  of  native  and  immigrant 
influences on U.S.  foodways,  but they were not embraced because they were seen as 
Other  or  authentic.210 The  most  striking  evidence  that  the  enthusiastic  pursuit  of 
cosmopolitan eating declined in the mid-twentieth century is how widely it was heralded 
as a “new” development when it re-emerged in the 1980s, again most conspicuously with 
the yuppies. 
The Return: Neither Frugal Nor Gourmet
Gabaccia actually argues “ethnic” eating first became more popular in the 1970s; 
however, she claims that at that point the phenomenon was primarily limited to people 
who identified with the “new ethnicity” movement:
It began with African-American critiques of a national history that had 
excluded them—some of  the  oldest  Americans—from participation  and 
membership.  Native-Americans,  Asian-Americans  and  Latinos  also 
emphasized  their  exclusion  from  the  celebrated  benefits  of  American 
prosperity and democracy. Racial minorities initiated this ethnic revival 
or 'new ethnicity' by demanding recognition for their unique histories and 
ways of life. . . . For these new ethnics, the task at hand was to undo the 
cultural effects of three generations of assimilation. Not surprising, food 
became an integral part of that effort.211
Some white ethnics also began to try to preserve or recover parts of their ethnic heritage, 
especially culinary traditions, as exemplified by the proliferation of ethnic food festivals 
and  community  cookbooks.  While  that  does  represent  one  form  of  culinary 
210  This attitude is exemplified by the editors of the America Eats project who “vigorously rejected foods 
or events they regarded as commercial or corporate” in their attempt to capture authentic American 
traditions. Gabaccia, 1999:143. 
211  Gabaccia, 1999: 176. 
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cosmopolitanism,  it  still  limited.  Like  most  other  scholars,  Gabaccia  dates  the 
mainstream explosion of ethnic restaurants, international food aisles, and the value of 
culinary adventurousness to the 1980s: 
“No longer a nation of fussy, self-denying eaters, Americans by the 1980s 
devoured  cookbooks  describing  the  foods  and  cooking  techniques  of 
cultures around the world.  .  .  .  Educated, well-traveled, and enjoying a 
higher income than most hippies had as young people in the early 1970s, 
yuppies in the 1980s searched more often for authentic and exotic, than 
healthy, ethnic food.”212
Where the yuppies  go,  the masses follow: “The yuppies'  fascination with ethnicity in 
authentic or nouvelle forms eventually spread to more modest consumers in the mass 
marketplace.” 213
The renewed popular appeal of culinary cosmopolitanism is exemplified by the 
success  of  Jeff  Smith,  otherwise known as “The Frugal  Gourmet.”  A  Time magazine 
article titled “Food: Most of the Decade,” published on January 1, 1990 declared Smith 
the “Most Visible Gourmet” of the 1980s.214 Smith's name may not ring a bell for some 
contemporary followers of celebrity chef culture, particularly ones who came of age in 
the 1990s or later, but the Time benediction is a testament to the influence he had in the 
first decade of gourmet's re-consolidation as a mainstream trend. According to the blurb 
about him: 
Jeff  Smith of  Seattle,  the  lanky,  gray-bearded,  cackle-voiced Methodist 
minster  who  calls  himself  the  Frugal  Gourmet,  entered  millions  of 
American homes via his still running how-to series on PBS. All four of his 
precise,  tip-laden  and  irrepressibly  cheerful  cookbooks—The  Frugal 
Gourmet,  The  Frugal  Gourmet  Cooks  with Wine,  The  Frugal  Gourmet 
Cooks American and The Frugal Gourmet Cooks Three Ancient Cuisines—
hit best-seller charts, with hard-cover sales of 3.4 million.215 
According to a 1987 article by Laura Shapiro in  Newsweek,  Jeff Smith's show was the 
“most popular television cooking series ever produced,” surpassing even Julia Child.216 A 
212  Gabaccia, 1999: 181, 215. 
213  Gabaccia, 1999: 217. 
214  “Food: Most of the Decade,” Time magazine, 01 January 1990, Web (accessed 10 April 2011). 
215  Ibid.
216  Laura Shapiro, “Preaching the Word About Food,” Newsweek, 09 March 1987 Lexis-Nexis (accessed 
01 September 2009). 
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1992  cover  article  in  Harper's claimed  (actually,  lamented)  that  he  had  15  million 
viewers,  “more  people  than,  if  things  keep  on  as  they  are,  will  vote  in  this  year's  
presidential election.”217 Several years later, an Associated Press article claimed that his 
in-store appearance at a Boca Raton bookstore had drawn crowds “exceeded only by 
those drawn by Ivana Trump and Oliver North.”218 
As the  Harper's article exemplifies,  he wasn't universally admired. Critics and 
culinary professionals generally found his popularity galling; in the scalding attack in 
Harper's magazine, Barbara Grizzuti Harrison asks, “Why is he beloved?” and answers, 
“The short answer is that people are stupid.”219 For his fans, the appeal seems to be the 
opportunity to learn about unfamiliar dishes from all over the world with the quirky, 
unpretentious Smith acting as a tour guide. The name of the show is a little misleading. 
Smith rarely mentions the cost of ingredients or anything else related to money, like how 
to  stretch  expensive  ingredients  or  possible  substitutions  for  someone  on  a  limited 
budget.  His  set  was  equipped  with  expensive  tools  like  a  KitchenAid  mixer,  then  a 
Williams-Sonoma exclusive (although he sometimes referred to it as “a Mixmaster,” the 
name for Sunbeam's less expensive version). His own cookbook implicitly acknowledged 
that  his  show  didn't  represent  the  common  understanding  of  the  word  “frugal”  by 
offering  his  own  definition:  “The  term  'frugal'  does  not  necessarily  mean  'cheap.'  It 
means that you use everything and are careful with your time as well as with your food 
products. Fresh foods, prepared with a bit of care and concern will result in terrific meals 
at lower costs.”220 Nor does the show focus on what most people thought of as “gourmet” 
food. He doesn't use the word “gourmet” very often, and rarely claims that the recipes 
he's demonstrating are sophisticated or impressive or fancy. 
217 Barbara Grizzuti Harrison, “P.C. On the Grill: The Frugal Gourmet, Lambasted and Skewered,” 
Harper's Magazine, June 1992, Web (accessed 10 April 2011). 
218 Associated Press, “Critics Turn Up the Heat Over Frugal Gourmet's Style, Endorsements,” Los Angeles  
Times 23 August 1992, Web (accessed 10 April 2011). 
219  Harrison, 1992.
220  Jeff Smith, The Frugal Gourmet (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1984: 1).
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Instead, episodes were usually organized around the cuisine of a particular region 
or foreign country. This was usually not France. The primary themes in his stream of  
consciousness monologue are how delicious and achievable these unfamiliar recipes are 
and his faith in God. The show was pitched squarely at a public broadcast audience used 
to  slightly-stuffy  educational  programming.  Like  the  foreign  entertainments  that 
Hoganson  describes,  this  is  food  that  comes  with  a  geography  lesson.  The  opening 
credits feature a montage of Smith sampling foods around the world while an orchestral 
arrangement of Handel's “Water Music” plays. Episodes frequently begin with a brief 
historical segment. Smith also peppers the cooking demonstrations with asides about the 
exotic  cookware  and  serving  dishes  he's  picked  up  in  his  international  travels.  He 
generally  speaks about  foreign ingredients  and foods  approvingly,  but almost  always 
follows them up with the assertion that his only real concern was how the food tastes. 
For example, in an episode where he demonstrates several versions of chicken 
teriyaki, he says, “They'll spend hours carving a little bitty carrot to make it really look 
attractive. The Japanese claim that food should feast the eyes as well as the stomach. 
Today  I'm concerned,”  and he  glances  over  both  shoulders  as  if  to  see  if  anyone  is 
listening and gives a little chuckle as he finishes, “with just the stomach.”221 Rather than 
attempting to teach formal restaurant techniques or insist upon adherence to foreign 
standards,  Smith effectively  told  people  that they were  the ultimate  arbiters  of  what 
counted as “gourmet” and they could adventure into unknown culinary waters without 
fear  and experience deliciousness.  In a show where he demonstrates  a Chinese soup 
including chicken feet, red dates, mushrooms, and peanuts, he says, “Now, I know this 
sounds strange to you, but the Chinese claim that this wonderful soup is one of the most 
healthy, invigorating, healing soups that you can you can possibly have. My friend Mary 
Young claims that this will solve cancer. I can't quite believe such a thing, but I'm not 
221 Jeff Smith, The Frugal Gourmet Collection: The Japanese Kitchen, produced by WTTW Chicago and 
MPI Home Video, 1992 (VHS).
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advocating it for that reason. I'm advocating it because it's delicious.”222 
People like Harrison found his schtick unbearable.  In the  Harpers article, she 
calls him “a downscale Bill Moyers of the Insinkerator, an aproned P.C. Guru of Ethnic 
Self-Esteem.”223 But he wasn't a cheerleader for foods on the grounds that there was any 
moral or politically  correct motivation to cook or eat diverse foods.  Smith frequently 
insisted  that  America  had  the  best  food,  best  quality  produce,  and  best  variety  of 
ingredients in the world. In the Chinese soup episode, he hails the availability of bok 
choy in “many supermarkets” saying, “I'm so glad that Americans are finally admitting 
the fact that we have better food than almost anybody.”224 However, the show clearly 
assumed that a mass audience would be interested in recipes and techniques from all 
over the world and the histories behind them. One of Smith's best-selling cookbooks is 
titled,  Three  Ancient  Cuisines:  China,  Greece,  and  Rome;  it  seeks  otherness  and 
authenticity not just in foreign places, but also in the distant past. But as with all of his 
work,  it  unites  the  diverse  traditions  under  a  friendly,  adventurous  search  for 
deliciousness.  Rather  than  evading the  traditional  categories  of  “gourmet”  cooking, 
Smith's show was representative of the redefinition of what could be called gourmet in 
the 1980s, which encompassed a wide range of cuisines marked other. 
Conclusion
By painting in broad strokes, I have undoubtedly oversimplified many aspects of 
American  eating.  However,  only  by  taking  a  long  and  broad  view  does  the  pattern 
emerge. A wide variety of scholars focusing on very different aspects of U.S. foodways all  
document  a  much  longer  history  of  popular  interest  in  the  ideals  of  sophistication, 
thinness, purity, and cosmopolitanism. The central pillars of the food revolution were 
222 Jeff Smith, The Frugal Gourmet: The Chinese Kitchen. Produced by WTTW Chicago and MPI Home 
Video, 1992 (VHS). 
223  Harrison, 1992. 
224  Ibid.
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not new in the 1960s when they were fringe preoccupations in the counterculture or 
super-elite. Nor was the 1980s the first moment when suburban consumers expressed an 
interest in eating “better” food. Instead, the mainstream popularity of all  four pillars 
corresponds closely to the pattern in income inequality: high in the postbellum period 
and first Gilded Age, low during the mid-twentieth century “Great Compression,” and 
high again during the return to an bifurcated income structure in the last three decades. 
In the following chapters, I focus primarily on that latter moment. Using exceptionally 
popular  mass  media  texts  about  food  and audience  responses,  I  analyze  1)  how the 
middle  class  has  embraced  meritocratic  ideologies  that  obscure  the  role  of  class  in 
culinary capital, 2) the persistent negotiation with snobbery that exposes the importance 
of food in the popular imagination of class, and 3) why the hard work and self-denial 
involved  in  eating  “well”  has  special  appeal  for  an  anxious  middle  class  in  need  of 
compensatory forms of aspiration. 
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
M E R I T O C R A C I E S  O F  T A S T E  A N D  T H I N N E S S
If  the  soil  creates  castes,  the  machine  manufactures  
classes—classes to which people can be assigned by their  
achievement rather than ascribed by their birth. Insofar  
as this has happened, social inequality can be justified. 
—Michael Young, The Rise of The Meritocracy1
Meritocracy and the Justification of Social Inequality
The word “meritocracy” was invented by the British writer and politician Michael 
Young  and  initially  popularized  by  his  1958  novel,  The  Rise  of  The  Meritocracy. 
Originally, the book was a non-fiction polemic against the belief that modern education 
would guarantee that people were selected for advancement based on their competence 
instead of nepotism, bribery, and inheritance. The manuscript was rejected by the first 
eleven publishers he sent it to, but one of the editors suggested that he  revise it using 
Aldous  Huxley's  Brave  New  World  as  a  model.  The  version  that  was  eventually 
published is hybrid of sociology and satire framed as an account of a major uprising by 
the underclass written in the year 2034 by a man named Michael Young. According to 
the  fictional  future  Young,  the  rebellion  was  the  result  of  a  century  and  a  half  of 
supposedly merit-based employment that had produced a highly inequitable, rigid class 
system. Rather than promoting equality and class mobility, the “merit” system enabled a 
small elite to accumulate a vastly disproportionate share of wealth by controlling how 
merit was defined. 
The primary thrust of Young's novel is that merit cannot be objectively defined, 
1 Michael Young, “Introduction to the Transaction Edition,” The Rise of Meritocracy 1958 (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994: xiii-xvii). 
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measured, and rewarded. Furthermore, as Young clarifies in a new introduction to the 
1994 edition, he intended the future Young to seem “dour and portentous” to show how 
arrogant  the  rich  would  become  if  they  were  convinced  that  their  advantages  were 
earned. The novel ends with a manifesto calling for a “classless society,” which claims, 
“Were we to evaluate people, not only according to their intelligence and education, their  
occupation and their  power,  but according to their  kindness and their  courage,  their 
imagination and sensitivity, their sympathy and generosity, there could be no classes.”2 
The quote in the epigraph, then, does not mean that a merit-based system is justified in 
the sense that it is actually just, but that it is made to seem so when it is actually unfair. 
The  term  has  been  widely  adopted,  especially  in  the  U.S.,  but  the  negative 
connotations intended by its originator have not been preserved. Instead, according to 
lexicographer Michael Quinion, "It is  usually employed in the sense .  .  .  [of] a social  
system  which  allows  people  to  achieve  success  proportionate  to  their  talents  and 
abilities, as opposed to one in which social class or wealth is the controlling factor.” 3 That 
kind  of  system  is  widely  seen  as  desirable.  To  the  extent  that  people  perceive  the 
prevailing system as meritocratic, they approve and welcome it as evidence of historical 
progress. The problem with meritocracies is not only that merit is almost impossible to 
reward objectively, but also that the belief that it is obscures structural inequalities. 
All four of the pillars of the food revolution are supported by meritocracies that 
construct  the  markers  of  enlightened eating as  evidence  of  talent,  effort,  and virtue. 
Becoming an enlightened eater is seen as an achievement rather than an expression of 
inherited tastes and privilege. A sophisticated palate, thin body, and affinity for natural 
and ethnic foods are constructed as things everyone can and should strive for rather than 
arbitrary preferences valued primarily because they are associated with the elite.4 This 
ideology is particularly powerful as it applies to body size. The belief that the thin body is 
2 Young, 1958:159.
3 Michael Quinion, “Meritocracy,” World Wide Words, 21 July 2001, Web (accessed 09 March 2011). 
4 I also discuss the logics and processes of distinction at greater length in Chapters Four and Five.
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the product of virtuous effort goes virtually unchallenged in U.S. popular culture, despite 
a substantial body of evidence suggesting that thinness5 is not, in fact, something most 
people can achieve. 
The idealization of meritocracy long preceded Young's term. It is represented in 
maxims like “you can do anything if you set your mind to it,” rags to riches stories like  
Horatio Alger's Ragged Dick books, and the proverbial American Dream.6 According to 
Jürgen  Habermas,  the  idea  that  “the  distribution  of  gratifications  should  be  an 
isomorphic image of the achievement differentials of all individuals” has been a constant 
feature  of  “bourgeois  conceptions.  .  .  from the beginnings  of  modern  natural  law to 
contemporary  election  speeches.”7 However,  he  suggests  that  the  market  has  lost 
credibility  as  an  allocation  mechanism,  and  thus,  populations  in  advanced-capitalist 
countries have shifted their  belief  in meritocracy from the market to the educational 
system.  He  predicts  that  as  the  educational  system  also  proves  to  be  incapable  of 
distributing rewards in a fair and reliable manner, people will lose faith in it as well: “In 
all advanced capitalist countries since World War II. . . . The expansion of the education 
system is  becoming increasingly  independent  of  changes in the occupational  system. 
5 Thinness is a shifting social construction. Many scholars have noted that what would have been 
considered “thin” in previous decades might be seen as “fat” today. Even medical definitions of normal, 
overweight, and obese have changed in the recent past (see note 28). Today, thinness refers less to a 
particular weight or body size than to the appearance of having little apparent body fat. Thus, a 
muscular person might appear “thin” even if they are technically overweight or obese, according to 
current medical definitions. 
6 The phrase “American Dream” was coined by James Trunslow Adams in a one-volume history of the 
United States called The Epic of America published in 1931, and generally refers to a combination of 
meritocratic beliefs—that wealth and power are distributed according to talent and effort—with a 
version of American exceptionalism—that an unparalleled equality of opportunity and freedom to 
define and pursue success distinguish the U.S. from other nations. Although many popular texts, social 
movements, and scholars have contested the “reality” of the American dream, public opinion surveys 
regularly find that vast majorities of American adults believe in its basic tenets. In a 2005 New York 
Times/CBS News poll about social class, eighty percent of respondents said they thought it was 
“possible to start out poor in this country, work hard, and become rich,” (versus only nineteen percent 
who said it was not possible). Forty-six percent of respondents said they thought it was easier to move 
up from one social class to another in the United States than in Europe, another twenty-six percent said 
they thought it was “about the same,” and only thirteen percent said they thought it was harder in the 
U.S. than in Europe. Stephen J. McNamee and Robert K. Miller, The Meritocracy Myth, Second Edition 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009:2) and David Leonhardt, “A Closer Look at Income 
Mobility,” The New York Times, 14 May 2005, Web (accessed 25 January 2009). 
7 Habermas, 1975: 81. 
165
Consequently the connection between formal schooling and occupational success may 
become looser in the long run.”8 My analysis challenges the theory that meritocracies 
depend on  fair  and reliable  allocation  mechanisms.  Instead,  people  actively  look  for 
evidence to support  the hegemonic belief  that  rewards are reliably tied to talent and 
effort and ignore evidence to the contrary. Meritocracy becomes the framework through 
which people interpret mass media texts and their own experiences. 
This chapter explores how mass media texts about food create meritocracies and 
how audiences negotiate with them. First, I use the 2007 Pixar film Ratatouille,  which 
tells the story of a rat who becomes a great chef, to explore the popular appeal of culinary 
meritocracies and how they justify prevailing power structures. Then, I turn my attention 
to perhaps the most powerful and tenacious meritocracy to emerge in the recent food 
revolution: the belief that an ideal body size is an achievement based on self-control,  
hard  work,  and  the  proper  use  of  food.  The  meritocracy  of  thinness  has  become 
hegemonic in the U.S. since the 1980s. As discussed in Chapter Two, earlier aesthetics 
that portrayed a wider range of body types as healthy and beautiful have been largely 
replaced  by  an  increasingly  stringent  ideal  of  thinness,  a  highly  judgmental  attitude 
about fatness, and the elevation of weight-loss dieting as a moral imperative for anyone 
who does not fit the current standards for a “healthy” weight. I offer a brief survey of the 
literature on weight-loss dieting, which challenges the idea that anyone can become thin 
by eating less. The lack of scientific support for the meritocracy of thinness suggests that 
other  factors—cultural,  political,  social,  or  economic—must  be  involved  in  the 
maintenance of that ideology. 
In order to analyze the popular appeal of weight-loss dieting and the belief that 
anyone can be thin, I analyze the NBC reality television series The Biggest Loser, one of 
the most-watched shows of the last decade. The Biggest Loser helps foster the myth of 
meritocratic thinness not only by obscuring the inconsistencies in the results of dieting 
8 Ibid.
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(although it does that too) but more importantly by folding some key inconsistencies into 
a misleading representation of weight-loss success. Using audience responses gathered 
from online discussion boards and blogs, I analyze how the show is popularly received 
and why audiences generally say “yes” to the idea that anyone can, and everyone should 
be thin, even when that conflicts with their personal experiences. My analysis challenges 
the  dominant  explanation  in  Fat  Studies  for  the  rise  of  fat-phobia  and  weight-loss 
dieting. Many scholars argue that the “obesity epidemic” was manufactured by powerful 
interests  that  stand to  profit  from the  sales  of  diet  products  and have succeeded in 
duping millions of  Americans.  Audience responses to  The Biggest Loser suggest  that 
audience have not been “duped,” but instead actively seek out narratives that portray 
thinness as universally achievable and resist evidence to the contrary. My analysis also 
challenges the theory that reality television succeeds primarily by satisfying voyeuristic 
desires and that audiences primarily take pleasure in the spectacle of shame. In the case 
of “life-changing” reality shows like The Biggest Loser, audiences invest in the success of 
the  contestants  and  portray  the  show  as  an  inspiration.  I  argue  that  the  immense 
popularity of texts like  Ratatouille  and The Biggest Loser is the result of a widespread 
desire  for  alternative,  cultural  arenas  of  aspiration  produced  by  increasing  income 
inequality and stagnating mobility since the 1980s. 
Not Just Anyone Can Cook 
The tension between the egalitarian ethos of the American liberal elite and the 
renewed  interest  in  foodways  constructed  as  “enlightened”  is  exemplified  by  the 
critically-acclaimed 2007 Pixar film  Ratatouille.  The film begins by zooming in on a 
television set broadcasting an image of a spinning globe with an Eiffel tower sticking out 
to mark the location of France. A voice with a French accent says:
Although each of the world's countries would like to dispute this fact, we 
French know the truth: the best food in the world is made in France. The 
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best food in France is made in Paris. And the best food in Paris, some say, 
is made by Chef Auguste Gusteau. . . . Chef Gusteau's cookbook, Anyone 
Can  Cook! climbed  to  the  top  of  the  bestseller  list.  But  not  everyone 
celebrates its success...9
The globe gives way to a montage of images of Paris and Gusteau. Then, the fictional  
documentary cuts to an interview with a skinny, bald man identified by a screen caption 
as “Anton Ego, Food Critic, 'The Grim Eater.'” Ego re-balances the half-moon spectacles 
on top of his giant nose and gestures with a copy of Gusteau’s cookbook in his hands as  
he says, “Amusing title,  Anyone Can Cook! What's even more amusing is that Gusteau 
actually seems to believe it. I, on the other hand, take cooking seriously. And, no, I don't 
think anyone can do it.” He punctuates his dismissal of Gusteau's motto by tossing the 
cookbook off screen. In less than a minute, this opening sequence establishes the central 
conflict in the film: Gusteau’s inclusive philosophy about cooking versus Ego’s exclusive, 
elitist one. 
The film's position in the debate is clear from the beginning; Ego is obviously 
portrayed as a villain. In addition to his sneering demeanor and giant nose,10 his clothing 
is dark, his shoulders are hunched, and his facial expression is consistently dour. His 
name  plays  on  the  pejorative  sense  of  “ego”  referring  to  an  inflated  sense  of  self-
importance and disregard for other people. Gusteau, on the other hand, dresses all in 
white, has round, pleasant features, and smiles warmly. His name plays on the Latin root  
“gust-”  meaning  taste  (as  in  gustatory and  gusto),  which  reinforces  the  idea  that 
Gusteau cares more about the inherent quality of someone's cooking than who they are. 
The fictional documentary explains that Gusteau became the youngest chef to earn five 
stars for his restaurant, but one of the stars was rescinded after a scathing review by Ego.  
Gusteau  was  “brokenhearted”  and  died  shortly  thereafter.  However,  Gusteau’s 
philosophy  lives  on  in  the  film's  protagonist,  a  rat  named  Remy  who  talks  to  an 
9 Brad Bird, dir. Ratatouille, Perf. Patton Oswalt, Lou Romano, Ian Holm, Janean Garofalo, Peter 
O'Toole, Walt Disney Pictures, 2007 (DVD). 
10 For more on the association between large noses and evil, see TV Tropes contributors, “Sinister 
Schnoz,” TV Tropes, last edited 03 March 2011, Web (accessed 09 March 2011). 
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imaginary ghost of the chef and has cooking skills formidable enough to challenge The 
Grim Eater.11
Remy teams up with a newly-hired garbage boy at Gusteau's restaurant named 
Linguini  who has  no  cooking  skills.  Through some trial  and error,  the  two of  them 
discover  that  Remy can control  Linguini  like  a  puppet  by  tugging  on  his  hair  while 
remaining  hidden  underneath  his  toque.  They  manage  to  fool  the  other  cooks  into 
thinking Lingiuni is a culinary genius, and Remy's cooking begins to lure crowds back to 
Gusteau’s  restaurant.  Ego  is  incensed  that  the  restaurant  is  becoming popular  again 
despite the fact that he gave it such a negative review and announces that he will return 
to “deflate the overheated puffery” about the new chef. On the night of Ego's return visit,  
Remy takes a risk by preparing ratatouille, traditionally a simple vegetable stew the other 
cooks  note  is  a  “peasant  dish,”  not  something  a  five-star  restaurant  would normally 
serve. Remy reinvents the dish and wows Ego, who agrees to wait until closing time for 
the privilege of meeting the chef. Linguini and another chef introduce Ego to Remy and 
explain how a rat came to be the primary architect behind the restaurant's renaissance. 
The review he writes resolves the conflict set up in the opening scene: 
In the past I have made no secret of my disdain for Chef Gusteau’s famous 
motto, “Anyone can cook.” But I realize only now do I truly understand 
what he meant. Not everyone can become a great artist, but a great artist 
can come from anywhere.12 
Thus,  the film initially  seems to endorse the inclusive philosophy represented by the 
motto “Anyone can cook.” In the end, even Ego agrees that social origins are irrelevant, it 
is only taste that matters and based on that criteria, even a rat can be a great cook, and 
even a rustic vegetable stew can become an entrée worthy of a five-star restaurant. 
However, both Ego and Gusteau specifically note that not everyone can be a great 
cook. In more of the documentary footage, Gusteau qualifies his motto by insisting that 




make mistakes, and ambition. “Great cooking is not for the faint of heart,” he says, “You 
must be imaginative, strong-hearted, you must try things that may not work. And you 
must not let anyone define your limits because of where you come from. Your only limit 
is your soul. What I say is true, anyone can cook, but only the fearless can be great.” 13 
Remy shows courage and ambition by repeatedly putting himself in harm's way in order 
to pursue his desire to create great food. He demonstrates creativity by defying the other 
cooks in the kitchen who want to stick to Gusteau's recipes; he also insists repeatedly 
that  he would rather  create than  steal the way his fellow rats do.  However,  the film 
suggests that those factors are tertiary to his ultimate success; they are necessary, but not 
sufficient.  The  primary  reason  Remy  is  driven  to  create  great  food  and  capable  of 
appreciating the heights of culinary artistry, instead of being content to eat garbage with 
the  rest  of  the  rats,  is  his  “highly  developed  sense  of  taste  and  smell.” 14 Instead  of 
suggesting  that  great  cooking  is  truly  something  anyone  can  achieve,  the  film  re-
mystifies  fine  dining  and portrays  culinary  skill  as  something you must  have  innate 
talent  to  achieve  or  appreciate.  Ultimately,  Ratatouille does  not  advocate  a  truly 
inclusive philosophy (e.g. everyone who tries hard can be great); instead, it suggests that 
culinary sophistication is exclusive, based not on social origins but on the possession of a 
sensitive palate.
The innate superiority of Remy's palate is established in two scenes where taste 
and smell are represented visually and aurally in a sort of cinematic synesthesia. The first 
sceen of synesthesia occurs approximately four minutes into the film when Remy sneaks 
into the kitchen of the house where his rat colony is living at the time. Gusteau appears 
on a television visible from the kitchen counter, and says “Good food is like music you 
13 His emphasis on having a strong heart and defying those who would deny you the chance to succeed 
seems especially notable in light of the fact that his death is attributed to a broken heart caused by Ego's 
criticism. Gusteau's downfall may have been his failure to fully live up to his own criteria. Ibid.
14 Remy introduces himself in a voice-over that plays as he is shown being flung through a window, 
shielding himself from the splintering glass with Gusteau's cookbook: “This is me. I think it's apparent I 
need to rethink my life a little bit. What's my problem? First of all, I'm a rat. Which means life is hard. 
And secondly, I have a highly developed sense of taste and smell.” Bird, 2007, Patton Oswalt, Perf. 
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can taste, color you can smell. There is excellence all around you. You need only be aware 
to stop and savor it.”15 Apparently inspired, Remy looks around and finds a bit of cheese 
and a strawberry. He closes his eyes, and the kitchen disappears so he is shown against a 
plain black background. First, he takes a bite of the cheese. Soft round shapes in mostly 
golden hues appear to his left while a syncopated brass melody plays. Then, he takes a 
bite of the strawberry. Delicate pink and purple swirls appear to his right while the brass 
is replaced by lilting violin. Finally, he takes a bite of both at the same time, and the 
entire screen fills with orange and pink, swirling shapes appear all around him, and the 
brass and violin themes merge harmoniously. [Figure 3.1]
Figure 3.1/Remy's Palate, Visualized16
The sequence is repeated about halfway through the film as Remy tries to guide 
his brother Emile through the same taste experience. In the alleyway behind Gusteau's 
restaurant, Remy stops Emile from eating an unidentifiable piece of garbage, saying, “I 
have got to teach you about food!” He tells Emile to close his eyes, and this time Emile is  
shown against a plain black background. Remy hands him a piece of cheese, and Emile 
swallows it greedily, with crumbs scattering from his mouth, emphasizing the difference 
between his natural inclinations and his brother's. Remy cries, “No, no, no! Don't just 
hork it down!” and then, scowling, offers him another piece with the instruction, “chew it 
15 Ibid. 
16 Screen shot by the author from Bird, 2007.
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slowly...think only of the taste. See?” A vague blob appears next to Emile's head and 
faint, disjointed brass notes play. Remy tries to nudge him along: “Creamy, salty sweet. 
An oaky nuttiness?” to which Emile replies sarcastically, “Oh, I'm detecting nuttiness.” 
Undaunted, Remy hands him the strawberry, saying, “Now taste this. Whole different 
thing right? Sweet, crisp, slight tang on the finish.” Another blob appears in the same 
place,  a  little  brighter  this  time.  “Okay,”  Emile  allows,  tentatively.  “Now  try  them 
together,” Remy instructs. Emile chews carefully, eyes shut tight in concentration. The 
blobs begin to form small shapes with a little more color, and the music beings to sound 
more melodic. “Okay,” Emile says, “I think I'm getting a little something there. It might 
be the nuttiness. Could be the tang.” [Figure 3.2]
Figure 3.2/Emile's Palate,Visualized17
Triumphantly, Remy begins to expound on how many different tastes there are in 
the  world  and  how  many  combinations  must  be  possible,  breaking  Emile’s 
concentration. As Emile opens his eyes, the music stops abruptly, the colors disappear,  
and  the  alleyway  returns.  “I  think  you  lost  me  again,”  he  says,  and  Remy  looks 
disappointed. The very same foods that  conjured up completely different shapes and 
colors  for  Remy  are  barely  differentiated  for  Emile.  For  Remy,  the  separate  flavors 
appear on opposite sides of him, while for Emile they appear in the same place. For 
17 Screen shot by the author from Bird, 2007.
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Remy, the flavors combine to fill  the screen with color and evoke a complex musical 
composition  while  for  Emile,  they  colors  remain  small  and  faint  and  the  sounds 
disjointed. The limited progress Emile makes with Remy's coaching suggests that even 
with a naturally insensitive palate, he might be able to develop an appreciation for fine 
food. However, the contrasting scenes of synesthesia suggest that few people naturally 
possess the ability to make the fine distinctions and experience the incredible sensations 
that Remy does when he tastes food. As Emile puts it, Remy has a unique “gift.” 
The  uniqueness  of  Remy's  abilities  are  further  emphasized  by  the  contrast 
between him and the other cooks. Remy’s cooking ability is portrayed as nearly magical.  
His skill far surpasses that of the other chefs in Gusteau's kitchen even though they are  
described as artists with shady backgrounds who defy convention for the love of cooking 
and pursuit of culinary greatness.18 Aside from Linguini, who is hired as a garbage boy 
because of his mother's relationship to Gusteau, the kitchen staff is talented and hard 
working. They are not employed at the restaurant because of who they were or where 
they came from. That is  especially true of Colette,  the tough-talking female chef who 
defends  Linguini’s  right  to  cook  despite  the  fact  that  he  is  a  lowly  garbage  boy  by 
invoking  Gusteau's  motto.  However,  even  Colette  insists  that  they  must  stick  to  the 
recipe, even when Linguini is assigned to make a sweetbread dish involving cuttlefish 
tentacles, snail porridge, Douglas fir purée, and veal stomach, which Gusteau himself 
declared a “disaster.” Instead of obeying her, Remy sends Linguini scrambling around 
the kitchen to gather new ingredient. He improvises a sauce that he manages to sneak 
18 One of the chefs named Colette describes the rest of the kitchen crew to Linguini in the following 
exchange: 
Colette: Lalo there ran away from home at 12. Got hired by circus people as an acrobat. And then he get 
fired for messing around with the ringmaster's daughter. Horst has done time.
Linguini: What for? 
Colette: No one know for sure. He changes the story every time you ask him. . . . Don't ever play cards 
with Pompidou. He's been banned from Las Vegas and Monte Carlo. Larousse ran gun for the 
Resistance.
Linguini: Which resistance?
Colette: He won't say. Apparently, they didn't win. So you see, we are artists, pirates... Ibid. 
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onto the plate just before it leaves the kitchen. The customers declare Remy's version 
“delicious.” 
Remy's  unique  ability  to  elevate  the  mundane  is  also  represented  by  the 
preparation of the ratatouille.  After Remy insists that  ratatouille is  what he wants to 
serve Ego despite the fact that it's a “peasant dish,” Colette shrugs, grabs a sprig of herbs, 
and turns to add it to a pot. But Remy stops her. “What?” she asks, “I'm making the 
rataoutille.” He shakes his head “no,” and she asks, “Well, how would you prepare it?” 
Remy shows her step by step, indicating that she should slice the vegetables thinly with a 
mandoline and bake them under parchment paper. He puts the final touches on the plate 
himself. [Image 3.3]
Figure 3.3/Rat-atouille19 
At the climax of the film, the ratatouille is delivered to Ego. He takes a bite, and 
his eyes grow wide. The restaurant whooshes out of focus and we see a flashback from 
Ego's childhood: a young boy stands in the doorway of a small cottage,  sniffling and 
fighting back tears. A wrecked bicycle is visible on the pathway to the house behind him. 
A young woman, presumably his mother, is standing at the stove with her back to him. 
She  turns  around,  sees  what  has  happened  to  him  and  his  bike,  and  smiles 
sympathetically. Moments later, the young Ego is seated at a table in the kitchen. His 
mother places a steaming bowl in front of him, filled with a more traditional stew-like 
19 Screen shot by the author from Bird, 2007.
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ratatouille, and touches his cheek tenderly. He takes a bite, and the scene cuts back to 
the present. Ego remains frozen in shock for a moment, and then his face is transformed 
by a smile. He eagerly devours the rest of the dish. [Figure 3.4] 
Figure 3.4/Anton Ego, Before and After20
Ratatouille reinforces culinary hierarchies, particularly the idea that food can rise 
to the level of art and that creating and appreciating true culinary art requires a sensitive, 
refined  palate.  The  synesthesia  scenes  equate  flavor  with  sound  and  color,  the  raw 
materials of music and visual arts like painting. In order to create a ratatouille with the 
appearance of  haute cuisine, the filmmakers consulted with Thomas Keller, the owner 
and head chef of The French Laundry in Yountville, California and Per Se in New York 
City,  both  of  which  have  three  Michelin  stars,  the  highest  rating  awarded  by  the 
prestigious  international  restaurant  guide  books  published  by  the  French  tire 
manufacturer.21 However, the film rejects the idea that taste hierarchies are based on 
elitist traditions. Great cooking in Ratatouille is not about “fancy” food that rich people 
like because they're snobs. The film portrays fine dining as genuinely superior in ways 
that anyone with an innately sensitive or well-trained palate will  appreciate. In other 
words,  it  portrays culinary hierarchies  as meritocratic  (based on achievement) rather 
20 Screen shots by the author from Bird, 2007.
21 Stacy Finz, “Bay Area Flavors Food Tale,” San Francisco Gate, 28 June 2007, Web (accessed 09 March 
2011). 
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than aristocratic (based on wealth or hereditary ties to power).
Making Ratatouille More Inclusive
Remy’s singularly magic touch reinforces popular taste hierarchies by portraying 
fine dining as objectively superior. The film suggests anyone with the proper skill will 
identify the same foods as delicious. Its message may be formally inclusive, ie. anyone 
can have a discerning palate or great  cooking skills,  but functionally exclusive:  most  
people do not. Rather than promoting the inclusive construction of good taste implied by 
the  motto  “Anyone  can  cook,”  or  portraying  access  to  the  kind  of  cultural  capital 
represented  by  gourmet  food  as  available  to  the  masses, Ratatouille  supports  an 
exclusive  construction  of  good  taste  as  something  that  by  definition  only  a  few can 
achieve. It also works to legitimate that hierarchy by rejecting the notion that access to 
good  taste  is  based  on  social  origins  or  privilege.  Ego's  concession  to  inclusiveness 
doesn't represent a relaxation of his exacting standards; he merely acknowledges that the 
criteria for admission are based on virtues that anyone can have, even if very few people 
do.  The  hierarchical  construction  of  culinary  sophistication  is  legitimated  by  a 
meritocracy of taste: the belief that good taste isn't bred but is instead built from innate 
talent, hard work, and virtues like courage and integrity (expressed in the film as being 
“true to yourself”). 
Reviews by American critics and audiences suggest that the widespread appeal of 
the film's meritocratic message was key to the film's popular success and critical acclaim.
Ratatouille  won the 2007 Academy Award for Best  Animated Feature  Film and was 
nominated for four others. It was only the fourth animated film to be nominated for Best 
Original Screenplay. It was also the 11th highest-grossing film of 2007 in the U.S., and as 
of  2011,  it  is  still  the  101th  highest  grossing  film  of  all  time.22 According  to  Rotten 
22 Based on over $206 million in box office sales earned during its wide release, between July 01, 2007 
and December 09, 2007. “2007 Domestic Grosses,” Box Office Mojo (an IMDb company), Web 
(accessed 09 March 2011). “All Time USA Box Office,” The Internet Movie Database (an Amazon.com 
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Tomatoes, a review aggregation site that codes reviews as either positive or negative, an 
overwhelming 96 percent of 213 professional critics' reviews were positive. In addition, 
nearly  one million audience members have rated the film for the site,  84 percent of 
which were positive.23 On Metacritic, which translates reviews into numerical grades out 
of 100, Ratatouille has an average grade of 96 based on 37 critics, which easily qualifies 
as “universal acclaim” and places it in a tie for the 21st highest-rated film on the site. 
Nearly 500 Metacritic users have given the film an average grade or 8.6 out of 10.24 Both 
the nomination for the Best Original Screenplay Oscar and the reviews written by critics 
and registered users on Metacritic and the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) praise the 
story and its message, which they generally identify as: 1) food can be a form of art and 
2) anyone can succeed with enough determination and hard work, so you should “follow 
your dreams” and “never give up.” 
Only  a  few reviewers  interpreted  the film's  message  as  exclusive.  In  the  first 
paragraph of A.O. Scott's review in  The New York Times, he invokes Ego's quote “Not 
everyone can be a great artist, but a great artist can come from anywhere,” and succinctly 
affirms: “Quite so.” Later, he notes that this aphorism is “both exuberantly democratic 
and  unabashedly  elitist,  defending  good  taste  and  aesthetic  accomplishment  not  as 
snobbish entitlements but as universal ideals,” and calls this “sensible.”25 However, most 
people who submitted reviews to IMDb focus on the democratic part alone, claiming the 
film is inspiring precisely because it shows that everyone, even a humble rat, can achieve 
greatness with enough effort. For example, IMDb user “Steverino171” says, “Remy, a rat 
with ironically refined tastes in matters culinary, embodies the film’s adamantly pro-
democratic theme of ‘anyone can cook,’” and describes the film overall as, “a powerful 
primer for the film’s target audience on American democracy and the egalitarian can-do 
company), Web (accessed 09 March 2011). 
23 “Ratatouille (2007),” Rotten Tomatoes, Flixter, Inc. Web (accessed 09 March 2011). 
24 “Movie Releases by Score: All Time,” Metacritic, CBS Interactive, Inc. Web (accessed 09 March 2011). 
25 A. O. Scott, “Voilà! A Rat for All Seasonings,” The New York Times 29 June 2007, Web (accessed 09 
March 2011). 
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notion at  its  core.”26 This interpretation suggests that the theme is democratic rather 
than hierarchical. Similarly, “Neil_fraser” says, “The basic premise of the movie is quite 
simple. Essentially it states that you can succeed, providing you have the talent and the 
tenacity to stick by your dream.”27 Although qualified by the admission that talent and 
tenacity  are  required,  the  thrust  of  this  interpretation  is  that  success  is  possible  for 
everyone: the generic you can succeed. 
The selective focus on the “rat makes good, wows critic,” aspect of the film, rather 
than the fact Remy is the only one in the film who can really cook, points to how eager 
audiences are to embrace democratic, egalitarian ideologies. People not only believe that 
everyone  ought  to  have equal  access  to  things  of  value,  including  “good  taste”  and 
success, they often believe that is actually the case: that anyone can achieve success and 
its  trappings  if  they  work  hard  enough.  Ratatouille was  embraced  as  yet  another 
affirmation of the American Dream. Audiences say “yes” to Ratatouille and the idea that 
good taste is democratic because there are rewards for endorsing ideologies that work to 
legitimate  the  prevailing  political  and  economic  system.  For  those  with  a 
disproportionately large share of capital and power,  meritocracies reinforce the belief 
that they deserve whatever they can get. For those with a disproportionately small share, 
they reinforce the hope that if they work hard and act virtuously, they will eventually 
reap  greater  rewards.28 For  everyone  whose  worldview  is  shaped  by  the  prevailing 
ideologies, meritocracies reinforce the belief (or hope) that the systems that shape their 
lives are basically fair and just, i.e. that skill, effort, and virtue are objectively and reliably 
defined, measured, and rewarded. 
The Myth of Meritocratic Thinness
Brain: How are we going to get the Earth to lose weight?
26  Steverino171, “This First Quality Film of the Summer.” IMDb. 09 March 2011.
27  Neil_fraser, “Awesome,” IMDb. 09 March 2011. 
28 The less-successful often feel that they deserve what they get, too. 
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Pinky: I know! We can get everyone to go on a diet!
Brain: Diets don’t work. 
Pinky: Not even if you call them “A Whole New Way of  
Eating?”
Brain: No.
—Gordon Bressack,Pinky and the Brain29
As I discussed in Chapter Two, the idealization of thinness is due in part to the 
fact that body weight is interpreted as measure of health, usually in a simple inverse 
relationship where the thinner you are, the healthier you are assumed to be.30 However, 
it also relies on the belief that body weight is determined by elective behaviors. As Paul 
Campos  points  out,  being  male  is  actually correlated  with  an  increased  risk  of 
cardiovascular disease and premature death. Being overweight isn't, but because gender 
is not seen as something people have control over, masculinity is not seen as a “problem”  
that  men  should  “correct.”  Fatness  has  been  constructed  as  something  within  most 
individuals’ control.  Thus, achieving and maintaining a thin body is  widely seen as a 
personal responsibility. More specifically, it has become an article of faith that the key to 
becoming or staying thin is not eating too much.31 Exercise is generally seen as healthful 
29 Gordon Bressack, “You Said a Mouseful,” Pinky and the Brain Season 1:Episode 48, created by 
Stephen Spielberg and Tom Ruegger, originally aired 14 November 1997 on Kids! WB, qtd. in Campos 
2004: 140.
30 NHANES analyses have repeatedly shown that the lowest mortality rates are associated with people 
whose BMI is defined as “overweight,” or even “obese” for some demographics (especially racial 
minorities). Claims that fatness is inversely related to health also focus on diseases, and especially 
diabetes, because Type 2 diabetes is reliably correlated with higher BMI (unlike cardiovascular disease 
and cancer). However, according to Paul Ernsberger, Professor Nutrition at Case Western Reserve 
University, the so-called “epidemic” of Type 2 diabetes is just as suspect as the “obesity epidemic.” He 
notes that there is no data to suggest that blood sugar levels on average are rising and notes that the the 
increasing rate of Type 2 diabetes diagnoses might be explained by any or all of the following three 
factors: 1) the disease was probably under-diagnosed in the past; 2) in 1997, the American Diabetes 
Association and World Health Organization to changed the diagnostic criteria for Type 2 diabetes from 
having a fasting blood sugar level of 140 milligrams of sugar per deciliter of blood to 126 mg per dl, a 
change that resulted in millions of Americans becoming “diabetic” overnight; 3) the widespread use of 
telephone surveys in studies that claim diabetes has increased, which may count people who have been 
told they are “borderline diabetic” or “pre-diabetic” but do not meet the diagnostic criteria. There is also 
some evidence to suggest that weight-cycling, which is by far the most common result of dieting for 
weight loss, may increase the risk of developing Type 2 diabetes, so if the disease is more common now, 
that might be due to the increased prevalence of weight-loss dieting (Campos, 2004: 22).
31  “Too much” may refer to total caloric intake, total or percent of dietary fat, especially saturated or 
animal fats, and total or percent of dietary carbohydrate, especially refined carbohydrates. Among 
macronutrients, only protein remains innocent, perhaps because it is physiologically impossible for 
humans to derive more than 30-35% of their caloric intake from protein or ingest more than 
approximately 200grams per day without exceeding the liver’s capacity to convert excess nitrogen to 
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and admirable but optional if you can be thin without it.  And exercise is not seen as 
sufficient to be thin on its own, without dietary moderation or restriction. Especially 
since the 1980s, this has become a form of common sense: we all know that you must not 
eat too much if you want to be thin.32 What this belief amounts to is a meritocracy of 
thinness: a set of beliefs, aesthetics, and practices that are fundamentally based on the 
assumption that anyone can be thin if  they eat “right” and therefore,  that a person's  
thinness or fatness is something they earn and deserve.
Almost a century of research on dietary interventions aimed at producing long-
term weight loss suggests that this ideology is entirely false. It does not just exclude a few 
outliers or underestimate the influence of genetic or structural factors that affect body 
size; it contradicts the results of all weight-loss dieting research and the vast majority of 
weight-loss dieters'  personal experiences.  People who are able to achieve thinness by 
eating  less  are  the  rare  exception,  and  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  their 
exceptional  “success”  is  due  to  better-than-average  intelligence,  willpower, 
determination, or any other kind of meritorious skill or effort. A whole host of doctors, 
scientists, nutritionists, psychologists, sociologists, historians political scientists, eating 
disorder specialists, lawyers, feminists and self-identified fat activists have examined the 
research and reached the same conclusion: most fat people can not lose weight by dieting 
(i.e. eating less). 
The most common result of weight-loss dieting is temporary weight loss followed 
by re-gain, also known as weight-cycling. Weight-cycling is associated with significant 
increases in risk for Type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and mortality. Indeed, the 
urea. The lethal results of high protein diets gave rise to the term “rabbit starvation,” originally adapted 
by anthropologist Vilhjámur Stefánsson from a similar phrased used by Inuit populations he lived with. 
Rabbit is a very lean source of protein, and according to Stefánsson, the Inuit had observed that after 
about a week of eating only rabbit, people would begin to suffer from diarrhea, headache, fatigue, 
discomfort, and hunger. Without a source of dietary fat, they would eventually die, even if they ate 
enough rabbit to feel continually full or appeared to still have stores of body fat. Vilhjámur Stefánsson, 
The Fat of the Land: Not By Bread Alone (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1956: 30). 
32  Which most people do because fatness is portrayed as unhealthy, ugly, irresponsible, and shameful. 
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negative effects of weight-cycling may be responsible for some of the weak correlations 
between very high BMI, poor health, and premature death.33 To date, there is not one 
study that shows that a randomly-selected group overweight or obese people can achieve 
a “healthy” weight through dietary modification, or any other method. Even people who 
undergo weight-loss surgery typically do not achieve a “healthy” weight.34 This is also 
why  there  has  yet  to  be  a  single  study  showing  that  a  randomly-selected  group  of 
overweight  or  obese  people  can  achieve  long-term  health  benefits  by  achieving  a 
“normal” or “healthy” weight: we don't know if that's true because no one knows how to 
take a group of fat people and make enough of them thin enough for long enough to 
evaluate.
The Medical Research
Virtually  every  study  of  weight-loss  dieting  that  has  followed participants  for 
longer than six months has found that the vast majority of dieters regain all the weight 
33 See Montani et al, “Weight Cycling During Growth and Beyond as a Risk Factor for Later 
Cardiovascular Diseases: The ‘Repeated Overshoot’ Theory,” International Journal of Obesity 4 (2006): 
S58-66; Strohacker and McFarlin, “Influence of Obesity, Physical Inactivity, and Weight Cycling on 
Chronic Inflammation,” Frontiers in Bioscience (Elite edition) 1:2 (2010): 98-104; Anastasiou et al, 
“Fitness and Weight Cycling in Relation to Body Fat and Insulin Sensitivity in Normal-Weight Young 
Women,” Journal of the American Dietetic Association 110 (2010): 280-4; Luo et al, “Body Size, 
Weight Cycling, and Risk of Renal Cell Carcinoma Among Postmenopausal Women: The Women’s 
Health Initiative (United States),” American Journal of Epidemiology 166 (2007): 752-9; Hamm et al, 
“Large Fluctuations in Body Weight During Young Adulthood and Twenty-five Year Risk of Coronary 
Death in Men,” American Journal of Epidemiology 129 (1989): 312-8; Iribarren et al, “Association of 
Weight Loss and Weight Fluctuation with Mortality Among Japanese American Men,” New England 
Journal of Medicine 333 (1995): 686-92; Lissner et al, “Body Weight and Variability in Mortality in the 
Gothenburg Prospective Studies of Men and Women,” in Obesity in Europe, eds. Bjorntorp and Rossner 
(1989: 55-60); Brownell and Rodin, “Medical, Metabolic, and Psychological Effects of Weight 
Cycling,” Archives of Internal Medicine 154 (1994): 1325-31.
34 In most studies of weight-loss surgery, the surgery is considered a “success” if the patient loses half of 
their “excess” weight; however, for most patients who qualify for weight-loss surgery, that amount of 
weight loss is not sufficient to make them a “normal” or “healthy” weight. Most of them remain 
“obese.” The post-surgery weight-loss nadir occurs approximately two years after the surgery and in 
post studies is around 26, which falls in the BMI range defined as “overweight.” After five or more 
years, average BMI is usually around 33, or “obese.” Many of these patients are nonetheless considered 
surgical “successes.” Sources: M. Kruseman et al, “Dietary, weight, and psychological changes among 
patients with obesity, 8 years after gastric bypass,” Journal of the American Dietetic Association 110.4 
(April 2010): 527-34; Nicolas V. Christou et al, “Weight Gain After Short- and Long-Limb Gastric 
Bypass Patients Followed for Longer Than 10 Years,” Annals of Surgery 244.5 (November 2006): 734-
740 and sources cited therein. 
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they lose initially, if not more. As early as 1959, long-term studies began to cast doubt on 
the efficacy of dieting. A study conducted by a hospital nutrition clinic, in which caloric 
consumption was strictly regulated, concluded that dieting was ineffective for ninety-five 
percent of participants. One of the few weight-loss studies involving subjects who were 
randomly-assigned to control or intervention groups and followed for more than one 
year  is  a  1995  study  by  Robert  W.  Jeffrey  and  Rena  Wing,  epidemiologists  at  the 
University  of  Minnesota  School  of  Public  Health.  They  recruited  202  participants 
between the ages of 25 and 45 who were between 14-32 kg above the MetLife weight 
standards and assigned them randomly to one of five experimental groups described as 
follows: 
1. A control group, which received no intervention.
2. A  standard  behavior  therapy  (SBT)  group  that  participated  in  group 
counseling sessions once per week for the first 20 weeks and once per 
month  thereafter,  with  weekly  weigh-ins  between  sessions.  Behavioral 
counseling  included  instruction  on  diet,  exercise,  and  behavior 
modification techniques. Dietary goals were assigned at 1,000 or 1,500 
kcal per day depending on initial body weight. Exercise recommendations 
were to walk or bike 5 days per week, beginning with a weekly goal of 250 
kcal  per  week  and  gradually  increasing  to  1,000  kcal  per  week. 
Participants  were  asked  to  keep  eating  and  exercise  diaries  regularly 
throughout the program.
3. Participants in the third treatment group, SBT + food, were given SBT and 
also were provided with food each week for 18 months. Food consisted of 
premeasured and packaged dinners and breakfasts for 5 days per week.
4. The fourth treatment condition, SBT + incentives, consisted of SBT plus 
an incentive program through which each participant could earn financial 
rewards up to $25 per week for achieving and maintaining weight loss.
5. The last  treatment group,  SBT + food + incentives,  included all  of  the 
treatment  elements  described  earlier  in  combination  (i.e.,  SBT,  food 
provision, and incentives).35
In addition to examining the subjects throughout the 18 months of the treatment, the 
participants  were  contacted  at  30 months  (a  full  year  after  the  study  ended)  for  an 
additional follow-up, which was completed by 177 (88%) of the original participants.  
All of the treatment groups lost weight during the intervention, achieving their 
35 RW Jeffrey and RR Wing, “Long-term Effects of Interventions for Weight Loss Using Food Provision 
and Monetary Incentives,” Journal of Consulting in Clinical Psychology v. 63: 5 (1995): 794.
182
maximum results at six months. However, by twelve months, even though they were all 
still receiving the treatment, they were beginning to regain weight. At 30 months, there 
was no significant difference between any of the treatment groups and the control group. 
The authors conclude, “The overall results of this evaluation reemphasize the important 
point  that  maintaining  weight  loss  in  obese  patients  is  a  difficult  and  persistent 
problem.”36 [Figure 3.5]
Figure 3.5/ Jeffrey and Wing (1995)37
At least fifteen review articles that survey decades worth of weight-loss studies 
have consistently reached the same conclusion. In 2007, a team of UCLA researchers 
reviewed  31  weight-loss  studies  in  order  to  develop  recommendations  for  Medicare 
regarding obesity prevention. They were only able to find seven studies of weight-loss 
dieting involving participants that had been randomly assigned to diet or control groups 
36 RW Jeffrey and RR Wing, “Long-term Effects of Interventions for Weight Loss Using Food Provision 
and Monetary Incentives,” Journal of Consulting in Clinical Psychology v. 63: 5 (1995): 793-6. 
37 Jeffrey and Wing 1995: 795.
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and followed for at least two years (which they define as the “gold standard” required to 
make  causal  claims  about  the  effects  of  dieting).  Statistically-significant  differences 
between the diet and control groups were only found in three of the studies, and even in 
those three studies, the amount of weight loss maintained was too small to be medically 
significant. Across all seven studies, the average weight loss maintained was 1.1 kg (2.4 
lb), ranging from a high of 4.7 kg (10.4 lbs) in the study with the shortest follow-up time 
to a gain of 1.8 kg (3.9 lb). The authors note, “It is hard to call these obesity treatments 
effective when participants maintain such a small weight loss. Clearly these participants 
remain obese.”38 
Mann et al also examined 14 studies with long-term follow-up that didn’t include 
control groups. The average initial weight loss in those studies was 14 kg (30.8 lb), but in 
the long-term follow-ups, participants typically gained back all but 3 kg (6.6 lb). Of the 
eight studies that tracked how many participants weighed more at the follow-up than 
before they went on the diet, the average was 41% with a range of 29%-64%, and in every 
case was higher than the percentage of participants who maintained their initial weight 
loss. Participants were more likely to regain more weight than they initially lost than 
they were to maintain their initial  weight loss.  Although Mann  et al  describe several 
problems with these studies,  like low participation rates in the long-term follow-ups, 
heavy reliance on self-reporting as the primary or only measure of weight, and failure to 
control for  the likelihood that  some of participants were already dieting again at  the 
follow-up, they note that those factors should have biased the results in the direction of 
showing greater weight-loss and better long-term maintenance, not less and worse.
Finally,  Mann  et  al looked  at  ten  long-term  studies  that  did  not  assign 
participants  to  “diet”  or  “non  diet”  conditions  randomly.  In  general,  these  were 
observational studies that assessed dieting behavior and weight at a baseline time and 
38 Mann et al, “Medicare’s Search for Effective Obesity Treatments: Diets Are Not the Answer,” American 
Psychologist 62 No. 3(2007): 223. 
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then followed up with participants to assess self-selected dieting behaviors and measure 
changes in weight over time. Of those studies, only one found that dieting led to weight 
loss over time, two showed no relationship between dieting at the baseline and long-term 
weight gain, and seven showed that dieting at the baseline was associated with to weight 
gain. Based on the results of all thirty-one studies, they conclude:
It appears that dieters who manage to sustain a weight loss are the rare 
exception, rather than the rule. Dieters who gain back more weight than 
they lost may very well be the norm, rather than an unlucky minority. If 
Medicare  is  to  fund  an  obesity  treatment,  it  must  lead  to  sustained 
improvements  in  weight  and  health  for  the  majority  of  individuals.  It 
seems clear to us that dieting does not.39
Fourteen other, earlier review articles published in peer-reviewed journals reach 
the  same  conclusion.40 In  most  studies,  most  participants  in  weight-loss  diet 
interventions lose weight for the first six months, and then begin to regain. A majority of 
participants regain most of the initial weight lost by the one year mark. Over 90 percent 
regain  all  of  the  weight  within  three  years.  Additionally,  between  30  to  40  percent 
usually regain more weight than they initially lost, which is far greater than the five to 
ten percent who maintain the weight loss. Despite these dismal results, and the risks of 
weight-cycling,  the  original  studies  often  conclude,  quite  mysteriously,  that  dieting 
promotes weight-loss and health. 
Blaming the Victim
The 1987 review of 20 years of long-term weight loss research led by Robert W. 
Jeffrey, a professor of epidemiology and public health at the University of Minnesota 
described  the  pattern  of  weight  loss  and  regain  among  patients  who  participate  in 
behavioral  treatments  for  obesity  as  “remarkably  consistent.”41 This  consistency  is 
39  Ibid, 230. 
40 Jeffrey et al 2000, Miller 1999, Perri & Fuller 1995, Garner & Wooley 1991, Jeffrey 1987, Bennett 
1986, Brownell & Wadden 1986, Brownell 1982, Foreyt et al 1981, Wilson & Brownell 1980, Stunkard 
& Penick 1979, Wooley et al 1979, Foreyt 1977, and Stunkard & Mahoney 1976. 
41 Robert W. Jeffrey et al, “Long-term Maintenance of Weight-loss: Current Status,” Health Psychology 
19 (2000): 7.
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visually represented in a series of graphs from different studies that repeatedly show a 
nadir between six months and one year of treatment, and then an increase back to the 
baseline, or even higher in the studies with the longest follow-up. They describe a wide 
range of different strategies used to induce weight loss, and lament that no matter what 
researchers  do,  most  dieters  achieve  their  maximum  weight  loss  at  6  months  and 
gradually regain all or almost all of the initial loss within 3-5 years. [Figure 3.6]
Figure 3.6/ Long-term Weight Loss Trends, Jeffrey et al (2000)42
However, rather than concluding that weight-loss is impossible or that dieting is a poor 
strategy for achieving long-term weight loss, the authors implicitly blame the overweight 
people who “fail to maintain” the behavior: 
The experience of people trying to control  their  weight is  a continuing 
source  of  fascination  and  frustration  for  behavioral  researchers. 
Overweight  people  readily  initiate  weight  control  efforts  and,  with 
professional  assistance,  are  quite  able  to  persist,  and  lose  weight,  for 
several  months.  They  also  experience  positive  outcomes  in  medical, 
psychological, and social domains. Nevertheless, they almost always fail 
to  maintain  the  behavior  changes  that  brought  them  these  positive 
results.43
The  diets did not fail,  the overweight  people failed—worse,  they “almost always fail,” 
42 Jeffrey et al 2000: 8-11. 
43  Ibid, 14.
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despite the supposedly obvious benefits of weight loss.
Jeffrey et al's interpretation is consistent with the earlier findings of David M. 
Garner and Susan C. Wooley, two professors of psychiatry who set out to translate the 
available  data  about  weight-loss  dieting  into  recommendations  for  mental  health 
practitioners seeking to treat overweight patients. After reviewing the literature, Garner 
and Wooley reversed course and advised against  the delivery of dietary treatments for 
mild obesity on the grounds that none had proven effective. Instead, the focus of their 
article  is  the  widespread  failure  to  reckon with even earlier  reviews  questioning  the 
effectiveness of behavioral (i.e. dietary) treatments for obesity. Garner and Wooley note 
that the tendency among the authors of the weight loss studies is to “advocate a critical 
attitude  towards  obese  patients”  and  interpret  the  failure  of  behavioral  treatment 
programs as  “understandable  only  as  a consequence of  patient  noncompliance.”  One 
study they review even advocates increasing the social sanctions against obesity “so that 
being overweight would be a tremendously shameful thing…. Inculcated into the normal 
socialization process for children.”44 Garner and Wooley accuse authors of “blaming the 
victim”  for  their  ineffective  treatments  and  call  on  health  professionals  to  explore 
alternative  approaches  to  addressing the  “physical,  psychological,  and social  hazards 
associated with obesity without requiring dieting or weight loss.”45 
For example, in one of the studies that Garner and Wooley review, researchers 
randomly  assigned participants  to  three  experimental  groups:  one  received  standard 
behavioral  therapy (counseling about diet  and exercise strategies aimed at  creating a 
caloric deficit), one received a weight loss drug, and one received both the therapy and 
the drug. All of the treatment groups lost a significant amount of weight in the first 6 
months, and all of the treatment groups showed significant re-gain by the end of the 18 
44  J. P. Foreyt et al, “Limitations of Behavioral Treatment of Obesity: Review and Analysis,” Journal of  
Behavioral Medicine 4 (1981): 159-174, quoted in Garner and Wooley, “Confronting the Failure of 
Behavioral and Dietary Treatments for Obesity,” Clinical Psychology Review 11 (1991): 733.
45  Garner and Wooley, 1991: 730-1. 
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month follow-up. [Figure 3.7] 
 Figure 3.7/Craighead et al (1981)46
 Instead of concluding that all of the treatments had failed to produce lasting weight loss,  
the study's authors claim that their results provide hope for behavioral therapy, because 
that group showed the slowest rate of weight re-gain: “This most recent study provides 
grounds for optimism as to the future of behavioral treatment of obesity…over the long 
run, behavior therapy clearly outperformed the most potent alternative treatment with 
which it has yet been compared.”47
According to Garner and Wooley, Craighead  et al's interpretation is par for the 
course in dieting research. After four years, nearly all participants in nearly all studies 
gain back nearly all  the weight they initially lost, and yet,  the authors of all  of those 
studies insist that the diet interventions are “effective.”48 Sometimes they claim that if 
46 Garner and Wooley, 1991: 734.
47 L.W. Craighead et al, “Behavior Therapy and Pharmacotherapy for Obesity,” Archives of General  
Psychiatry 38 (1981): 763-768, quoted in Garner and Wooley, 1991: 734. 
48  Adams, Grady, Lund, Mukaida, & Wolk, 1983; Dubbert & Wilson,1984; Kirschenbaum, Stalonas, 
Zastowny, & Tomarken, 1985; Murphy, Bruce, & Williamson, 1985; Rosenthal, Allen, & Winter, 1980, 
Bjorvell & Rossner, 1985; Graham, Taylor, Hovell, & Siegel, 1983; Jordan, Canavan, & Steer, 1985; 
Kramer, Jeffery, Forster, & Snell, 1989; Murphy et al. 1985; Stalonas, Perri, & Kerzner, 1984; Stunkard 
& Penick, 1979. 
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the  participants  had  not  dieted,  they  would  weigh  even  more,  even  if  the  actual 
difference would only be a matter of five to ten pounds, reflecting just how deep the bias 
against fat runs. A lower body weight, no matter how medically insignificant, is heralded 
as a triumph while the negative health consequences of weight-cycling are ignored on the 
basis of the assumption that being less fat, even if you are still obese, must be a beneficial 
outcome. In many cases, the authors call for more “aggressive” treatments like very low 
calorie diets (VLCD or <800 kcal/day) or supervised fasting, both of which are no longer 
approved because of the risk of mortality. The ideas that people can and should be thin, 
and should be encouraged to eat as little as it takes to make them that way hold powerful  
sway even over researchers whose own work shows otherwise. 
The “Exceptions”
A 2001 study by nutritionists  at  the  University  of  Kentucky led by James W. 
Anderson  claimed  to  challenge  the  “current  perception.  .  .  that  participants  of  a 
structured weight-loss program regain all of their weight loss within five years.”49 They 
performed  a  meta-analysis  of  twenty-nine  studies,  meaning  that  rather  than 
summarizing and evaluating what those individual studies found, they lumped together 
all the data from all the studies and subjected it to new analysis. Thirteen of the studies 
involved  “very  low  energy  diets”  (VELDs,  which  typically  limit  participants  to  <800 
Kcal/day), fourteen involved “hypoenergetic balanced diets” (HBDs, which involve aim 
for a deficit between calories consumed and calories burned, but usually not as severe as 
in VELDS) and two involved both—in other words, they were all calorie-restriction diets, 
and about half of them required participants to eat less than 800 kcal/day. The authors 
claim that no long-term randomized, controlled studies were available (it’s unclear why 
they didn’t think studies like Jeffrey and Wing 1995 should count).
49  James W. Anderson et al, “Long-term Weight-loss Maintenance: A Meta-Analysis of U.S. Studies,” 
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 74 (2001): 579-584.
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Anderson et al note that the number of participants in these 29 studies ranged 
from 6 to 504, the length of treatment ranged from 8 to 30 weeks, the average initial  
weight loss ranged from 3.5 to 37.9 kg for women and 6.2 to 44.2 kg for men, and follow-
up participation rates ranged from 50% to 100% with a median of 82%. They aggregated 
the results of all of these studies. The average weight loss after five years for both VELDs 
and HBDs was 3.0 kg, or ~3.2% of the participants’ starting weight and 23.4% of their 
initial weight loss. Anderson et al conclude, “These average values are higher than those 
reported  in  earlier  studies  and  indicate  that  most  individuals  who  participate  in 
structured  weight-loss  programs  in  the  United  States  of  the  type  reported  in  the 
literature do not regain all of the weight lost at 5 y. of follow-up.”50 Indeed, they did not. 
The aggregated study participants regained 76.6% of their initial weight loss. Their claim 
that  these  results  show  that  calorie-restriction  diets  are  effective depends  on  a 
redefinition of diet “success” as the maintenance of any amount of weight-loss. [Figure 
3.8]
Figure 3.8/ Anderson et al (2001) Results51
50 Ibid.
51 Reproduced from Anderson et al, 2001: 581.
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The average initial weight loss in the studies was 14 kg; in individual terms, their 
assessment would be the equivalent of someone losing 31 pounds, regaining 25 pounds, 
and calling their diet a “success” based on the six pounds they had managed to keep off. 
Indeed,  different  standards  for  what  makes  a  diet  “effective”  explains  much  of  the 
difference  between Anderson  et  al  2001  and  Mann  et  al 2007;  in  the  14  long-term 
studies without control groups that Mann et al evaluated, they also observe an average 
two-year weight-loss maintenance of  approximately three kilos. Since that  amount of 
weight loss is medically irrelevant and certainly not enough to put any “obese” people in 
the “healthy” weight range, they do not portray it as evidence of “successful” weight loss. 
Several studies also mention the National Weight Loss Control Registry (NWCR) 
as evidence that people can lose weight and keep it off. According to the NWCR website, 
they have over 5,000 members, all of whom have lost at least 30 pounds and maintained 
it for at least 1 year. Many registry participants have done far better—registry members 
have lost an average of 66 lbs and kept it off for an average of 5.5 years.52 However, as the 
research above suggests, that’s not remotely “representative” of people who attempt to 
lose weight. On the contrary, the entire raison d'être of the registry is to figure out what’s 
different about the 5-10% of dieters in almost every study who lose significant amounts 
of weight and keep it off. The registry's stated goal is to identify strategies that might 
help other dieters, but as the researchers who run the registry admitted in a 2005 article, 
“Because this is not a random sample of those who attempt weight loss, the results have 
limited generalizability to the entire population of overweight and obese individuals.”53
The kinds of things the registry members do are generally the same things the 
participants  in  most weight  loss  studies  are  counseled to do (or,  in  clinical  settings, 
forced to do): most of them follow a low calorie, low fat diet, eat breakfast every day,  
52 “NWCR Facts,” The National Weight Control Registry, Brown Medical School/The Miriam Hospital 
Weight Control & Diabetes Research Center, Web (accessed 08 March 2011). 
53  J. O. Hill et al, “The National Weight Control Registry: Is It Useful In Helping Deal With Our Obesity 
Epidemic,” Journal of Nutrition Education Behavior 37:4 (2005): 169. 
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weigh themselves at least once a week, watch less than 10 hours of TV per week, and 
engage in very high levels of activity (420 minutes per week on average). The NWCR has 
yet  to  figure  out  what  makes those things work for  them or  makes  them capable  of 
sustaining those behaviors when most people don’t or can’t.  Collecting 5,000 success 
stories does not prove that dieting “works” for most people, let alone that it’s the norm. 
Somewhere between 45 million and 90 million Americans diet to lose weight every year, 
most  of  them  by  attempting  to  reduce  their  caloric  intake.54 According  to  a  survey 
conducted in April 2010 by a private consumer research firm on behalf of Nutrisystem, 
thirty percent of Americans have dieted repeatedly—among dieters, the average number 
of attempts is twenty.55 Unsurprisingly, weight loss attempts are more common among 
overweight  and  obese  people.  If  calorie-restriction  dieting  worked,  in  the  sense  of 
producing significant,  long-term weight loss,  America would be a nation of very thin 
people.
Negotiating the Contradictions with The Biggest Loser
As public health authorities and news media are constantly reminding us, a large 
number of  Americans are not “thin.”  Obesity has increased to the extent that  it  has 
widely been declared an “epidemic.” In 2004, just months after U.S. Surgeon General 
Dr. Richard H. Carmona named obesity a national health crisis and “the fastest-growing 
cause of disease and death in America,”56 a new reality series called The Biggest Loser 
debuted  on  NBC.  It  combines  the  single-elimination  game  show  style  of  reality 
television, in which a field of competitors is narrowed down, one contestant per week 
54  The 45 million statistic was reported by CBS News in January 2005; the 90 million statistic was 
reported by PR Newswire in August 2010; the difference likely has to do more with the measurement 
than a 2-fold increase in the number of people dieting over the span of five years. Christine Lagorio, 
“Diet Plan Success Tough to Weigh,” CBS News 03 January 2005, Web (accessed 08 March 2011). PR 
Newswire, “Cost of Weight Loss in America: Many Americans Would Forgo a Job Promotion to Lose 
10 Pounds, Reports Nutrisystem Diet Index,” 12 August 2010, Web (accessed 08 March 2011). 
55  PR Newswire, 2010. 
56 Richard H. Carmona, The Obesity Crisis in America. Released 16 July 2004, Web (accessed 14 July 
2008).
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until only one remains, with the makeover genre in which regular people get help from 
experts to solve problems ranging from outdated wardrobes to unruly toddlers.57 For the 
first season of The Biggest Loser, NBC recruited twelve obese contestants willing to be 
filmed as they tried to lose as much weight as they could using only diet and exercise 
over the course of a television season. The grand prize for the contestant who lost the 
largest percentage of his or her starting weight by the end of the show was $250,000. 
Even though the show wasn't part of the network's initial fall schedule, and therefore 
wasn't promoted with the rest of the fall line-up during NBC's coverage of the Olympics, 
9.9 million viewers tuned in for the premiere. The ratings share amongst adults (ages 18-
49) was a remarkable 4.1/10.58 The third episode attracted nearly double the audience of 
Fox's  heavily-promoted  competitive  reality  show  The  Rebel  Billionaire (10.0  million 
viewers compared to 5.1 million), which aired at the same time. The fourth episode beat 
out the simultaneous broadcast of The Amazing Race, a popular, award-winning reality 
series on CBS. At its ratings height, The Biggest Loser performed better in its time slot 
than any non-Olympic programming aired on NBC in 2004.59
Most episodes follow the same basic structure. There is a re-cap of the previous 
episode,  incorporating  new  confessional  interviews  with  the  contestants.60 Next, 
57 Examples of the former include Like Big Brother, Survivor, The Bachelor, The Amazing Race, America's  
Next Top Model, The Apprentice, Top Chef, and many others. Like Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, 
Extreme Makeover, The Swan, SuperNanny, MTV's Made, and etc.
58 The “rating” is the estimated percent of the specified group tuned to a program in the average minute, 
expressed as a percent. The “share” is the percent of households or persons using television tuned into a 
program at a specific time. 
59 Steve Rogers, “NBC's 'The Biggest Loser' continues making ratings gains.”Reality TV World, 23 
November 2004, Web (accessed 20 October 2008).
60 A common reality television trope where footage of individual participants speaking directly to the 
camera is spliced into the regular footage. Unlike some mansion-style reality shows, The Biggest Loser 
does not feature a “confession cam room,” but contestants are frequently filmed in outdoor locations, 
apparently isolated from the rest of the cast. As there are often no indicators of when confessional 
interviews took place, they are prime candidates for “manipulative editing,” where conflicts are 
manufactured or exaggerated to generate audience interest. According to Annette Hill, audiences are 
sometimes express suspicion of “confession cam” footage. I found less evidence of that skepticism in 
online reactions to The Biggest Loser, and suspect that even when audiences have a critical awareness 
that the characters and narrative may be manipulated by selective editing, they nonetheless use the 
information from confessional interviews in their judgments about the contestants. In The Biggest  
Loser, confessional interviews primarily focus on reactions to the Temptations and Challenges and to 
build anticipation for the Weigh-In, generally reinforcing the idea that central conflict in the show is the 
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contestants are shown going about their lives—getting dressed, eating, exercising. The 
first  event  in  most  episodes  is  the  “Temptation,”  in  which  contestants  have  the 
opportunity to high-calorie foods in exchange a prize. The Temptation is followed by an 
exercise scene or a healthy eating scene. The exercise scenes show them working at their 
physical limits, bodies straining, faces contorted in grimaces while the trainers bark at 
them to work harder. In the diet scenes, trainers or guest chefs show the contestants how 
to  prepare  low-calorie,  low-fat  foods  featuring  ingredients  produced  by  the  show's 
sponsors  (the  two  main  ones  being  Jell-O  and  Jennie-O  Turkey).  Sometimes  the 
contestants go out to restaurants to practice ordering low-calorie meals. The next event 
in most episodes is the “Challenge,” which tests the contestants physically, and also often 
has  a  teamwork  element.  Prizes  for  Temptations  and  Challenges  fall  into  three 
categories:  material  rewards,  emotional  rewards  like  a  phone  call  home,  or  in-game 
advantages  a  “pound pass”  that  can  add  to  the  weight  loss  for  the  purposes  of  the 
competition. After the Challenge, the contestants participate in a “last chance workout,” 
which precedes the weekly weigh-in 
The  concept  of  turning  weight-loss  into  a  competition  not  only  assumes that 
weight-loss is desirable but also that individual weight-loss results are based on some 
common denominator and can be compared in a meaningful way. If individual weight-
loss were acknowledged to be based on underlying biological tendencies, it would make 
little  sense  to  reward  someone  who happens  to  lose  weight  faster  than  others.  The 
Biggest  Loser acknowledges  individual  differences  in  weight-loss  results  but 
simultaneously works to construct body size and weight loss a reliable indicator of self-
restraint in eating and hard work at the gym. Furthermore, it constructs self-restraint 
and hard work as virtues that anyone can and everyone should cultivate, reinforcing the 
meritocracy of thinness in the face of contradictory evidence.  Fans and critics of the 
contestants versus their own weight, not between contestants. See: Annette Hill, Reality TV: Audiences  
and Popular Factual Television (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005: 173). 
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show acknowledge the contradictions, but overwhelmingly embrace the meritocracy of 
thinness  represented  by  The  Biggest  Loser's  triumphant  narratives  of  weight-loss 
success. 
Pathological Eaters and the Temptation Paradox
The show repeatedly frames the contestants' excess weight as the result of their 
pathological eating habits. They are portrayed as initially weak-willed and “emotional” 
eaters who turn to food for comfort and are willfully ignorant about the negative impact 
of their dietary excesses. The title sequence for the first season opens with a shot of a 
hamburger overlaid with the text “Do you have the will power?” The text remains as the 
hamburger  fades  and  is  replaced  by  a  naked  male  torso  that  would  typically  be 
considered fat. The image cuts back to the burger and then to another large belly, this  
one with measuring tape wrapped around it, and then to a pile of donuts, each image 
echoing the others'  curves,  equating the round,  squat,  and presumably  calorie-dense 
foods with round, fat bellies and bodies. [Figure 3.9] 
Figure 3.9/ Do You Have the Will Power?61
Then,  the scene cuts  to an image of  the  contestants  on their  initial  approach to the  
“Biggest  Loser ranch,”62 implying that  their  presence,  like  their  fatness,  is  the direct 
61 Screen shots by the author. The Biggest Loser Season 1: Episode 1, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave 
Broome, perf. Caroline Rhea, Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 19 October 2004 on 
NBC. Re-broadcast on Bravo 01 January 2008.
62 The “ranch” includes the house, professional gym, and extensive grounds where the show is filmed. 
Seasons Two and Three were filmed at the “Hummingbird Nest Ranch” in Simi Valley, California. In 
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result of consuming foods like hamburgers and donuts. The images reinforce the belief 
that  people who get  fat do so because they eat foods like hamburgers and donuts to 
excess and that people who remain thin do not.63 
In the first episode, host Caroline Rhea says, “Let's take a look at your past” and a 
horse-drawn wagon filled with haystacks pulls away to reveal another set of haystacks 
covered with checkered tablecloths and food. The contestants' names appear on placards 
spaced out among the piles. As the scene is revealed, several of the contestants' mouths 
drop  open,  and some laugh knowingly  or  uncomfortably.  “The  buffet  is  now open,” 
Caroline64 quips, “this is  some of the food that you all ate last week.” The camera pans 
over piles of spaghetti and french fries. A contestant named Lizzeth exclaims, “Oh my 
gosh” and covers her mouth in horror.” They cut to an individual interview with Lizzeth 
in which she says, “I ate all that? That is gross. It kind of made me sick, like, I can't  
believe I put that stuff in my body.” In between shots of popcorn, donuts, and slabs of 
ribs,  they show an interview with another contestant named Kelly Mac, who says,  “I 
didn't need to be eating all that food. I'm five feet tall!” Another contestant describes the 
food as being “laid out like a body being laid out like a wake or at a funeral,” and says  
saying goodbye to it, “was like saying goodbye to a loved one.” The host calls these their  
“comfort foods,” and tells them to say farewell before entering the house because “after 
stepping through those doors you will no longer have this to comfort you.”65
However, the same foods reappear frequently in two forms: as representations of 
the contestants themselves and in the Temptations. The former is exemplified by the 
Season Four, the set was referred to as a “campus” instead of a “ranch,” but subsequent seasons 
returned to the word “ranch.” Viewers also generally favor “ranch” to “campus,” even when discussing 
Season Four.
63 The Biggest Loser Season 1: Episode 1. Smith, 2004.
64 I have chosen to refer to the hosts, trainers, and contestants by the names they call each other on the 
show, in most cases is their first names. In seasons where multiple contestants shared a name, they 
usually adopted a nickname (e.g. in Season One, there were two women named Kelly who were 
referred to throughout the show as “Kelly Mac” and “Kelly Min”). These are also the names that people 
typically use when they discuss the show and contestants in online forums and blogs.
65 Ibid.
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glass-front display refrigerators that line the walls of the “Elimination Room,” where 
weekly  votes  to  determine  who  will  be  sent  home  take  place.  Each  refrigerator  is  
identified by an illuminated sign at the top displaying one of the contestants' names. The 
foods  displayed  inside  are  further  associated  with the  contestants  in  interviews  that 
confirm  the  show  has  selected  their  primary  “vices.”  When  the  refrigerators  are 
introduced,  Caroline  says,  “Inside  each  of  your  refrigerators  is  your  biggest  enemy: 
temptation,” which again suggests that the primary cause of their weight is their lack of  
self-control. The camera zooms in on a basket full of fried chicken inside the refrigerator 
labeled “Maurice,” and then cuts to an interview with Maurice in which he says, “I'm not 
even gonna lie to you. Fried chicken: that's a southern boy's favorite.”66 The refrigerators 
full of “enemy” foods literally represent the contestants: they remain illuminated as long 
as the contestant remains on the show, and after a contestant is eliminated, the light in 
his or her refrigerator dims.
As each season progresses, the show begins to equate the “favorite/enemy” foods 
with the weight the contestants have lost. In Season 1: Episode 8, the five remaining 
contestants  are  led,  blindfolded,  to  life-size  cardboard  cutouts  of  themselves  as  they 
looked when they arrived at the ranch. Each one stands next to a pile of their favorite 
foods equivalent to the amount of weight they have lost so far in the competition: 77 
pounds  of  apple  pie,  48 pounds  of  pizza,  50 pounds  of  fried  chicken,  45  pounds  of 
66 Maurice is black, so his reported affection for fried chicken evokes popular stereotypes about African 
Americans and soul food, which likely also works to reinforce the “validity” of the refrigerators as 
representations of the contestants. Every season of the show has included non-white contestants and 
contestants who espouse a strong identification with ethnicities now seen as white, especially Italian 
and Jewish heritage. “Favorite”/”enemy” foods often reflect racial or ethnic heritage, and are 
particularly pathologized as “comfort” foods that the contestants overeat for emotional reasons. On the 
other hand, the show also focuses on how foods seen as “all American” like hamburgers or the classic 
Thanksgiving meal can be comforting and fattening for contestants regardless of their racial and ethnic 
identities. The show has also filmed contestants cooking at home and adapting regional and ethnic 
heritage foods to conform to the ideas of “health” promoted by the show, usually by reducing fat 
content or substituting a no-calorie sweetener for sugar. The hosts and trainers never discuss race and 
ethnicity or address weight-loss challenges people might face based on their particular racial, regional, 
or ethnic background. By limiting the discussion of race and ethnicity to the contestants' own 
acknowledgment of the role their identities plays in their personal eating habits, the show resists 
stigmatizing particular identity groups and their foodways and suggests that regardless of cultural 
identity, all people can become thin and all foodways can be part of a “healthy” diet.
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macaroni and cheese, and 44 pounds of spaghetti. The platforms are too small to hold it  
all, so some of it spills onto the ground, emphasizing how excessive and  gross all this 
food is meant to appear. The host says, “You guys, you've all been carrying that weight 
around for so many years. And it feels so much better to be that much lighter.” The bad 
foods are equated directly with their excess weight, and the implication is that those 
foods were the primary cause of their “excess” weight and would cause anyone to become 
fat were they to succumb to temptation.67 
However, the contestants rarely express a desire to eat the forbidden foods, or eat 
to excess. While they are on the show, women are counseled to eat  between 1,200 and 
1,500 calories per day and the men between 1,500 and 1,800 calories per day. On rare  
occasions,  a  contestant  will  have  a  teary  meltdown because  they  feel  hungry  or  are 
confused about  what  they are  supposed to  eat.  In  Season 1:  Episode 1,  a  contestant 
named Lisa is shown sitting at a table in the kitchen and crying while she says, “I'm just  
hungry. I don't know what to eat. I think I just overate chicken. I don't know how many 
ounces it was and then I put barbecue sauce on it.... I ate 595 calories in one day. That 
can't be enough.”68 Later in the same episode, there is an array of breakfast food waiting 
for the contestants when they wake up including french toast, butter, syrup, and turkey 
bacon. Maurice is shown repeatedly reaching for the bacon, and his teammates shun him 
for the rest of the day.69 But those scenes are relatively rare exceptions. For the most 
part,  the  contestants  are  portrayed  as  obedient  adherents  to  their  restricted  diets. 
Indeed, they often express surprise at how delicious or satisfying the low-calorie, low-fat 
alternatives they're learning to make are. 
They also express  horror  at  how many calories  are  in  the foods they used to 
consume regularly. In season three, the Red team's personal trainer Kim shows them 
67 The Biggest Loser Season 1: Episode 8, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, perf. Caroline Rhea, 
Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 01 December 2004 on NBC. Re-broadcast on Bravo 
01 January 2008.
68 The Biggest Loser, Season 1: Episode 1. Smith, 2004.
69 Ibid.
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how to prepare a sugar-free dessert she calls, “Jell-O Chocolate Berry Bliss,” and several 
of the female contestants claim that it's something they can see themselves serving to 
their friends, who won't even know how many calories they're “saving.” However, even 
when  they're  eating  approved  foods,  contestants  are  sometimes  portrayed  as 
pathological, out of control eaters. In the third season, Blue team trainer Bob enters the 
kitchen, where his team is preparing dinner after having lost that week's Challenge. He 
asks them what they're doing and they tell him they're preparing some white fish—the 
same food Maureen Dowd portrayed as the virtuous alternative to Obama's burgers. The 
show cuts to an interview with Bob in which he says: 
“You talk to overweight people and a lot of them are emotional eaters. 
And  when  you're  dealing  with  emotional  eaters,  when  anything  bad 
happens, they're gonna reach right for the food. Especially when you're 
dealing with people that are the size of the ones that are in the house right 
now.70 
Bob tells  them that instead of  eating dinner,  he wants them to go to the gym. Even 
though the contestants are preparing a virtuous dinner, their relationship to eating food 
of  any kind is  portrayed as  pathological.  Bob plays the role  of  the  good conscience, 
helping fulfill the host's promise the show is going to inspire them to make the correct  
choices  and force  them to stop using food for  comfort.  One of  the  contestants  asks, 
“Before we eat?” And Bob affirms that yes, he wants them to work out before they eat. 
Although they seem stunned for  a moment,  they dutifully  follow him to the gym to 
complete the workout.
This pattern is  consistent across  season: contestants  provide little  evidence of 
their  supposedly pathological  appetites  but the show portrays them as out-of-control 
eaters.  Even  during  the  Temptations,  when  contestants  are  presented  with  the 
opportunity to eat “fattening” foods, they almost never express a desire to do so. Instead,  
they agonize over whether the prizes are desirable enough to justify the extra calories. 
70 The Biggest Loser, Season 3: Episode 1, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, perf. Caroline Rhea, 
Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 20 September 2006 on NBC. Re-broadcast on Bravo 
08 September 2008. 
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Emotional  rewards,  like  the  opportunity  to  speak  to  temporarily-estranged  family 
members  are  often  especially  tempting.  Contestants  also  weigh  in-game  advantages 
against the the estimated caloric content of the food they would have to eat, sometimes 
explicitly calculating how many minutes of cardiovascular exercise they will have to do to 
make up for taking the bait. Rather than displaying an irrational, pathological desire to 
eat the “fattening” foods, the contestants express emotional attachments to their loved 
ones (portrayed as natural and appropriate) and engage in what appear to be rational 
calculations about how the foods will affect their weight-loss goals. Thus, even within the 
competition,  the  food is  is  portrayed as  a  disincentive.  The contestants  may actually 
want to eat the foods, but getting them to actually do so requires additional incentives,  
beyond the inherent pleasures that they are supposedly so bad at resisting.
Despite  being  provided  with  additional  incentives  in  the  Temptations, 
contestants almost always decline the food. Even in first episodes of every season when 
the contestants are portrayed as self-control neophytes who still need to build up their  
willpower  along  with  their  muscles,  they  usually  resist.  In  Season  2:  Episode  2,  the 
contestants  have  to  sit  at  a  dinner  table  where  letters  from  home  peek  out  from 
underneath platters full of “fattening” foods. They are told they can only read the letters 
if they eat what's on the plates. The camera lingers on contestants who lick their lips or 
stare  at  the  food  intently;  however,  when  the  contestants  talk  about  the  food,  they 
universally say they do not want to eat it and express frustration that they would have to 
sabotage  their  diets  in  order  to  read  the  letters.  One  contestant,  Shannon,  is  so 
distraught  over  not  being  able  to  read  the  letter  that  the  other  contestants  begin 
encouraging  her  to  eat  the  food,  telling  her  she  can  work  it  off  in  the  gym  later.  
Ultimately,  even  Shannon  resists.  In  other  Temptations  when  at  least  a  few  of  the 
contestants decide the prize is too good to pass up—as is often the case when they have 
the chance to win immunity from elimination—contestants generally eat the food quickly 
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and without much apparent pleasure. They also confer with each other as they attempt 
to  track the calories  they consume and strategize ways to  make up for these dietary 
transgressions.
Nevertheless, the show explicitly claims the Temptations test contestants' ability 
to resist their desire to eat fattening foods, which is portrayed as the “enemy” they must 
conquer in order to become thin. The shots of contestants licking their lips are often 
repeated  in  the  re-caps  shown  after  commercial  breaks  and  at  the  beginning  of 
subsequent  episodes,  suggesting  that  it  really  is  the  food  that's  tempting,  not  the 
additional  prizes,  despite  what  the  contestants  say  and  do.  The  show  also  routinely 
frames the Temptations as preparation for the real world and all the desirable foods they 
will encounter there, obscuring the role of the prizes. Furthermore, when contestants do 
decide to eat,  it  is  portrayed as  evidence of  their  unresolved issues with food,  not  a 
rational calculation.
In Season 4: Episode 3,  host Allison Sweeney introduces the Temptation as a 
“real world challenge” and a “simulation” of the kinds of temptations they will face after 
they leave the show. She tells the contestants that the show has set up a buffet full of 
their favorite foods, like pizza, brownies, and cupcakes. Each of them will spend four 
minutes in the room, and whoever eats the greatest number of calories will win a three-
pound pass for their team (meaning for the purposes of the competition, three pounds 
will be added to their collective weight loss at that week's weigh-in). Allison also says 
that no one else on their team will know how much they ate. Only two of the contestants  
eat any food while in the room; both of them eat immoderately, but not in an apparent  
act of succumbing to temptation. Once in the room, Neil begins grabbing at whatever is 
closest to him with no apparent attempt to select favorite foods or enjoy them; at one 
point, he tips a small bowl of M&Ms into his mouth like a shot of liquor (replayed several  
times  in  re-caps).  Patty  also  eats  as  if  on  a  mission,  shoving  egg  rolls,  eclairs,  and 
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handfuls of apple pie into her mouth. Both claim that their primary motivation for eating 
the food was to win the three pound pass for their team. However, Patty's teammates 
claim that she wasn't supposed to eat,  and berate her until  she admits that she “has 
issues.” Bob tells them he “doesn't want to punish” anyone but that his philosophy is “if  
you play, you have to pay.” He is shown working both Neil and Patty especially hard 
during the subsequent workout.71
The Temptations promote the idea that the contestants' weight loss is a hard-won 
battle  with  their  pathological  appetites  and  deviant  habits. Rather  than  being 
sequestered in a clinic  where they have no choice but to eat  an approved diet,  their 
weight  loss  is  presented  as  a  personal  triumph  over  their  natural  inclinations.  The 
construction of weight loss as difficult challenge whose accomplishment demonstrates 
laudable virtue is also what makes the competitive aspect of the show make sense. If the 
show instead focused on the remarkable consistency with which contestants are able to 
resist the tempting foods dangled in front of them and appear more concerned with the 
emotional rewards and in-game incentives, that would undermine both the ideology of 
weight-loss the show is based on and the logic of the competition. 
The Correspondence Between Effort and Weight-Loss
The Biggest  Loser attempts  to  construct  contestant  eliminations  as  fair,  even 
when they are based on a group vote or the results of a single work-out, as in the Season  
3: Episode 1. For that season the show recruited fifty contestants, one representing every 
state. In the first episode, all fifty of them are gathered at the ranch. In the first minutes 
of the episode, the host informs them that only fourteen of them will be chosen to stay. 
Based on their stunned reactions, this is news to the contestants, who may have thought  
they would spend at least a week and up to several months there. She introduces the 
71 The Biggest Loser, Season 4: Episode 3, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, perf. Allison 
Sweeney, Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 25 September 2007 on NBC.
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personal  trainers,  who  immediately  begin  leading  the  whole  group  in  a  calisthenics 
routine. In between shouting instructions to the crowd, the trainers run up and down the 
rows of people, asking individual contestants questions like “Do you want this real bad? 
How  bad?”  Immediately  afterward,  they  return  to  the  stage  and  choose  seven 
contestants each to be on their teams. Each selection is followed by the trainer claiming 
to have seen something special in them, usually identified as “heart.” 
Some of the contestants seem to invest in the idea that this initial elimination is 
based  on  some  kind  of  merit.  In  an  confessional  interview  with  the  woman  from 
Vermont, who was not chosen, she says, “I thought I was going to die when we did the  
first workout in our rows. I kept thinking, like, you gotta do it, just one more time 'cause 
they're watching you and you know, maybe if I just get my legs up a little higher, I'll be 
one of the fourteen to stay.”72 After the chosen fourteen repair to the mansion with the 
trainers to settle in, the host gathers the remaining 36 contestants into a huddle to “let 
them in on a little secret”: they are not actually out of the running, instead they are to 
return  to  their  normal  lives  and  compete  from  home,  armed  with  a  Biggest  Loser 
cookbook and workout DVD. The most successful among them will be invited back and 
have the opportunity to be crowned “The Biggest Loser.” 
Audience  members  were  split  on  whether  this  initial  elimination  was  fair  or 
appropriate. “Adam2010” on the online forum “Reality TV World” started a thread titled 
“terribly disappointed” that railed against the show: 
If anyone saw the opening of The Biggest Loser, you probably felt as I did 
– angry. . . . They were told they would be given a DVD and book to help 
them lose weight.  I'm not  overweight myself,  but my mother  is,  and I 
know that she is not unique in that she has tried every diet and read every 
book  out  there;  another  new  book  and  DVD  will  hardly  make  the 
difference. . . . I encourage everyone else to turn the channel and watch 
something else; or better yet, get out and go for a walk!73
Other audience members adopted what Hall might classify as a “negotiated' position, 
72 The Biggest Loser, Season 3: Episode 1. Smith, 2006.
73 Reality TV World contributors, “terribly disappointed,” Reality TV World: Biggest Loser 20 September 
2006, Web (accessed 18 November 2008).
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expressing sympathy with Adam2010's belief that sending so many contestants home so 
quickly seemed unfair but holding out more hope for those who would be competing 
from home. A reply by “MizJazmine” noted that they had not been eliminated from the 
competition: 
When they were picking the two teams, I was sitting there thinking this is 
like a bad dream. What are they basing their selections on? What made 
one person more worthy than the other?.... BUT I also did see it coming 
that they weren't gonna be left out so to speak. In essence they did enroll 
them in their program and are using them as a type of promo.... one of the 
people who weren't picked for the teams could actually win this thing.74
Another  user  named “jackandjill”  sided  with MizJazmine:  “I  agree  that  the  selection 
process wasn't very fair and slightly mean, but to get the opportunity to learn proper 
nutrition,  work with a trainer,  and possibly win some money are good motivators.”75 
Others  offered  what  seems  to  be  the  dominant  or  preferred  reading.  A  user  named 
“skeetergirl87” said:
I  kind of  like  what  the show has  done....  I  think that  they have more 
motivation to prove that they can do it without the ranch.... I think it's  
great for the audience, too...it's great to see that you don't need a personal 
chef and personal trainer to lose weight - all it takes is the right mind set 
and lots of determination and hard work!!”
The  plurality  of  online  commentary  on  Reality  TV  World and  elsewhere  seems  to 
ultimately agree that the potential unfairness of the initial elimination will be righted by 
the rest of the competition, which they seem to believe will reward whoever works the 
hardest, wherever they do it.76 
Individual eliminations are also portrayed as merit-based. In Season 3: Episode 1, 
the Red team loses the weigh-in (meaning that as a team, their  collective percentage 
weight loss was lower than the Blue team's) so they have to vote to eliminate one of their 
team members. The team is shown back at the house, reacting to the news. A contestant 





but Jen's starting weight was lower,  so she was the contestant on the team with the 
lowest percentage weight-loss. “You had the lowest percentage,” Heather says, pointing 
at Jen, “So just know that. So don't try and lie to yourself or lie to anyone else. You had 
the lowest percentage because you didn't bust it.” The show then cuts to an individual 
interview with Kim, who says that at first she was “shocked” that Heather “called Jen 
out,” but that on further reflection, “I could kind of see it. I told Jen several times this 
week, 'Step it up.'” The scene cuts to a flashback of the Red team at the gym. Jen appears 
to be struggling while working out on an elliptical machine, and Kim comes over and 
asks, “What are you doing?” Jen says wearily, “I think it's called a break,” and Kim barks, 
“Uh uh, there are no breaks here.” The scene cuts back to the present, where Kim looks  
intently  at  Jen  as  she  says,  “Only  you  know  if  you're  working  100  percent.”  The 
implication of the scene is clear: the scale has revealed the truth, Jen wasn't working 
hard enough. At the end of the show, her team members vote to send her home.77 
Participants in online discussions generally accept the premise that the largest 
percentage weight loss is a reliable indicator of who is working the hardest and therefore 
deserves to win the competition. In a discussion about who should have been the final 
four  contestants  of  the fourth season,  registered users  on the Biggest  Loser  message 
boards hosted by NBC's official website almost all use the percentage weight loss as their 
only criteria. They also equate the amount of weight the contestants lose with the amount 
of effort they put forth. For example, a user named “Wizzykin” says, “Neil for sure. He 
was a workhorse - he lost 211 lbs. He absolutely deserved to be up there.” Although all the 
contestants had been shown working hard all  season, “Wizzykin” suggests that  Neil's 
weight loss proved that he must have worked harder than the other contestants who, 
implicitly, did not “deserve to be up there.” Many NBC forum participants are so invested 
in the idea that  percentage weight  loss  should be the only factor  in determining the 
winner, they found the results of Season Four frustrating because several contestants lost 
77 The Biggest Loser Season 3, Episode 1. Smith, 2006.
205
a greater percentage of their starting weight than the contestant ultimately crowned “The 
Biggest Loser.” A participant named “littlenicky2” writes that the season was a “fraud”: 
“On all the other seasons the winner of the show could say with conviction that they lost  
the most weight. Not this season. The winner of this season can only say he won it but 
did it through game playing.”78 
However, the contestants' bodies don't always comply with this strict, weight-loss 
based meritocracy.  In some weeks,  contestants don't lose any weight or actually gain 
weight despite spending hours in the gym and eating salads and sugar-free Jell-O. The 
first season of the show initially set up the competition between the teams as a mini-
experiment, with the blue team following what the show called the “Eat More” diet with 
many small meals throughout the day that Bob promised would “stop hunger before it  
hits,” and the red team following the “Eat Less” diet, focusing exclusively on restricting 
caloric intake.79 After the second week, when competitors from both teams lost very small 
amounts and several lost nothing at all or even gained weight back, trainer Jillian revised 
the diet  plan, claiming that  the contestants bodies were “hoarding” calories and they 
needed to “trick” their bodies in to starting to lose weight again.80 When a contestant 
named Wylie lost zero pounds in Season 3: Episode 9, Kim told him it must be because 
he  had  been  building  muscle  so  fast,  which  weighs  more  than  fat.81 In  general, 
contestants fluctuate between good weeks, when they lose a lot, and bad weeks, when 
they only lose a little. Some contestants actively try have a “bad” week when protected by 
78 Ibid.
79 The “Eat More” and “Eat Less” diets are mentioned rarely after the second episode when the trainer 
Jillian Michaels decides her team members should eat more to prevent their bodies from responding as 
if they're being starved. However, the core principle of the “Eat Less” diet—that people must consume 
fewer calories than they burn in order to lose weight—is the basis of both diets in the first season and all 
of the subsequent seasons.
80 The Biggest Loser, Season 1: Episode 2, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, perf. Caroline Rhea, 
Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 02 November 2004 on NBC. Re-broadcast on Bravo 
01 January 2008. 
81 The Biggest Loser, Season 3: Episode 9, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, perf. Caroline Rhea, 
Kim Lyons, and Bob Harper, originally aired 15 November 2006 on NBC. Re-broadcast on Bravo 08 
September 2008. 
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immunity in order to have a “good” weigh-in when it will count.82 In at least one instance, 
a contestant also manipulated his weigh-in by drinking a lot of water.83
Nevertheless,  the  overall  trend  towards  weight  loss  is  taken  as  evidence  that 
consuming fewer calories than you burn can make anyone thin. In an online community 
called “Fat Fighters,” a contributor named “Renee” offered to “crunch the numbers” to 
figure out how dramatic losses,  like a 16 pound loss  in one week by a Season Three  
contestant named Amy, would be possible according to caloric arithmetic: 
At  260lbs,  she  needs  2333  calories  to  maintain  her  weight  if  she  is 
sedentary. Bob put his ladies on a 1200-1500 calorie diet, creating a 1100 
daily deficit via eats alone. . .  .  I am going out on a limb and say they 
workout  intensely  4  hours  a  day.  .  .  .  @ her  size,  she can burn 5000 
calories  in  those 4  hours  if  she just  walked or  jogged.  .  .  .  Easily  she 
burned 6000 calories. 6000 burned via exercise + 2100 daily deficit ='s 
doing the above for 7 days @ her 260lb weight is how she shed 16lbs in 
one week.84
That doesn't explain why in subsequent weeks Amy's weight loss dropped to eight or 
nine  pounds  and then  to  four  pounds  for  two weeks  in  a  row,  after  which  she  was 
eliminated from the competition. 
Differences in weight loss based on gender prompt the most active debate about 
the  fairness  of  the  competition  both  in  the  show  and  in  online  communities.  Men 
typically  start  off  heavier  and  lose  weight  faster.  Trainers  and  hosts  frequently 
acknowledge the gender gap. When the first two members of the blue team eliminated in 
Season Three were women, Bob told the one remaining woman on his team that she 
would have to work out “like a man” to stay in the game.85 On the red team, a contestant 
named Wylie expresses a jealous admiration for a woman on his team named Kai, who 
82 For example, Erik gains 3 pounds while protected by immunity. The Biggest Loser Season 3: Episode 7, 
dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, perf. Caroline Rhea, Kim Lyons, and Bob Harper, originally 
aired 01 November 2006 on NBC. Re-broadcast on Bravo 08 September 2008. 
83 Neil gained 17 pounds in a Episode Seven by drinking a lot of water before the weigh-in, and lost 33 
pounds the next week. Wikipedia contributors, "The Biggest Loser (season 4)," Wikipedia, The Free 
Encyclopedia, 10 Mar. 2011, Web (accessed 14 Mar. 2011).
84 Renee, “Be a Biggest Loser,” Fat Fighters, 2006. Web (accessed 18 November 2008). 
85 The Biggest Loser, Season 3: Episode 3, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, perf. Caroline Rhea, 
Kim Lyons, and Bob Harper, originally aired 04 October 2006 on NBC. Re-broadcast on Bravo 08 
September 2008. 
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he says “loses weight like a guy.”86 Kai was the runner-up for the grand prize, and at the 
finale Caroline praised her for losing the most weight “of any woman in the history of the 
Biggest  Loser,”  implicitly  recognizing  that  the  bar  for  record-setting  achievement  is 
lower  for  female  competitors.87 In  all  of  these  instances,  participants  in  the  show 
acknowledge that the playing field is not level but simultaneously imply that if women 
work hard enough, they can compete with men. 
So the rules of the competition and eliminations remain gender-blind, despite 
evidence that the scale is not. In the second season, the teams were initially divided 
based on gender. They were rearranged after the women's team lost three weigh-ins in a 
row, but the “men versus women” theme was fundamental to the season's continuing 
narrative. Special attention was devoted to the fact that three of the final six and two of 
the final four contestants were women, which was supposed to “prove” that the 
competition does not inherently favor men. However, many viewers were still skeptical 
that underlying biological differences predispose men to succeed in the competition. In 
December 2007, after a man won the grand prize for the fourth consecutive season of the 
show, a user named “goofball” started a message board topic in NBC's online Biggest  
Loser community titled: “IT'S TIME FOR A FEMALE TO WIN!” In the message body, 
“goofball” elaborates: “Julie was the first woman who had a good opportunity to win and 
she still didn't. She looked fantastic and could not have lost any more! I'm frustrated and 
it's time for the show to do an all female cast.”88 “BGSU_Falcon” agrees: “I'm beginning 
to realize that it's going to have to be an all women final 3 or final 4 for a woman to 
win.”89 Many other contributors endorse the claim that women have an inherent 
86 The Biggest Loser, Season 3:Episode 3. Smith, 2006.
87 The Biggest Loser, Season 3 Finale, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, perf. Caroline Rhea, 
Kim Lyons, and Bob Harper, originally aired 29 November 2006 on NBC. Re-broadcast on Bravo 08 
September 2008. 
88 NBC.com contributors, “IT'S TIME FOR A FEMALE TO WIN!” mynbc.com NBC> Reality> The 
Biggest Loser> Previous Seasons Discussion Archive> The Biggest Loser: (Season 4) 19 December 
2007, Web (accessed 14 March 2011). 
89 Ibid.
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biological disadvantage that makes the competition unfair. 
However, a sizable contingent of NBC message board participants disagree. They 
generally suggest that the fact that at least one woman made it to the final elimination in 
every season proves that  women are capable of  winning.  Many of  them claim that a 
victory  based on adjusted rules  would be unsatisfying.  A user named “matthew_me” 
writes: “Last year, Poppi beat out 35 other people to win [the “at home” prize] by losing 
over 50% of her starting weight - if she had been in this year's final four, she would have 
been crowned the Biggest Loser with that stat!”90 Another user named “gambitsgal45” 
agrees: “I want to see a female biggest loser to, but I want to see her win it  fair and 
square. If they changed to rules to help the women, I wouldn't feel good about the win. It  
can be done... and I'm sure it will.”91 Some argue that implying that gender is an issue 
undermines the achievements of the winners. “Ryan_D” said: “Your frustrated that a 
woman has not won? I am frustrated that you are trying to cheapen the wins of every 
winner by claiming that the competition was not fair. They won fair and square and they 
had amazing accomplishments.”92 In Season Six, a woman named Ali was crowned the 
first female Biggest Loser, silencing most complaints about inherent gender inequality 
and reinforcing the idea that weight loss is an equal playing field.
The fact that most contestants lose significant amounts of weight by the end of 
the season through diet and exercise93 offers powerful reinforcement for the hegemonic 




93 Some contestants have publicly admitted to the use of diuretics and laxatives to enhance their results 
and implied that those strategies are promoted by the trainers and other people involved in the show; 
however, the bulk of the weight loss is likely achieved through the dietary modifications and hours of 
strenuous exercise. Spokespeople for the show tend not to address the specific allegations regarding 
dehydration or laxative use; however, they insist that the contestants are monitored by health 
professionals and that “the consistent health transformations of over 200 contestants through nine 
seasons of the program speak for themselves.” Emily Friedman, “Former Biggest Loser Contestant Kai 
Hibbard Says Show Triggered Eating Disorder,” ABC News, 25 June 2010, Web (accessed 14 March 
2011). 
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Inconsistencies prompt some viewers to question the fairness of the competition, but in 
general, the show and its audience work hard to make inconsistent results make sense 
with the dominant nutritional paradigm of calories in vs. calories out. Additionally, the 
overall  weight-loss  trends  are  widely  interpreted  as  evidence  that  dieting  can  help 
anyone achieve a “healthy” weight.94 Some viewers (and many doctors and nutritionists) 
have questioned the safety and sustainability of the rapid rate of weight loss portrayed on 
The  Biggest  Loser,  but  in  general,  they  also  conclude  that  the  results  “speak  for 
themselves.”95 
Experts, Equipment, and Seclusion
Despite the dramatic results, both the show and its viewers struggle to reconcile 
the belief that anyone can lose weight through diet and exercise with the fact that the 
contestants have exceptional resources and incentives to do so. Many of them identify as 
the  show  as  a  singular opportunity  or  say  it  is  their  “last  chance.”  The  show  is  a 
potentially humiliating and painful trial they are only willing to go through because their 
previous weight-loss attempts have failed and they are convinced they cannot succeed on 
their own. Most of the contestants have careers, typically in middle class professions like 
education  or  firefighting,  and  many  of  them  have  children.  They  often  identify 
obligations related to work and family as barriers to their past weight loss attempts. The 
trainers also sometimes acknowledges that the kind of weight loss people achieve on the 
94  Gard and Wright note in The Obesity Epidemic that a review of over fifty years of research on adiposity 
suggests that less than half of individual variation in weight can be attributed to this sort of abstracted 
ideal of caloric metabolism or the strict measure of calories in versus calories out (2005). Nevertheless, 
as the show demonstrates, regardless of individual variations in hunger and satiety, muscle mass and 
development, metabolic rate, percieved exertion or effort expended, most people will lose weight if they 
restrict their consumption to the extent the contestants on the show do and exercise for four or more 
hours every day. 
95 Obesity experts like Xavier Pi-Sunyer and Albert Stunkard have called the show “humiliating” and 
“cruel and counterproductive,” although their primary concern is that the weight-loss achieved will not 
last, not that weight-loss in itself is unsustainable or undesirable. Similarly, contributors to the forum 
Getting Lean raise concerns about whether The Biggest Loser's methods are “safe,” but ultimately 
decide that the “results speak for themselves.” Travis Smith, “'The Biggest Loser' Full Review! Is it 
Safe?” Getting Lean 2005, Web (accessed 01 December 2008).
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show may be difficult for contestants to sustain once they return to their normal lives.  
However, the show also works to reinforce the idea that the primary factors determining 
weight loss are available to everyone: self-control and willpower, both of which might 
vary naturally between individuals (much like a palate sensitivity) but which everyone is 
presumed to be able to cultivate. 
In Season 1: Episode 10, the Challenge involves holding on to a bunch of helium-
filled balloons. The last person to let them go will win a professional-grade treadmill, just 
like the ones in the Biggest Loser gym. In individual interviews, the contestants discuss 
the significance of the prize. Kelly says,“If there was one piece of equipment I would love 
to  take home it  would be the treadmill,”  and Ryan emphasizes  the dollar  value of  a 
professional piece of fitness equipment: “The fact that the treadmill was the prize was 
definitely motivation enough to win this. Jillian tells us they cost seven or eight thousand 
dollars.”96 All of the contestants express concern that they will not be able to maintain 
their weight loss without access to the kind of equipment available to them on the show. 
However, the show also include a number of segments designed specifically to address 
that  anxiety.  The  trainers  sometimes  have  contestants  exercise  outside  of  the  gym, 
during  which  they  repeatedly  remind  the  contestants  that  it's  possible  to  work  out 
anywhere and  any time. In the second week of  season three,  the trainers take their 
teams to a beach, where they do yoga and run through the sand. Later that season, the 
entire cast goes on a cruise where they are tested on their ability to eat healthy foods in 
moderate amounts at the ship's buffet and must adapt to working out with the resources 
available on the ship. In at least one episode in every season, the contestants and trainers 
arrive at the gym to find signs indicating that the gym is closed. They do cardiovascular 
and strength training exercises outside to prove that “you don't have to go to the gym to 
96 The Biggest Loser, Season 1: Episode 10, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, Perf. Caroline 
Rhea, Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 21 December 2004 on NBC. Re-broadcast on 
Bravo 01 January 2008. 
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get a great workout.”97
Some viewers, like Sarah Dussault, the Senior Video Producer at Diet.com who 
also writes columns under the moniker “the Diet Diva”, take umbrage with the show's 
failure  to  offer  a  more realistic  role  model  for  real-world dieters.  In  a  column titled 
“Biggest Loser: Do They Eat?” she says, “working out 8 hours a day is not something you 
or I can do. Why do they show us footage of things we can't take away any tips from?” 98 A 
user registered as “ehaley” replied in agreement: “Just started watching it this season, 
and while I love it and feel that it's really inspirational for a lot of people, I don't know 
that it's setting the best example in some ways. Pretty much no one can lose 10 lbs a 
week in 'the real world' (which I suppose they do mention).”99 On a message board on the 
site Diet.com, a user named “lifematters” expresses the same concern: “I think they lose 
so much b/c of the 24/7 attention to diet and exercise. We can all diet but not many have 
the luxury of several intense workouts in one day! Some of us have to work!” 100 However, 
most fans accept the show's gestures to “at home” success as evidence that anyone can 
lose weight, even if they don't have 24/7 to devote to their bodies. 
Every season involves an “at home” period when the finalists leave the ranch and 
continue trying to lose weight at home, which is constructed as a test of their ability—or 
anyone's ability—to lose weight in the “real world.” In every season the show has also 
awarded a smaller prize to the eliminated contestant who loses the most weight by the 
finale,  crowning him or  her  the “at  home champion.”  The third season involved the 
largest number of “at home” competitors with the thirty-six contestants sent home in the 
first week competing not just for the secondary prize, but also for a chance to return to 
97 The Biggest Loser, Season 3: Episode 6, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, perf. Caroline Rhea, 
Kim Lyons, and Bob Harper, originally aired 25 October 2006 on NBC. Re-broadcast on Bravo 08 
September 2008. 
98 Sarah Dussault, “Biggest Loser: Do They Eat? Plus Idol Weight Watch,” Diet.com 30 January 2008, 
Web (accessed 22 October 2008).
99 Ibid.
100 Diet.com contributors, “Anybody watching The Biggest Loser this season?” Diet.com, 22 Sept 2006, 
Web (accessed 28 October 2008). 
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the Biggest Loser ranch and compete with the remaining contestants for a chance at the 
grand prize. 
Contestants  who  achieve  significant  weight  loss  at  home  are  given  special 
attention by the show and help convince many viewers that people can achieve dramatic 
weight loss even without the special resources available to the show's contestants. In the 
same discussion thread on Diet.com mentioned earlier, a user named “reneesman” says: 
“I[t] goes to show that if he [Ken, eliminated in Season 3: Episode 6] can lose that much 
while at home, they aren't giving them some magic potion. When people ask me what I  
am doing to lose weight, I say, diet and exercise. So simple that it works. I know I can, I  
know I can.”101 Rather than focusing on the problem of finding the time to exercise for 
hours a day while also attending to other responsibilities of a job, family and home, the 
show suggests that the biggest differences between being on the show and going home 
are issues of self-control and motivation. Many fans echo “reneesman” in claiming that 
this proves that they themselves should be capable of losing weight. 
The contestants' reliance on the expertise of personal trainers also challenges the 
idea that anyone can lose weight on their own. The show frequently creates drama out of 
the question of whether or not contestants  need the help of the personal trainers.  In 
Season Three, one of the costs of losing a Temptation was being denied access to the 
personal trainers for 48 hours. When Bob learns which contestants have been assigned 
to work out without his assistance for two days, he looks at Erik, the heaviest contestant 
on the show that season, and says, “You're screwed.”102 However, Erik has a good week at 
the weigh-in, which is later portrayed as a “turning point” for him and the moment when 
he realizes that he can lose weight on his own. 
When the most successful men and women competing from home return and re-
join the competition at the ranch, they struggle with the trainers. Both returners lost an 
101 Ibid. 
102 The Biggest Loser, Season 3: Episode 6. Smith, 2006.
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greater percentage of their starting weight than the competitors at the ranch in the same 
time period, and their weight loss is a challenge to the trainers' expertise and authority. 
Jaron gets into an argument with Bob about whether or not the diet he's been following 
is sustainable, and Adrian worries in private interviews whether following Kim's advice 
will work as well for her as what she has been doing at home. Furthermore, in the final 
episode  of  each  season  when  the  winner  is  announced,  the  personal  trainers  are 
welcomed  to  share  the  stage  with  the  finalists  and  applauded  for  their  role  in  the 
contestants' weight loss; however, the winning contestants accept both the prizes and the 
credit for their transformations. 
In the Season 3: Episode 10, when the final four contestants say farewell to their 
trainers before returning home, Erik admits to Bob, “the one thing that makes me sad 
about leaving here is you.” Bob reassures him, saying, “you are a man in control of his 
life again,” and introduces Erik to a cardboard cut-out of himself as he looked when he 
first appeared at the ranch. Erik begins to cry. He tells Harper, “You said you were going 
to save my life and you did.” Bob encourages Erik to talk about how he felt when he was 
“that big” and a morose soundtrack plays while Erik talks about how unhappy he was. 
Then,  Bob  turns  the  conversation  towards  Erik's  accomplishments  (mirrored  by  an 
appropriate soundtrack shift). He announces that Erik has lost 124 pounds, more than 
any other contestant in their time on the ranch, and says, “You did it. My friend, you did 
it all. And that's what I am so proud of. Look how far you have come. Because of  your 
determination and  your focus.” Erik cries, nods, and accepts the praise. Although the 
show  invests  the  trainers  with  expertise,  scenes  like  this  one  place  the  primary 
responsibility for weight loss squarely on the overweight individual's shoulders. 
Tuning in for Success, not Schadenfreude 
The weigh-in is the longest segment of The Biggest Loser, comprising the entire 
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second half of each regular episode and the entirety of the season finales, which are two-
hour live broadcasts. Contestants don special outfits and step onto a giant scale with 
large  flatscreen  displays  behind them and a  smaller  one  mounted  at  their  feet.  The 
outfits put their bodies on conspicuous display: all of the contestants wear shorts, and 
the women wear only a sports bra. The men wear t-shirts that they remove just before 
stepping onto the scale. [Figure 3.10]
Figure 3.10/The Biggest Loser First Week Weigh-in103
Jennifer Fremlin compares the moment they step on the scale to the “money shot” in 
porn, a normally private moment of vulnerability turned into a titillating spectacle. 104 
Fremlin says she fast-forwards through the rest  of  the show to get to the weigh-ins. 
Based on the Nielsen ratings for season finales, she's not the only one. Ratings grow 
substantially in the second hour, when re-caps of the season finally give way to the final  
weigh in and the announcement of the winner.105 According to Fremlin, the squirming 
103 Screen shot by the author, The Biggest Loser Season 6: Episode 1, written by David Braun, created by 
Dave Broome, perf. Allison Sweeney, Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 16 September 
2008 on NBC. 
104 Jennifer Fremlin, “The Weigh-in as National Money Shot,” FlowTV 7 07 May 2008, Web (accessed 14 
June 2008).
105 The season five finale, which aired April 15, 2008 averaged 3.6 percent of viewing households during 
the 8pm hour and jumped to 5.1 for the 9pm hour according to Nielsen's overnight report. Wayne 
Friedman, “'Biggest Loser' Finale Scores Its Best Rating This Season,” Media Daily News 17 April 
2008, Web (accessed 14 March 2011). 
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pleasure offered by the weigh-in is the public display of shame which shields viewers 
from the shame of their voyeurism. 
They put their shame on display: at being fat, their exerted bodies wheeze 
and squeeze into spandex workout clothes meant for svelter shapes. Their 
exhibition  becomes  a  cover  for  our  own  shame  as  viewers  who,  by 
participating in their humiliation, in turn abject ourselves.106
Both the shame of voyeurism and the shame of the weigh-in rely on a deep-seated moral 
and aesthetic revulsion to the fat body. The televisual gaze that fixes on the exposed body 
on the scale may be punitive and most viewers probably do seek to distance themselves 
from the fat, exposed bodies. 
However,  the weigh-in  also encourages identification.  Like the contestant,  the 
viewer waits in suspense as the false numbers flash. The drama of the show depends on 
the impressive bodily changes the contestants achieve by making weight-loss their full-
time job, so audience members are invested in seeing the numbers go down, just as they 
are when weigh themselves in the privacy of their own bathrooms. When the scale finally 
settles on a number and the net loss appears, contestants pump their arms triumphantly, 
shout with joy, and usually, at least for a moment, look totally un-self-conscious about 
their  bodies.  Additionally,  midway  though  each  season,  the  weigh-in  outfits  change. 
[Figure 3.11]
Figure 3.11/The Biggest Loser Mid-Season Weigh-in107
106 Ibid.
107  Screen shots by the author. The Biggest Loser Season 5: Episode 10, created by Dave Broome, starring 
Allison Sweeney, Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 04 March 2008 on NBC. 
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Men step onto the scale wearing lose-fitting sleeveless t-shirts that hide their bellies, and 
the  women wear  form-fitting  tank  tops  that  streamline  their  bodies.  Beginning  with 
those episodes, the weigh-in is shown with a split screen. One side shows a video of them 
from the first weigh-in, fat and exposed next to their now-slimmer and more forgivingly-
attired bodies. The show emphasizes the visual evidence of their success as a testament 
to the tangible rewards of dieting. People who fast-forward the show or turn it on just to 
see the weigh-in are tuning in for that, too. 
Fremlin's reading of the weigh-in reflects a broader consensus among critics of 
reality television that the format succeeds primarily by putting people in uncomfortable 
situations to attract viewers based on their base,  voyeuristic tendencies. The genre is 
often accused of having demonstrated to network executives that superior writing and 
acting are  unnecessary  expenses,  and reinforcing undesirable  social  behaviors.  Susan 
Douglas sums up critiques of the genre when she says, “We should appreciate that reality 
TV, particularly, traffics in and relies upon voyeurism, one-upmanship, humiliation and 
often soft-core pornography. . . . It exhorts us to be a voyeur of others' humiliation and to 
see their degradation as harmless, even character-building fun.”108 Some scholars argue 
that viewers derive satisfaction from seeing people fail because they get to feel superior 
to the “losers.” A 2004 study at Ohio State University survey found that respondents who 
reported watching and enjoying reality television had “above average trait motivation to 
feel self-important and, to a lesser extent, vindicated, friendly, free of morality, secure, 
and romantic,” which the authors suggested may lend some support to the theory that 
viewers watch to feel better about their own lot.109
Cultural critic Lee Spiegel,110 offers an alternative theory, but one that nonetheless 
108 Susan J. Douglas, “We Are What We Watch,” In These Times 01 July 2004, Web (accessed 20 
November 2005). Annette Hill echoes this summary in Reality TV: Audiences and Popular Factual 
Television (2005:7). She claims that the criticism fails to capture the immense variety in the genre, but 
implies that it may be accurate for the “worst” shows. 
109 Steven Reiss and James Wiltz, “Why People Watch Reality TV,” Media Psychology 2004 v. 6: 368-378.
110 Currently a Visiting Professor of Journalism and Media Studies at Rutgers University.
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depends on the assumption that reality television primarily portrays people as failures. 
He  suggests  that  “only  in  America”  could  reality  television  become  a  “gigantically 
profitable object of diversion.”111 Rather than arguing that reality television represents 
something  new  in  American  culture,  he  claims  that  Americans  are  drawn  to  the 
underdog figure because they identify with his/her failures:
[Reality]  television  consoles  people  for  their  daily  failures  and defeats 
rather  than  making  them  feel  superior  to  other  people's  failures  and 
defeats. Reality television replaces the glowing, successful celebrity ideal 
with gross imperfection and incontrovertible unhappiness. In a ruthlessly 
competitive society, where the market has become the exclusive arena of 
success, reality television shames the illusion of meritocracy by making 
universal the experience of the underdog, the bumbler, the unlucky and 
unattractive person.112
It's true that on The Biggest Loser only one person earns the grand prize in every season; 
however, the show doesn't portray the “losers” as abject or unlucky. At the end of every 
regular episode, the show provides an update about the eliminated contestant. Many of 
them continue to lose weight for a while after leaving the show, and they often talk about  
how they have changed their diet and exercise habits. 
For contestants who have not lost a significant amount of weight, the epilogue 
often focuses on what kinds of “healthy” behaviors they engage in. Maurice, for example, 
lost an additional twenty pounds after leaving the ranch, but at 363 pounds did not look 
significantly slimmer than at 380. However, in an interview he says that he's enjoying 
healthier  foods  and  continuing  to  exercise.  The  show also  reports  that  he  has  been 
appointed to serve as a spokesperson for a Tennessee Department of Health program 
called “Respect Your Health.”113 During the season finale, all the eliminated contestants 
return for a final weigh-in and the one who loses the greatest percentage of their starting 
111 This is empirically untrue. There are versions of The Biggest Loser in 22 countries, and many other 
shows in the reality genre like Pop Idol and Big Brother actually started abroad. Perhaps the statement 
is a simplification of a softer claim like, “reality television has been especially successful in the U.S.”
112 Lee Spiegel, “Reality in America,” The New Republic 16 June 2003. Web (accessed 20 November 
2005).
113 The Biggest Loser, Season 1: Episode 11, dir. Brian Smith, created by Dave Broome, perf. Caroline 
Rhea, Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 04 January 2005 on NBC. Re-broadcast on 
Bravo 01 January 2008. 
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weight is declared the “at home” winner and awarded $100,000. Furthermore, the host 
and contestants who do not win either prize frequently riff on the series title, noting that 
they by losing weight, they are really all “winners.” 
Dozens of critics, bloggers, and message board participants claim the show has 
inspired them and convinced them that they can lose weight even if their past attempts 
have failed. Some people even report being moved to do calisthenics while watching the 
show. A woman named Brenda Rizzo writes  the following in a post titled,  “Why the 
Biggest Loser?” on a blog called Brand Liberators: 
I  love  Biggest  Loser.  I  watch  it  faithfully  every  season.  My  husband 
wonders why. Is it because of the game playing, or tips on eating or the 
tips on exercise?. . . And what about those outfits? Why do they make the 
men take their shirts off to get weighed when they are at their heaviest?. . .  
. The real reason I love Biggest Loser is for the sheer fact that it works. I  
have struggled with weight my whole life and I just love to see someone 
have success with weight loss. For the most part – the past contestants 
have kept it off. Who else has statistics like that? 114
Rizzo specifically rejects the idea that she watches to see the fat bodies revealed by the 
initial  “weigh-in”  outfits  and  ties  the  appeal  of  the  contestants'  success  to  her  own 
lifelong struggle with weight. She seems to be aware that most weight-loss diets fail, but 
embraces The Biggest Loser as proof that they can succeed. Rizzo doesn't claim to have 
lost a significant amount of weight—indeed, she may have more in common with the less 
successful contestants—but she wants to identify with the winners. 
Perhaps  the  best  evidence  that  The  Biggest  Loser's widespread  appeal  is 
primarily  due  to  audiences  viewing  it  as  inspirational  rather  than  taking  voyeuristic 
pleasure in the display of fat bodies is the success of its licensed subscription weight-loss 
club and $100 million line of weight-loss merchandise.115 Many of the books in the The 
Biggest Loser Cookbook series have spent weeks on The New York Times Bestseller lists, 
and the most recent diet book by trainer Jillian Michaels spent more than 30 weeks in 
114 Brenda Rizzo, “Why the Biggest Loser?” Brand Liberators, GSW Advertising L.L.C. (an inVentiv 
Health company) 22 February 2011, Web (accessed 17 March 2011). 
115 Edward Wyatt, “On 'The Biggest Loser,' Health Can Take a Back Seat,” The New York Times, 24 
November 2009, Web (accessed 17 March 2011). 
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the  top  ten  best-selling  “Advice”  books.116 There  are  also  Biggest  Loser-branded 
bathroom scales,  kitchen scales,  workout  DVDs,  stability  balls  and resistance  bands. 
People are literally buying into the Biggest Loser brand. 
The conviction expressed by fans like Rizzo that The Biggest Loser “works” for 
long-term  weight  loss  is  probably  a  significant  driver  the  sales  of  the  licensed 
merchandise; however, it is not supported by the experiences of the contestants after the 
finale. When the contestants return from the “at home” portion of the competition, they 
are at the typical weight-loss dieters' nadir. After approximately three months on the 
ranch, the contestants are sent home for another three and a half months before the 
finale.  Thus,  the dramatic  results  that  conclude every  season are precisely  at  the six 
month point when most weight-loss dieters reach their maximum weight loss. In every 
season, at least one contestant has lost over 100 pounds. In Season Three, nine of the 
contestants from from the ranch and another nine of the contestants competing from 
home lost that much, and the winner lost over 200 pounds. Although these results may 
not be typical, what follows for most of them is: they almost all begin to regain the weight 
they lost. In an interview with the New York Times published during the eighth season of 
the show, the executive producer and physical trainers estimated that only half of the 
contestants  keep  the  weight  off  for  several  years.  If  they  keep  statistics  on  former 
contestants'  weight,  they  do  not  make  them  publicly  available.  Contracts  that  the 
contestants sign before participating in the series prevent most contestants from talking 
to reporters by threatening them with fines of up to a million dollars. 
Nonetheless, several contestants have publicly admitted to re-gaining some or all 
of the weight they lost on the show and challenged the show's assertion that its methods 
are healthy and sustainable. In 2009, first season champion Ryan told The New York 
Times that he had not been invited to the special reunion episode, and suggested that he 
116 Weekly sales of both print books and e-books are reported confidentially to The New York Times and 
sales of print titles are statistically weighted to represent all outlets nationwide. “Best Sellers,” The New 
York Times, 20 March 2011, Web (17 March 2011). 
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had “been shunned by the show because he publicly admitted that he dropped some of 
the  weight  by  fasting  and  dehydrating  himself  to  the  point  that  he  was  urinating 
blood.”117 Season Three runner-up Kai began writing on her MySpace page in 2007 about 
dehydration techniques that she had used, like working out in multiple layers of clothing, 
drinking no water for 24 hours before weigh-ins, binging on asparagus because it has a 
mild diuretic effect, and having a colonic before the finale.118 In 2010, she appeared on 
“The Early Show” on CBS, claiming that she had regained 30 of the 118 pounds she lost 
on the show in the weeks following the finale merely by drinking water normally again. 
By the time of the interview, she had regained a total of 70 pounds and claimed to be  
struggling with an eating disorder as  a  result  of  her experiences on the show.119 Her 
Biggest Loser trainer, Kim, confirmed some of what she said, telling the St. Petersburg 
Times that “she once saw a black trash bag sticking out from under one competitor's 
sweat shirt during a work out,” and that the producers “love big numbers on the scale”  
but downplay the role of dehydration in achieving them. 120
Season Three winner Erik regained almost all of the 200 pounds he lost on the 
show  within  two  years  of  the  finale.  Discovery  Health  produced  an  hour-long 
documentary about his weight rebound titled Confessions of a Reality Show Loser that 
aired in January 2010.121 In the documentary, his Biggest Loser trainer, Bob, shows up at 
his house unannounced and challenges him to return to The Biggest Loser to weigh in 
during  the  Season  Nine  finale.  Erik  accepts  the  challenge.  At  the  finale,  Allison 
announces that after spending five weeks at the “Biggest Loser resort,” Erik has lost 150 
117  Wyatt, 2009. 
118  Kai Hibbard, “Completely Content Kai's Blog,” Myspace, 2007-2011, Web (accessed 05 April 2011). 
119 CBS News, “'Biggest Loser' Contestant: Show 'Hurts' People,” The Early Show18 June 2010, Web 
(accessed 17 March 2011). 
120  Eric Deggans, “Former 'Biggest Loser' Competitor Kai Hibbard Calls the Show Unhealthy, 
Misleading,” St. Petersburg Times, 04 April 2010, Web (accessed 05 April 2011). 
121 Confessions of a Reality Show Loser, produced for Discovery Health (executive producer Alon Orstein) 
by Discovery Studios (executive producer Robin Sestero), starring Erik Chopin. Originally aired 06 
January 2009 on Discovery Health.
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pounds.122
Special Biggest Loser “reunion” episodes reveal that almost all contestants regain 
at least some of the weight they lose on the show within a few years; however, the show 
obscures the apparent trend towards weight re-gain using the following strategies:  1) 
disproportionately  featuring  contestants  from  recent  seasons,  2)  featuring  mostly 
contestants who have kept off  at least some of the weight, 3) comparing contestants'  
current weight to their starting weight from when they entered the competition rather 
than their weight at the finale, and 4) featuring at most one contestant who has regained 
most or all of their initial weight loss. Thus, despite the producers' concession that only 
about half of the contestants maintain a significant amount of their weight loss on the 
show, the reunion shows paint a picture of near-universal long-term maintenance. Erik 
is  the  lone  example  of  significant  weight  re-gain  during  the  2009 “Where  Are  They 
now?” episode,123 and in the 2010 reunion, the only contestant portrayed as a failure is 
Ryan, the first winner who admits to being just ten pounds shy of his starting weight  
when he went on the show. His former trainer Jillian hugs him, and then berates him, 
calling him a “jerk” who learned nothing from her. Ryan takes personal responsibility for 
his re-gain, saying he struggled to incorporate the lessons from the show into his life at 
home but intends to do better and lose the weight again.124
Although the reunion shows do their best to provide an unrealistically optimistic 
view  of  long-term  weight-loss  maintenance,  for  many  viewers  even  the  supposedly 
“successful”  former  contestants  do  not  live  up  to  the show's  promise  of  universally-
achievable  thinness.  A  recap  of  the  reunion  show  on  the  avowedly-snarky  website 
Television Without Pity is peppered with comments like, “After a commercial break, we 
122 The Biggest Loser, Season 9: Episode 19, dir. Neil DeGroot, created by Dave Broome, perf.Alison 
Sweeney, Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 25 May 2010 on NBC.
123  The Biggest Loser, “Where Are They Now? Special,” dir. Neil DeGroot, created by Dave Broome, perf. 
Alison Sweeney, Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 25 November 2009 on NBC.
124  The Biggest Loser, “Where Are They Now? Special,” dir. Neil DeGroot, created by Dave Broome, 
starring Alison Sweeney, Jillian Michaels, and Bob Harper, originally aired 24 November 2010 on 
NBC.
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learn that five former contestants have decided to get off of their couches and get to work  
battling the childhood obesity epidemic. . . . Ed should maybe work on treating his own 
self again, because he's looking a touch hefty,” and “Sione is clearly very moved by his 
experience in Tonga. . . . At this point it feels tacky to mention that he's maybe put on a 
couple of pounds.”125 The writer even notes: “Is nobody going to remark on the fact that 
the winners of seasons one through three have all plumped back up? This seems like a 
problematic  trend.”  Nonetheless,  the  recap  ends  by  claiming  that  the  episode  was 
inspiring, and it's great to see so many of the former contestants looking “fly.”126 At least 
for the recap author, the overall narrative of triumph overwhelms the seeds of doubt.
The message boards on Television Without Pity reveal a wide range of reactions. 
Some  people  argue  that  on  the  whole,  the  results  are  obviously  good  or  “speak  for 
themselves,” while others suggest that some regain is natural, but express concern about 
former contestants who seem to be “slipping.” After the second reunion show, a user 
named “chocolatine” noted only one of the contestants had kept off all the weight so far 
and that two contestants who had become personal trainers weighed 35-40 pounds more 
than at their finales less than a year earlier. “If they couldn't manage to keep their own 
weight off, how are they going to help other people reach their optimum weight?” the 
writer asks, implying that the contestants' “optimum” is the lowest weight they've ever 
gotten to. In response to people who claimed that some regain was natural and even 
healthy, chocoltatine protests:
Most contestants are at a healthy weight at the finale, so if they regain 
30+ lbs, they're coming close to the overweight territory again. I guess I 
was just hoping that, once the media circus is over, the contestants would 
continue working towards / staying at a healthy weight for their own sake. 
I don't mean keeping up the 8hr/day workouts, but a consistent regimen 
of intense workouts 3-4 times a week, coupled with a calorie-controlled 
diet, should get 99% of the population to a healthy weight eventually. 127
125 Potes, “Thanksgiving Leftovers,” Biggest Loser Recaps, 24 November 2010, Web (accessed 17 March 
2011). 
126  Potes, 2010.
127 Television Without Pity contributors, “'Biggest Losers': Where Are They Now?” Television Without Pity, 
19 December 2008, Web (accessed 15 March 2011). 
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Chocolatine's  faith  in  the  meritocracy  of  thinness  is  absolute;  even  though  the 
contestants in question are personal trainers who exercise regularly as a part of their 
jobs, the body supposedly does not lie. Anyone who eats a calorie controlled diet and 
exercises three to four times per week should not be capable of becoming overweight. 
And if  it  was possible for the contestants to get there in the first place,  it  should be 
possible for them to stay there. 
Given that  The Biggest  Loser  as a  franchise  profits  substantially  from people 
believing  that  their  methods  produce  lasting  weight  loss,  the  show's  misleading 
narratives  about  weight-loss  might  be  seen  as  a  craven  form  of  mass  media 
manipulation. Critics of the public health campaign against obesity and overweight that 
has intensified since the 1980s often point to the fact that many of the loudest voices in  
the “war on fat” also stand to gain financially from more people believing they should try  
to lose weight. Obesity research in the U.S. is almost entirely funded by the diet and 
pharmaceutical  industries,  and  scholars  like  Laura  Fraser  argue,  “Diet  and 
phamaceutical companies influence every step along the way of the scientific process. 
They pay for the ads that  keep obesity journals  publishing.  They underwrite medical 
conferences, flying physicians around the country expense-free and paying them large 
lecture fees to attend.”128 Fraser also reports that many of the lead researchers on studies 
that claimed obesity was a dangerous disease had financial ties to diet products. 
The  conflicts  of  interest  extend  to  the  currently-accepted  definitions  of 
“overweight”  and  “obesity.”  The  WHO's  International  Obesity  Task  Force  received 
funding from the pharmaceutical companies Hoffman La Roche and Abbot Laboratories, 
which manufacture the weight-loss drugs Xenical and Meridia, and was chaired by Philip 
James, a nutritionist who was paid to conduct clinical trials on both drugs. The term 
“morbid  obesity”  was  coined by Howard Payne,  a  weight-loss  surgeon attempting to 
128  Laura Fraser, Losing It: False Hopes and Fat Profits in the Diet Industry (New York, NY: Plume, 1997: 
16-50).
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justify the use of a risky form of major surgery to treat what may be primarily a cosmetic  
issue.129 
Jeffrey Sobal argues, “The medicalization of obesity as a process did not occur by 
chance, but was a process which gained momentum 'as medical people and their allies 
made increasingly frequent, powerful and persuasive claims that they should exercise 
social  control  over  fatness  in  contemporary  society."130 Two  unnamed  “obesity 
researchers” told Campos that many researchers exaggerate the supposed health risks 
associated with obesity to  get  funding and engage in “data trimming” that  would be 
unacceptable in any other field in order to get the results they want. Campos himself 
concludes: 
In  America  today  the  medical  and  public  health  establishment  has 
managed to  transform what  has  traditionally  been considered a  vice—
physical vanity—into that most sacred of secular virtues: the pursuit of 
'health'....  The  health  establishment's  constant  barrage  of  scientifically 
baseless  propaganda  regarding  the  relationship  between  weight  and 
health constitutes nothing less than egregious abuse of the public trust 
(2004). 
His indignation is easy to understand in light of the pervasive distortions of research and 
conflicts of interest that  have shaped the way public  health authorities and the mass 
media portray fatness. The work he, Fraser, Oliver, Glen Gaesser, Michael Gard and Jan 
Wright, Paul Ernsberger, and many others have done to uncover and document those 
distortions  is  invaluable  to  anyone  seeking  to  understand  contemporary  American 
ideologies about food and fatness; however, the story they tell is incomplete. 
Audience responses to  The Biggest  Loser challenge the prevailing assumption 
that the “obesity epidemic” and increasing prevalence of weight-loss dieting in the U.S. 
were manufactured by a diet industry conspiracy. That line of reasoning esembles the 
“magic bullet” theory of communication. Widespread concern about the susceptibility of 
mass  populations  to  propaganda  in  the  wake  of  the  world  wars  inspired  the  first 
129  Oliver, 2005: 55. 
130  Quoted in Gard and Wright, 2005: 179. 
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generation  of  mass  media  scholars,  including  Paul  Lazarsfeld  and  Carl  Hovland,  to 
undertake  empirical  research  on  mass  media  effects.  What  they,  and  subsequent 
generations of communications scholars have found is that  audiences do not,  by and 
large,  passively  accept  whatever  mass  media tell  them. Furthermore,  the idea that  a 
pharmaco-medical-media conspiracy has deliberately perpetuated the myth of obesity 
does little to explain historical shifts in the attitude towards fatness, in particular the 
increase in concern about fatness in the last few decades. If existing anti-fat attitudes 
were so easy to exploit,  why didn't earlier producers of diet wonder drugs cultivate a 
profitable hysteria decades earlier? 
People  who  think  calorie  restriction  dieting  can  make  anyone thin  haven’t 
necessarily  been  duped  by  the  diet  industry.  Many  of  them believe  it  because  their 
personal experience seems to confirm it, often repeatedly. The meritocracy of thinness 
provides  the  narrative  framework  through  which  they  interpret  their  experience,  so 
rather than seeing their weight regain as evidence that dieting fails, they tend to blame 
themselves for their failure and assume that dieting works if done correctly. Even people 
who personally struggle to achieve a “healthy” weight often embrace the idea that they 
are responsible for their body size. 
In  January  2009,  when Oprah Winfrey  admitted to  having gained back forty 
pounds since her triumphant 2005 weight loss, the cover story of  O Magazine was titled, 
“How Did I Let This Happen Again?” In the story, she says, “I'm mad at myself.  I'm 
embarrassed. I can't believe that after all these years, all the things I know how to do, I'm 
still talking about my weight.” The photograph on the cover echoes the January 2005 
cover,  but  this  time  the  image  of  “working  out”  Oprah  in  white  is  faded  slightly, 
representing the “then” juxtaposed to the “now” Oprah dressed in a purple three-piece 
activewear outfit. Instead of a proudly bared midriff, the purple jacket she wears over a 
matching shirt is  zipped up to doubly conceal  her stomach. Wrinkles in the material 
226
suggest shameful bulging. One of “now” Oprah's hands gesture towards her past self, and 
the other hangs at her side, turned outward to form a dejected, questioning half-shrug. 
Her question, provided by the headline, insists on her personal responsibility for what is 
clearly constructed as failure: not “How did this happen again?” but “How did I let this 
happen again?” [Figure 3.12]
Figure 3.12/ O Magazine covers January 2005, January 2009131
The same tendency that shapes the way obesity researchers interpret the results 
of their studies also shapes the way dieters and fans of The Biggest Loser interpret their 
both mass media weight-loss narratives and their own experiences. People actively seek 
to construct meritocratic narratives because there are powerful incentives for believing 
that you can acquire culinary capital. The same desire to affirm of the “can-do” spirit that 
audiences saw in  Ratatouille drives the popularity of  The Biggest Loser. Some people 
may be tuning in to reassure themselves that they are not as grotesque as the contestants 
who begin the competition, but they stay tuned for the amazing transformations. In their 
eagerness to believe the hierarchies of taste and thinness that have become mainstream 
since the 1980s are democratic and fair, they actively work to interpret mass media texts 
131 Images reproduced from Oprah.com. Photos by Matthew Rolston. Winfrey, 2008.
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about food as being even more inclusive and optimistic about the universal potential to 
achieve the markers of class distinction than a dominant reading of the texts would seem 
to be. That tendency has helped turn taste hierarchies into key arenas of class aspiration. 
1
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
T H E  L E G I T I M A T I O N  O F  C U L I N A R Y  C A P I T A L
Just Mustard
The commercial that introduced the phrase “Pardon me, but would you have any 
Grey Poupon?” into the American lexicon was written by the improbably-named ad man 
Larry Elegant in 1980. Elegant's Madison Avenue advertising agency, Lowe Marschalk, 
had  been  hired  by  the  Heublein  Company  to  create  something  for  television  to 
supplement a new print and product-placement campaign for their then-unknown brand 
of Dijon-style mustard. The 30-second spot that Elegant came up with opens with an 
interior shot of a car driven by a man in a classic chauffeur's uniform while a baroque 
orchestral piece plays in the background. A voice-over says in an affected British accent, 
“The finer things in life. Happily, some of them are affordable,” as the chauffeur opens 
the glove compartment box to reveal a jar of Grey Poupon.1
The  camera  follows  the  chauffeur's  gloved  hand  as  he  gives  the  jar  to  the 
passenger in the back seat, a man wearing a suit and tie with a small table in front of him 
set with white cloth linens, a plate of sliced beef, a separate plate with a green salad, 
silver utensils, and glass stemware. Images of the passenger eating are interspersed with 
glamor shots of mustard being spooned onto other plates of meat and a golden-hued 
dressing being poured over another green salad. The voice-over continues, adding that 
Dijon  mustard  is  “so fine  it's  even made  with white  wine,”  and listing  a  number  of 
applications ending with, “and of course, sandwiches.” Then, the video cuts to a shot of 
the car from the outside as it comes to a stop. A second car with the same distinctive  
1 “Grey Poupon Original,” Commercial, YouTube, uploaded 06 March 2007 by spidermann26, Web 
(accessed 19 March 2011).
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Rolls Royce grille pulls up alongside it. The second car's passenger, another man wearing 
a suit and tie, leans towards the open car window and delivers the famous question. “But 
of course,” the first passenger replies, extending the jar of Grey Poupon out the window. 
The camera zooms in on the jar and the shot freezes as it passes between their hands. 
Beneath the jar, the tagline “One of life's finer pleasures” appears on the screen.2
Sales  jumped  forty  to  fifty  percent  in  cities  where  the  commercial  aired, 
prompting Heublein to go national with the campaign. The “Pardon me” ads have since 
been widely credited with catalyzing America's shift from a yellow mustard monoculture 
to a country where even fast food franchises located in gas stations typically have big 
plastic  squeeze  bottles  of  Dijon  mustard  among  their  condiment  choices.3 The 
campaign's success has made it  a legend in modern marketing even though its overt 
strategy is hardly remarkable. Advertising historian Roland Marchand notes that even in 
the  earliest  forms  of  national  advertising,  “the  most  obvious  source  of  distortion  in 
advertising's  mirror was the presumption by advertisers  that  the public  preferred an 
image  of  'life  as  it  ought  to  be'.”  According  to  Marchand,  even  during  the  Great 
Depression,  “ad creators  tried to  reflect  public  aspirations rather  than contemporary 
circumstances” and “often sought to give products a 'class image'  by placing them in 
what advertising jargon would call 'upscale' settings.”4 
Elegant himself said in a 2004 New Yorker article that was essentially how the 
“Pardon me” ad worked: “The tagline in the commercial was that this was one of life’s  
finer pleasures, and that, along with the Rolls-Royce, seemed to impart to people’s minds 
that this was something truly different and superior.”5 In 1984,  the trade publication 
2 Ibid.
3 Malcolm Gladwell, “The Ketchup Conundrum,” The New Yorker, 06 September 2004, Web (accessed 
19 March 2011). 
4 Roland Marchand, Advertising The American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940 (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press,1985: xvii). See also T.J. Jackson Lears on how advertisements 
portray a specific vision of the good life and particular symbols of wealth that are historically and 
culturally-contingent. Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America (New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 1994).
5 Gladwell, 2004.
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Madison Avenue reported that Grey Poupon had captured 80 percent of the U.S. market 
for Dijon mustard, and they attributed its success to three factors: “1. the popularity of 
nouvelle cuisine,6 2. impressive growth of the whole Dijon category, and 3. an upscale, 
national  television  advertising  campaign  that  successfully  linked  mustard  with 
opulence.”7
However, product development and marketing history is full of examples where 
the same strategy failed and few where it succeeded so spectacularly. In the same New 
Yorker article,  author  Malcom Gladwell  recounts  ketchup entrepreneur  Jim Wigon's 
struggle to get people to buy his upscale version of mustard's most common counterpart. 
The story challenges the notion that the “Pardon me” ads deserve primary credit for Grey 
Poupon's remarkable success. While Gladwell admits that the sophistication imparted by 
the ads may have gotten some people to try the mustard, he argues that Grey Poupon 
ultimately succeeded because it simply tastes better than yellow mustard.  According to 
Gladwell, “The rise of Grey Poupon proved that the American supermarket shopper was 
willing to pay more—in this case, $3.99 instead of $1.49 for eight ounces—as long as 
what they were buying carried with it an air of sophistication and complex aromatics.” 
For Gladwell, the “complex aromatics” are really the key:
One day the Heublein Company, which owned Grey Poupon, discovered 
something  remarkable:  if  you  gave  people  a  mustard  taste  test,  a 
significant  number  had  only  to  try  Grey  Poupon  once  to  switch  from 
yellow mustard. In the food world that almost never happens; even among 
the most successful food brands, only about one in a hundred have that 
6 While the term has been used to describe many different styles of French cooking, dating back to the 
1740s, today it is most commonly used to refer to the style popularized in the 1960s in a self-conscious 
rebellion against the “orthodoxy” associated with Georges Auguste Escoffier. The primary 
characteristics of this rebellion are an emphasis on using fresh ingredients and preserving the original 
flavor of the ingredients as much as possible. It is less reliant on rich sauces and complicated techniques 
than the cuisine associated with Escoffier. Paul Bocuse, one of the chefs most associated with “nouvelle 
cuisine,” claims the term first used by the author Henri Gault to refer to the food Bocuse prepared for 
the maiden flight of the Concorde airliner in 1969. In the 1980s, when French restaurants and cooking 
became popular again in urban centers, it was often referred to as “nouvelle cuisine,” or sometimes 
“American nouvelle.” Source: Paul Bocuse, featured in France on a Plate, produced by BBC Four, 
starring Andrew Hussey, originally broadcast 29 November 2008 on BBC Four. 
7 Gillian Teweles, “Brand Management: La Crème de la Mustard,” Madison Avenue 26.11 (1984): 28. 
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kind of conversion rate.8
He argues that this explains why concerted efforts on the part of people like Wigon to fill  
what seems like a gaping hole in the condiment market have failed. Heinz is already as 
palate-pleasing as it is possible for ketchup to be. The implication is that people won't  
buy whatever you're selling just because you put it in a Rolls Royce and tell them that it's 
made with wine. 
Gladwell's explanation relies on a meritocratic logic similar to the ones employed 
by Ratatouille and The Biggest Loser: if certain foods succeed and others fail even when 
they're marketed in the same way, then the successful ones must be objectively superior. 
However, Gladwell's initial description of Jim Wigon's “World's Best Ketchup” suggests 
that  it,  too,  might  have an objective advantage over  popular  commercial  brands.  He 
spent a day watching people taste free samples of Wigon's Ketchup at Zabar's specialty 
food store in New York, reporting, “The ratio of tomato solids to liquid in World’s Best is 
much higher than in Heinz, and the maple syrup gives it an unmistakable sweet kick.  
Invariably,  people would close their  eyes,  just for a moment,  and do a subtle double 
take.”9 Ninety people who tasted it that day liked it well enough to purchase a jar. No one 
could expect Wigon's ketchup to woo every customer from Heinz. Despite Grey Poupon's 
success,  French's  classic  is  still  America's  best-selling  mustard.  However,  condiment 
purchases are not a zero-sum game. Many people now keep both yellow mustard and 
Dijon in their  refrigerators.  It  remains unclear why the “complex aromatics” of Grey 
8 Gladwell, 2004.
9 Gladwell doesn't fully account for the apparent conflict between his observations at Zabar's and his 
theory that Grey Poupon was a success primarily because of its distinctive taste. By way of partial 
explanation, he speaks to several flavor experts who report that Heinz has a high “amplitude,” meaning 
its dimensions are well-balanced, and that a panel of trained tasters at Kansas State University decided 
Wigon's ketchup tasted “more like a sauce.” However, he also offers a counterexample: Ragu 
dramatically increased its market share by diversifying beyond its classic formula. His conclusion is 
ambivalent: “It is possible, of course, that ketchup is waiting for its own version of that Rolls-Royce 
commercial, or the discovery of the ketchup equivalent of extra-chunky—the magic formula that will 
satisfy an unmet need. It is also possible, however, that the rules of Howard Moskowitz, which apply to 
Grey Poupon and Prego spaghetti sauce and to olive oil and salad dressing and virtually everything else 
in the supermarket, don't apply to ketchup.” Ibid. 
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Poupon would catapult  it  from a hundred-thousand-dollar niche brand to one of the 
most-recognized names in condiments, but the double-take-inspiring flavor of Wigon's 
ketchup (or some other gourmet ketchup) has yet to carve out a similar space in the 
supermarket condiment aisle.10 Nor does superior taste explain the simultaneous rise of 
nouvelle cuisine and upscale brands in general, particularly if as Gladwell claims, it is  
extremely rare for products to have the power to convert people based on taste alone. 
Gladwell's  explanation  also  fails  to  clarify  why  if  it  was  superior  flavor that 
catapulted Grey Poupon into a national brand, the commercials themselves became a 
cultural touchstone. Even before trade publications were heralding its sales success, the 
mustard  had  become  comedic  fodder.  Eddie  Murphy  jokes  about  it  while  playing  a 
homeless man transplanted into high society in the 1983 movie  Trading Places.11 The 
mustard has also been alluded to on  The Tonight Show,  The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air, 
Married with Children, The Simpsons, and Mad TV, always in the context of caricatures 
of wealth and luxury. Mike Myers re-enacts part of the commercial in his popular 1992 
movie  Wayne's World.  Wayne and Garth pull up next to a Rolls Royce stopped at  a 
traffic light, and Wayne gestures to the passenger to roll down his window; when the 
man complies, Wayne affects a British accent and asks if he has any Grey Poupon and 
then they drive away, laughing.12 Almost three decades after the original Rolls Royce 
campaign was first  launched,  it  was referenced again in the 2007 Star  Wars-themed 
season premiere of the animated series  Family Guy.  In the midst of a chase sequence, 
two sandcrawlers pause at a stoplight, open their windows, and hand off a jar of Grey 
10 The theory that name brands  like Pepperidge Farm shortbread cookies, Hellman's mayonnaise, Sara 
Lee poundcake, Coca-Cola and Pepsi all have indisputably superior flavor is challenged by brand 
loyalties and the growing interest in home-made, gourmet, “natural,” restaurant-produced, or a generic 
or store-brand version of all of those products. Additionally,  news channels frequently run stories 
reporting that in blind taste-tests people either can't tell the difference between generic store brands and 
name brands or actually prefer the former. See, for example, Jeff Anderson, “The Great Taste Test,” 
WRDW News 12 On Your Side 05 May 2008, Web (accessed 30 April 2009).
11 Wikipedia contributors, “Grey Poupon,” Wikipedia: The Free Encylclopedia 18 April 2009, Web 
(accessed 30 April 2009). 
12 Penelope Spheeris, dir. Wayne's World, written by Mike Myers, Bonnie Turner, and Terry Turner, perf. 
Mike Myers and Dana Carvey, Paramount Pictures, 1992. DVD. 
233
Poupon.13 According to a list of the “100 greatest television catchphrases” published by 
the cable network TVLand in 2006, “Pardon me sir, would you have any Grey Poupon?” 
ranked #69, just ahead of “Marcia, Marcia, Marcia!”14 
Some  allusions  simply  invoke  the  brand  name  although  even  then  the 
significance  is  likely  due  to  the  Rolls  Royce  campaign.  However,  many  specifically 
reference elements from the commercials, especially the cars. The 2006 single “We in 
Here” by DMX contains the lyrics, “if I pull up on, it won't be for Grey Poupon.” 15 In the 
song “Show It to Me” on T.I.' s 2007 T.I. Vs. T.I.P, featured guest Nelly says, “Yea you 
rollin' wit the King and the one/ Country black folk in the Chevy passin' Grey Poupon.”16 
Dozens of user-produced images on the popular website  I Can Has Cheezburger? are 
emblazoned with  either  the  original  query  or  an  obvious  play  on  it,  and  many  also 
visually  reference  the  Rolls  Royce  scene.17 Additionally,  if  the  comments  on  the 
YouTube.com page where the original commercial can be watched are to be believed, 
dozens of people have re-created the “Pardon me” scene on their own.18 The elevation of 
the commercial to the status of cultural touchstone and the widespread interpretation of 
even  the  original  version  as  humorous  call  into  question  the  assumption  that  the 
campaign's success owes entirely, or perhaps even primarily, to a successful association 
13 “Blue Harvest,” Family Guy Season 6: Episode 1, dir. Dominic Polcino, written and created by Seth 
MacFarlane, perf. Seth MacFarlane, Alex Borstein, and Seth Green, originally aired 23 September 2007 
on FOX. 
14 One of the most famous lines from The Brady Bunch. “100 Greatest TV Quotes and Catch-Phrases” 
TVLand.com, Web (accessed 02 June 2009). 
15  DMX, “We in Here,” Produced by Swizz Beats, Columbia Records (2006).
16  T. I., T.I. vs. T.I.P. Produced by T.I. Atlantic Records: Grand Hustle (2007).
17 I Can Has Cheezburger contributors, “Today's LOLs: All Kittehs,” I Can Has Cheezburger? Web 
(accessed 29 May 2009). 
18 Dgllamas: “Years ago, my ex b/f was giving my sister & I a ride home. He came upon a stop sign with a 
distinguished man in the car with a full head of gray hair. My then-b/f actually asked, "Pardon me, 
would you have any Grey Poupon?: WE WERE BUSTING A GUT LAAAAAAFFFFFING!!!!!” 
TregAichi writes: “I have done this once. Needless to say, I didn't get much of a laugh from the other 
person...Crotchety old farts...”  
lilmiss698: “lmaooooo last night on the way home from the club my sisters friend gets out the car n 
comes n runs beside our car at a red light n knocked on the window to ask if we had any grey poupon.” 
tomack78: “Classic commercial. I did it in a fancy neighborhood in LA when I saw a Rolls Royce. I 
motioned the lady passenger to roll down the window and asked her if she had any Grey Poupn. She 
started cracking up. LOL.”  “Grey Poupon Original,” YouTube.
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between the condiment and sophistication. [Figure 4.1] 
Figure 4.1/Images Created By I Can Has Cheezburger? Users19
Later versions of the ad further testify that something other than what Marchand 
calls a “class image” is at work in the popular appeal of the “Pardon me” campaign. In 
2007,  a  spokesperson  for  Kraft  Foods,  which  acquired  the  brand  in  1999,  told 
Advertising Age that consumers “know, love, and associate the 'Pardon me' campaign so 
strongly with the Grey Poupon brand” that the company decided to return to a campaign 
very similar to the original to introduce three new varieties. The new 30-second spot was 
almost exactly the same as the original, with similar music and a passenger in the back 
seat  of  a  chauffeur-driven  Rolls  Royce  enjoying  a  virtually  identical  meal.  Shots  of 
vinaigrette being poured over salad and a dollop of mustard being spooned onto a plate 
featuring slices of beef clearly reference the original ad. However, instead of handing 
over the jar when asked “would you have any Grey Poupon?” the passenger with the 
mustard simply says “But of course,” and then his driver pulls away, leaving the second 
19 Clockwise from top right, photographs submitted by 1) Unknown, 2) Unknown, 3) “KmotrMichail,” 
and 4) Unknown, captioned by 1) “afearonwood,” 2) “wintersky12,” 3)“dragon69,” and 4) “Jdbaby22.” 
I Can Has Cheezburger, search query “grey poupon,” Web (accessed 30 April 2009).
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passenger  flustered  and  mustard-less.20 By  mocking  the  heightened  formality  of  the 
“would you” syntax, the 2007 ad lampoons both the 1980 commercial and the idea of 
mustard as a class marker. Nor was that the first time the campaign had poked fun at  
itself. In 1995, when then-owner Nabisco introduced a new squeeze bottle, they ran a 
commercial showing a man in the back seat of a Rolls Royce assembling a sandwich. As 
he  dispenses  the  mustard,  an  air  bubble  bursts  in  the  bottle's  opening,  mimicking 
flatulence, and passenger exclaims, “Pardon me!” to the chauffeur.21 
Elegant and Madison Avenue consider only Grey Poupon's sales success when 
they assume the ad worked as intended: cementing a relationship between the brand and 
the idea of culinary superiority in the minds of consumers. The proliferation of parodies 
suggest, instead, that the commercial's appeal was at least partially in its critique of class 
pretentions. “Pardon me” became a catchphrase because it was an effective caricature, 
and the ad resonated widely as a  mockery of ostentatious wealth. Although the later ads 
were  explicitly  arch,  even the  first  commercial  was  predominantly  viewed ironically, 
whether  or  not  that  was  Elegant's  intention.  Rather  than  reinforcing  the  idea  that 
anything other than yellow mustard was a snooty luxury,  the commercial highlighted 
how ludicrous it would be to believe that something as mundane as a condiment could be 
a marker of privilege. The idea of keeping a glass jar of mustard in a Rolls Royce glove 
compartment box, having a multi-course dinner with wine in the back seat of a car, or 
sharing a condiment jar between vehicles shot directly past the “image of 'life as it ought 
to be'”22 and landed directly in Saturday Night Live's  territory.  Notably,  many of the 
parodies didn't significantly alter the content of the commercial—they simply re-enacted 
the scene because it  was already taken as a joke.  It's  possible that by portraying the  
brand as being “in” on the joke, the ads actually brought Grey Poupon over to the side of 
20 “Son of Rolls,” Grey Poupon Commercial. YouTube, uploaded 09 February 2007 by beautykilledbeast, 
Web (accessed 21 March 2011). 
21  Sam Bradley, "ADBANK's Brand Watch,” Brandweek, 15 May 1995: 44.
22 I discuss the idea of “the good life” more in Chapter Five. 
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the average consumer, aligning it against the lampooned limousine set. 
The original  spot also made implicit  claims about Grey Poupon's ordinariness 
that undermined the explicit claims of its extraordinariness. The pedagogical listing of 
possible applications and reassurance that Grey Poupon could “of course” be used on 
sandwiches implied that  it  could substitute  directly  for the mustard consumers were 
familiar with. For all that Grey Poupon might have seemed pretentious, with its French 
appellation, glass jar, and wine in the ingredient list, the commercial worked to convey 
the idea that it was still just mustard. That isn't to say that people didn't perceive Grey 
Poupon as a “classier” product than French's. The ad succeeded because it negotiated (or 
enabled consumers to negotiate) two seemingly contradictory cultural norms: on the one 
hand, Americans generally believe that economic success, wealth, and luxuries are good 
both in that they are desirable and that they should ideally reward virtue and merit; on 
the other hand, wealth is associated with decadence and arrogance and the aspiration to 
higher class status is generally considered vulgar. Calling someone a “social climber” is 
an  insult.23 Widely  seen as  parody  of  the  rich,  the  “Pardon me”  commercial  offered 
consumers plausible deniability that buying a gourmet mustard was a sign of elitism. For 
nearly thirty years, the campaign has effectively reinforced the idea that Grey Poupon is a 
23 Many people trace American anti-elitism to the foundational myths that the United States was founded 
on egalitarian principles in contrast or in deliberate reaction to the entrenched hierarchies of the Old 
World. Alexis de Tocqueville famously commented on the “general equality of condition” in the United 
States, even claiming equality was the “fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived.” Of 
course, as many others have documented, that “equality” has never been universal, and indeed when de 
Toqueville was writing, applied to a small minority of Americans. Contemporary manifestations of anti-
elitism seem to owe less to the inheritances of 18th and 19th C. political philosophy and more to the 
tensions produced by the rise and bifurcation of mass culture. In Highbrow/Lowbrow, Lawrence Levine 
argues that the America de Tocqueville wrote about was actually, in many ways, less hierarchically 
organized, at least in terms of popular culture. He claims that it wasn't until the end of the nineteenth 
century that popular culture split into distinctively “highbrow” and “lowbrow” camps. While the 
consolidation of “legitimate” culture has worked to reinforce class hierarchies, populist resistance to the 
notion of having cultural “betters” has produced resistance to and suspicion about claims to superiority. 
This has been especially evident in political campaigns where candidates seen as embodying the culture 
of privilege are criticized by their opponents as “elitist” and “out of touch.” See Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America, 1835, trans. and ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Debra Wintrhop, 1835 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000); Carla Seaquist, “Obama and American anti-elitism,” The Christian 
Science Monitor, 01 October 1 2008, Web (accessed 02 Jun 2009); Levine, 1990. 
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desirable luxury by ridiculing the idea that eating it is unappealingly snobbish.24 
Mass media representations and popular discourses about foods constructed as 
superior  reveal  a  persistent  anxiety  about  the  possibility  that  they  might  be  elitist. 
Anxieties about  “food snobbery” constitute a tacit acknowledgment of the role of taste in 
the reproduction of class and the arbitrary nature of “enlightened” eating. I analyze how 
the threat of elitism is negotiated in the 2004 film Sideways, whose protagonist starts off 
as a caricature of food snobbery at its worst. The film's success and its effect on the U.S. 
wine market (the “Sideways Effect”) reflect the film's successful rehabilitation of Miles 
from a snob who uses wine to show off to a connoisseur who appreciates it for its own 
sake. Then, I examine the tenacity of the thereat of elitism in popular debates about the 
term  foodie.  Foodie initially  gained  currency in  the  1980s  as  an alternative  to  older 
words with undesirably elitist connotations; however, many people reject foodie on the 
grounds that it, too, conveys a sense of snobbery. The problem with the earlier terms was 
not  a  residual  association  with  snobbery  left  over  from  an  earlier  time  when 
“enlightened” eaters really  were  snobs; instead, the foods and practices constructed as 
“enlightened” are  inherently  exclusive.  As long as  they are used to distinguish social 
classes, they will always have to negotiate with the threat of snobbery. 
Food is  particularly  well-suited to  dealing with that  negotiation.  Unlike  other 
status symbols like luxury cars and high culture forms like painting and classical music, 
food  and  drink—even  currently-upscale  drinks  like  wine—are  both  literally  more 
accessible to non-elites and generally perceived as less intimidating. The universality of 
food  and  the  ways  in  which  it  is  ultimately  mundane  paradoxically  make  it  a  more 
powerful source of cultural capital because it offers plausible deniability about its role in 
class aspiration. 
24 It's also unclear why, if consumers were merely seeking a superior product or to distinguish themselves, 
they would have chosen Grey Poupon over Maille, the main competing brand of Dijon mustard through 
the 1970s and which many “foodies” still claim is better-tasting, although perhaps only because the 
former has become so ubiquitous. John Bowen, “Pardon Me. Grey Poupon is a niche brand,” 
Brandweek 39.17, 27 April 1998:14.
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Sideways and Culinary Capital
Sideways  was  adapted  from  a  novel  by  Rex  Pickett  published  in  2004  that 
focuses on a couple of middle-aged men taking a road trip to Santa Ynez Valley, where 
some of the most expensive and sought-after wines in California are produced. One of 
the opening scenes testifies to the value of performing certain kinds of culinary know-
how. Miles and Jack are shown driving in Miles' convertible. Jack complains that Miles 
was  late  picking  him  up  from  his  future  in-laws'  house  and  accuses  him  of  being 
hungover. Miles concedes, “Okay, there was a tasting last night, yes, but I wanted to get 
us something nice for the ride up. Check out the box,” gesturing to the back seat. Jack 
selects a bottle with the caged cork indicative of a sparkling wine and begins to open it  
despite Miles' protests that it's not chilled. As it erupts from the bottle, only mostly into 
the  stemware  that  Jack  seems  to  produce  out  of  nowhere,  Miles  laments,  “Half  of 
it...gone!”25 [Figure 4.2]
Figure 4.2/ “Pinot Noir...then how come it's white?”26 
Jack hands him the first glass—a “proper” champagne flute—and then pours one of his 
own—a regular wine glass.  “Hey, shut up, okay?” Jack says,  “Here's to a great  week. 
25 Alexander Payne, dir. Sideways, Fox Searchlight Pictures, producer Michael London, perf. Paul 
Giamatti, Thomas Hayden Church, Virginia Madsen, and Sandra Oh, 2004. DVD.
26 Screen shot by the author from Payne,  2004.
239
Come on.”  Miles  sighs  and then  nods,  clinking  Jack's  raised  glass  and saying,  “Yes,  
absolutely.  Despite  your  crass  behavior,  I'm  actually  glad  we're  getting  this  time 
together.” Jack takes a sip and then does a double-take: “Man, that's tasty.” Miles nods 
and says, “That's 100% Pinot Noir, single vineyard. They don't even make it anymore.” 
Jack  looks  at  his  glass  again,  quizzically,  and says,  “Pinot  Noir...then how come it's 
white?”  “Oh Jesus,”  Miles  scoffs,  “Don't  ask  questions  like  that  up in  wine  country.  
They'll think you're some kind of dumb shit, okay?”27 
One the one hand, this scene implies that expectations about the kinds of culinary 
knowledge people “ought” to have vary according to social context. Acknowledging the 
contingent nature of sophistication seems to undermine the power of those expectations. 
A non-wine country audience might identify with Jack's confusion about the fact that 
Pinot  Noir  grapes  can  produce  a  golden,  effervescent  wine  and  reject  the  idea  that 
admitting  that  would  make  someone  a  “dumb  shit.”  On  the  other  hand,  the  scene 
reinforces the idea that there are superior wines and that it is a good thing to know how 
to select and appreciate them. Even though Miles's derision casts him as a pompous jerk,  
the scene suggests that  he really  does have superior knowledge and taste.  Even Jack 
recognizes that the wine he's selected is especially “tasty.” Additionally, Miles provides a 
clear  (and  accurate)  explanation  of  the  difference  between  red  and  white  wines, 
suggesting that  there  is  an objective basis  for differences between wines that  can be 
learned and Miles has cultivated that knowledge. Miles may be pretentious, but he's not 
just pretending when it comes to wine.28 
Furthermore, Jack's indifference to the proper rituals of wine consumption are 
aligned  with  his  “crass  behavior.”  If  the  wine  were  merely  white  and  not  sparkling, 
Miles's insistence that it be chilled might be histrionic, but Jack's refusal to heed his 




it spills all over the car. Miles's claim that the wine is no longer in production further 
justifies his frustration and encourages the audience to sympathize with him instead of 
Jack. Miles isn't just being fussy; Jack has effectively ruined a unique taste experience 
he's been anticipating—he says he'd been “saving” this bottle, delaying gratification—and 
now won't be able to recreate.29 
Miles's concern about how Jack's ignorance about wine might inspire the wine 
sophisticates  in  Santa  Barbara  to  think  of  him  as  a  “dumb  shit”  (tainting  Miles  by 
association)  exemplifies  the  way  foodways  reflect  and  reinforce  social  hierarchies. 
Foodways not only reproduce material advantages (i.e.,  rich people can afford better-
quality  food,  which  might  directly  improve  their  health  and  life  chances)  but  also 
through the hidden or “soft” forms of domination that operate at the level of aesthetic  
taste,  habitual  behaviors,  and  social  dispositions.  As  Pierre  Bourdieu  argues  in 
Distinction, “Taste classifies and it classifies the classifier. Social subjects, classified by 
their classifications, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make between the 
beautiful  and  the  ugly,  the  distinguished  and  the  vulgar.”30According  to  Bourdieu's 
survey of the habitus (defined as lasting, inherited schemes of perception, thought and 
action)  of  different  socioeconomic  classes  in  1960s  and  1970s  France,  class-specific 
preferences for certain kinds of food reflect different levels of investment in being versus 
seeming: the working classes are primarily concerned with the material reality of food, 
the middle classes are less concerned with being and more concerned with seeming, and 
the  bourgeoisie  are  concerned  almost  exclusively  with  seeming.  Thus,  according  to 
Bourdieu,  “the  working-class  meal  is  characterized  by  plenty...  Food is  claimed as  a 
material reality, a nourishing substance which sustains the body and gives strength.” At 
the other end of the spectrum, “the bourgeoisie is concerned to eat with all due form.... 
with quality more important than quantity.”31 Miles's concern about form and quality 
29 Ibid.
30 Bourdieu, 1979: 6. 
31 Ibid, 194-9.
241
might  appear,  at  least  at  first,  like  a  quintessential  illustration  of  the  bourgeois 
preoccupation with seeming and the rituals of fine dining over the materiality of food. 
However, in terms of both his income and upbringing, Miles is more middle-class than 
bourgeois. 
On their way to Santa Barbara, Miles insists on stopping at his mother's house, 
ostensibly  because  it's  her  birthday.  She  lives  in  a  small  condo  with  mismatched 
furnishings and tacky, dated bric-a-brac on the walls, indicative of a middle or lower-
middle-class lifestyle. [Figure 4.3]
Figure 4.3/ Mrs. Raymond's Living Room32 
He promises Jack they won't stay long, but when she offers them food he immediately  
says, “Yeah, I'm hungry,” and then feigns helplessness as she  insists they stay the night. 
Jack offers a backhanded compliment on the dinner she serves them on mismatched 
plates: “This is delicious Mrs.  Raymond, absolutely delicious...is this chicken?” which 
further establishes that Miles didn't get his epicurean tendencies from her. Miles' real 
purpose is revealed when he sneaks upstairs to her bedroom and then roots around in 
her dresser until he finds a can of Ajax. He expertly twists off the bottom and a roll of 
hundred dollar bills wrapped in rubber bands slides out. He peels off at least a thousand 
32 Screen shot by the author. Payne, 2004.
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dollars before re-wrapping the bills and returning them to the can. Miles' reliance on his 
mother to support his expensive tastes is not an isolated incident, but a habit. When he 
returns to the table, she asks in an indiscreet whisper, “Do you need some money?”33 
Bourdieu's  taxonomy of  different  classes'  concerns with seeming versus being 
doesn't  account  especially  well  for  people  like  Miles  who  have  acquired  tastes  that 
conflict  with  their  economic  circumstances  and  class  socialization.  According  to 
Bourdieu,  food habits  and preferences,  like less  literal  forms of  taste,  “are  organized 
according to.  .  .  the social  space determined by volume and composition of  capital.” 
“There is no neutral viewpoint” between the working-class belief that “substance” takes 
precedence  and  the  upper  class  belief  that  appearances  and  form  are  paramount.34 
Bourdieu also argues the influence of social origin (measured by father's occupation) is 
strongest  in  the  “personal”  realms  “such  as  clothing,  furniture  and  cookery,”  while 
education has leveling effects on preferences in “legitimate areas such as  painting or 
music.”35 Food preferences should be very well predicted by the class one is born into,  
especially for people who remain in the same class. But Miles has neither the background 
nor the income to justify his gourmet tastes. 
Miles's  aesthetic  disposition  towards  food  and drink  associated  with  a  higher 
class status is explained better by the process that historical anthropologist Sidney Mintz 
calls “intensification.” In Sweetness and Power, Mintz's account of how sugar became a 
staple food and drug for the British industrial working class, he argues that sugar was 
initially seen as a precious “spice” and used only by the very wealthy. Like the twentieth 
century  French  bourgeoisie  described  in  Distinction,  the  seventeenth  century  British 
upper classes Mintz describes were very concerned about “seeming.” According to Mintz, 
33 Payne, 2004.
34 Bourdieu, 1979:199-208. He defines capital as “the set of actually usable resources and powers—
economic capital, cultural capital, and also social capital” and argues that the structure of a person's 




the rich “derived an intense pleasure from their access to sugar—the purchase, display, 
consumption and waste of sucrose in various forms.”36 As sugar became more widely 
available, practices like having a wedding cake “complete with dragees, congratulatory 
script, hardened sugar figures...percolated down through society.”37 Mintz further argues 
that the availability of sugar and its association with the wealthy would not have been 
sufficient to inspire people to make its use a part of their daily lives, hospitality rituals,  
and celebrations. The working classes took to sugar because it fulfilled needs created by 
broader historical shifts:
Sugar, tea, and like products represented the growing freedom of ordinary 
folks,  their  opportunity  to  participate  in  the  elevation  of  their  own 
standards  of  living.  .  .  .  Tobacco,  sugar,  and tea were  the first  objects 
within capitalism that conveyed with their use the complex idea that one 
could become different by consuming differently. This idea has less to do 
with nutrition or primates or sweet tooths. . . . it is closely connected to 
England's fundamental transformation from a hierarchical, status-based, 
medieval society to a social-democratic, capitalist, and industrial society.38
Sugar offered the working classes a material  and symbolic way of improving their lives 
through consumption, which was rapidly becoming a central part of daily practice during 
the rise of capitalism. 
Although Bourdieu himself does not offer an account of lower classes emulating 
upper  class  practices  or  how tastes  change over  time,  he  did provide the theoretical 
grounding and vocabulary for other scholars seeking to describe those phenomena. In 
particular, Bourdieu's assertion that symbolic practices work to reinforce and reproduce 
36 Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York, NY: Penguin 
Books, 1985: 154).
37 Ibid, 152.
38 Ibid, 183-5. Anthropologist Alan MacFarlane and tea-grower Iris MacFarlane argue that the increase in 
tea drinking, facilitated in part by the use of sugar to make the tannin-rich drink more palatable, 
facilitated the Industrial Revolution in Britain by limiting waterborne diseases like dysentery that 
flourished in urban environments. Fermented beverages like beer and ale helped prevent disease 
through the seventeenth century, but a tax introduced on malt in the late seventeenth century caused the 
poor to turn to water and gin. According to the MacFarlanes, mortality rates began to rise until the 
1720s. He credits the subsequent drop to the increasing availability of tea, which has antiseptic 
properties and more importantly, is boiled which kills many waterborne pathogens. Alan MacFarlane 
and Iris MacFarlane, The Empire of Tea: The Remarkable History of the Plant That Took Over the  
World (New York: New York, 1997: 183-5). 
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social hierarchies and thus function like material wealth helps to explain the rewards of 
emulating the rich. This idea is articulated in his term “cultural capital,” which insists on 
the real value of aesthetic dispositions and symbolic behaviors. In an essay on the class 
ideology  promoted  by  representations  of  Julia  Child  and  Martha  Stewart,  Kathleen 
LeBesco and Peter Naccarato build on the idea of cultural capital by introducing the term 
“culinary  capital.”  They  argue  that  “representations  of  food  and  food  practices  that 
circulate  via  television  programs,  books,  magazines,  internet  sites,  and  other  media 
invite viewers and consumers to imagine a class status and identity for themselves and to 
escape, if only temporarily, their real economic conditions.”39
LeBesco and Nacarrato depart  from Bourdieu in their  argument  that  culinary 
capital is “illusory.” Bourdieu argued that cultural capital was a real form of capital that 
was “convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital” and just as critical to the 
structure and functioning of hierarchies as economic and social capital.40 LeBesco and 
Nacarrato, on the other hand, suggest that the performance of a desired class identity 
through  foodways  merely  creates  an illusion of  mobility.  They  also  imply  that 
performances  of  culinary  capital  are  unrelated  to  the  “reality  of  their  [consumers'] 
economic and social position.”41 Thus, they claim that Martha Stewart's exclusive line of 
products for K-Mart is ironic:
While  one  buys  her  products  at  K-Mart,  one  uses  them to create  and 
sustain the identity of a person who would never shop there. Thus the 
consumer's class status (and the broader class hierarchy) is maintained 
while said consumer is able to fantasize about an imagined class mobility 
as she uses her Martha Stewart products to perform an identity that she 
has not achieved.42
LeBesco  and  Nacarrato  state  that  although  the  consumer  might think  she  was 
performing a particular class identity,  she would be wrong. Her actual  class identity, 
which must therefore be based on something other than her performance of culinary 
39 LeBesco and Naccarato, 2007: 224.
40 Bourdieu, 1983: 247. 
41 LeBesco and Naccarato, 2007: 224.
42 Ibid, 236.
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capital (like her income) remains unchanged. Thus, her real class status is maintained by 
the fantasy of mobility enabled by the Martha Stewart product line. In other words, she 
can never become different by consuming differently. 
Although their analysis of the popular appeal and ideological functions of Julia 
Child and Martha Stewart is compelling, it's unclear why they've chosen to identify the 
use of  foodways to promote the “illusion of class mobility” as a form of capital. It's true 
that watching lifestyle programming is unlikely to boost someone into a higher income 
bracket, even if the knowledge they acquire enables them to produce goods they could 
not  afford  to  purchase  ready-made.  Nonetheless,  given  that  culinary  capital,  like  all 
forms of cultural capital, is socially-constructed, it's unclear what would distinguish food 
and food practices with real value from the “illusions” offered by the likes of Child and 
Stewart.43 Furthermore—as they note—the pleasure that audiences derive from lifestyle 
programming  is  “an  important  site  for  the  discursive  production  of  power  and 
resistance” and Martha Stewart's fans in particular are attracted to the “fantasy of an 
upper-class lifestyle attainable through hard work and attention to detail  rather than 
wealth.”44 Notably, the fans believe they can actually attain that lifestyle, even without 
becoming wealthy.  To insist that  they  cannot,  as LeBesco and Nacarrato do,  reduces 
class to material capital. 
On the contrary, culinary capital is a source of real value, pleasure, and power. 
What LeBesco and Naccarato seem to be identifying when they claim that foodways are 
“vehicles for performing an illusory identity” is not actually that the identity is illusory 
43 Food historians like Laura Shapiro and Harvey Levenstein argue that Child's recipes were seen as 
sophisticated-but-accessible alternatives to the growing range of processed and prepared foods available 
in the 1950s. Shapiro argues that Child empowered women, even comparing her to Betty Friedan, 
whose book, The Feminine Mystique, was published the same year Child's cooking show premiered on 
television. Shapiro says of Child: “In essence, she said to women, 'You don't need to get it from a 
package. You can take charge. You can stand at the center of your own world and create something very 
good, from scratch.” Laura Shaprio, Something From the Oven: Reinventing Dinner in 1950s America 
(Bloomington, IN: 2004, 74). 
44 Ann Mason and Marian Meyers, “Living With Martha Stewart Media: Chosen Domesticity in the 
Experience of Fans,” Journal of Communication (December 2001): 810-23, quoted in LeBesco and 
Nacaratto, 236.
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but that the idea that everyone has access to that identity is a myth. The problem is not 
that culinary capital is fake capital (implying that audiences who buy into it are dupes).45 
The problem is that  the meritocratic  ideology that drives the popular appeal of  both 
lifestyle programming and films like Sideways is false. Like Ratatouille and The Biggest  
Loser, Sideways helps  create  and sustain  the myths  that  some foods  are  objectively 
better, that it is an inherently admirable thing to be able to appreciate them, and that the 
skill  required to do so is  available to anyone willing to cultivate it.  The fact that the 
meritocracy of taste is mythical doesn't make culinary capital any more illusory than the 
meritocracies of occupational success and wealth make material capital illusory. To the 
extent that the meritocracy of taste enables people to aspire to and embody a desirable 
identity—to become different by consuming differently—it is a real source of power and 
might even work as  a democratizing or leveling force.  However,  to the extent that it 
obscures the differences in access to high-status foodways, it reinforces class hierarchy. 
This duality is the focus of a recent book on food and social class called Foodies: 
Democracy and Distinction in the Gourmet Foodscape. Sociologists Josée Johnston and 
Shyon Baumann argue that the term “foodie” embodies the tension between the two key 
terms  in  their  title:  democracy  and  distinction,  which  they  conceptualize  as  “two 
competing  poles  in  the  gourmet  foodscape.”46 They  describe  them  as  follows:  “A 
democratic pole that eschews elite cultural standards and valorizes the cultural products 
of  “everyday”  non-elite  people,  and  a  pole  of  distinction  that  continues  to  valorize 
standards that are rare, economically inaccessible, and representing significant amounts 
45 LeBesco and Naccarato acknowledge that “their [lifestyle programming audiences'] pleasure marks an 
important site for the discursive production of power and resistance” and claim that they are not 
dismissing culinary capital as mere “false consciousness,” and that Martha Stewarts fans are “not just 
cultural dupes.” However, the “just” is telling—whatever else the fans of lifestyle programming might 
be, LeBesco and Naccarato imply that they are dupes. Their fantasy of mobility  is a form of false 
consciousness if, as LeBesco and Naccarato argue, the pleasure audiences experience is derived from a 
temporary escape from their “actual” class identities and “a means of...performing a class identity to 
which one aspires but that many never actually attain.” LeBesco and Naccarato, 2007: 235-6. 
46 Johnston and  Baumann, 2010: 61. 
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of cultural capital.”47 According to Johnston and Baumann the tension between these 
poles  explains  why  foodies  do  contradictory  things  and  act   differently  from  the 
“epicures” of the past who were concerned only with distinction. Like their predecessors, 
foodies  seek  out  the  most  expensive  meals  and  ingredients.  Unlike  them,  they  also 
idealize  “authenticity”  and  “exocticism,”  which  Johnston  and  Baumann  argue  are 
“reasonable  and  potentially  egalitarian  criteria—not  snobbish.”48 Although  they 
acknowledge  that  even  the  search  for  authenticity  and  exoticism  may  be  used  as 
strategies for deriving status, they suggest it may also serve genuinely democratic aims 
and insist that the defining characteristic of foodies is their omnivorousness, which is “a 
strategy that is opposed to snobbery.”49
The relationship  between  democracy  and distinction  is  less  antagonistic  than 
Johnston and Baumann suggest. Rather than conceptualizing democracy and distinction 
as  conflicting  ideals  in  tension  with  one  another,  the  conceptually  egalitarian 
meritocracy of taste only appears to be open to all kinds of foods and all kinds of people 
in order to legitimate a taste hierarchy that is actually exclusive and works primarily to 
distinguish social classes, not enable class mobility. In other words, the appearance of 
openness to foods that are not traditionally associated with the elite primarily works to 
shore  up the  illusion  that  culinary  capital  is  meritocratic.  In  practice,  the  foods  and 
practices that distinguish the middle class are inherently exclusive. Sideways exemplifies 
the legitimation of exclusive taste hierarchies through the contrasts between Jack, Miles, 
and Miles's love interest, Maya. 
The Rube, the Snob, and the Connoisseur
The Rube





does turn out to be a “dumb shit.” At first, Jack seems to be a proxy for the audience,  
modeling both their likely bemusement at Miles's fussiness and unfamiliarity with wine 
tasting culture. In their first visit to a tasting room, Miles explains the full ritual: holding 
the glass up to the light, tipping the glass to evaluate the color and opacity, sniffing,  
swirling, and sniffing again. Jack follows along dutifully, and then asks the question the 
audience may also be wondering at that point—“When do we drink?”50 [Figure 4.4.]  
Figure 4.4/“When do we drink?” “Now.”51 
However, the film discourages a complete identification with Jack. His ignorance is the 
butt of many of the jokes in the film, and in most cases the viewer gets to be in on the  
joke by virtue of knowing more than him. Even viewers who don't know why people swirl 
their glasses will probably know that it's unseemly to down a tasting pour like a shot of 
cheap tequila. Jack evidently doesn't. Even more egregious, at the end of the scene, Miles 
notices that Jack was chewing gum throughout the tasting room scene. Jack is not only 
guilty of failing to adhere to stuffy rituals, he also fails to follow rules the audience will  
likely know and agree with, like the idea that you shouldn't chew gum while you're trying 
to taste anything, let alone wine. 
Sympathy with Jack is  further  discouraged by his  general  boorishness,  sexual 
50 Payne, 2004. 
51 Screen shot by the author, Payne, 2004. 
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infidelities, and callous treatment of Miles. Although Jack confidently introduces himself 
as an “actor,” it turns out that aside from a bit part on a daytime soap opera a long time 
ago, the only work he can get is reading the disclaimers at the end of commercials. At  
breakfast  the first morning after  their  arrival  Jack leers  at  their  young waitress,  and 
declares that his best man's gift to Miles is going to be to “get him laid” despite Miles's 
protests that  he'd “rather have a knife.”52 The next morning,  when Miles  lays  out an 
itinerary featuring another series of wine tastings, Jack explodes: “I am going to get my 
nut on this trip, Miles. And you are not going to fuck it up for me with all your depression 
and anxiety and neg-head downer shit. . . . I am going to get laid before I settle down on 
Saturday. Do you read me?”53 Although Miles's plan is selfishly oriented towards his own 
interests, Jack's grounds for rejecting those plans are even less admirable. 
Jack quickly achieves his goal,  getting involved with a sultry wine pourer named 
Stephanie without telling her about his upcoming marriage. Miles is shown golfing alone, 
exiled from the hotel room while Jack and Stephanie have loud sex. Crucially, even after 
Stephanie finds out about Jack's engagement and breaks his nose in a fit of rage, he flirts  
his way into bed with another woman the very same night (an overweight waitress at the 
restaurant where they have dinner). The results are again disastrous: it turns out the 
waitress has suckered him into a strange cuckold fantasy/scam and when her husband 
shows up, he has to flee without his clothes or wallet. Rather than showing any signs of 
remorse, Jack deliberately drives Miles's car into a tree to buttress the lie he plans to tell  
his fiancée about the origins of his bandaged nose. As the film's caricature of a culinary 
rube, Jack is almost wholly unsympathetic. He remains a blundering jerk who thinks 
only about himself to the bitter end.54
The Snob
Sideways doesn't  portray  Miles  and  his  culinary  knowledge  as  unequivocally 
52 Payne, 2004.
53 Ibid.
54   Payne, 2007. 
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preferable to Jack's ignorance. During the opening credits, Miles goes into a coffee shop 
to  order  a  triple  espresso,  The New  York  Times  and  a  spinach croissant,  which  he 
pronounces with a French accent: “kwa-san” rather than the Americanized “kreh-sont.” 
The affected pronunciation and the fact that he asks for  The New York Times  (in Los 
Angeles, no less) rather than just grabbing one off the rack are not only stereotypically 
elitist but also highly performative; he's not just seeking out the refined pleasures he 
happens to enjoy, he's trying to impress the people around him with his superior taste. 
Later, his histrionic refusal to drink Merlot and his insistence that he smells “the faintest 
soupçon of like asparagus and just a flutter of a, like a, nutty Edam cheese” in a glass of  
wine are played for laughs, just like Jack's gum chewing.55[Figure 4.5]
Figure 4.5/ “Just a flutter of uh, like a, nutty Edam cheese.”56
As he squints with concentration to discern those subtle flavors, the camera focuses on 
Jack's incredulous expression. The fact that Miles has to steal from his mother to afford 
the vacation not only establishes that his sophisticated tastes are a form of pompous 
posturing, it also makes him an archetypal loser. He's a snob in the classically pejorative 
sense: “one who meanly or vulgarly admires and seeks to imitate, or associate with, those 
of  superior  rank  or  wealth;  one  who  wishes  to  be  regarded  as  a  person  of  social  
55   Ibid. 
56 Screen shot by the author. Sideways (Payne 2004) DVD. 
251
importance.”57
Like  Jack's  ignorance  about  food,  Miles'  food  snobbery  corresponds  with  his 
other character flaws. The lies he tells to Jack and his mother about the reason for their 
detour to her house align with his constant attempts to use his wine smarts to delude 
everyone, including himself, about how pathetic his life is. Rather than a refined hobby, 
his love of wine is  largely a flimsy disguise for his use of alcohol to escape from his 
failures, a dependence bordering on alcoholism. He insists they walk to distant vineyards 
so as not to have to “hold back” and plans their tasting room visits so “the more [they] 
drink the closer [they] get to the motel.”58 After Jack accidentally lets it slip that Miles's 
ex-wife has remarried,  Miles guzzles an entire bottle as Jack chases him through the 
vineyards. At dinner with Stephanie and Maya, Miles drinks so much he slips into a dark 
mood and excuses himself to drunk dial his ex-wife from the restaurant pay phone and 
passive-aggressively slur at her that she doesn't have to worry about running into him at 
Jack's wedding because he's decided not to go. Her initial concern about being awoken 
by his call fades quickly into a weary, “Oh Miles. You're drunk,” suggesting that this is  
habitual behavior that likely played a role in their divorce.59 
In one telling scene, Miles gets so desperate for a drink he drops the pretense. 
Mid-way through a  visit  to  big commercial  vineyard Jack insisted they stop at,  after 
already  declaring  that  their  wine  tastes  like  “rancid  tar  and  turpentine  bullshit,”  he 
receives a voicemail alert. He walks into the parking lot to listen to the message, which 
turns  out  to  be  from  his  literary  agent.  She  says  that  the  publisher  who  had  been 
interested in his novel has decided to pass and that she doesn't think she'll be able to find 
another one. Devastated, Miles marches back into the tasting room, steps up to the bar 
and demands a pour. He downs it in one gulp, just like Jack did at the first tasting room, 





replaces his glass on the bar and says, “Hit me again.” He downs the second pour just as 
quickly and exasperatedly asks the pourer for a full glass, offering to pay. When the man 
refuses, suggesting that he buy a bottle and go drink it in the parking lot, Miles grabs the 
bottle out of the man's hand and fills his glass nearly to the brim. The pourer grabs the 
glass  and  they  struggle  over  it,  spilling  the  wine  in  the  process.  Miles  steps  back, 
momentarily defeated but then glances at the spit bucket sitting on the bar—full of the 
expectorated tastings of dozens of strangers. He grabs it, and pours it into his mouth 
(and all over his face and shirt) as the other people in the tasting room groan in disgust.60 
Rather than being portrayed as a form of enviable sophistication, Miles's taste is 
portrayed as ridiculous pedantry at best and alcoholism at worst. His drunken escapades 
drive as many of the film's moments of outlandish farce as Jack's libido. The apparent 
contrast between the two characters turns out to be a red herring. Jack turns out to be 
less a  foil  than a  double for Miles.  They are both selfish losers who lie and hurt the 
women  in  their  lives  and  delude  themselves  about  who  they  really  are.  Note  the 
similarity between the framing of the shots in the tasting room (Images 4.4 and 4.5): 
Jack and Miles mirror each other. Miles's posturing is portrayed as just as ludicrous and 
pathetic  as  Jack's  boorishness.  The  difference  between  them  is  that  whereas  Jack 
remains the same to the end, Miles is allowed to evolve. In fact, the resolution of the film 
depends on his redemption, which like so many things in the film, is symbolized by wine. 
The Connoisseur
Sideways offers  an  idealized  example  of  what  a  wine  drinker  who's  neither 
ignorant nor pretentious might be like in Maya. In a pair of monologues almost exactly 
mid-way through the film that draw attention to themselves both by their length and also 
because they ooze metaphorical significance, Miles explains why he loves Pinot Noir and 
Maya  explains  why  she  loves  wine  in  general.  Although  the  scene  appears  to  be  a 
moment  of  touching connection between the characters—they're  alone on a  porch at 
60 Payne 2004.
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night, lit warmly from the glow of the house, and they gaze into each others eyes as they 
speak—their words offer a neat juxtaposition of their attitudes towards wine. The scene 
primarily emphasizes how different they are. 
First, Maya asks Miles to explain his fondness for Pinot Noir, which as she notes 
is  “like  a  thing  with  [him].”  He  says  he  likes  it  because  because  it's  “thin-skinned, 
temperamental... not a survivor like Cabernet,” but if carefully nurtured by someone who 
“really  takes  the  time  to  understand  its  potential...  its  flavors,  they're  just  the  most 
haunting  and  brilliant  and  thrilling  and  subtle  and...  ancient  on  the  planet.”61 The 
description is  a thinly-veiled portrait  of  Miles as he sees himself:  unique, fragile  and 
misunderstood,  full  of  unrealized  potential.  After  he  trails  off,  he  says,  “What  about 
you”? Whereas Maya's question was specific and reflected that she had paid attention to 
him,  his  is  an  afterthought.  “What  about  me?”  She  asks  to  clarify,  looking  a  little 
surprised  that  he's  even  asked.  “I  don't  know,  why  are  you  into  wine?”  he  offers, 
shrugging. She initially credits her ex-husband, who she says had a “big sort of show-off 
cellar.” She continues, sotto voice: 
Maya: Then, I discovered that I had a really sharp palate. And the more I 
drank, the more I liked what it made me think about. 
Miles: Like what?
Maya: Like what a fraud he was. [Miles laughs and says “Wow” or “ow”  
uncomfortably] No, [she laughs too] I like to think about the life of wine, 
how its a living thing. I like to think about what was going on the year the 
grapes were growing, how the sun was shining that summer or if it rained 
[. . .] all the people who tended and picked the grapes, and if it's an old 
wine how many of them must be dead by now [. . .] how every time I open 
a bottle it's going to taste different than if I had opened it on any other day 
because a bottle of wine is  constantly evolving and gaining complexity, 
that is, 'til it peaks...and it tastes so fucking good.”62
Maya's love of wine is rooted in the wine itself—the grapes and people who picked them, 
the weather and the weight of history represented by the aging process, and especially  
how it tastes. Unlike Miles, she doesn't invoke any superlatives or express any concern 




uniqueness of every bottle on the day you open it. She acknowledges that every bottle has 
a peak, but embraces the diversity of flavors a single bottle can provide. She implies that 
every bottle  is  a living thing worth celebrating.  Meanwhile Miles  dismisses Cabernet, 
which can “grow anywhere and thrive even when it's  neglected.”63 Most importantly, 
unlike Miles and her ex-husband, Maya has no apparent interest in showing off.  She 
cannot be a “fraud.” Her love of wine is based on her experience of wine, not what she 
hopes it will make other people think about her. Miles's uncomfortable laughter exposes 
his guilty conscience. Maya's genuine love of wine for wine's sake exposes him for the 
self-obsessed snob he is.
The film also implies that Maya has a better palate than Miles, or at least that her 
perceptions  are  less  muddled  by  the  desire  to  impress  people  (or  just  get  drunk). 
Immediately  before  the  scene  with  the  monologues,  she  and  Miles  are  talking  in 
Stephanie's kitchen where they've just opened a bottle of wine to share. Miles takes a sip 
and immediately intones, “Wow, that's nice, that's really good.” He swirls the glass and 
continues, “Need to give it a minute, but that's really tasty. How 'bout you?” Maya looks 
thoughtful and shakes her head: “I think they overdid it a little. Too much alcohol, it 
overwhelms the fruit.” “Huh,” Miles says and takes another sip. Then, he praises her 
assessment, “Yeah, yeah, I'd say you were right on the money. Very good.”64 Like Miles's 
explanation of difference between red and white wines, Maya's expertise is ratified by her 
ability to make assessments about wine based on objective qualities like alcohol content. 
She also  immediately recognizes that  the bottle  he names as the prize in his 
collection, a 1961 Chateau Cheval Blanc, is “peaking,” and urges him to drink it before it  
begins  to  decline  in  quality.  However,  she exhibits  an appealing humility  by  quickly 
noting that she “read that somewhere,” rather than posing as the expert. When Miles 
says he's been waiting for a special occasion, and that it was originally intended for his 
63 He also calls it “prosaic,” and the description is likely meant to refer to Jack, who is represented by 
Cabernet in the novel. Rex Pickett, Sideways (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2004, 73). 
64 Payne, 2004. 
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ten-year wedding anniversary, Maya replies that the day you open a bottle like that, the 
wine itself is the occasion. Once again, Miles is hung up on what wine symbolizes about 
him while Maya advocates for enjoying wine as a simply a tasty beverage. 
Despite their differences, Maya seems to genuinely like Miles until he lets it slip 
that Jack is engaged. Complicit in his friend's lie, Miles blows his chance. Piling on top of 
his miseries, in the parking lot after the ceremony, he has a cordial exchange with his ex-
wife in which she reveals that she is pregnant. Instead of following the other cars leaving 
the church parking lot to go to the reception, Miles drives off in the opposite direction. 
He runs up the stairs to his tiny, cluttered bachelor pad and roots around at the bottom 
of a closet. The film cuts to the register at a fast food restaurant. The camera slowly pans 
around the room full of sweatsuit-clad fat people shuffling around in the unflattering 
light and slowly zooms in on Miles, sitting alone in one of the vinyl booths. He's drinking 
from a large Styrofoam cup without a lid and there's a half-eaten burger and pile of onion 
rings in front of him. He looks around surreptitiously to ensure that no one is watching 
and refills the cup from a bottle of hidden in the corner of the booth.
The “proper” rituals he modeled for Jack,  like swirling the wine carefully in a 
glass are utterly abandoned. He actually has to hide the bottle from view and fill it up 
surreptitiously rather than showing it off. [Figure 4.6] 
Figure 4.6/ Burger and Wine
The  slug  lines  in  the  script  specifically  recall  Maya's  monologue,  referring  to  the 
emotions that wine inspires and the complexity of wine, especially an old one reaching 
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its peak.: “As the camera MOVES CLOSER, all the complex emotions inspired by the 
wine ripple across Miles's face.”65 The ultimate irony—as defenders of Merlot were quick 
to  point  out—is  that  the  wine  he's  savoring  is  composed substantially  of  the  Merlot 
grapes he claims to despise.66 While only oenophiles familiar with the name Cheval Blanc 
are likely to pick up on that detail, it offers further evidence that the scene represents a 
departure for Miles, a break with his old, bad, snobbish self. The new Miles doesn't care 
if a wine happens to be made of Merlot, or about drinking from the “correct” glass or  
about impressing anyone. He just enjoys how good it tastes. The more accessible clues 
that Miles has abandoned all pretense are the setting and the meal. The burger—perhaps 
the  most  prominent  icon  of  populist,  un-pretentious  food—and  fast-food  restaurant 
cleanse Miles's love of wine of its unappealing elitism. 
The burger joint scene is the turning point for Miles. After it ends, the words “five 
weeks  later”  appear  and  Miles  is  shown  at  the  front  of  his  middle  school  English 
classroom.  One  of  his  students  reads  a  passage  from  A  Separate  Peace  and  Miles 
dismisses them for the weekend.67 He returns to his apartment to find a message on the 
answering machine from Maya. She praises his unpublished novel and says he should let  
her know if he'll be back in Santa Barbara anytime. Her message, tentative but warm, is 
65  Alexander Payne and Jim Taylor, Sideways Screenplay, The Internet Movie Script Database, 23 May 
2003, Web (accessed 24 March 2011). 
66 The filmmakers actually tried to get permission to use Chateau Petrus Pomerol instead of Chateau 
Cheval Blanc—the former being the most expensive and sought-after Merlot in the world. However, as 
Christian Moueix, who runs Chateau Petrus, told The San Francisco Chronicle, “"Quite a few film 
scripts cross my desk and I vaguely recall 'Sideways' asking for permission to use Petrus. I am afraid 
that at that time, I found the script unexciting and declined.” W. Blake Gray, “Knocked Sideways: 
Merlot is suddenly uncool – but the great ones still shine,” San Francisco Chronicle, 24 February 2005, 
Web (accessed 06 July 2010).
67 The quote the student reads is: “The marrow of his bone," I repeated aimlessly. This at least penetrated 
my mind. Phineas had died from the marrow of his bone flowing down his blood stream to his heart. I 
did not cry then or ever about Finny. I did not cry even when I stood watching him being lowered into 
his family's straight-laced burial ground outside of Boston. I could not escape a feeling that this was my 
own funeral, and you do not cry in that case.” There are many parallels between the characters Gene 
and Phineas in A Separate Peace and Miles and Jack. Gene is stumbling and awkward where Phineas 
seems confident, and Gene initially emulates him. However, the final quote ,  and the title of the novel, 
suggest that Gene must achieve a peace—if indeed, he can find peace—on his own. Miles's redemption 
and maturation similarly requires him to “grow up” in a way Jack apparently cannot. John Knowles, A 
Separate Peace (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1953: 186)
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the voiceover that provides the final words of the film while Miles's convertible is shown 
entering the same highway he and Jack set out on in the beginning of the film and then 
climbing the wooden steps to Maya's apartment.  Her message ends; he takes a deep 
breath and knocks. The scene in the fast food restaurant and his transformation from a 
snob to a connoisseur creates the sense of resolution and the possibility that buoys the 
film's conclusion: perhaps this time, Miles will finally succeed. 
The “Sideways Effect”
Sideways was hailed as a “surprise hit.”68 The film's distributor, Fox Searchlight, 
initially had difficulty getting theaters interested.69 In its opening weekend, the film was 
shown in only four theaters  and grossed a paltry $207,042.  After it  began attracting 
critical acclaim (most prominently five Academy Award nominations and the Oscar for 
Best Adapted Screenplay) it was re-released at 699 theaters nationwide. It ended its box 
office  run  in  May  2005 after  grossing $71  million,  which made it  the  40th highest-
grossing film of 2004 (out of 551 ranked by Box Office Mojo, an IMDb affiliate), ahead of 
many other films released that year with bigger budgets and more famous stars,  like 
Quentin Tarantino's Kill Bill Vol. 2 and The Stepford Wives.  Commercially, it also beat 
out other successful independent films released that year, like  Eternal Sunshine of the  
Spotless Mind, Garden State, and Napoleon Dynamite.70 That success is at least partially 
due to the writing and direction and the performances of  the four lead actors,  all  of 
whom received accolades and award nominations. However the comments on Metacritic 
and the  Internet Movie Database (IMDb) suggest that the focus on wine, which some 
critics suggested would hamper its mainstream success, was actually a large part of its  
68 “Absolute Corker,” The Independent, 12 March 2005, Web (accessed 28 July 2010); Wikipedia 
contributors, “Sideways,” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, 16 Mar. 2011, Web (accessed 24 Mar. 
2011). 
69 John Horn, “A surprise package: Juno is catching on in Middle America. $100 million looks possible,” 
Los Angeles Times, 10 January 2008, Web (accessed 31 July 2010).
70 “2005 Domestic Grosses,” Box Office Mojo, Web (accessed 31 July 2010).
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appeal. 
IMDb user  “Sa'ar  Vardi”  writes,  “where else  will  you learn how to taste  wine 
properly, have a good laugh and relate to two of the most charming losers ever seen on 
film – all at once?”71 For some viewers who didn't find the losers so charming, the wine 
theme seems to have been the only appeal. “Jaywillingham” slammed the film with a 
1/10 rating, but says he “did enjoy the shots of wine country and wine tasting 101.”72 
User-submitted reviews were far more likely than those by film critics to describe the 
movie as slow or boring, but not generally because of the wine. For example, a comment 
on  Metacritic from “Patrick  C.”  calls  Sideways “boring  as  hell,”  but  then  says,  “the 
movie's wine theme is actually pretty interesting and not only do you learn about all sorts 
of wine, each character takes on their own type.”73 
Perhaps the best evidence that  Sideways  appealed to people largely because of 
the focus on wine is the “Sideways Effect.” Just a month after the film's wide release in 
January of 2005, ACNeilsen reported that the percentage of households buying Merlot 
was down 2 percent compared to the same 12-week period in the previous year.74 The 
change in Pinot Noir sales was even more striking: between October 24, 2004 (two days 
after the film's limited opening weekend) and July 2, 2005, grocery store sales of Pinot 
Noir jumped 18%.75 The change in the demand and price for Merlot and Pinot Noir, now 
established  as  the  “Sideways  Effect,”  has  proven  to  be  statistically  significant  and 
lasting.76
 Although the sales data alone are suggestive,  anecdotal reports offer an even 
71 “IMDb user reviews for Sideways,” The Internet Movie Database, Web (accessed 06 July 2010).
72 Ibid.
73 “User comments: Sideways,” Metacritic.com <http://apps.metacritic.com//movie/usercomments.jsp?
id_string=2924:giPKj2Gf$3MgWGUvPar8cw**> (accessed 06 July 2010). 
74 Gray, 2005.
75  The difference in magnitude compared to Merlot is at least partially because it represents a far smaller 
share of the U.S. wine market. Jordan MacKay, et al., Passion for Pinot: A Journey Through America's  
Pinot Noir Country (Berkeley, CA: Ten Speed Press, 2009: 13). 
76 Cueller, Stephen, et al., “The Sideways Effect: A Test for Changes in the Demand for Merlot and Pinot 
Noir Wines.” American Association of Wine Economists Working Papers No. 25 (2008) Web (accessed 
06 July 2009).
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more compelling case that the effect on wine sales was the result of the film. A Seattle  
sommelier interviewed in February 2005 said at least two or three customers a night 
would specifically  mention the movie  when ordering.  Others  were  suddenly sheepish 
about ordering Merlot, prefacing their order with, “'I'm know I'm not supposed to...'.”77 
In March 2005, an Ohio wine store owner was quoted in the Sunday Times of London 
saying,  “People have been coming in and asking for the Sideways grape,  even if  they 
don’t quite remember its name.”78 The idea that liking a Merlot was something of a faux 
pas was echoed by Virginia Madsen, the actress who plays Maya.  In an interview with 
Strawberry Saroyan of The New York Times, Madsen described a recent visit to the Los 
Angeles restaurant Pastis: “'They fooled me,' she said. 'They brought out this wine and 
we were like, this is really good, thinking it was the pinot as usual.' It turned out to be a  
merlot: horrors. 'If you saw it on a menu, you'd throw it across a room. It was a merlot 
from Malibu.'”79 Even some people who seemingly hadn't seen the film caught wind that 
Merlot  was  now “uncool.”  Without  mentioning  Sideways,  Katie  Couric  said  on “The 
Today Show” that she had “heard” she wasn't supposed to drink Merlot.80 Seeking to 
evaluate whether this “so-called 'Sideways Effect'” was statistically significant, a team of 
economists at Sonoma State University led by Steven Cuellar examined the sales volume 
and price of 750 ML bottles of Merlot, Pinot Noir and several varietals that didn't feature 
prominently in Sideways—Cabernet and Syrah—before and after the film's release.
 Based on annual scan data from U.S. retail chains from 1999 through 2008, they found 
that until 2004, the sales growth rate of all the varietals increased at a similar rate, with 
Pinot Noir at a consistently higher growth rate than Merlot or the “Control” varietals.  
[Figure 4.7]
77 Richard Kinssies, “On Wine: 'Sideways' has intoxicating effect on pinot noir sales, some say.” The 
Seattle Post-Intelligencer 23 February 2005, Web (accessed 06 July 2010). 
78 “Oscar winner knocks sales of merlot wine sideways,” The Sunday Times 06 March 2005, Web 
(accessed 07 September 2008).
79 Strawberry Saroyan, “A Night Out With: Virginia Madsen: Days of Wine and Chocolate,” The New 
York Times 16 January 2005, Web (accessed 06 July 2010).
80 Gray, 2005
260
Figure 4.7/ Volume of Red Wine Sales Indexed to Their 1999 Sales81 
The baseline is the 1999 sales volume of each varietal and the vertical line represents the year Sideways 
was released. “Promoted” includes any wine advertised in mailers, featured in in-store displays, or offered 
at temporary price reductions of 5% or more.
After 2004, Merlot sales slowed or even declined slightly while Pinot Noir sales increased 
precipitously. Based on a regression analysis, they found that the change in the demand 
for both varietals was statistically significant (p>.05) and that they varied significantly 
from the growth rate  of  the  control  group,  with Merlot  growing less  and Pinot  Noir 
growing  more  than Cabernet  and Syrah.  They  also  found a  decrease  in  the price  of 
Merlot and increase in the price of Pinot Noir consistent with a decrease in the demand 
for the former and an increase in the demand for the latter.  They conclude,  “all  the 
results  are  consistent  with  the  theory  that  Sideways  had  a  negative  impact  on  the 
consumption of Merlot, while increasing the consumption of Pinot Noir.”82
One possible explanation for the Sideways Effect is that Sideways enlightened its 
81 Reproduced from Cuellar et al 2008: 5.
82 Cueller et al 2008: 21.
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audience.  The effect  might  be  evidence the film taught  Americans  to  be  better  wine 
drinkers by educating them about how bad Merlot is—or at least a lot of the Merlot they 
were previously buying—and how much better Pinot Noir is or introduced them to a 
varietal  many had never have tried before.  However,  wine critics  generally claim the 
opposite: that the phenomenon is an example of mass media brainwashing. They argue 
that Pinot Noir—or at least most of the Pinot Noir Americans have been buying since 
Sideways came out—isn't inherently better than Merlot and indeed is getting worse as 
the demand rises. Thus, the effect on the sales of both varietals indicates that Sideways 
duped a lot of people into thinking that the varietal was a reliable heuristic. They bought 
into the hype and spent more money on inferior wine. For example,  New York Times 
wine critic Eric Asimov claimed in 2007 that the Sideways Effect had been exaggerated 
and the demand for and appreciation of  “good” Merlot  had never been substantially 
harmed. According to Asimov, the only thing the film had done was flood the market 
with a “growing sea of bad Pinot Noir.”83 
The second theory posits that the effect is evidence of Americans' ignorance about 
wine rather than enlightenment. Both theories rely on the idea of objective good taste. 
The idea that increasing Pinot Noir consumption is evidence of enlightenment relies on 
the belief that Pinot Noir is, at least in general, actually better than Merlot. The idea that  
varietals make a poor heuristic and educated consumers would not have been duped 
reinforces  a  more  complicated  and  exclusive  set  of  criteria  for  evaluating  and 
appreciating wine, but nevertheless one in which some wines can be objectively declared 
“better” or “worse.” Experiments on taste perception, suggest the opposite: that taste is 
deeply subjective, influenced as much by context as objective properties.
83 Cueller et al also sought to determine whether the effect was different for different price segments by 
re-examining the data for wines under $10, between $10-20, and $20-40. They hypothesized that the 
film's effect would have a stronger effect on lower-priced wines. The results for Merlot were mixed, 
with decreases in every price range. For Pinot Noir, the results were contrary to the hypothesis. The 
increase in sales growth was smallest in the lowest price segment, and “drastic” for promoted wines in 
the $20-40 range. This suggests that wine consumers at all “levels” were affected (2008, 14-5).
262
In a 2004 study at the Cornell University Food and Brand Lab, 32 participants 
were invited to taste what they were told was strawberry yogurt. The lights were turned 
out  and they were actually given chocolate yogurt.  Nineteen of  them still  rated it  as 
having  “good  strawberry  flavor.”84 The  yogurt-tasters  weren't  food  critics  or  trained 
chefs,  but  even  people  experts  can  be  dramatically  influenced  by  contextual  cues. 
Frédéric Brochet demonstrated this in a series of experiments he conducted as a doctoral 
student at the University of Bordeaux involving subjects recruited from the Faculty of 
Oenology—i.e., wine experts or experts-in-training. In one experiment, Brochet asked 54 
expert tasters to describe wines in two sessions: in the first, they were given a red wine (a 
blend of Cabernet Sauvignon and Merlot grapes) and a white wine (a blend of Sémillion 
and Sauvignon grapes) and asked to draw up a list of odor descriptors for each, using 
words on a list provided or their own preferred terms. The words most often to describe 
the white were honey, citrus fruit,  floral,  passion fruit,  butter,  and pear;  the red was 
described as wooded, spice, blackcurrant, strawberry, cherry, prune, raspberry, vanilla, 
pepper, animal, and licorice.85 In the second session, the same subjects were given two 
glasses of the same white wine used in the first session, one of which had been dyed red 
with a flavorless, odorless grape extract.86 Each subject was given the list he or she had 
generated in the first session and asked to indicate which of the two wines most intensely 
84  Brian Wansink, Mindless Eating: Why We Eat More Than We Think (New York: Bantam, 2006: 120).
85 Descriptors characteristic of red and white wines were determined using a textual analysis program 
called ALCESTE that counted the co-occurrence of words in particular blocks of text. Brochet ran the 
analysis on five collections of tasting notes: notes on 100,000 wines from the Hatchette Guide to the 
Wines of France; 3,000 from Jacques Dupont who published the weekly Gault & Millau letter; 9,000 
from Robert Parker who writes “The Wine Advocate,” 2,000 from Brochet's personal corpus, and 352 
from a single blind tasting session of 8 wines by 44 “tasters of international reputation.” Although there 
were few overlaps between the different authors' corpuses—Brochet says no more than 10 words were 
common to more than two authors—each body of tasting notes was strongly indexed by color. F. 
Brochet & G. Morrot, “Influence of the context on the perception of wine—Cognitive and 
methodological implications,” Journal International des Sciences de la Vigne et du Vin 33 (1999): 187–
192.
86 The neutrality of the dye, which was made from purified grape anthocyanins, was tested in a separate 
trial. 50 people were recruited to taste the white wine with and without the added color served in opaque 
glasses in booths illuminated by red light to obscure the visual difference. The glasses were presented in 
random order with three random digits indicated on the glass so neither the experimenter or subject 
knew which wine contained the red dye. Brochet et al, “The Color of Odors,” Brain and Language 77 
(2001): 187-196.
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indicated  each  descriptor.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  wines  were  identical,  the  tasters 
consistently associated the “red” wine with the descriptors they had used for the real red 
wine a week earlier. 
In  another  experiment,  Brochet  served  57  experts  the  same  red  wine  in  two 
different sessions, first identifying it as a table wine (vin du table) and then as a high-
prestige wine (Grand Cru Classé).  When identified as a cheap, common wine,  it  was 
described with words like “unbalanced” (83%),  “fault”  (70%), “weak” (75%),  “simple” 
(100%), “flat” (68%), “sting” (79%), and “none” (100%). However, when it was identified 
as an expensive and prestigious wine, the tasters used positive words like “balanced” 
(65%) “agreeable” (79%), “full” (87%), “complex” (73%), “round” (100%), “a lot” (100%), 
and “excellent” (100%). 
These experiments don't necessarily mean that people can't discern differences in 
food or that they don't derive more or less pleasure from them based on those perceived 
differences.  A  recent  study  that  used  an  fMRI  to  scan  brain  activity  while  subjects 
sampled several different wines provides further evidence that contextual cues like price 
affect not only what people  say about food but also how they experience it. A team of 
researchers led by economist Antonio Rangel had twenty subjects who were screened for 
liking and at least occasionally drinking red wine (11 men and 9 women between the ages 
of 21-30) taste five samples of Cabernet Sauvignon and a neutral control solution. The 
wines were identified to the subjects only by their retail price, and two of the wines were 
administered twice—once at a low price and once at a higher price. Wine 1 was presented 
at both $90, its actual retail price, and $10, and Wine 2 was presented at both $5, its  
actual retail price, and $45. Wine 3 was identified only at its real retail price of $35. Both 
the reported pleasantness of the wine and the amount of neural activity in an area of the 
brain involved in the experience of pleasantness were highly correlated with price. The 
price did not affect areas of the brain involved in more basic sensory perception. Rangel 
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et al conclude: “It seems that price changes modulate the representations of experienced 
utility but not the encoding of the sensory properties of taste in the primary gustatory 
complex.”87
What all of these experiments suggest is that both good taste—or the perception 
of food and drink as pleasurable—and “good taste”—foodways with social and cultural 
value—are  socially  constructed.  The  belief  that  more  expensive  wines  or  particular 
varietals are superior isn't based on an objective evaluation of how the wines taste. That 
suggests that the Sideways Effect is neither the result of the audience being enlightened 
(taught that Pinot Noir is objectively good) nor duped (deceived into thinking varietals 
are a good heuristic for objective quality). Instead, the “Sideways Effect” reflects the film 
successfully winning consent for its particular construction of those varietals.88 The key 
to its appeal was its successful negotiation of the tension between the desire to display 
“good taste” by partaking in the pleasures of food constructed as desirable and the threat 
of  seeming  pretentious.  By  constructing  high-status  food  and  wine  as  objectively 
superior and “good taste” as meritocratic,  Sideways made it safe to cultivate culinary 
capital and enhanced the rewards of doing so. 
Given that Pinot Noir is associated with the snobbish Miles of the first 90 percent 
of film, it is somewhat counter-intuitive that  Sideways  would have driven its sales up 
rather than other varietals. If the film endorses the inclusive, unpretentious aesthetic 
represented by Maya in which a fast food burger or a Merlot might be just as delicious as 
87 Hilke Plassmann et al, “Marketing Actions Can Modulate Neural Representations of Experienced 
Pleasantness,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 105(3) 22 January 2008: 1050-1054. A 
later study of 6,000 blind tastings concluded: “In a sample of more than 6,000 blind tastings, we find 
that the correlation between price and overall rating is small and negative, suggesting that individuals 
on average enjoy more expensive wines slightly less.” Goldstein et al, “Do More Expensive Wines 
Taste Better? Evidence from a Large Sample of Blind Tastings,” Journal of Wine Economics 3 (Spring 
2008): 1-9. 
88 In thinking about the ideological effects of media texts in terms of “winning consent,” I'm relying on 
Stuart Hall's use of Gramsci's theory of hegemony. Rather than seeing media as reflective of an 
achieved consensus, Hall argued that media was an active agent of consensus that had to continually 
work to win “a universal validity and legitimacy for accounts of the world which are partial and 
particular” and which generally work to reinforce prevailing hierarchies and the dominant mode of 
production (Hall 1982). 
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something rarefied, then Pinot Noir shouldn't have fared any better in the wake of the 
film's release than Merlot or Cabernet. The argument that the film's effect was simply the 
result  of  it  introducing  people  to  a  varietal  they'd  never  heard  of  isn't  sufficient  to 
account for the fact that Pinot Noir became “trendy” and “cool.” It's not actually the case 
that all  publicity is good publicity. Addressing a situation similar to the post-Sidways 
Merlot slump, British wine critic Oz Clark argues that the film Bridget Jones Diary may 
have hurt sales of Chardonnay in England: 
Bridget Jones goes out on the pull [the singles bar scene], fails, goes back 
to her miserable  bedsit,  sits  down,  pours herself  an enormous class  of 
Chardonnay,  sits  there  with  mascara  running  down  her  cheeks  saying 
'Dear  diary,  I've  failed  again,  I've  poured  an  enormous  glass  of 
Chardonnay and I'm going to put my head in the oven....  Until Bridget 
Jones,  Chardonnay was really  sexy.  After,  people  said 'God,  not in my 
bar.'89
Based  on  the  often  equally-pathetic  portrayal  of  Miles,  it  would  have  followed  the 
preferred reading of the film if  Pinot Noir  sales  had slowed and Merlot  had become 
popular as the choice of anti-snobs everywhere. Indeed, that's exactly how Mary Baker, 
the owner of a small winery in Santa Barbara County explains the fact that her Merlot 
sales weren't hurt: “No one wants to be the ‘geeky Miles.' Miles apparently hated Merlot,  
and that made people curious about Merlot because no one wants to come across as such 
a navel-lint-gazing wine snob.”90
However,  that  phenomenon  clearly  conflicts  with  the  broader  market  trends 
captured by Cuellar's research and reflected in Katie Couric's reporting that she “heard 
she wasn't supposed to drink Merlot.” Baker's explanation only applies to a niche market 
of  people  who  might  purchase  a  bottle  of  40  dollar  Merlot  from  a  self-described 
“microwinery”  in Paso Robles,  CA (and who might  have understood why the Cheval 
89 Martin Hickman, “Bridget Jones 'has put Britain off chardonnay',” The Independent, 27 May 2008, Web 
(accessed 06 July 2010). 
90 Simon Owen, “The Sideways offensive: Will Merlot sales ever recover?” Bloggasm 03 July 2007, Web 
(accessed 06 July 2010). Notably, according to the website of her winery, Dover Canyon, they no longer 
offer any wines made with Merlot grapes. “Our Wine,” Dover Canyon Winery, Web (accessed 06 July 
2010). 
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Blanc  was  ironic).  The  passionate  defense  of  Merlot  by  wine  critics  also  seems 
symptomatic of the desire to appear less pretentious by embracing the maligned grape 
and simultaneously distinguishing oneself from the Pinot Noir-duped masses. Because 
the  vast majority of American wine consumers did the opposite.
The majority of wine consumers didn't know that the Cheval Blanc was a Merlot-
Cabernet blend, so Miles's invective against Merlot had more sticking power than its role 
in his redemption. Instead of creating an association between Pinot Noir and snobbery, 
Sideways  turned the words “Pinot Noir” into a useful heuristic for the average person 
seeking  to  make  better  wine  purchases.  Ironically,  the  only  people  who  made  the 
connection between Pinot Noir and snobbery were the snobs who endorsed Merlot to 
(snobbishly) distinguish themselves from the masses. By offering an idealized version of 
the connoisseur in Maya and redeeming Miles by showing him drinking wine with a 
burger,  the  film  reassured  most  viewers  that  cultivating  the  kind  of  “good  taste” 
represented by Pinot Noir wouldn't necessarily make them snobs. 
Foodies, Snobbery, and Class
Similarly, the term foodie has has been embraced because it is perceived as less 
snobbish than older words like  gourmet or epicure. The term was independently coined 
by  New York Magazine restaurant  critic  Gael  Greene  in  198091 and  the  anonymous 
author of a letter to the features editor of Harpers & Queen magazine in 1981. Even the 
initial appearances of the term reveal some of the conflicts that persist over its meaning. 
Is it an insult or a badge of pride?
Greene  first  used  the  term  in  an  article  titled  “What's  Nouvelle?  La  Cuisine 
91 Greene started her career as a writer for Cosmopolitan and the Ladies Home Journal, largely focusing 
on “sex and the single woman.” In 1968, she was hired by New York magazine to review restaurants, 
although she is best known for writing about sex in the guise of food (or vice versa). See Kamp 2006: 
134-5. The Wikipedia article about her is exactly 5 sentences long, and one of them reads, “Her memoir 
Insatiable: Tales from a Life of Delicious Excess includes a description of a sexual encounter with Elvis 
Presley.” Wikipedia contributors, “Gael Green,” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, 28 April 2008, Web 
(accessed 24 March 2011).  
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Bourgeoisie” to describe the clients at a hip restaurant in Paris whose chef was at that 
time the only woman to rate three red toques from Gault-Millau (the equivalent of three 
Michelin stars) : 
She offers crayfish with white feet or red...three ways, tends stove in high 
heels, slips into the small Art Deco dining room of Restaurant d’Olympe—
a funeral parlor of shiny black walls and red velvet—to graze cheeks with 
her devotees, serious foodies, and, from ten on,  tout Paris, the men as 
flashily beautiful as their beautiful women.92 
Although bourgeoisie often refers to the wealthy (when contrasted with the proletariat, 
for example), the title of Greene's piece refers to a movement beginning in France that 
was seen as less refined than “Nouvelle Cuisine.” La cuisine bourgeoisie was how her 
Paris connections were referring to the growing interest in regional, seasonal, traditional 
cooking, “like Grandma used to make” and the rise of chefs like Dominique Nahmias, 
who had no formal training. Greene describes her as “a housewife friends pestered to 
turn professional.”93 Thus,  foodies appears to refer to restaurant-goers eager to sample 
cooking that departed from the French culinary establishment. They are a peculiar elite 
that embraces anti-elitism. 
Around the same time that Greene was sampling la cuisine bourgeoisie in Paris, 
Ann Barr, editor of the features section of  Harpers & Queen  in England, also noticed 
“the food world was shifting on its tectonic plates, and that perfectly sane people had 
suddenly become obsessed with every aspect of food.”94 She invited readers to send their 
thoughts on the phenomenon, and several seized on the opportunity to criticize regular 
contributor Paul Levy. One of the letters referred to him as a greedy, gluttonous, lip-
smacking “king foodie.”  The letter made it into an article in the magazine's August 1982 
issue. Levy and Barr were so excited about the word—Levy describes it as “a cocktail stick 
applied to a raw nerve—that they immediately began working on The Foodie Handbook, 
92 Gael Greene, “What's Nouvelle? La Cuisine Bourgeoisie,” New York magazine, 02 June 1980:33, 
archived at The Insatiable Critic: Vintage Insatiable, Web (accessed 26 March 2011). 
93 Ibid.
94 As recounted by The Foodie Handbook co-author Paul Levy on The Guardian's Word of Mouth Blog.  
Paul Levy, “What is a foodie?” The Word of Mouth Blog, 14 June 2007, Web (accessed 26 March 2011). 
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a satirical  manual similar in style and tone to  The Yuppie Handbook.  The book was 
published in 1984. By 1989 the word had achieved sufficient cultural currency to appear 
in the second edition of the O.E.D.95 
Although  the  anonymous  letter-writer  clearly  meant  it  as  a  pejorative,  Levy 
claims its valance shifted as soon as more people began to use it: “What started as a term 
of mockery shifted ground, as writers found that 'foodie' had a certain utility, describing 
people who, because of age,  sex,  income, and social class, simply did not fit into the 
category 'gourmet,'  which we insisted had become 'a rude word.'”96 In a 2007 article 
reflecting on the term's currency, Levy claimed, “It long ago stopped being (if it ever 
really was) a term of abuse. But is it a compliment about your knowledge or food or the 
sensitivity of your palate? Or is it simply a value-neutral description, like civil servant, 
football  fan,  or  stamp-collector?”97 Many  of  the  commenters  disagree  vehemently. 
“Gastrotom” writes, “No, it is still a term of abuse in my book. Please stop using the F-
word. I am not a f**die!”98 Others express surprise the term had negative origins, and 
claim to see it as value-neutral, just a hobby like any other. A third camp claims the term 
with pride, often suggesting that the debate about whether or not it's a good thing to care 
about  what  you  eat  could  only  be  had  in  the  UK  and  US since  all  people  in  other 
countries like Italy and France care about “good food.” 
Similar discussions have cropped up on numerous blogs and message boards, and 
Johnston and Baumann use them as the basis for their discussion of the term. They cite 
the manifesto from the online community Chowhound, which defines the community as 
anti-foodie:  “We're  not  talking  about  foodies.  Foodies  eat  where  they're  told. 
Chowhounds blaze trails.”99 However, they note that many self-identified foodies make 
95 Their book is often credited with originating the term, despite the fact that in the book, Barr and Levy 
credit Greene. Johnston and Baumann, 2010: 53. 
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Asterisks in place of vowels is a common way to avoid profanity filters, implying that foodie is vulgar. 
Ibid.
99 “Chowhound Manifesto,” Chow, Web (accessed 05 December 2008), qtd. in Johnston and Baumann, 
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the kind of boundary crossing that seems to be implied by the “trailblazing” Chowhounds 
central  to  their  definition  of  what  makes  someone  a  foodie.  A  respondent  called 
“Zapatista”  responds  to  the  Chowhound  manifesto  in  a  thread  on  the  Serious  Eats 
message board: 
I'm a foodie, too. It's a shame that a perfectly good word has become a 
stigma. Like liberal. Or gay. I read on Chowhound that the hounds are 
definitely not foodies. What the heck are they then? They spend all day 
chiming in to every possible thread, ranting about everything from holes-
in-the-wall  to  El  Bulli.  They're  foodies.  Take  back  the  word.  Foodies 
unite!100
According to Johnston and Baumann, Zapatista's comment reflects an intermediate level 
of  reflexivity:  it  shows  some  awareness  of  the  negative  connotations  and  issues  of 
culinary elitism, but “little awareness of privilege and social status.” They argue that a 
higher level of reflexivity is “relatively uncommon” and that although class and status are 
“inextricably  woven  into  the  gourmet  foodscape....  Class  inequality  is  a  relatively 
invisible phenomenon in the foodie world.”101
Their  assertion  that  the  popular  discourse  about  food  obscures  class  and 
“maintains classlessness” seems to disregard the class implications of the word snobbery. 
The texts they analyze and the data from their qualitative interviews with foodies reveal 
the same process of negotiation with the threat of snobbery reflected in the popularity of 
the Rolls Royce commercials and  Sideways.  The anxiety about elitism and insistence 
that the taste discrimination that demarcates the foodie are inclusive are explicit claims 
about status. Class is  not “invisible” in the foodie world, it  is the heart of the debate 
about whether or not the term foodie is snobbish.
The word “snob” originally referred to a shoemaker, but in the late eighteenth 
century it became a slang term for the “ordinary classes.” In 1848, William Thackaray 
used it to describe people who “ape their social superiors” in The Book of Snobs, which is 
2010: 54-5. 
100 Zapatista, “Who's a Foodie Here,” Serious Eats, 29 February 2008, Web, qtd. In Johnston and 
Baumann, 2010: 59.
101 Johnston and Baumann, 2010: 59, 175. 
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still  sometimes  part  of  its  connotation.  However,  in  the  early  twentieth  century  it  
acquired  another  shade  of  meaning,  now  dominant  in  the  U.S.:  people  who  have 
contempt  for  their  social  inferiors.102 According  to  Joseph  Epstein's  Snobbery:  The 
American  Version,  “The  snob  measures  himself  and  others  by  extraneous  things: 
ancestry, wealth, power, social connections, possession of glittering or elegant objects—
everything  that  is  connected with status  in  the world or  with that  portion of  it  that 
vibrates  alluringly  for  him.”103 The  awareness  and  anxiety  about  snobbery  is  an 
awareness of and anxiety about class.
Those who reject the term foodie do so on the grounds that it implies an excessive 
concern about what kinds of foods have been officially sanctioned—thus the Chowhound 
sneer that foodies “eat where they're told.” This implies that foodies are concerned less 
with the way food tastes than with what their habits communicate about them—foodies 
are  Miles.  Zapatista's  defense  of  the  term  also  invokes  status  by  claiming  that  it  is 
precisely  an  openness  to  food  from “holes-in-the-wall”  (low status)  to  El  Bulli  (high 
status) that characterizes the foodie. The foodies in Foodies doth protest too much. Their 
anxiety  about  snobbery  reflects  the  guilty  conscience  of  the  food  revolution. 
Furthermore, the pervasive concern about elitism challenges Johnston and Baumann's 
argument that foodies and their omnivorousness represents a  significant departure from 
the old, snobbish way of being a gourmet or epicure. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the term gourmet was used to poke fun at culinary 
pretentiousness  from  its  earliest  uses  in  English.  Much  like  the  term  foodie,  it  was 
always-already a pejorative term. Embraced by people seeking to distinguish themselves 
from the lower classes, its very ability to do so was always in conflict with the ideals of 
democratic populism and egalitarianism. The attempt to recuperate the term by claiming 
foodies  are  equal-opportunity  eaters  is  yet  another  attempt  to  portray a  hierarchical 
102  “snob,” OED.
103  Joseph Epstein, Snobbery: The American Version (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003: 
18). 
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system of cultural capital as a meritocracy.  As in  Sideways,  the defense of cultivating 
high-status tastes is that as long as you sip your fancy wine with a burger, or eat in holes-
in-the-wall as well as El Bulli, being a foodie will not make you a “snob.” The implication 
is that nearly any food can be gourmet and nearly any eater can cultivate the kind of 
discriminating taste that distinguishes foodies.
The argument that this discourse is  classless mistakes the meritocratic ideology 
that works to obscure privilege as a real erasure of class.  It  is rather the evidence of 
centrality of class to the term foodie and the habits associated with them. The discourse 
about class and status in the U.S. has always involved the use of euphemistic terms like 
nice,  proper, and  polite society.  The ideological contortions on display in discussions 
about  the  term  foodie  reflect  the  tensions  inherent  in  the  reproduction  of  class 
hierarchies in a liberal, democratic society. Style and taste only work to reinforce class 
distinctions if the markers of the middle-class are actually confined to the middle class; 
however, the hierarchy must be ideologically justified by universalistic claims.104 In other 
words, it’s a problem for class distinction if everyone can afford to eat the same food in 
the same way and does so,  because what then  distinguishes anyone? However,  it's  a 
problem for normative egalitarianism if the real reason people are eating the way they do 
is because of inherited taste and privilege rather than the skill and effort—like a naturally 
good and/or well-trained palate, and a carefully-cultivated sense of what's “hip.” 
Foodies do not often discuss the role of privilege in their tastes or the role of taste 
in  the  reproduction  of  capital,  but  the  anxiety  about  snobbery  acknowledges  the 
importance of status considerations in their food choices. It also points to the role of  
food in the popular construction of class. Class is not—and has never been—merely a 
designation based on wealth or income. The most mundane forms of consumption are 
central to the the performance of class identity in America. The next chapter explores the 
104 See also: the discussion of “universalistic morality” as a legitimating strategy for bourgeois ideologies 
in liberal capitalism in Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (New York, NY: Beacon Press, 1975: 86-
92).
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cultural significance of food as a marker of class and what the food revolution can teach 
us about changes in the U.S. class structure over the last three decades. 
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
F O O D ,  F L O U R I S H I N G ,  A N D  C L A S S  F O R M A T I O N
What It Means to Flourish  
The water  gurgled in the pipes and splattered out  in a  
burst.  I  drank  some  down  and  then  remembered  my  
plant. I've had it for almost ten years. It's barely alive, but  
it is alive. More brown than green. There are parts that  
have withered. But still it lives, leaning always to the left.  
Even when I rotate it so that what faced the sun no longer  
faces  the  sun,  it  stubbornly  leans  to  the  left,  choosing  
against physical  need in favor of  an act  of  creativity.  I  
poured the  rest  of  my  water  into  its  pot.  What  does  it  
mean, anyway, to flourish?
—Nicole Krauss1
Most theories of class, dating back to Marx, are fundamentally concerned with 
human flourishing.  Flourishing  is,  in  essence,  what's  at  stake in  class  analysis:  class 
inequality is a problem because it inhibits flourishing, and access to capital is significant 
because it promotes flourishing. However, flourishing is just as slippery and difficult to 
define as class itself. Although the popular understanding of class in America is based 
largely on income,2 flourishing connotes more than material prosperity or the fulfillment 
of physical need. Precisely what,  though, is  a matter of debate.  The musings of Leon 
Gursky,  protagonist  of  Nicole  Krauss'  novel  The  History  of  Love, concerning  his 
withered, left-leaning plant offers a parable for the conflicting views on what constitutes 
human flourishing. 
According to philosopher Luc Ferry, Western conceptions of flourishing fall into 
four main categories: Classical (Greek), Christian, Utopian, and Nietzschean. The first 
1 Nicole Krauss, The History of Love, A Novel (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2005: 19).
2 For example, the title of a 2003 article in The Washington Times, “What is Middle Class? Income Isn't 
Necessarily Sole Measure,” implies that at least some people would assume that income is the sole 
measure. 
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three are governed by external principles: for the ancient Greeks, the idea of fulfilling an 
inherent nature (cosmological); for Christians, God's laws (theological); for Utopians, a 
secular ideal of the greater good (humanistic). In contrast, Nietzsche rejects the use of 
external criteria to judge the value of a life. Nietzschean flourishing is more like “living 
life to the fullest” according to one's unique, individual desires. Gursky's plant embodies 
the Nietzchean model. By choosing against physical need, the plant violates its supposed 
nature  in  favor  of  an  act  of  defiant  self-expression.  However,  if  the  plant's  act  of 
creativity is not just a form self-expression, but also a kind of self-creation, then it also 
has something in common with Marx's cosmological conception of the “good life.”
According to Marx, what makes capitalism antithetical to human flourishing is 
that  it  turns  work  from a  freely-chosen,  life-affirming  activity  into  forced  labor  that 
alienates and enslaves people:
Labor  not  only  produces  commodities.  It  also  produces  itself  and  the 
worker as a commodity. .  . . The worker does not affirm himself in his 
work but denies himself, feels miserable and unhappy, develops no free 
physical and mental energy but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. The 
worker, therefore feels at ease only outside work. . . . His work therefore, 
is  not  voluntary,  but  coerced,  forced labor.  .  .  .  it  is  not  his  own,  but 
another person's...in work he does not belong to himself but to someone 
else.3 
Marx's vision of the “good life” promised by communism is a system where no one is 
reified  by  having  to  sell  their  labor.  Rather  than  having  to  become  “a  hunter,  a 
fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and. . . remain so if he does not want to lose 
his means of livelihood,” Marx claims that in a communist society, people will be able to 
“hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the evening, criticize after 
dinner.”4 For  Marx,  the  essence  of  human  flourishing  is  the  freedom  to  engage  in 
pleasurable labor. 
According to philosopher Philip Kain, Marx's view of the “good life” is aligned 
3 Karl Marx,“Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (selections),” 1844, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 
ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994: 59-62).  
4 Karl Marx, “The German Ideology,” 1844, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. Lawrence H. Simon 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994: 119). 
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with Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia, often translated as “happiness” but closer in 
meaning  to  “fulfillment,”  or  the  “best  good.”5 In  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Aristotle 
argues that “each thing has a process, activity or function [ergon]6, when it has realized 
its essence, it achieves its end or good.”7 Marx suggests that the essential function or 
species-being [ergon] of man8 is work, beginning with the work he does to produce the 
means of his own subsistence: 
Man can be distinguished from the animal by consciousness, religion, or 
anything you please. He begins to distinguish himself from the animal the 
moment he begins to produce his means of subsistence, a step required by 
his physical organization. By producing food, man indirectly produces his 
material life itself.9 
The essential act of creativity that defines human flourishing for Marx is the creation of 
the self, free from the constraints of capitalism. Perhaps in leaning to the left, Gurksy's 
plant  is  expressing  a  freely-chosen  form  of  self-creation  predicated  on  defying  the 
productivist ethos that would be represented by growing towards the sun.
Another interpretation of how Gursky's plant might be flourishing concerns the 
role  of  virtue in  the  “good life.”  Although Aristotle  acknowledges  the  importance  of 
external factors like health, wealth, and family, his emphasis in Nicomachean Ethics is 
virtue.10 For him, man's  ergon is “the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.”11 
According  to  Aristotle  one  of  the  primary  virtues  and  the  main  distinguishing 
qualification of a free male subject is moderation (sōphrōsyne) in the use of food, drink, 
5 Phillip J. Kain, Marx and Ethics (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1988: 21). 
6 Also sometimes translated as “work.”
7 Ibid.
8 Although I generally try to avoid using the outdated male “universal,” here I'm trying to echo Marx. His 
understanding of labor privileges the kind of work traditionally done by men (i.e. hunting, fishing, cattle 
breeding, criticizing) and specifically excludes the work of reproduction and consumption that falls 
disproportionately on women.
9 Marx, 1844b: 107. 
10 The ancient Greeks were far from agreed on what constituted a “good life.” Because Ferry is concerned 
primarily with the source and validity of the standards, he conflates conflicting Greek philsophies like 
Aristotle's—which acknowledges the importance of material goods like wealth and immaterial goods 
like virtue—and the Stoics, who privileged virtue to the exclusion of material goods. 
11 Again, the masculine “universal” echoes the original text. According to Aristotle, ethical subjecthood is 
limited to free, adult men. Richard Kraut, ed. The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006: 278).
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and sex. Moderation is a habit that has to be cultivated through the regular exercise of 
self-control  over physical  pleasures that  tend towards immoderation.  A similar belief 
later manifested in Christian asceticism, which also associated virtue with the voluntary 
renunciation of physical pleasures and needs. So Gursky's plant might also be flourishing 
in the sense that its act of creativity involves leaning away from the sun, thus renouncing 
physical needs and embodying virtue.  
Food is  implicated in all  of  these modes of  flourishing: food is  a medium for 
individual  self-expression  (especially  for  the  food  revolution,  whose  defiance  of  the 
industrial “establishment” is particularly Nietzschean); producing food can be a form of 
pleasurable  labor,  especially  for  people  who  choose  it  freely  (a  la  Marx);12 and  the 
physical need to eat and pleasures involved in eating have always been fundamentally 
implicated in what it means to be morally good and live well (invoking Aristotle). This 
chapter explores the factors that have made flourishing through the use of food more 
important to the American middle class in the last three decades. First, I briefly examine 
the role of food in bourgeois ethics from antiquity to the present, relying primarily on 
Michel Foucault's account of the desiring subject in The History of Sexuality. Second, I 
explore how the food revolution negotiates with a complex ethics of pleasure and self-
denial that makes it especially appealing to the liberal elite. Third, I outline changes in 
U.S. income structure that have produced a particular form of class anxiety in the middle 
class since the 1980s and driven people to seek compensatory forms of aspiration. Lastly, 
I  explore  the  implications  of  the  theory  of  compensatory  consumption  for  scholarly 
definitions of social class.  
12  This is the usual explanation for recent surveys that suggest that although men are doing more of the 
home cooking in America, women still do the vast majority. Men who do cook report enjoying it more 
than women who cook, likely because for them it is more likely to be an optional, leisure pursuit (like 
weekend grilling) whereas women are more likely to experience cooking as an obligation or form of 
forced labor. 
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Alimentary Ethics in The History of Sexuality: What if Sex Never Surpassed 
Food?
Michel  Foucault's History  of  Sexuality is  best  known  for  challenging  the 
“repressive hypothesis” about sex in the Victorian era and introducing the theory of bio-
power. In Volume I: The Will to Knowledge, Foucault argues that sexuality is a modern 
phenomenon that emerged along with capitalist mode of production and modern class 
structure in the eighteenth century.  Contrary to the popular belief  that  the Victorian 
bourgeoisie made sexuality taboo and silenced sexual discourse,  Foucault argues that 
during  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  there  was  a  “veritable  discursive 
explosion” about sex.13 Institutions like school dormitories, hospitals, and the bourgeois 
family established new rules about sexual propriety and new technologies of surveillance 
and control focused on “perversions” like adultery,  masturbation, and homosexuality. 
Prohibited acts became full-blown identities—e.g.  homosexuality went from a class of 
forbidden same-sex desire and sex acts to a principle for classifying people.  The new 
discourses of sexuality affirmed the differential value of the bourgeois body and replaced 
the sovereign monarch's power to “take life or let live” with the capitalist state's power to 
“foster life or disallow it to the point of death.”14
The role of food in the  The History of Sexuality  has attracted far less scholarly 
attention,15 in part because it emerges only in the later volumes when Foucault turns his 
attention to earlier historical periods. The research program outlined in the first volume 
promises to flesh out its incomplete history of the technologies of repression that began 
to take shape in the sixteenth century with the Reformation and Tridentine Catholicism, 
and penetrated the laity “sometime around the eighteen-thirties”16 However, the second 
13 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, 1978 (New York, NY: Vintage 
Books, 1990: 17).
14 Ibid, 138.
15 Which is not to say it has been entirely ignored. Two exceptions published in the last decade: Elspeth 
Probyn, Carnal Appetites: FoodSexIdentities (London, UK: Routledge, 2000) and John Coveney, Food,  
Morals, and Meaning: The Pleasure and Anxiety of Eating (London, UK: Routledge, 2006). 
16 Foucault, 1978: 122.
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volume reflects a dramatic change in the scope of his project, leaping back in time to the 
fourth century B.C.  The reason for  the  shift  was Foucault's  recognition that  modern 
sexuality was part of a longer history of individuals recognizing themselves as desiring 
subjects. In the introduction to Volume II: The Use of Pleasure, he says, “One could not 
very well analyze the formation and development of the experience of sexuality from the 
eighteenth century onward, without doing a historical  and critical  study dealing with 
desire and the desiring subject.”17 The narrative that emerges in The Use of Pleasure 
about  the  desiring  subject  in  Greek  antiquity  is  an  inverse  of  his  refutation  of  the 
“repressive hypothesis.”  The ancient Greeks are popularly depicted as pagan hedonists 
who exulted in sodomy and pederasty, but Foucault argues that they actually glorified 
self-restraint and moderation. 
He supports  this  counter-intuitive  finding not  only  by  examining  their  beliefs 
about behaviors that we would recognize today as sexual, but also by looking at what he 
calls their “alimentary ethics,” beliefs about the right use of food and drink. Foucault 
says:
Foods, wines, and relations with women and boys constituted analogous 
ethical material; they brought forces into play that were natural, but that 
always tended to be excessive; and they all raised the same question: how 
could  one,  how  must  one  “make  use”  (chrēsthai)  of  this  dynamics  of 
pleasures,  desires,  and  acts?  A  question  of  right  use.  As  Aristotle 
expresses it, “all men enjoy in some way or another both savoury foods 
and sexual intercourse, but not all men do so as they ought [ouch' hōs 
dei].18
Here, he claims alimentary and sexual pleasures were merely analogous, which implies 
that they were conceptually separate, but a few sentences later he suggests that in the 
fourth century B.C. food and sex had not yet been uncoupled:
It  would  be  interesting,  surely,  to  trace  to  the  long  history  of  the 
connections between alimentary ethics and sexual ethics, as manifested in 
doctrines, but also in religious rituals and dietary rules; one would need to 
discover  how,  over  a  long  period  of  time,  the  play  of  alimentary 
17 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume II: The Use of Pleasure, 1985 (New York,NY: 
Vintage Books, 1990: 5). 
18 Ibid, 51-2. 
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prescriptions became uncoupled from that of sexual morals, by following 
the  evolution  of  their  respective  importance  (with  the  rather  belated 
moment,  no doubt,  when the problem of  sexual conduct became more 
worrisome  than  that  of  alimentary  behaviors)  and  the  gradual 
differentiation of their specific structure (the moment when sexual desire 
began to be questioned in terms other than alimentary appetite).
He further claims that the uncoupling of alimentation and sex and the elevation of the 
latter as the more worrisome of the two was “belated,” and that the ancient Greeks did 
not distinguish (morally at least) between them. Alimentary and sexual appetites were 
not  analogous  or  twin,  but  instead constituted  an undifferentiated  subject  of  ethical 
concern, a single site for the moral problematization of bodily needs and pleasures. In 
the fourth century B.C., sexual desire had not yet been questioned “in terms other than 
alimentary appetite.” 
In the third volume of the History, Foucault says that before the differentiation of 
food and sexuality, food was actually the more important subject of ethical concern. In 
Volume III: The Care of the Self, he argues that the problematization of sexual pleasure 
intensified in the earliest centuries A.D., resulting in the creation of elaborate regimens 
that governed the proper timing and use of sexual pleasure. However, sexual regimens 
were  of  minor  importance  in  comparison  to  dietary  ones,  based  on  the  volume  of 
practical  advice  published  about  both  of  them.  Foucault  concludes  that  eating  and 
digestion was of  far  greater concern than  procreation and sexual pleasure  based on 
medical texts published between the first and fifth centuries A.D.19 
Foucault refers again to some later date when sex became as important as food 
and then surpassed it: 
A  whole  development—evident  in  Christian  monasticism—will  be 
necessary  before  the  preoccupation  with  sex  will  begin  to  match  the 
preoccupation with food. But alimentary abstentions and fasts will long 
remain fundamental. And it will be an important moment for the history 
of  ethics  in  European  societies  when  apprehension  about  sex  and  its 
regimen will significantly outweigh the rigor of alimentary prescriptions.20 
19 Foucault, 1988: 140-1.
20 Ibid, 141. 
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Although  Foucault  says  it  would  be  “interesting”  to  figure  out  when  sexual  and 
alimentary ethics were differentiated, he analyzes the moral problematization of sexual 
pleasure in pre-Victorian times as if sex were already a distinct object of moral concern. 
The main reason Foucault's History is not more strongly associated with food is because 
he neglected  the subject  himself.  This  is  exemplified by his  decision to  focus  in  the 
second volume on aphrodisia rather than akolasia. 
Foucault says that his concern in The Use of Pleasure is the ancient Greeks' moral 
problematization  of  the  pleasures  whose  use  required  moderation  (sōphrōsyne). 
According  to  Aristotle,  the  opposite  of  “moderation”  (sōphrōsyne)  is  akolasia,  the 
pleasures that tend towards immoderation. Instead of focusing on  akolasia, Foucault 
focuses on “the general  form of  the moral  inquiry  that  they pursued concerning the 
aphrodisia.”21 He notes that  aphrodisia  is not an equivalent to “sexuality” because the 
latter term refers specifically to a modern invention, but it offered the best analog for 
ensemble  of  acts,  gestures,  and  contacts  later  recognized  as  sexuality.  The  moral 
equivalent  of  sexuality  was  akolasia.  For  the  ancient  Greeks,  self-restraint  was 
recommended against the immoderate use of all the pleasures of the body, including the 
consumption of food and drink.22
Foucault never specifies whenthe concern with sex became more important than 
the concern with food or what the signs of that important shift might have been. The 
three volumes of the History seem to chart a continuous increase in concern with sexual 
pleasure from the ancient Greeks to the Victorians, but it's not clear how Foucault arrives 
at the conclusion that sexuality not only became a distinct concept but also surpassed the 
21 Foucault, 1985: 36. 
22  This is clarified further in his discussion of the distinction between sōphrōsyne and its synonym 
enkrateia. Foucault notes that Aristotle was the first to distinguish systematically between the two 
terms. According to the Niomachean Ethics, sōphrōsyne is the deliberate, active choice to be moderate 
and do what is fitting. This is why its opposite is akolasia, the deliberate, active choice to be 
immoderate and take pleasure in following bad principles. Enkrateia referred instead to self-control or 
continence, and its opposite was akrasia, or succumbing to desires in spite of one's better intentions or 
efforts. Foucault's focus on sōphrōsyne reflects his argument that the Greeks' ethics concerned action 
and exteriority more than desire and interiority. Foucault, 1985: 63-5.
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other pleasures of the body in importance.  He bases his claim that alimentary ethics 
were  more  important  for  the  ancient  Greeks  and early  Christians  on  the  volume  of 
practical advice they published concerning the proper use of food and drink. However, 
the introductory volume, where he first claims that sexuality was a special site of moral 
concern, is based not on practical texts, but the discourses and institutional mechanisms 
that constituted a technology of sex that was deployed to create, discipline, and foster a 
bourgeois body.23
If he had been looking for it, Foucault would also have found a proliferation of 
discourses and institutions aimed at regulating  alimenation during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth-centuries, and specifically a growing concern about moderation and restraint 
in the use of food and drink. It was in the eighteenth century that alcoholic beverages 
and  other  drugs  first  were  distinguished  from  food  and  their  use  subjected  to  the 
discourses  of  medicine,  psychiatry,  and  social  reform.24 Dr.  Benjamin  Rush,  who  is 
credited with founding both American temperance movement and American psychiatry 
criticized alcohol and tobacco in both medical and moral language. He also pioneered the 
language  of  “addiction”  and  the  prescription  of  psychiatric  treatment  for  excess 
drinking.25 His  Inquiry Into the Effects of Ardent Spirits Upon the Human Body and  
Mind ranked liquids according to how beneficial they were; water and buttermilk were at 
the top of the list, wine in the middle, and hard liquor at the bottom.  He called the chart 
a “moral thermometer” and associated anything more alcoholic than “weak punch” with 
lists of vices, diseases and punishments.26 Moderation and morality were also central to 
Rush's  writings  on  tobacco.  He  claimed  “statistical  observation”  had  revealed  that 
23 Foucault, 1985: 31. 
24 Craig Reinarman, “Policing Pleasure: Food, Drugs and the Politics of Ingestion,” Gastronomica 7 
(Summer 2007): 55. 
25 He was also one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, notable primarily because of what it 
suggests about his social status. Melanie E. Du Puis, “Angels and Vegetables: A Brief History of Food 
Advice in America,” Gastronomica 7 (Summer 2007): 36. 
26 Benjamin Rush, An Inquiry Into the Effects of Ardent Spirits Upon the Human Body and Mind (Boston, 
MA: Loring, 1823: 2-3). 
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tobacco  activated  and  worsened  diseases  of  the  nerves;  he  also  complained  of  its 
filthiness and associations with idleness and rudeness. Noting that tobacco was alleged 
to provide relief from “intemperance in eating,” he says, “Would it not be much better to 
obviate  the alleged necessity  of  using Tobacco by always eating a  moderate  meal?”27 
[Figure 5.1]
Figure 5.1/ The Moral and Physical Thermometer, Benjamin Rush28
27 Benjamin Rush, Essays, Literary, Moral, and Philosophical (Philadelphia: Thomas and William 
Bradford, 1789): 266. 
28 Reproduced from Benjamin Rush, An Inquiry into the Effects of Spirituous Liquors on the Human Body and the  
Mind, 1790.
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As with the modern discourses of sexuality, the bourgeois family was one of the 
main sites where modern alimentary ethics were deployed. They were also focused on 
the production of a distinctive bourgeois body. Middle class families in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries  came to  see  mealtime as  a  crucial  opportunity  for training 
children in manners, conversation, and taste. Children began to dine with their parents 
instead of with nannies and servants as it gradually became “improper” to delegate that 
important  time  to  the  working-class  help.29 Much  of  the  advice  aimed  at  Victorian 
mothers focused on proper care of the adolescent female body, including how daughters 
should eat and exercise to cultivate the correct social identity and moral character. The 
recommendations often reflect the continued parallels between food and sex; meat and 
spicy foods were thought to stimulate and signal sexual desire, so their consumption was 
seen  as  unsuitable  for  proper  ladies.30 According  to  Joan  Jacobs  Brumberg,  the 
combination of smothering maternal concern about eating with elevation of  restraint 
and physical delicacy prompted the emergence of anorexia nervosa among middle-class 
girls in the Victorian era.31 
Social  reform  movements  like  Temperance  and  Home  Economics  and  health 
crusaders like Sylvester Graham and John Harvey Kellogg were all invested in a morality 
of both food and sex, which were often seen as mutually constitutive. Both Graham and 
Kellogg claimed that vegetarianism could reduce sexual urges. Writing in 1891, Kellogg 
claims, “The science of physiology teaches that our very thoughts are born of what we 
eat.  A man that lives on pork,  fine-flour bread, rich pies and cakes, and condiments, 
drinks  tea  and coffee,  and  uses  tobacco,  might  as  well  try  to  fly  as  to  be  chaste  in  
29 Levenstein, 2003: 61. See also, Nobert Elias's history of table manners. He claims that the bourgeoisie 
began to adopt the manners of the nobility in the eighteenth century. The Civilizing Process:  




thought.”32 The invocation of physiology echoes the medicalization of sexual perversions 
that Foucault documents. Kellogg's precautions against unchaste thoughts include eating 
moderate meals, eating only twice a day and, “Discard[ing] all stimulating food. Under 
this head must be included spices, pepper, ginger, mustard, cinnamon, cloves, essences, 
all  condiments,  pickles,  etc.,  together with flesh food in any but moderate quantities 
[emphasis  original].”33 Home  economists  expressed  concerns  about  the  diets  of 
immigrant  populations—including  foremost  their  use  of  spices  and  pickled  foods—
because of their suspected sexually-stimulating effects.34
In the quarter-century since Foucault's death, the growing popular interest in and 
anxiety about food has led some people to question whether it has now surpassed sex in 
importance. For example, a 2009 Policy Review article by Hoover Institution research 
fellow Mary Eberstadt35 asks, “Is Food the New Sex?: A curious reversal in moralizing.”36 
Eberstadt argues that shifts in the availability and consequences of food and sex have 
created  an  unprecedented  situation  in  much  of  the  West:  most  adults  can  have 
practically all the food and sex they want. Instead of pursuing both with equal ardor or 
developing  more  limitations  on  both  appetites,  she  says  a  surprising  paradox  has 
emerged between “mindful eating” and “mindless sex.”37 
To illustrate, she asks readers to imagine the sexual and alimentary mores of a 
hypothetical woman named Betty who was 30 years old in 1958 and her 30-year old 
granddaughter, Jennifer. Betty eats mostly processed foods and has no strong feelings 
32 John Harvey Kellogg, "Treatment for Self-Abuse and Its Effects,” Plain Facts for Old and Young 
(Burlington, Iowa: F. Segner & Co., 1891: 302). 
33 Ibid, 303. 
34 Gabaccia, 2000: 124-8. This lives on in an inverted form in magazine articles that claim that spicy foods 
act as aphrodisiacs. 
35  Eberstadt is a former Republican speechwriter for the Reagan administration and primarily writes 
critiques of what she has referred to as “our feminized, secularized, pornified times.” See the interview 
with Kathryn Jean Lopez, “Don't Lose Out: Mary Eberstadt on Her New Book,” The National Review, 
23 April 2010, Web (accessed 04 April 2011). She also edited a 2007 collection titled Why I Turned 
Right: Leading Baby Boom Conservatives Chronicle Their Political Journeys (New York, NY: Simon 
and Schuster/Threshold, 2007).
36 Mary Eberstadt, “Is Food the New Sex?: A Curious Reversal In Moralizing,” Policy Review 153, 27 
January 2009, Web (accessed 04 April 2011). 
37 Ibid.
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about  how  other  people  eat;  Jennifer  shops  for  organic  groceries  and  has  strong 
convictions about how other people “should” eat. Conversely,  Jennifer is  laissez-faire 
about sexual ethics,  believing that  things like abortion,  STDs,  and homosexuality are 
fundamentally personal matters; Betty believes all three are clearly wrong and the world 
would be a better place if people adhered to traditional Judeo-Christian ethics regarding 
sex.38 Eberstadt quickly surveys some of the most popular manifestations of “mindful 
eating” like dieting and the success of Whole Foods, and also gestures to some “extreme” 
manifestations like macrobiotic diets and legal battles about terroir in Europe.39 
Ultimately, she concludes that increased vigilance about food is simply rational: 
“decades of recent research have taught us that diet has more potent effects than Betty 
and  her  friends  understood,  and  can  be  bad  for  you  or  good  for  you  in  ways  not 
enumerated before.”40 The mystery, according to Eberstadt, is why people haven't come 
to the same conclusion about sex given that monogamous, married couples live longer,  
happier lives (according to some researchers). She claims that the apparent struggles of 
our ethical and legal institutions to cope with a sexually laissez-faire society suggest that 
“mindless  sex” is  as  bad and unnatural  as  “mindless  eating.”  We need some kind of 
restrictions on our carnal appetites. Noting that people are often furtive about both their 
indulgence of junk food and “junk sex,” Eberstadt concludes: 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the rules being drawn around food 
receive some force from the fact that people are uncomfortable with how 
far the sexual revolution has gone — and not knowing what to do about it, 
they turn for increasing consolation to mining morality out of what they 
eat.41
Both Foucault and Eberstadt seem to be proposing a zero-sum morality in which 
any increase in the ethical concern about food is countered by an equal and opposite  






fully  uncoupled?  I  suspect  Foucault  assumes that  sex  surpassed food as  a  subject  of 
moral concern because he conceived of his project in the History as an inquiry into the 
moral significance of sexual acts. This blinded him to the proliferation of discourse about 
the moral significance of food in the Victorian era. He claims sex was a special subject of  
moral solicitude.42 The continued—or even intensified—moralization of food, eating, and 
the body in the Victorian era challenge the notion that sex was a separate and more 
important subject of moral solicitude. 
Eberstadt proposes that the new morality of food is an attempt to compensate for 
the conspicuous lack of morals in a sexual revolution gone too far. This theory relies on 
the mistaken assumption that the older generation represented by Betty is amoral about 
food  and  that  the  younger  generation  represented  by  Jennifer  is  amoral  about  sex. 
Betty's eating does not conform to the new norms of the food revolution, but that does 
not make her eating norm-less. This is apparent in Eberstadt's description of how Betty 
eats: “Betty’s food is served with what for us would appear to be high ceremony, i.e., at a  
set table with family members present. . . . The going slogan she learned as a child is 
about cleaning your plate, and not doing so is still considered bad form.”43 The meat and 
potatoes meals that Betty prepares for her family are not mindless; they merely reflect a 
very different set of beliefs about food. She is concerned with reproducing the “ordered 
meal”: a hot dinner consisting of a prominent protein, starch, and vegetable served by a 
woman. Bentley shows that the ordered meal reflects historically- and culturally-specific 
42 See, for example, the Introduction to Volume II, in which he asks, “Why is sexual conduct, why are the 
activities and pleasures that attach to it, an object of moral solicitude? Why this ethical concer—which, 
at certain times, in certain societies and groups, appears more important than the moral attention that is 
focused on other, likewise essential areas of individual or collective life, such as alimentary behaviors 
or the fulfillment of civic duties?” Later in the “Introduction,” he says “it occurred to me that this 
problematization [of sex] was linked to a group of practices that have been of questionable importance 
in our societies: I am referring to what might be called the 'arts of existence.'” Nonetheless, the volume 
focuses on sex almost to the exclusion of food. The blurb on the back cover summarizes the questions 
that Foucault tries to answer: “How in the West did sexual experience become a moral issue? And why 
were other appetites of the body, such as hunger, and collective concerns, such as civic duty, not 
subjected to the numberless rules and regulations and judgments that have defined, if not confined, 
sexual behavior?” However, Foucault does not answer that question at all. Instead, he acknowledges 
that food was subjected to numberless rules and regulations.  Foucault, 1985: 10 and back cover.
43 Eberstadt, 2009. 
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beliefs about what people should eat for optimum health, who should do the cooking, 
and what kinds of meals were “proper” and “respectable.”44 Betty's adherence to outdated 
foodways might be intransigent, but it is not morally indifferent. Similarly, casual sex is 
not devoid of ethics. It reflects a shift in the nature of sexual mores, not an abandonment 
of them.45 
Eberstadt underestimates the importance of food as a site of moral concern for 
the older generation, the continued moral importance of sex for the younger generation, 
and the persisting connection between the two. Both food and sex are still central to the 
constitution  of  ethical  self-hood,  but  that  doesn't  mean  nothing  has  changed.  The 
contrast  Eberstadt  describes  between  the  “Betty”  generation  and  the  “Jennifer” 
generation reflects a sea change in the dominant norms about food. Her discussion of 
“Jennifer's” habits is telling:
Wavering in and out of vegetarianism, Jennifer is adamantly opposed to 
eating red meat or endangered fish. She is also opposed to industrialized 
breeding,  genetically  enhanced  fruits  and vegetables,  and  to  pesticides 
and other artificial  agents.  She tries  to  minimize  her  dairy intake,  and 
cooks tofu as much as possible. She also buys “organic” in the belief that it 
is better both for her and for the animals raised in that way, even though 
the  products  are  markedly  more  expensive  than  those  from  the  local 
grocery store.46 
Jennifer's choices are based on avoidance—she never eats red meat or endangered fish 
and  sometimes  eats  no  meat  at  all.  She  avoids  pesticides,  the  industrial  animal 
agriculture, and genetically-modified organisms. The embrace of tofu and organic food is 
a less a positive agenda than an attempt to fill in the gaps: in the U.S., tofu is almost 
exclusively seen as a meat substitute and organic produce is the alternative to produce 
with pesticide and GMOs. Additionally, she pays a financial price: the foods she buys are 
44 See Chapter Two. Bentley, 2002: 171-192. 
45 For example, the popular sex columnist Dan Savage is constantly being asked by readers to help them 
navigate the ethics and etiquette of “kinky” or non-normative sex—how to establish appropriate 
boundaries and respect the needs of all participants in open relationships, what the role of pornography 
in committed sexual relationships should be, what constitutes abuse or disrespect of a sex worker, when 
disclosure about sexual preferences is appropriate or mandatory, etc. Dan Savage, “Savage Love,” 
syndicated by The Stranger (1999-2011), Web (1999-2011)
46 Eberstadt, 2009. 
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more expensive and less convenient than what Betty gets at the local grocery store. This 
characterization of the new ethics of food highlights the importance of a particular kind 
of elective asceticism. The food revolution offers people the opportunity to flourish in the 
Aristotlean sense of living a virtuous life by exercising moderation in their use of readily-
available food and working hard to achieve an ethically superior diet. 
Price, Sacrifice, and Virtue in the Food Revolution 
“We're  talking  about  health,  we're  talking  about  the  
planet,  we're  talking  about  the  people  who  are  
supporting  the  land,”  said  Alice  Waters.  .  .  .  “Make  a  
sacrifice on the cellphone or the third pair of Nike shoes,”  
she said.”
—Alice Waters47 
The high price of “better” food is almost always portrayed as deterrent. Michael 
Pollan and Alice Waters, the de facto spokespeople for the food revolution, claim the 
main  reason  anyone  is  still  eating  Doritos  and  McDonalds  despite  the  increasing 
availability of locally-grown produce and grass-fed steaks, is that the former are so much 
cheaper.  Their  critics  claim it  is  unrealistic  and elitist,  to  ask  people  to  spend more 
money on groceries. In an interview with the blog  DCist to promote his newest book, 
Anthony Bourdain said, “I'll tell you. Alice Waters annoys the living shit out of me. We're 
all in the middle of a recession, like we're all going to start buying expensive organic food  
and running to the green market.”48 Pollan's and Waters's responses to the charge of 
elitism  suggest  that  rather  than  being  a  deterrent,  the  higher  price  of  supposedly-
superior food and other sacrifices required to eat “well” are a central part of the appeal 
for many  participants in the food revolution. 
Pollan  and  Waters  do  not  deny  the  food  they  want  people  to  eat  is  more 
47 Kim Severson, “Some Good News on Food Prices,” The New York Times, 02 April 2008, Web (accessed 
04 April 2011). 
48 George Pelecanos, “Chewing the Fat: No Reservations' Anthony Bourdain,” DCist.com, 19 January 
2009, Web (accessed 04 April 2011). 
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expensive. They instead depend on it to explain why their preferred foodways have not 
yet become universal.  They portray fresh, local,  organic food as inherently better and 
suggest that  any rational actor armed with full  information and the ability to choose 
would necessarily  abandon processed food.  According to Pollan,  if  people  don't  even 
though their attention has been brought to bear on the subject, it's because the scales are 
tipped in favor of junk.
In a 2007 New York Times article, Pollan describes a study by obesity researcher 
Adam Drewnowski in which he found that if he had a single dollar to spend at the typical 
American supermarket, he could buy 1,200 calories of cookies or potato chips and 875 
calories of soda but only 250 calories of carrots or 170 calories of orange juice. “This 
perverse  state  of  affairs  is  not,  as  you  might  think,  the  inevitable  result  of  the  free 
market,” Pollan explains, but instead the result of an archaic Farm Bill that subsidizes 
cheap, unhealthy sources of calories like commodity corn, and the meat from corn-fed 
animals.49 Since the Farm Bill does almost nothing to subsidize the production of fresh 
fruit and vegetables, the “rules of the food game in America are organized in such a way 
that if you are eating on a budget, the most rational economic strategy is to eat badly — 
and get fat.”50 Pollan accordingly welcomes increasing prices for fuel and food on the 
grounds that they “level the playing field for sustainable food that doesn't rely on fossil  
fuels.”51
However, Pollan has undermined the idea that eating cheap food and getting fat 
is really the “most rational economic strategy” elsewhere. In a 2010 interview with The 
Wall Street Journal,  he argues that spending four dollars on a single peach or eight 
dollars on a dozen eggs isn't really expensive when you take the actual costs of producing 
“good” food into account.52 The problem is not that good food costs too much for most 
49 Michael Pollan, “You Are What You Grow,” The New York Times, 22 April 2007, Web (accessed 04 
April 2011). 
50 Ibid.
51 Severson, 2008. 
52 Ben Worthen, “A Dozen Eggs for $8? Michael Pollan Explains the Math of Buying Local,” The Wall  
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people; the problem is that government subsidies have made junk food too cheap and 
confused people about the actual cost of food. Pollan's proposed solution is  for more 
people to follow his “little rule: 'Pay more, eat less.”53 Rather than eating too much cheap 
food, the truly rational consumer will pay a little more, eat a little less, and stay thin. 
Pollan reinforces this claim by attributing enthusiasm for more expensive food in 
the Bay Area to a “consumer who is willing to pay more for better food. That's a matter of 
consciousness and a palate that has been educated by the chefs locally.”54 Here, again, he 
suggests that the smart, conscious, educated consumer will choose more expensive food 
when possible. And he suggests that it  is  possible for most people: “Eight dollars for a 
dozen eggs sounds outrageous, but when you think that you can make a delicious meal 
from two eggs, that's $1.50. It's really not that much when we think of how we waste 
money in our lives.”55 The inclusive “we” suggests that most people—a least readers of 
The Wall Street Journal—have discretionary income they're spending unwisely which 
would be better spent on fresh, local food. Alice Waters' suggestion that people should be 
willing  to  forgo  “  the  cellphone  or  the  third  pair  of  Nikes”  also  implies  that  nearly 
everyone can sacrifice somewhere. Cell phones are ubiquitous. The “third pair of Nikes” 
evokes a long-standing stereotype about the profligacy of the black, urban poor.56 Eating 
better is therefore a choice that anyone can make.
That  line  of  reasoning  undermines  the  first  argument:  people  don't  buy  the 
approved  food  because  of  the  price.  In  an  article  in The  Atlantic,  historian  James 
McWilliams offers further evidence that price is  not the key factor in food purchases. 
Decreases in the price of “healthy” foods over the last few decades challenge the theory 
that  more people  would buy fresh, local,  organic foods if  they were cheaper or more 




56 See Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
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readily available. McWilliams notes that even when the kinds of foods championed by 
the food revolution are readily available at  lower prices  than fast  food,  not everyone 
seems eager to buy them. According to the USDA's Economic Research Service [ERS], 
from 1980 to 2006—precisely the period when fast food supposedly overtook the U.S. 
diet and made Americans into the fattest people on the planet—food declined in price 
across the board. The price of apples, dry beans, carrots, and celery went down right 
along with cookies, ice cream, and potato chips.57  According to the ERS, “the price of a 
healthy diet has not changed relative to an unhealthy diet.”58 McWilliams concludes: 
Evidently,  consumers  have  chosen  to  take  advantage  of  the  declining 
prices for the cookies rather than the apples,  thereby undermining the 
claim that we choose cheap unhealthy food because it's cheap. As it turns 
out,  we  also  choose  it  because  we  appear  to  like  it  better  than  cheap 
healthy food.59 
As McWilliams suggests, food choices are often less influenced by price than they are by 
taste. Nonetheless, there are limits to his “we,” too. Clearly it does not include Michael 
Pollan  or   the  Jennifers  out  there  who  don't like  cheap,  unhealthy  food  and  are 
influenced by price—albeit in the opposite direction.
For the food revolution faithful, the sacrifices involved in eating better aren't a 
deterrent. They are central to their perception that their foodways are morally superior. 
In  the  Wall  Street  Journal  interview  Pollan  adopts  an  uncharacteristically  agnostic 
position about the local food: 
To eat well takes a little bit more time and effort and money. But so does 
reading  well;  so  does  watching  television  well.  Doing  anything  with 
attention to quality takes effort. It's either rewarding to you or it's not. It 
happens to be very rewarding to me. But I understand people who can't be 
bothered, and they're going to eat with less care.60
However, his entire oeuvre is devoted to making the case for eating “well,” even when it 
57 James McWilliams, “Should We Really Pay $4 for a Peach?” The Atlantic, 07 September 2010, Web 
(accessed 04 April 2011). 
58 Fred Kuchler and Hayden Stewart, “Price Trends Are Similar for Fruits, Vegetables, and Snack Foods,” 
ERS Report Summary, March 2008, Web (accessed 04 April 2011). 
59 McWilliams, 2010. 
60 Worthen, 2010. 
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takes more time and effort and money. In the first chapter of The Omnivore’s Dilemma, 
he writes: 
“Eating is an agricultural act,” as Wendell Berry famously said. It is also 
an ecological act, and a political act, too. Though much has been done to 
obscure this simple fact, how and what we eat determines to a great extent 
the use we make of the world—and what is to become of it. To eat with a 
fuller consciousness of all that is at stake might sound like a burden, but 
in  practice  few things in  life  can afford quite  as  much satisfaction.  By 
comparison, the pleasures of eating industrially, which is to say eating in 
ignorance, are fleeting.61 
Far  from  portraying  junk  food  as  an  innocent  predilection,  like  watching  reality 
television instead of The Wire, Pollan insists that eating determines the use we make of 
the world (reminiscent of Marx's discussion of  ergon).  Rather than just one of many 
satisfying things one could devote time and effort to if one were so inclined, he portrays 
eating well,  even at a cost, as the only rational choice. Eating industrial food is not a 
rational choice of someone who “can't be bothered;” it is ignorant. 
Pollan suggests that the reason eating well matters is because of its effect on the 
world, but when the environmental or political superiority of local or organic foods is 
challenged,  many  proponents  of  local  food  admit  to  being  more  interested  in  the 
symbolic act of voting against the industrial food system than the real effects of their 
consumption  choices.  McWilliams'  2009  book Just  Food:  Where  Locavores  Get  It  
Wrong and How We Can Truly Eat Responsibly challenges the claim that local food is 
always  more  sustainable  with  data  on  carbon  dioxide  emissions  and  environmental 
inputs. Food produced in optimal conditions and shipped to markets in large quantities 
often  has  a  smaller  per-unit  carbon footprint  than  locally-grown produce.  The  latter 
often  requires  greater  inputs  and  takes  a  less  efficient  path  to  market.  A  review by 
Stephanie Ogburn posted on the environmental site Grist claims that McWilliams misses 
the point. The real effects of local farming aren't locavores' main concern: 
Consumers, when faced with a system they don't support, are voting with 
61 Pollan, 2006: 11. 
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their  dollars  for  the  only  alternatives  they  can  find-local  food  at  the 
farmers market and organic products at the store.  .  .  .  The locavores I 
know don't  view shopping consciously  as  a  solution;  they view it  as  a 
protest.62 
Ogburn suggests that what matters to locavores is not the actual carbon footprint of their 
purchases so much as  the symbolic  protest  represented by buying any alternative  to 
industrially-produced food. Like Eberstadt's  fictional Jennifer,  Ogborn's locavores are 
primarily concerned with going against the norm.
Other reviewers claim that there are unquantifiable benefits to eating locally or 
that what matters is that locavores are  trying. A review of McWilliams' book by Kelly 
Trueman  published  on  AlterNet claims  McWilliams  fails  to  take  into  account  the 
meaningful relationships and communities forged at farmers' markets, “as opposed to 
the  soulless  commerce  of  the  supermarket.”63 Trueman  says  McWilliams  “dwells 
obsessively on food miles, presumably because he couldn't acknowledge these benefits 
without  undermining  his  own arguments.”  But  McWilliams'  argument  it's  about  the 
ecological  soundness  of  local  foods,  a  central  claim  in  the  popular  justification  for 
locavorism. A review in the Christian Science Monitor praises McWilliams for “digging 
beneath slogans and oversimplifications,” but concludes, “it seems counterproductive to 
simultaneously  belittle  those already trying to  make the best  choices  they can.”64 All 
three reviews reject the possibility that the “best choices” for anyone attempting to eat 
sustainably might be choosing industrial  agriculture over local and organic.  They are 
universally offended by the suggestion. 
On the other hand, all three reviewers praise the one part of McWilliams' book 
that corresponds with the idea of virtuous self-denial: his claim that the best way to eat 
more sustainably is  to eat less meat.  The response to  Just Food suggests that eating 
62 Stephanie Ogburn, “James McWilliams' Over-hyped and Undercooked Anti-Locavore Polemic,” Grist 
08 September 2009, Web (accessed 04 April 2011). 
63 Kelly Trueman, “Inflammatory New Book Attacking Local Food Movement Has One Grain of Truth 
Buried Under Heaps of Manure,” AlterNet, 26 August 2009, Web (accessed 04 April 2011). 
64 Rebekah Denn, “Just Food: A Challenge to Current Ideas About Responsible Eating,” The Christian 
Science Monitor, 02 September 2009, Web (accessed 04 April 2011). 
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“better” isn’t driven by evidence about what’s really healthier, more sustainable, more 
humane, or even better-tasting (often conflicting ideals anyhow). Instead, eating “better” 
is  a construct  based on the idea that  it  is  difficult  and requires sacrifices,  much like 
Aristotlean virtue. It is good to work hard and resist immediate pleasures. Participants in 
the food revolution might claim that what makes the hard work and sacrifice worthwhile 
is some long-term goal or objective good, but their resistant to attempts to evaluate the 
real impact of their choices suggests otherwise.
Evidence is ultimately unnecessary to produce the sensation of virtue.  Making a 
special trip to the farmer’s market during the few hours per week it’s open seems like a 
virtuous act in part because it’s so much less convenient than shopping at a grocery store  
that’s open all the time. Turning a box of locally-grown produce you probably never ate 
as  a  child  into  edible  meals  must  be  better—morally,  if  not  nutritionally—than 
microwaving a Lean Cuisine. Spending more money on something labeled “organic” or 
“hormone free” must be better, because otherwise why would it cost more? People don’t 
even need to know what it's better for to reap the psychic rewards of self-denial. Things 
that  are  difficult,  inconvenient,  or  require  sacrifices  offer  the  satisfactions  Pollan 
promises—for some people. 
Virtuous  self-denial  does  not  appeal  to  everyone.  Many  Americans—perhaps 
especially those whose jobs require tending to others' needs—feel like they make enough 
sacrifices in other areas of their life, thank you very much. Others may see the effort and 
expense of superior eating as decadent or wasteful, not a form of virtuous self-denial. As 
stereotypes like Dave Barry's “left-wing communist latte-sucking tofu-chomping holistic-
wacko neurotic vegan” suggest, the morality represented by rejecting the norm seems to 
be a particular preoccupation of the demographic identified as yuppies, bobos, or the 
liberal elite.  However,  those tastes have become increasingly hegemonic over the last 
three decades. The processes seems to echo the spread of bourgeois sexuality described 
295
by Foucault. 
Foucault says the deployment of sexuality did not happen evenly across social 
classes. It proceeded in roughly three stages: First, it was embraced by the bourgeoisie, 
whose initial concern was the creation of a distinctive body:
The primary concern was not the repression of the sex of the classes to be 
exploited, but rather the body, vigor, longevity, progeniture, and descent 
of the classes that “ruled.” This was the purpose for which the deployment 
of  sexuality  was  first  established,  as  a  new  distribution  of  pleasures, 
disclosures, truths, and powers; it has to be seen as the self-affirmation of 
one class rather than the enslavement of another: a defense, a protection, 
a  strengthening,  and  an  exaltation  that  were  eventually  extended  to 
others.65
Second, sexuality and the institutions of the body, especially the family, were extended to 
others  “as  a  means  of  social  control  and  political  subjugation,”  which  he  locates 
historically in the 1830s. During that process the bourgeois family became hegemonic 
and central to the “great campaign for the 'moralization of the poorer classes.'” 66 Third, 
at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  sexuality  was  institutionalized,  especially  in 
medicine  and law.  Foucault  identifies  this  as  “the  moment  when the  deployment  of 
'sexuality,' elaborated in its more complex and intense forms, by and for the privileged 
classes, spread throughout the entire social body.”67
The rise of a new ethics and aesthetics of food and the body in the middle class  
beginning in the 1980s parallels the first moment, when the bourgeoisie embraces a new 
attitude towards bodily sensations and cultivates a body with differential value. There 
are also signs of the second stage: the moralization of the poor. Proposed taxes on soft 
drinks, the ban on new fast food restaurants in South-Central Los Angeles,68 the New 
York City  Green Carts  initiative,69 and the “war  on fat”  are  all  aimed at  low-income 
65 Foucault, 1978: 123. 
66 Ibid., 122. 
67 Ibid., 122.
68  In July 2008, the Los Angeles City Council voted unanimously to place a moratorium on the opening 
of fast food restaurants in low-income areas, citing above-average rates of obesity in neighborhoods like 
South Central. Kim Severson, “Los Angeles Stages a Fast Food Intervention,” The New York Times, 12 
August 2008, Web (accessed 06 April 2011). 
69 In 2008, New York City Mayor Bloomberg signed Local Law 9, which established 1000 permits for 
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Americans. There are also parallels in the earlier period of enlightened eating I described 
in  more  detail  in  Chapter  Two.  The  rise  of service  à  la  Russe,  slimming  diets,  and 
cosmopolitan entertainments is akin to the first inwardly-focused stage. Urban reform 
movements focused on immigrants and the poor represent stage two. 
What is missing is stage three. Instead of penetrating the “entire social body,” 
after the Great Depression the pillars of “enlightened” eating became less popular. They 
were replaced by the idealization of plain foods and abundance—preferences Bourdieu 
associates  with  the  working  class.  Rather  than  constituting  an  inevitable,  top-down 
process  of  social  control  and political  subjugation,  the  relative  popularity  of  elective 
asceticism varies over time. My theory is that its appeal depends on historically-specific 
forms of class anxiety. 
Stagnation, Inequality, and Anxiety
The rise of the food revolution in mainstream popular culture corresponds with a 
dramatic shift in U.S. income distribution. That shift is consists primarily in declining 
mobility between income brackets (most studies use quintiles) and increasing income 
inequality. Those trends first began to attract widespread attention in 2004 and 2005, 
when both The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times published special features 
on  class  in  America.  At  that  point,  they  were  portrayed  as  surprising  and  counter-
intuitive. 
Declining Mobility
According to the introduction to the one in The Wall Street Journal :  
carts that can only sell whole fruits or vegetables, restricted to low-income neighborhoods. Of the 350 
permits made available in Brooklyn, only 84 were in use two years later. Some vendors have been 
successful, but many complain that they can't compete with local stores that have a better selection of 
produce and are allowed to sell other foods. Erin Durkin, “Vendors See Mixed Results After City's 
Green Cart Push to Sell Fruit, Veggies, in 'Deserts,'” New York Daily News, 27 April 2010, Web 
(accessed 06 April 2011). 
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Many  Americans  still  think  of  their  land  as  a  place  of  exceptional 
opportunity—in  contrast  to  class-bound Europe—the  evidence  suggests 
otherwise....  As recently as the later 1980s, economists argued that not 
much  advantage  passed  from  parent  to  child,  perhaps  as  little  as  20 
percent....  But  over  the  last  10  years,  better  data  and  more  number-
crunching have led economists and sociologists to a new consensus: The 
escalators  of  mobility  move  much  more  slowly.  A  substantial  body  of 
research finds that at least 45 percent of parents advantage in income is 
passed along to their children and perhaps as much as 60 percent.70 
The article implies that the idea of mobility so foundational to Americans' national self-
image wasn't always a myth. Economic historian Joseph Ferrie's research on U.S. and 
British census records from the 1850s through the 1920s (which include occupational 
data  for  thousands  of  native-born  father-and-son  pairs)  shows  that  more  than  80 
percent  of  the  sons  of  unskilled  men born in  the  U.S.  during  that  period  moved to 
higher-paying, higher-status positions. Fewer than 60% of the sons born in Britain did 
so.71 As the article notes, even Marx argued that “the position of a wages labourer is for a 
very large part of the American people but a probational state, which they are sure to 
leave within a longer or shorter term.72 It's worth noting that the restrictions on Ferrie's 
data  set  suggest,  the  economic  prospects  for  non-white,  female  and  immigrant 
Americans during the same time period were considerably bleaker.  The possibility  of 
income  mobility  was  never  as  universal  or  merit-based  as  some  versions  of  the 
“American  Dream”  promise.  Nonetheless,  for  the  demographic  taken  to  be 
representative of the nation, advancement was possible, even commonplace.
Throughout much of  the twentieth century,  intergenerational income mobility 
increased regardless of race, gender, or nation of birth.  An intergenerational study of 
census  data  from  1940  through  2000  that  compared  individuals'  incomes  to  their 
parents'  showed  that  the  chance  of  moving  to  a  different  income  bracket  increased 
steadily between 1940 and 1980. Income mobility began to fall sharply in the early 1980s 
70 David Wessel, “Rich-Poor Gap Widens in the U.S., Class Mobility Stalls,” The Wall Street Journal 13 
May 2005: A1. 
71 Ibid.
72 Karl Marx, “Value, Price, and Profit,” 1865 qtd. in Wessel, 2005.
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and declined steadily until  2000.73 Panel studies  that  measure the progress of single 
generations  over  time  also  suggest  that  mobility  has  declined  in  recent  decades. 
According  to  Katherine  Bradbury  and Jane  Katz,  between the  1970s  and 1990s,  the 
chances of a family moving up or down the income ladder decreased.74  [Figure 5.2]
Fig. 5.2/ Up and Down the Income Ladder (Bradbury and Katz 2002)75 
The closer the numbers are to 20, the greater the rate of mobility between income quintiles.
In 2005, The New York Times reported that the percentage of families who remained in 
the same quartile of income earners increased from 35 percent in the 1970s to 37 percent 
in the 1980s and 40 percent in the 1990s.76 As a result, class structure in the United 
States in 2009 is less fluid than it is in countries like France, Germany, Britain, 
Denmark, and Canada.77
73 Aaronson and Mazumder, 2008: 139.  
74 Katherine Bradbury and Jane Katz, “Are lifetime incomes growing more unequal? Looking at new 
evidence on family income mobility,” Regional Review 12:4 (2002), Web (accessed 23 January 2009).
75 Reproduced from Bradbury and Katz, 2002. 
76 Leonhardt, 2005. 
77 Miles Corak, “Do Poor Children Become Poor Adults?: Lessons from a Cross Country Comparison of 
Generational Earnings Mobility,” Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper No. 1993 
(March 2006), Web (accessed 05 April 2011). Scott Winship, the research manager of the Pew 
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Income Inequality 
As Bradbury and Katz  note,  the decline in  mobility  has  exacerbated the even 
more dramatic shift in income inequality since 1980. By virtually every measure, income 
inequality decreased from the 1940s through the early 1970s and has increased since the 
1970s. According to  Class Matters, between 1950 and 1970, for each dollar earned by 
people in the bottom 90 percent of income earners, those in the top .01 percent made an 
additional $162. Between 1990 and 2002, that ratio was 1 to $18,000.78 Another way to 
measure inequality is to compare growth in the economy as a whole to median family 
income. Between 1947 and 1973, productivity and real median income rose at the same 
rate—both more than doubled, but from 1973 to 2003, median family income grew at 
one-third the rate of productivity. Data from the tail end of the set suggest that the trend 
is accelerating, not slowing: productivity increased by twelve percent between 2000 and 
2003 while real median family income actually declined by three percent.79 Since the 
mid-1970s, the vast majority of Americans have faced decreasing chances of moving into 
a higher income bracket. They have also seen their income stagnate or decline both in 
actual and relative terms.80  [Figure 5.3]
Economic Mobility Project, argues that broader trends in inequality in the U.S. are consistent with the 
rest of the industrialized world. In the fifteen richest countries in the world, inequality decreased from 
1920 to 1980 and then began to rise. However, even Winship admits that there is a difference between 
trends in the U.S., UK, and Canada (Anglophone countries) and the rest of the world. In almost all 
nations, income inequality since 1980 has increased dramatically, with the exception of Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. A fuller discussion of international differences is beyond the scope of this 
project. A tentative hypothesis: in countries where income inequality has increased, there has been a 
corresponding increase in aspirational cultural forms; in countries where income inequality has 
remained constant since the 1980s, there has been less popular interest in cultural forms of aspiration. 
78 The book version of the 2004 special series on class. The New York Times and Bill Keller, Class 
Matters (New York, NY: Times Books, 2005): 186.
79 Jared Bernstein, “Updated CBO Data Reveal Unprecedented Increase in Inequality,” Economic Policy 
Institute, 13 December 2007, Web (accessed 05 April 2011). 
80 The recent increases in income inequality have prompted many scholars to re-define American class 
structure as a bifurcated system, like the one described by Marx, in which the top 20% is the “privileged 
class” and the bottom 80% constitute a “new working class” (Perrucci and Wysong 1999, Perelman 
2007). This offers another way out of the “embarrassment” of the middle classes for Marxist scholars, 
as Erik Olin Wright pointed out in his 1984 essay, “A General Framework for the Analysis of Class 
Structure,” 
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Figure 5.3/ Median Family Income Compared to Productivity81  
Class Anxiety, Not Status Anxiety
Economist  Robert  Frank  argues  the relative  wealth  gap  is  what  drives  status 
anxiety,  which he attributes  to  the dramatic  increases  in  income at  the very  top.  In 
Luxury Fever,  he argues that  by the 1990s runaway spending by the super-rich had 
infected the masses like a virus, causing people in all income brackets to devote more 
resources  to  frivolous  purchases.  Invoking  Thorstein  Veblen's  term  conspicuous 
consumption,82 Frank says the increase in the consumption of goods like wine, cigars, 
and  professional-grade  home  appliances  was  driven  by  a  “spectacular  rise  in  top 
incomes”  and  “unusually  rapid  growth  in  the  incomes  of  top  earners  in  every 
81 Inflation adjustment via the CPI-U-RS. Median family income is post-transfer, pretax (post-tax not 
available). Data sources: Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis. Reproduced from Lane 
Kensworthy, “Reducing Inequality: What's the Problem?” Consider the Evidence, 13 April 2009, Web 
(accessed 05 April 2011). 
82 His explanation differs from Veblen's. Veblen claimed that the grandiose expenditures of the Gilded Age 
and excesses like utensils made from real silver were a vestige of pre-industrial economic systems 
where leisure and excess consumption came to represent success at violent exploit and labor came to 
represent “the indignity of lack.” Silver spoon were essentially a new way for the rich to show how 
“manly” they were. Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class 1899 (New York: Random House 
Modern Library. 1934: 25). 
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demographic category” throughout the 1980s and 1990s.83 According to Frank, those top 
earners “spent lavishly merely to demonstrate to others that they could afford to do so.”84 
This created what he describes in his later book Falling Behind as an “arms race” in the 
middle class for “positional goods” like bigger houses and nicer cars (and perhaps also 
more expensive mustard).85 
Frank's argument recall's Bourdieu's observation that the rich are concerned with 
“seeming”  and  seek  to  distinguish  themselves  by  buying  expensive  things.  However, 
Frank claims that instead of merely acting on a different sent of tastes structured by their 
differing economic conditions, the middle and lower classes are driven by the aesthetic 
competition to buy luxuries despite the fact that they often cannot afford to do so.86 In 
his later book Frank clarifies that he doesn't think middle class consumers sacrifice non-
positional goods like leisure time or go into debt to buy more expensive things purely out  
of envy, but because the social standards that affect them also shift. Frank notes that as 
top earners spend more money on clothes, middle-class job seekers have to buy more 
expensive clothing to make the appropriate impression in interviews.87 
Although plausible in theory, Frank's argument turns out to be based on flawed 
assumptions  about  how  the  middle-class  actually  spends  their  money.  In  The  Two-
Income  Trap:  Why  Middle-Class  Mothers  and  Fathers  are  Going  Broke,  Elizabeth 
Warren  and  Amelia  Warren  Tyagi  challenge  what  they  call  the  “over-consumption 
myth.”88 They argue that rising consumer debt and decreased savings are the result of 
83 Robert H. Frank, Luxury Fever: Money and Happiness in an Era of Excess (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999:34). 
84 Ibid, 14.
85 Robert H. Frank, Falling Behind: How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle Class (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2007: 4). 
86 Similar arguments are made by Juliet B. Schor in The Overspent American: Upscaling, Downshifting,  
and the New Consumer (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998) and John de Graaf, David Waan and 
Thomas H. Naylor's Affluenza: The All-Consuming Epidemic 2001 (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler 
Publishers, 2005). 
87 Frank, 2007: 3-4. 
88 Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi, The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Mothers and  
Fathers Are Going Broke (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2003: 15-55).
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both stagnating incomes and dramatic increases in the price of housing, particularly in 
areas seen as “safe” and accessible to “good schools.” Frank points to absolute material 
gains in the 1990s as evidence that most middle-class people would not have to go into 
debt if  they were content to maintain the same standard of living that satisfied their 
parents. Warren and Tyagi cry foul: 
The average two-income family earns far more today than did the single-
breadwinner family of a generation ago. And yet, once they have paid the 
mortgage, the car payments, the taxes, the health insurance, and the day-
care bills, today's dual-income families have less discretionary income—
and  less  money  to  put  away  for  a  rainy  day  than  the  single-income 
family.89
According  to  the  Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  conducted  by  the  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics,  in 2000 the “average family of four” spent 21 percent less on clothing,  22 
percent  less  on  food,  and  44  percent  less  on  major  appliances  than  in  1972-1973 
(adjusted for inflation).90 The apparent epidemic of “overconsumption” is a myth created 
by the declining price of many basic consumer goods. 
The  areas  where  spending  has  skyrocketed,  sending  increasing  numbers  of 
families into bankruptcy and foreclosure are housing, education, and health care. While 
the median home value for childless individuals went up by 23 percent between 1983 and 
1998, housing prices for married couples with children shot up 79 percent. Seeking to 
explain why parents would spend so much on a home, Warren and Tyagi discover: 
The answer  came down to  two words  so powerful  that  families  would 
pursue them to the brink of bankruptcy: safety and education. Families 
put Mom to work, used up the family's economic reserves, and took on 
crushing  debt  loads  in  sacrifice  to  these  twin  gods,  all  in  the  hope  of 
offering their children the best possible start in life.”91  
The spiraling costs of housing in the suburbs92 and college education further magnify the 
effects of wage stagnation and growing inequality. The anxiety induced by the structural 
89 Ibid, 8.
90 Ibid, 23.
91 Ibid, 23. 
92 They do not discuss the racial implications of the expressed desire for “safety.” See Matthew Lassiter, 
The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2006).
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changes in the U.S. economy over the last three decades is not the product of vain one-
upmanship, but instead a real threat to the material foundations of middle-class identity: 
home-ownership and a college degree. Although that could also be referred to as “status 
anxiety” (the term Hofstadter used to describe a similar and real disenfranchisement) I 
use “class anxiety” to differentiate it from the phenomenon Frank describes. 
 
The Professional Class and the Fear of Falling
In Fear of Falling Barbara Ehrenreich argues that the professional middle-class 
(PMC) that emerged in the nineteenth century is always insecure because the basis of its 
status  is  expertise,  a  social  construct  she  portrays  as  evanescent  compared  to  older 
sources of class status like wealth or property. She claims that as expertise cannot be 
inherited, every generation has to fight for admission to the club and fight to protect its 
exclusivity by erecting barriers to keep out intruders from other classes.  Thus, the PMC 
is  marked by a  constant  “fear  of  falling.”  She attributes  a  wide range of  sometimes-
contradictory trends to that fear. In the 1950s, it manifested in concerns about “growing 
soft” and being corrupted by wealth.  However, with the “discovery of poverty” in the 
1960s, the middle class began to characterize the poor as soft, lazy, hedonistic, and self-
indulgent—the same qualities the middle-class was previously afraid they would contract 
from affluence.  In  the 1980s,  the  PMC turned to  what  Ehrenreich  calls  “the  yuppie 
strategy,” a superficial emulation of the rich. She identifies the fitness craze associated 
with them as an extension of the older fear of softness.93 
As a description of class anxiety from the 1950s through the 1980s, Ehrenreich's 
account is highly compelling. Where my analysis parts ways with hers is what we see as 
the likely cause of that anxiety and the changes in how its manifestations change over 
time. I disagree with her claim that expertise is evanescent. Although actual credentials 
(degrees, memberships) cannot be passed from one generation to the next, the forms of 
93 Ehrenreich, 1989.
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social and cultural capital that pave the way to professionalism are often inherited. Some 
kinds of social and cultural capital, like habits of speech and table manners, may actually 
be more reliable legacies than wealth because they can withstand financial catastrophe. 
Lawyers cannot guarantee that their children will get professional jobs, but they can give 
them a far better shot than most children who grow up in poverty. Furthermore, middle-
class anxiety pre-dates the nineteenth century rise of professionalization. Eighteenth-
century  technologies  of  class  distinction  like  bourgeois  sexuality  and  prescriptive 
grammar were adopted first by the new “middling” classes,  like the bourgeoisie,  that 
emerged along with the rise of capitalism.94 The middle class has always been anxious to 
protect its privilege. 
As Ehrenreich's book argues persuasively, that anxiety takes different forms in 
different  periods,  some  of  which  may  seem  contradictory.  The  middle-class  fear  of 
affluence in the 1950s and 1960s stands in marked contrast to the “yuppie strategy” of 
buying  “Rolex  watches,  Porsches,  quick  trips  to  Aruba,  and,  most  notoriously,  high-
status foods.”95 The change reflects a shift in taste leadership that resulted from the shift 
in income structure. When the majority of Americans who identify as middle-class were 
doing better materially (i.e., when their incomes were increasing in both absolute and 
relative terms and their chances of moving into a higher income quartile were better) 
their  anxieties  focused  on  punishing  class-climbers  and  preventing  cultural  change; 
instead, they sought security and stability. When they began doing  worse, they sought 
compensatory forms of aspiration and cultivated new ways of living better. 
Ehrenreich's analysis of the “yuppie strategy” mistakes the popular critique of 
yuppies for the broader emulation of the lifestyle associated with them. The idea that 
buying  fresh  pasta,  doing  aerobics,  and  drinking  imported  wine  was  solely  crass 
94 On sexuality, see the earlier discussion about Foucault. On Standard English, see Dennis Freeborn, 
From Old English to Standard English: A Course Book in Language Variation Across Time (University 
of Ottawa Press, 1998: 376-402). 
95 Ehrenreich, 1989: x.
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materialism mistakes the caricature of yuppies for the broader appeal of those trends. 
For many of the people engaging in the new practices of enlightened eating (often at the 
same time as they continued to eat familiar, domestic, processed foods), the appeal was 
not to appear rich, but to embody a particular middle class status marked by the effort 
and sacrifices required by the new and different lifestyle. It was less important that rich 
people were doing it than that the foods were novel, harder to come by, and a departure 
from the status quo. The stereotype of the yuppie as a class-climber is akin to the specter 
of  snobbery  that  haunts  popular  portrayals  of  “enlightened”  eating:  a  guilty 
acknowledgment of the role that class hierarchies play in the construction of cultural 
capital. 
The Compensations of Culture: Hipsters on Food Stamps
Despite  the  fact  that  most  Americans  who  identify  as  middle  class  have  lost 
ground  over  the  last  thirty  years,  survey  research  shows  that  the  vast  majority  of 
Americans still believe the basic tenets of the American Dream are valid. In a 2005 New 
York Times/CBS News poll, 46 percent of respondents said they thought it was easier to 
move up from one social class to another in the United States than in Europe, another 26 
percent said they thought it was “about the same,” and only 13 percent said they thought 
it was harder in the U.S. than in Europe.96 Additionally, 80 percent of respondents said 
they thought it was “possible to start out poor in this country, work hard, and become 
rich,” versus only 19 percent who said it was not possible.97 Compared to responses to the 
same question in previous surveys, the popular belief in the possibility of social mobility 
has  increased despite  the  fact  that  economic  indicators  show  a  decline  in  income 
mobility. In 1983, only 57 percent of respondents claimed to believe it was “possible to 
start out poor in this country, work hard, and become rich” and 38 percent said it was 
96 Leonhardt, 2005.
97 The poll was conducted in English and Spanish with 1,764 respondents selected by random digit dialing 
between March 9 and 14, 2005. Leonhardt, 2005.
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“not possible.” [Figure 5.4] 
Figure 5.4/ Is it possible to start out poor in this country, work hard, and get rich?98 
While still a majority, that  represents a much weaker consensus. People are not only 
increasingly likely to believe  mobility is possible, they also tend to say that mobility is 
increasing  rather than decreasing. When asked whether the “likelihood of moving up 
from one social class to another” now compared with 30 years ago was greater, worse, or 
about the same, the plurality (40 percent) chose answered “greater.”99 
At  first,  this  appears  to  be  a  quintessential  example  of  “false  consciousness.” 
People  are  clearly  mistaken  about  the  reality  of  income  mobility  in  the  U.S.  Many 
scholars argue this persistent or even increasing belief  in the American Dream is the 
product  of  institutional  brainwashing by the mass  media  or  educational  system.  For 
example, in  The New Class Society, Robert Perrucci and Earl Wysong claim that “It is 
precisely because of.  .  .  Forrest  Gump-genre films,  and other 'rags-to-riches'  cultural 
products that most Americans appear to accept the myth of the American Dream.” 100 
Perrucci and Wysong argue that films like  Forrest Gump, public school civics classes, 
and the broader corporate culture in the U.S. distort the reality of class in America or  
98 Screen shot from the interactive feature “A Closer Look at Income Mobility,” Leonhardt, 2005. 
99 Ibid.
100 Perrucci and Wysong, 1999: 186.
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distract people from the reality of class inequality.
For this system to work, the majority of disadvantaged Americans must be 
persuaded to believe that the way things work out for people is fair. This is 
done by distracting attention from class inequality. . . . The complexity, 
the contradictions, the madness of modern life lead the average American 
to alternate between anger, involvement, and frustration and often finally 
to withdraw into some safe haven or escapist activity. 
 The masses, in short, have been duped.
But what if the phenomenon people are identifying when they claim it's possible 
to  move  from  one  social  class  to  another  is  based  on  a  definition  of  class  that 
encompasses  more than just  income?  An  article  in  the  online  magazine  Salon titled 
“Hipsters on Food Stamps” exemplifies the complexities in how people define class and 
police  its  boundaries.  Jennifer  Bleyer  describes  what  she  claims  is  a  growing  trend 
generated by the recent recession: 
Faced with lingering unemployment, 20-and 30-somethings with college 
degrees and foodie standards are shaking off old taboos about who should 
get government assistance and discovering that government benefits can 
indeed be used for just about anything edible, including wild-caught fish, 
organic asparagus, and triple-crème cheese.101
Her evidence is mostly anecdotal. Bleyer goes grocery shopping with an unemployed art 
school graduate and a part-time blogger with a degree from the University of Chicago 
who live in an “artsy” neighborhood in northwest Baltimore and had recently qualified 
for $150-200 in food stamp assistance. They use the stamps to buy  ingredients to make 
a Thai curry, including lemongrass, coconut milk, a Chinese gourd, and clementine juice. 
She  also  interviews  an  AmeriCorps  volunteer  from  Brooklyn  who  supplements  his 
stipend with food stamps (an approved part of the standard AmeriCorps compensation) 
and who says some of his artist friends who live in Williamsburg also received nutritional 
assistance in recent months.  The final piece of  evidence is  a quote from a cashier at 
Rainbow Grocery in San Francisco who says that more young people seem to be buying 
101 Jennifer Bleyer, “Hipsters on Food Stamps,” Salon.com: Pinched: Tales from an Economic Downturn, 
15 March 2010, Web (accessed 29 March 2011). 
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organic food with Electronic Benefit Transfer [EBT] cards.102 
Bleyer  admits  the  scope  of  the  phenomenon  is  difficult  to  measure  (perhaps 
because  “hipster”  is  not  an  official  demographic  recognized  by  human  resource 
administrators). The food policy experts she interviews insist most food stamps go to 
“traditional recipients: the working poor, the elderly and single parents on welfare.” She 
also acknowledges the dramatic increase in unemployment for people between the ages 
of 20-to-34—between 2006 and 2009, the rate increased 100% for the entire age group 
and  176%  for  those  with  a  bachelor’s  degree  or  higher—leading  her  to  somewhat 
grudgingly admit  that  “young urbanites with a taste for ciabatta  may legitimately be 
among  the  new  poor  [emphasis  added].”  But  then  she  quotes  Parke  Wilde,  a  food 
economist from Tufts, who implies their questionable poverty is temporary and that they 
likely  have other  sources of  support:  “There are many 20-somethings from educated 
families who go through a period of unemployment and live very frugally, maybe even 
technically  in  poverty,  who  now  qualify.”  The  word  “educated”  is  applied  to  family, 
almost certainly a class marker that elides the possibility that these college graduates 
might  come  from  poor  backgrounds.  Wilde  further  states  that  their  poverty  is 
“technical,” only a phase in which they are temporarily reduced to “frugal” living . 
The article generated over 450 comments in three days,  at which point Salon 
closed  the  thread.  Most  of  them  were  from  angry  readers  demanding  government 
assistance be limited to more deserving people and restricted from expensive luxuries. 
Many  readers  sought  to  distinguish  the  hipsters  described  in  the  article  from  the 
genuinely poor,  using their  high-class  tastes  as  the primary evidence that  they don't 
belong on government assistance. “KathyI” writes, “Instead of asking the government to 
assist your educated palate, maybe you should be asking Mom & Dad. Obviously they 




Again, the word “educated” is code for “elite,” deployed almost like a slur. This response 
challenges the idea that class is  based solely on income. The hipsters' other forms of 
capital—college degrees and high-class tastes—mark them as illegitimate recipients of 
government support. 
Commenters were more likely to question the authenticity of their poverty than 
the average price of their subsidized meals. A reader named “pjamma” says, “If a single 
person qualifies and can shop in this fashion every day then 1) he or she is receiving too  
much money  or  2)  they  run  out  of  money  mid-month  and are  getting  money  from 
somewhere  else  (mommy  and  daddy)  and  should  not  qualify  to  begin  with.”104 The 
insistence that desiring premium foods must reflect wealthy social origins and involve 
excess  expenditures  points  both  to  the  role  of  cultural  practice  in  the  popular 
imagination of class and the socially-constructed exclusivity of the practices associated 
with “foodies.” Many other commenters suggested the people described in the article 
must  be  unemployed  “by  choice”  either  because  they  could  get  jobs  in  the  service 
industry if they were willing to do them or should have known better than to major in 
art. A reader identified as “CBFE” writes: 
I have a hard time believing these people truly exhausted their options. 
Did they look into fast-food, janitorial services, retail?. . . . No - these type 
of jobs don't fit  into their self-image as an artist or whatever.  So,  even 
though this  is  a  situation  of  their  own making  -  they're  expecting  the 
government to subsidize their lifestyle. And its all being paid for by people 
who actually bite the bullet and work at jobs they don't necessarily love . . . 
. Yeah, its pretty appalling.105
The reproachful comments follow in a long tradition of stigmatizing poor people 
lazy,  self-indulgent,  and  the  authors  of  their  own immiseration.  It  also  follows  in  a 
secondary tradition of anxiety about welfare cheats. However, unlike the fiction Reagan 
popularized about a black woman living in subsidized housing who drives a Cadillac and 
and uses 50 different social security numbers to collect thousands of dollars a month in 
104 Ibid.
105 Salon contributors, “Letters to the Editor, Re: Hipsters on Food Stamps,” Salon, 15-18 March 2010, 
Web (accessed 29 March 2011). 
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public handouts, the main things used to cast aspersion on the hipsters are their college 
degrees and ability to make a Thai curry from scratch. They're not being accused of greed 
or  “gaming  the  system”  (at  least  not  much—the  suggestion  that  they  might  have 
undeclared income sources from family support networks is a considerably more modest 
accusation  than  the  ones  leveled  at  Reagan's  welfare  queen).  The  primary  focus  of 
readers'  anger  is  that  they  appear  to  be,  as  KathyI  says,  living  the  “good  life”  and 
therefore cannot be truly poor. 
The primary debate in the comments is about whether their habits are virtuous or 
as  self-indulgent as the article  suggests.  In the opening paragraph,  Bleyer claims the 
hipsters  from  Baltimore  “sauntered through  a  small  ethnic  market  stocked  with 
Japanese eggplant, mint chutney,  and fresh turmeric [emphasis added],” implying an 
insouciance belied by their defensiveness about receiving public assistance. Most of the 
examples  of  “upscale”  food  mentioned  in  the  article  are  conjured  from  Bleyer's 
imagination, not foods she actually observed the hipsters buying or eating (aside from 
the curry). She uses these icons of high-status food culture to undermine her theoretical 
defense their practices: 
Food stamp-using foodies might be applauded for demonstrating that one 
can, indeed, eat healthy and make delicious home-cooked meals on a tight 
budget.  And  while  they  might  be  questioned  for  viewing  premium 
ingredients as a necessity, it could also be argued that they're eating the 
best and most conscious way they know how. . . . Is it wrong to believe 
there should be a local, free-range chicken in every Le Creuset pot?106
They might be applauded, she claims, but then she conflates the act of making healthy 
and delicious meals on a tight budget with “viewing premium ingredients as a necessity.” 
She caricatures this further in her updated version of the proverbial “chicken in every 
pot.”107 The  subtitle  of  the  article  also explicitly  invites  people  to  criticize  the (likely 
106  Bleyer, 2010. 
107  Widely attributed to President Herbert Hoover, apparently because it was invoked by 1928 Republican 
National Committee ad that claimed Hoover had put the “proverbial 'chicken in every pot .' And a car in 
the backyard, to boot” so a vote for Hoover was a vote for continued prosperity. Herbert Hoover 
Presidential Library, “Frequently Asked Questions,” Web (accessed 07 April 2011). 
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apocryphal) trend: “They're young, they're broke, and they pay for organic salmon with 
government subsidies. Got a problem with that?”108 
Many  people  who  responded  to  article  issued  a  resounding  “Yes,  we  have  a 
problem with that.” However, a smaller, but still substantial, group of comments came 
from people defending the hipsters for eating “real” food instead of junk despite their 
limited means. This second group frequently suggested that their superior food choices 
would prevent them from getting fat and taxing the health care system. For example, 
“terribletink” writes: 
“With  rising  obesity  epidemics  and  other  diet-related  health  issues  so 
prevalent in our culture, why would we want these folks to spend their 
meager  allotment  on  highly  processed  foods  laden  with  fats  and  high 
fructose corn syrup instead of organic carrots, salmon, and other healthy 
items?” 
Others  re-framed “real”  food as  frugal  rather than extravagant,  like  “tweeders1”  who 
applauds the hipsters for their principled refusal to support agribusiness: 
I have absolutely no problem with this. Its about time that food stamps 
were used for real food. Its about time that people really learn how to cook 
how to cook food as opposed to buying canned food and chips. Its the best 
way to stretch a buck. It also take's away from the profits of the like's of 
Nabisco, Nestle and all  of those other corporations who don't care and 
produce corn and other products.109 
Here, buying healthy food is specifically contrasted with junk. Others mention other bad, 
cheap  alternatives.  “Aburkett,”  writes,  “They  are  buying  in  the  store  rather  than 
McDonalds  and they are  getting  something healthy  and cooking it  well.  .  .  .  Should 
people suffer and eat junk food that makes them diebetic (which those working for would 
have to  pay for)?” One commenter  suggested a  better  solution than preventing poor 
hipsters from buying good food would be to make them teach “traditional” food stamp 
recipients to shop and cook.110 
108  Bleyer, 2010.
109  Salon contributors, 2010. 
110 “SalliganeG” writes, “Perhaps a solution that could make more people happy would be requiring them 
to take more traditional recipients shopping, and to teach them to use ingredients with which they may 
not be familiar to cook simple, flavorful, nutritious meals. They might even see teh benefit of public 
service.” Ibid.
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The hipsters' defenders romanticize them as resourceful and frugal,  admirably 
unfettered  by  the  the  gluttonous  excesses  of  capitalism.  Like  Reagan's  myth  of  the 
welfare queen, hipsters on food stamps became a repository for widespread fantasies and 
fears, which is likely why the article generated such an enthusiastic response.  A typical 
article in Salon attracts about a dozen comments. More than three dozen is unusual. 
Four hundred is truly rare. What the two primary responses have in common is that 
whether  the  respondents  saw  the  hipsters  as  admirable  or  loathsome  was  based 
primarily on whether they interpreted their food choices as a renunciation of unhealthy 
junk food (i.e. as a denial or deferral of pleasure) or as an indulgence. Many of the people 
who  argued  food  stamps  should  be  restricted  specifically  complained  about  the 
possibility  that  people  could  use  government  assistance  for  pleasure.  For  example, 
“Soliel” writes: 
ONLY BASIC foods should be OK for food stamps. No chips, no cakes, no 
artisinal breads, nothing fancy[. . . .] There are millions of non food stamp 
people buying beans and rice to save money while food stamp folks can 
buy fun food? No, that isn't right. If I could wave a magic wand...I would 
say  ONLY basic  vegetables,  fruits,  beans  and  grains  are  OK for  foods 
stamps. Not much else.111
Neither junk foods nor artisanal bread are permitted according to Soliel's criteria, which 
has less to do with how expensive the foods are than whether or not they are fun. 112 
Part of the reason so many readers were so quick to dictate thrift and asceticism 
to the hipsters is because it enabled them to negotiate their own shameful indulgences. 
Just like the image of obese poor people buying frozen pizzas and soda is a useful target  
of “fat shame,” the hipsters with their heaping bowls of government-subsidized squash 
curry drew attention and derision because it's the ideal repository for foodie shame. That 
111  Ibid.
112  A difficult restriction to operationalize, but not a novel suggestion. As Donna Gabaccia notes, at the 
same time that home economists were trying to Americanize new immigrants by teaching them to eat 
corn, often prepared in simple dishes portrayed as frugal and nutritious like Indian corn pudding, the 
federal Indian Bureau specifically did not include corn in their rations, seemingly because that's what 
the Indians wanted and/or because the government thought they could assimilate them with rations of 
wheat. Gabaccia, 2000: 130. 
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may even be one of the reasons many readers credulously accepted such a thin story, 
assumed it was a real phenomenon, and even made their own unfounded assumptions 
about what kinds of things foodies on food stamps might buy. 
The  responses  also  reveal  ways  of  policing  class  boundaries  that  the  idea  of 
foodies  on  food stamps transgress.  The  debate  about  the proper  role  of  government 
assistance highlights the difficulty of defining class using only traditional measures like 
income. Even though Bleyer exaggerated the extent to which people on food stamps can 
afford upscale foods, many “gourmet” items have become more available and affordable 
even on a limited budget. Although many people who identify as middle class have found 
themselves unable to get ahead financially in the last three decades, food is one arena 
where many have been able to reach for the “good life.” 
Flourishing and Class Formation
Marx developed the idea of “class” in an attempt to provide an empirical account 
of capitalism, the dominant mode of economic production and social organization in the 
Western world when he began writing. Specifically, the term “class” expressed how the 
dominant mode of producing the means of subsistence creates differences between how 
various groups within a society relate to production; those differences determine the 
conditions of their lives. For example, he discusses the emergence of a distinct class of 
urban burghers who controlled movable property and craft labor in the Middle Ages:
Out of the many local corporations of burghers there gradually but very 
slowly  arose  the burgher  class.  The conditions  of  life  of  the  individual 
burghers  became  conditions  which  were  common  to  them  all  and 
independent  of  each  individual  because  of  their  contradiction  to  the 
existing relationships and because of  the mode of  labor determined by 
these.113 
As this example clarifies, it's not merely having shared conditions of life, but being in 
“contradiction  to  the  existing  relationships”  that  produces  classes.  Even  in  tribal 
113 Marx, 1846: 143. 
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societies,  the  labor  required  for  subsistence  is  unequally  divided  between  family 
members, and individuals end up competing for scarce resources: “the division of labor 
implies the conflict between the interest of the individual or the individual family and the 
communal  interest  of  all  individuals  having contact  with one another.”  114 For  Marx, 
classes emerge only in conflicts between groups with antagonistic interests. The burgher 
class emerged only through conflict with the landed nobility and the peasants. 
In  other  words,  classes  form  when  individuals  whose  conditions  of  life  are 
determined by their relationship to the mode of production are united against another 
group with a different one: “various individuals form a class only insofar as they have to 
carry on a joint battle against another class.”115 The critique of capitalist societies Marx is 
remembered for is that “the necessary result of competition [which capitalism depends 
on and fosters] is the accumulation of capital in a few hands...the whole society must 
divide into two classes of proprietors and propertyless workers.”116 This introduces the 
idea  of  exploitation:  dominant  classes  secure  their  material  welfare  through  the 
systematic material deprivation of subordinated ones.
According  to  Erik  Olin  Wright,  a  contemporary  proponent  of  Marxist  class 
analysis, a concern with exploitation is what distinguishes Marxist approaches to class 
from  other  definitions  and  models  of  class  developed  later.  Wright  argues  that  the 
normative critique inherent in the idea of “exploitation” forms the basis of the moral 
outrage  that  characterizes  Marxist  criticism.117 For  people  who  believe  that  people 
deserve equal access to the goods required for their subsistence, exploitation is not just 
unfortunate for the people who are systematically deprived, but fundamentally unfair 
and wrong. Therefore, Marxist analysis is “rooted in” the foundational assumption that 
114 Ibid, 119. 
115 Ibid, 144. 
116 Marx, 1844: 58. 
117 Wright also notes that this moral dimension is a source of discomfort for many Marxists, including 
Marx himself because they generally believe that morality reflects material conditions and interests: 
“Marx preferred to simply argue that socialism was in the interests of the working class and that it was, 
in any case, the historical destiny of capitalism.” Wright, 2005: 6. 
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“human flourishing would be broadly enhanced by a radically egalitarian distribution of 
the material conditions of life... that human beings will generally flourish better under 
such egalitarian conditions than under conditions of inequality and hierarchy.”118 
Most scholars agree that class in contemporary capitalist societies doesn't seem to 
fit  Marx's polarized model.119 Subsequent attempts to define class in ways that better 
reflect  the  developments in capitalism since Marx's  death fall  into two main groups: 
those who continue to identify class as primarily an expression of a person's relationship 
to material resources and those who define class as a socially-constructed identity like 
race or gender. Wright's typology is an example of the former. He proposes a matrix of 
three kinds of unequally-distributed assets: relation to the means of production, relation 
to authority, and the possession of scarce skills. The matrix also takes into account the 
size of the operation. This yields twelve possible classes. [Figure 5.5] 
Figure 5.5/Wright's Class Typology120
Wright's model is very useful for analyzing power relationships and exploitation in the 
workforce, but as even he admits, the majority of people in capitalist societies do not 
118 Ibid, 6.
119  With some notable exceptions. See: Perucci and Wysong, 1999. Michael Zweig's argument that the 
majority of Americans are working class acknowledges the “middle class” as real, but small and claims 
that most people who think they are middle class are “really” working-class. The Working Class  
Majority: America's Best Kept Secret (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
120 Erik Olin Wright, Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997: 25. 
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have jobs in the labor force.121 
He suggests many of them can still be located within the matrix based on family 
relations, like children of wealthy capitalists whose class interests match their parents; 
however, he admits that “housewives” pose a problem because they work but are not part 
of the paid labor force.122 The hipsters and their questionable class status poses another 
problem for Wright's  typology.  There is  no place for the unemployed,  participants in 
informal labor markets, or the idle rich. In Wright's matrix, a teenager working at a fast 
food restaurant is a “nonskilled worker” even if her parents are expert managers. Nor 
does Wright offer a way to account for the vast differences in wealth, power, and status 
that  different  kinds of  small  business  owners,  skilled workers,  and petty bourgeoisie 
might  have.  The  structural  factors  that  affect  how  much  power  people  have  when 
negotiating  the  sale  of  their  labor  do  not  necessarily  correspond  well  to  the  lived 
experience of class. 
Closely  related  to  neo-Marxist  models  like  Wright's  are  conceptualizations  of 
class that rely heavily on the writings of Max Weber and define class differences in terms 
of  unequal  “life  chances.”  The  focus  on  life  chances  places  greater  emphasis  on  the 
market than labor exploitation, but is nevertheless fundamentally based on an equation 
between material interests and flourishing. In  Economy and Society, Weber writes: “a 
class situation is one in which there is a shared typical probability of procuring goods, 
gaining a position in life, and finding inner satisfaction,"123 as if it's common sense that 
“procuring goods” and “finding inner satisfaction” would have the same “shared typical 
probability”  for  the  individuals  in  each  given  class.  Both  neo-Marxist  and  Weberian 
121  Taking into account children, students without jobs, retirees, etc. Ibid, 26. 
122  He specifically rejects attempts to analyze housework in terms of class, like the argument that 
household production is a special form of feudal exploitation or a subsidiary part of capitalist 
exploitation as misguided attempts “to treat the gender and kinship relations within a family as if they 
were a form of class relations” and says “since the analysis in this book is restricted to people in the 
paid labor force, we will bracket these issues. Ibid, 26. 
123  Weber, qtd. In Breen 2005: 32. 
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approaches  essentially  reduce  flourishing  to  material  conditions.124 Even  cultural 
approaches which might not define class in terms of life chances or relative material  
wealth typically argue that inequalities produced by differences in cultural capital are 
unfair because they reproduce material wealth and advantages.125
In  recent  decades,  many  scholars  have  begun  referring  to  “class”  as  merely 
another kind of socially-constructed difference like race,  gender,  ethnicity,  or  nation. 
Feminist scholars in particular have been critical of how the dominant approaches to 
class  that  center on wage labor,  occupational status,  and class consciousness exclude 
unpaid  work,  traditionally  feminized  jobs,  and  practices  of  everyday  living  that  also 
generate class difference. In Growing Up Girl Walkerdine et al argue that definitions of 
class based on wage labor are blind to how class is “lived as an identity designation, and 
not simply as an economic relation to the means of production.”126 They define social 
class as “the social and psychic practices through which ordinary people live, survive, 
and cope...at a particular time and in a particular place.”127 Ethnographer Lois Weis finds 
that formulation especially useful in her attempts to explain the survival of working-class 
identity in cities where the industrial jobs have disappeared. Her understanding of class 
is much more like prevailing approaches to race and gender—she argues that class is a 
“phantasmatic category” and class identities are not necessarily stable or “real,” meaning 
essential, but that class “nevertheless organizes the social, cultural, and material world in 
exceptionally profound ways.”128
Scholars  like  Walkerdine  and  Weis  have  critically  illuminated  how  class  is 
124  Thorstein Veblen made this point in his accusation of Marx being too “utilitarian.” He also says 
supporters of socialism, or communal property and production and equitable wealth distribution, rely on 
a vulgar and “hedonistic calculus.” “Socialist Economics of Karl Marx and His Followers,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics v. 20 (1906).
125  See, for example, Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities (1991).
126 Valerie Walkerdine, et al. Growing Up Girl: Psycho-Social Explorations of Class and Gender (New 
York, NY: New York University Press, 2001: 13). 
127 Ibid, 27.
128 Lois Weis, Class Reunion: The Remaking of the American White Working Class (New York, NY: 2004, 
13). 
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gendered and gender is  classed.  Like most scholarship on forms of  social  difference, 
theirs is  characterized by a commitment to equality. However, ideals of race or gender 
equality don't require the elimination of difference. Class equality does. Race and gender 
differences could theoretically persist in an equal system, e.g. the multicultural ideal of a 
diverse  society  without  hierarchies  in  which  people  recognize  and  celebrate  their 
differences.129 In  contrast,  the  Marxist  ideal  of  a  radically  egalitarian  distribution  of 
material  conditions  of  life  would  eliminate  the  basis  for  class  hierarchy.  Ehrenreich 
echoes this when she claims “the point of discussing class is ultimately to abolish it.”130 
The primary alternative to approaches that reduce class difference to economic assets are 
conceptions  of  class  that  functionally  abandon  the  critique  of  class  exploitation  and 
hierarchy.
If class were merely another category of social identity, then like race and gender 
it could theoretically persist even if class hierarchy were dissolved. But it's unclear what 
the  basis  of  the  construction  of  difference  would  be.  Even  when  class  is  used  to 
characterize a way of living, that way of living is associated with a relative position in a 
hierarchy based on unequally-distributed assets. Scholars typically argue that cultural 
differences  shouldn't  be  seen  as  hierarchical—for  example,  studies  of  working  class 
culture in particular often argue that  the ways of  speaking, eating,  decorating,  child-
129 Multiculturalism is a contested term, subject to caricature and attack from both ends of the political 
spectrum. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam argue that critiques from the left, perhaps most prominently 
Slavoj Zizek's argument that multiculturalism is “the ideal ideological form of global capitalism” is 
based on “top-down” forms of “tolerance” or “diversity” multicultualism and not the more radical forms 
of critique that originated in the social justice movements of the 1960s (2008: 128). Notably, Abul R. 
JanMohamed and David Lloyd argue that it's a lack of attention to class that causes the slide from 
multicultural agendas to the kind of liberal pluralism Zizek takes issue with: “Such pluralism tolerates 
the existence of salsa, it enjoys Mexican restaurants, but it bans Spanish as a medium of instruction in 
American schools. Above all it refuses to acknowledge the class basis of discrimination and the 
systematic economic exploitation of minorities that underlie postmodern culture” (qtd. in Ella Shohat 
and Aamir Mufti's 1997 introduction to Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial  
Perspectives 1997). My point here is that while it is certainly possible to imagine equality between 
racial or ethnic groups without a complete eradication of differences between them; class difference is 
always hierarchical, meaning equality would require either the elimination of difference or an 
elimination of the hierarchy (which would, therefore, eliminate the basis for class difference)--either 
way, class difference and equality cannot co-exist.
130  Ehrenreich, 1989: x. 
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rearing, relaxing, and so on that characterize the lived experience of, say, the working 
class  of  the 1970s American rust belt  are no better or worse than the ways of  living 
associated  with  the black working class  or  white  upper  class,  or  middle-class  Asian-
Americans,  etc.131 Nevertheless,  the unequal distribution of  material  assets  and social 
hierarchy that gives rise to class-based differences persists. 
While  increasing numbers  of  Americans  have come to  believe  treating people 
unequally on the basis of race, gender, or ethnicity  is immoral, they tend not to see class  
bias as unjust, or even something that deserve to be labeled “bias.”132 Equal opportunity 
and affirmative action policies rarely claim to protect against “class” discrimination, and 
even when they do, class is “generally forgotten in their implementation.”133 Scholars like 
Michael  Savage claim that  while  race  and gender  identities  are  no less  embodied or 
correlated  with  employment  qualifications,  capitalism  literally  cannot  withstand the 
removal  of  class.  Thus,  while  real  advances  have  been  made  in  establishing  and 
addressing formal and informal discrimination on the basis of race and gender,  class 
inequality is still often seen as natural, inevitable, and sometimes even desirable.
Many scholars point to the lack of a unified theory of class as a cause of popular 
confusion about what “class” means and its declining popularity as a theoretical lens 
compared  to  other  major  categories  of  social  difference  like  race,  gender,  ethnicity, 
nationality,  sexuality,  and  etc.134 However,  class  is  no  more  ambiguous  than  race.  I 
131 An implicit theme of Distinction and especially characteristic of studies of the working class, like the 
pioneering work of E.P. Thompson in The Making of the English Working Class (1963), and scholarship 
associated with the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies. 
132 Hate crime laws, for example, often permit federal prosecution for crimes motivated by bias against 
people on the basis of “race, religion, ethnicity nationality, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
and disability” but not class identity (“Hate crime laws” 2009). Measures of explicit bias on the basis of 
race and ethnicity have declined so much that since the late 1990s, much of the research on racism has 
shifted to measures of implicit bias like the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Although the research on 
implicit bias shows that racism, sexism, and homophobia still shape American society in important 
ways, there is also a broad consensus that bias has declined significantly in the past half-century.
133  Andrew Sayer, The Moral Significance of Class (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 
14).  
134 In recent decades, categories of social difference like gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality have come to 
the fore in both the politics of recognition and liberal arts scholarship. While that was necessary to 
address their egregious neglect and advance many important social justice agendas, it often came at the 
expense of class analysis. The declining popularity of class analysis and class politics have led some 
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suspect that some of the resistance to using “class” as an analytic is due to a widespread 
discomfort with, on the one hand, the idea that flourishing ultimately comes down to 
material capital and on the other hand, the idea that class is not inherently hierarchical. 
Instead of assuming that class must reflect different relationships to capital, I propose 
that  the  social  construction  and  lived  experience  of  class  is  based  on  perceived 
differences in flourishing itself. 
Where people stand in the class hierarchy depends on the extent to which they 
embody the dominant construction of the “good life,” which connotes not just pleasure 
but also fulfillment and virtue. Wealth and status are often indicators of flourishing, but 
class,  like  eudaimonia,  ultimately  reflects  far  more  than  the  sum  of  one's  assets. 
Flourishing  is  inherently  contextual,  constructed,  and  contingent—what  looks  like 
“flourishing”  in  the  an  impoverished  society  might  seem  like  squalor  in  a  wealthier 
one,135 and things that have at other times and places served as markers of wealth and 
power,  like  extreme  fatness,  are  stigmatized  and  associated  with  poverty  in  many 
contemporary Western nations. Even within small and homogeneous communities, the 
“good life” is a a moving target, constantly being contested, re-evaluated and re-shaped. 
Lifestyles that fit the dominant construction of the “good life” are seen as superior, not 
merely  different.  Classes  are  thus  inherently  hierarchical,  even  if  they  are  just  as 
contingent as race and gender. Class is best understood as a project, like the definition 
Michael  Omi and Howard Winant  offer  for  race:  “race  has  no fixed meaning,  but is  
constructed  and  transformed  sociohistorically  through  competing  political  projects, 
through  the  necessary  and  ineluctable  link  between  the  structural  and  cultural 
sociologists to claim that class is “disappearing” in the United States, and Americans seem less likely 
than ever to form stable identities based on distinctions between economical assets. Nevertheless, 
attempts to describe and account for the reproduction of material advantage testify to the continued 
influence of structural relationships to productive resources and cultural divisions that cannot be wholly 
attributed to other forms of difference (Wright 2005).
135  Robert Frank notes that when he was a Peace Corps volunteer in Nepal, he lived in a house without 
plumbing or electricity “that most families would be ashamed of in the United States,” but that he never 
felt embarrassed or even deprived because “it was actually a terrific house in that context” (2007:38). 
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dimensions of race in the U.S.”136
Many indicators of flourishing are the factors traditionally used to define social 
classes:  occupation,  income,  and  wealth.  However,  the  idea  of  the  “good  life,”  like 
eudaimonia,  is  based on more than just capital;  the good connotes both pleasure,  or 
good feelings, and virtue, or good morals. Class hierarchies based on the perception of 
flourishing  don't  always  correspond to  the ranking  implied  by terms  like  upper  and 
lower. The upper class may be composed of people with the greatest wealth and prestige, 
but be seen as decadent, snobbish, and overprivileged—distinctly lacking in virtue.137
Sociologist  Andrew  Sawyer  has  writes  about  the  importance  of  virtue  to 
constructions of class in The Moral Significance of Class. He argues, “people's normative 
concerns in relation to class go beyond the unequal distribution of material goods and 
recognition  and  respect,  to  questions  of  just  what  is  good  in  terms  of  ways  of  life,  
practices, objects, behaviors, and types of character that people see as desirable.”138 The 
ideologies  that  govern  aspirational  eating  are  quintessential  examples  of  the lay 
normativities that Sayer argues are central to the experience of class, like the conviction 
that  some foods  are  morally  good because  they promote  weight-loss  or  ecologically-
sound  practices  while  foods  seen  as  fattening  or  products  of  distant  and  wasteful 
industrial processing are morally bad.
Sayer says sociologists typically reduce lay normativities to habitual action, status 
acquisition,  and rationalizations  of  the  status  quo.  This  is  exemplified by Bourdieu's 
136  Omi and Winant, 1986:71.
137  In a 1989 book titled The Good Life, Loren Baritz refers to the “everywhere, invisible, and taken for 
granted” middle classes as “the great imperial middle,” noting that while “by no means have all 
Americans been middle-class, that is what most have wanted to be, and they have conducted themselves 
in ways acceptable to the norm before they have had or even after they have lost the price of admission” 
(xi-xii). In other words, the middle class is the hegemonic class; they are cultural leaders, and the class 
to aspire to. Paul Fussell gets even more specific in Class: A guide through the American Status system, 
which proposes a nine-class system based on economic power (as opposed to the traditional three-class 
system), but claims that everyone, even the truly rich, really want to be upper middle-class, whether 
they would admit it or not. Fussell's “everyone” is indisputably too broad, but reflects the dominant 
construction of “the good life.” 
138  Sayer, 2005: 2-3. 
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theory that tastes reflect either rational calculations based on need or savvy maneuvering 
for social advantage. That would mean poorer people buy yellow mustard because it's 
what they're used to and all they can afford; people with enough money to be concerned 
about how they “seem” buy Dijon for its social cache. According to the prevailing theory, 
anyone  who  claims  to  genuinely  believe  yellow mustard  or  Dijon  is  better—whether 
because they believe it is more sophisticated or simply think it tastes better—is merely 
rationalizing.
Popular constructions of the “good life” are inevitably shaped by prevailing power 
relationships, but that doesn't mean they are merely rationalizations for the choices that 
promote  powerful  interests.  Often,  lay  normativities  and  popular  representations 
actually challenge the status quo. More often, they are contradictory or indeterminate 
and open to a wide variety of different interpretations and uses. Part of the power of  
aspirational eating is in its ability to absorb contradictions and justify a wide range of 
tastes and behaviors. 
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C O N C L U S I O N
S T O P  F E E L I N G  G O O D  A B O U T  W H E R E  Y O U  S H O P
Figure C.1/Billboard in Shorewood, Wisconsin, 20061  
Our daily choices are largely inconsequential next to our  
larger system choices. Sure, eating less meat, buying less  
stuff, and flying less often are all helpful. But living in  
compact neighborhoods, getting rid of our cars if we can,  
working for companies and voting for candidates who  
will fight to bring us clean energy, transit, better farming,  
smarter buildings and more sustainable infrastructure—
those are the transformative actions.2 
—Alex Steffen
Food Matters
Food is so often taken for granted that it is still something of a revolutionary act 
1 Photograph by Flickr user michael.newman, originally published 12 August 2006, Web (accessed 19 
March 2011). 
2 Daniel Fromson, “A Conversation With Alex Steffen, Sustainability Thinker,” The Atlantic, 17 March 
2011, Web (accessed 19 March 2011). 
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to claim that “food matters.” This is especially true in academia, where food has only 
recently been embraced as a legitimate object of inquiry in many disciplines. In Food: 
The Key Concepts, Warren Belasco claims that while food studies is “now 'respectable,' it 
is also inherently subversive. To study food often requires us to cross disciplinary 
boundaries and to ask inconvenient questions.”3 Because those inconvenient questions 
often target powerful interests or critique prevailing social structures, paying attention to 
food and insisting on its importance is not just academically revolutionary (i.e. a 
challenge to traditional cannons and disciplinary approaches) but also politically 
revolutionary. As Belasco elaborates, “the academic left has found food studies to be a 
fertile base for activist analysis of hunger, inequality, neo-colonialism, corporate 
accountability, biotechnology, globalization, and ecological sustainability.”4 In other 
words, people who study food and insist on its importance are generally not just trying to 
correct a traditional oversight in the production of knowledge, but also seeking change. 
Similarly, when popular writers like Michael Pollan and Mark Bittman insist that “food 
matters,” they not only imply that their target audience takes food for granted, but also 
that if they paid more attention to food, they would behave differently. 
This logic follows from the culinary enlightenment thesis: if the reason that more 
people have begun to eat “better” since the 1980s is that they discovered the importance 
of food and became better educated about matters of taste, health, purity, and 
authenticity, then people who are not interested in eating “better” must be ignorant and 
apathetic. Indeed, Pollan conflates eating industrially with eating “in ignorance”: “The 
pleasures of eating industrially, which is to say eating in ignorance, are fleeting.”5 
Apparently, no one could believe that food matters, be educated about the source and 
process and costs—apparent and hidden—of food and still choose the industrial option. 
However, the evidence that industrial food is necessarily, objectively inferior in terms of 
3 Belasco, 2008: 6.
4 Ibid. 
5 Pollan, 2006: 11.
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taste, nutrition, ethical purity, or authenticity is often far from conclusive. 
The Fantasy of the Golden Yolks
In June 2010, I bought my first carton of non-specialty eggs. I knew they were 
laid by hens housed in battery cages that had likely been de-beaked and unable to fully 
extend their wings for the entirety of their short, miserable lives. I hesitated before 
putting them into my basket and looked around guiltily. “You care more about climate 
change than chicken happiness,” I reminded myself, “And the chickens in the 'free range' 
coop were probably not meaningfully happier anyway.” Then I willed myself to walk 
away. My momentary egg crisis was prompted by two articles that had rocked my belief 
in the superiority of specialty eggs. 
The new information did not concern chicken welfare. I had already accepted the 
fact that labels like “cage free” and “free range” were unreliable indicators of humane egg 
production. “Cage free” eggs are laid by chickens that may be able to extend their wings, 
but they still live in cramped conditions with no access to the outdoors; additionally, 
without the protection of the cages, they are far more susceptible to injury or premature 
death by pecking and clawing, which crowded confinement encourages.6 “Free range” 
and “USDA organic” eggs come from hens that often have only token access to the 
outdoors in the form of a small, concrete patio attached to the side of a cage-free coop.7 
According to a 2010 report by the Cornucopia Institute, 80 percent of eggs that bear the 
USDA organic label are laid by hens with “no meaningful outdoor access.”8 
6 In a 2010 report, the American Veterinary Medical Association (a non-profit professional association of 
licensed veterinary practitioners and academics) concluded, “alternative systems also have considerable 
liabilities in terms of animal health, biosecurity and economic efficiency. It cannot be assumed that hens 
in non-cage systems will experience improved welfare.” AVMA, “Backgrounder: Welfare Implications 
of Laying Hen Housing,” March 2010, Web (accessed 10 April 2011). 
7 Catherine Price, “Sorting Through the Claims of the Boastful Egg,” The New York Times, 16 September 
2010, Web (accessed 10 April 2011). 
8  Defined by the National Organic Standards Board’s Livestock Committee as outdoor space sufficient 
“to satisfy [the chickens’] natural behavior patterns, provide adequate exercise area, provide preventive 
health care benefits and answer consumer expectations of organic livestock management.” The 
Cornucopia Institute, Scrambled Eggs: Separating Factory Farm Egg Production from Authentic  
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Nonetheless, I had long assumed that even if the difference in chicken welfare 
between caged and cage-free industrial coops is very small, it would probably be worth 
the slight difference in cost to support producers who give their chickens the freedom to 
walk around and extend their wings fully. Additionally, I suspected—apropos of 
essentially nothing—that specialty eggs also were also healthier and better-tasting. In 
part, that was probably inspired by claims on specialty egg packaging like “all vegetarian 
feed” or “rich in omega-3s.” However, the main reason I believed that there was really a 
difference was because of the difference in the color of the yolks.
Specialty eggs tend to have darker-colored yolks. In 2008, when a bottle of 1893 
Veuve Clicquot was discovered locked away in a sideboard at a Scottish castle, I read 
somewhere that the bottle's distinctive yellow label (which had been perfectly preserved 
by the dark conditions it was stored in) was the first real evidence that the now-
trademarked color was in use that early in the brand's production. According to company 
lore, the label was one of the innovations of Barbe-Nicole Clicquot Ponsardin (aka the 
Widow Clicquot) herself, and was originally based on the color of egg yolks.9 Or, as 
Mireille Guiliano notes in her account of the brand's rise, “what used to be the color of 
egg yolks when all chickens were free-range.”10 Ah ha! I thought: this is how eggs yolks 
laid by healthy, natural chickens are supposed to look. Every time I saw a Veuve Clicquot 
label, it confirmed my belief that the rich, golden yolks of my specialty eggs were more 
authentic to the true essence of eggs, and probably more nutritious, and—I truly believed
—better tasting than conventional eggs with their small, pale post-it-colored yolks.
I was not alone in those assumptions. In June 2010, The Washington Post  
published an article by freelance health writer Tamar Haspel about a blind taste-test she 
Organic Agriculture (September 2010), Web (10 April 2011). 
9 The BBC story about the bottle's discovery does not mention egg yolks, but many other accounts of 
Clicquot Ponsardin confirm the color story, see the reference below or Natalie MacLean, Red, White,  
and Drunk All Over: A Wine-Soaked Journey from Grape to Glass (New York, NY: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2007: 110) 
10 Mireille Guiliano, Women Work and the Art of Savoir Faire: Business Sense & Sensibility (New York, 
NY: Simon and Schuster, 2009: 82)
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had arranged to compare eggs from her own backyard hens to “ordinary supermarket-
brand eggs, organic supermarket eggs, [and] high-end organic Country Hen brand 
eggs.”11 Haspel, her husband, and six other tasters, including the publishers of Edible 
Cape Cod and the owner of a well-regarded local restaurant, took turns donning 
blindfolds and spoon-feeding each other soft cooked eggs. Tasters scribbled notes in-
between bites, but audible comments were discouraged. In the end, “every egg got both 
good and bad comments, and the votes for the best-tasting were split almost evenly.”12 
Furthermore, all acknowledged it had been difficult to differentiate between the eggs at 
all. Haspel interviewed Pat Curtis, a poultry scientist from Auburn University, who 
confirms that Haspel's results mirror years of egg industry research:
'People's perception of egg flavor is mostly psychological,' she told me in a 
phone interview. 'If you ask them what tastes best, they'll choose whatever 
they grew up with, whatever they buy at the market. When you have them 
actually taste, there's not enough difference to tell.' The egg industry has 
been conducting blind tastings for years. The only difference is that they 
don't use dish-towel blindfolds; they have special lights that mask the 
color of the yolks. 'If people can see the difference in the eggs, they also 
find flavor differences,' Curtis says. 'But if they have no visual cues, they 
don't.'13 
Curtis also noted that freshness can affect the moisture content and acidity of 
eggs, which may affect their taste and texture. The whites of fresh eggs tend to be stiffer, 
which can make them more difficult to beat into the stiff peaks required for meringues 
and sponge cakes. However, differences in the final product are small. As Haspel notes, 
“For those of us who wanted to believe that homegrown eggs just taste better, that wasn't 
much of a consolation prize. Okay, there's a difference, but it's small, and it isn't even 
lifestyle-related. Any super-fresh egg would outperform any older egg, cage or no cage.”14 
11 There are no official stats on how many people have backyard chickens; like the “hipsters on food 
stamps” trend, the evidence cited in trend report articles is largely anecdotal: interviews with a few 
participants and a few people in the business, like chick suppliers, talk about how they're experiencing 
high demand. Jack Shafer, “Bogus Trend of the Week: Raising Backyard Chickens,” Slate 14 May 
2009, Web (accessed 10 April 2011), and references therein. 
12 Tamar Haspel, “Backyard Eggs vs. Store-Bought: They Taste the Same,” The Washington Post, 02 June 




Nonetheless, she tried one more test, baking a simple spice cake with her fresh eggs (all 
laid within 36 hours), and ordinary supermarket eggs. The batters looked different: “Our 
version was a brighter color and held together better than its supermarket counterpart.” 
However, after baking and cooling, “they were absolutely indistinguishable in flavor, in 
texture, in appearance.”15 Apparently, with eggs, as with wine, the differences people 
perceive are based more on expectation and framing than any objective qualities. 
Disturbed but intrigued, I went looking for more information about the 
nutritional content of conventional and organic eggs, thinking (or hoping) the darker 
color was still an indicator of some beneficial vitamin or omega-3 fatty acids or 
something, anything at all. Instead, what I found is that yolk color depends primarily on 
the concentration of yellow pigments (mostly carotenoids) in the chicken feed that have 
no necessary relationship to the taste or nutrient profile of the eggs. Some carotenoids, 
like beta-carotene, have nutritional value. Not all of them do. According to Marion 
Nestle, New York University Professor of Nutrition, Food Studies and Public Health, 
“deeper-colored egg yolks only indicate the presence of carotenoids in general, not 
necessarily the presence of beta-carotene.”16 
Much of the debate about the nutritional quality of eggs centers on fatty acid 
composition, and particularly the amount of omega-3s. However, in 2002, a team of 
animal scientists at Oregon State University found that “specialty” (free-range, organic, 
and vegetarian-fed, antibiotic-free) eggs were not nutritionally superior than 
conventional eggs based on the fatty acid profile either. (They did find that they were 
significantly more prone to breakage—not exactly good news).17 The authors explain that 
while fatty-acid composition can sometimes be affected by chicken feed, it also varies 
based on the age, size, and breed of the hen. Several studies have shown that the eggs 
15 Ibid.
16 Marion Nestle, “Does the Color of an Egg Yolk Indicate How Nutritious It Is?” Chow Nagging 
Question, 15 June 2009, Web (10 April 2011). 
17 G. Cherian et al, “Fatty Acid Composition and Egg Components of Specialty Eggs,” Poultry Science 81 
no. 1 (2002): 30-33. 
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laid by chickens raised on pastures with a lot of legumes like alfalfa and clover may have 
higher levels of omega-3 fatty acids and vitamins A and E.18 However, not all grasses 
provide the same benefits, according to Heather Karsten, Assistant Professor of Crop 
Production and Ecology at Penn State. “The leafier the plant, the higher the digestibility 
for the animal,” says Karsten. If a pasture is overgrazed or the grass is too mature and 
'stemmy,' the nutritional benefits fall off.”19 In any case, most specialty eggs come from 
hens that eat chicken feed composed of corn and soy, just like conventional chickens. 
Organic eggs must come from hens that eat organic corn and soy feed, but the resulting 
egg nutrient profile is the same. 
Figure C.2/Cherian et al (2002)20
My last line of defense was the environmental argument. Even if the chickens that 
lay the eggs aren't meaningfully happier, and the resulting eggs don't really taste better, 
18 Karsten et al, “Vitamins A, E, and fatty acid composition of the eggs of caged hens and pastured hens,” 
Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems 25 (2010): 45-54. 
19 Joanna Lott, “Pasture-ized Poultry,” Penn State Online Research 24.2 (May 2003), Web (accessed 10 
April 2011). 
20 The eggs labeled “animal fat free and high in omega-3” (SP1)had the highest percentage of omega-3 
fatty acids and lowest ratio of omega 6: omega 3. The “cage free, natural”  brown eggs were also 
significantly better by that measure. However, the “organic free range (SP2) and “cage free all-
vegetarian feed” eggs (SP4) had similar omega-3 content to the conventional eggs (Control). Oleic acid, 
the predominant fatty acid in chicken eggs, only varied from 42 to 45 percent across the different 
samples. Reproduced from Cherian et al, 2002: 32. 
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and the eggs aren't any healthier, perhaps the fact that feed is grown without the use of 
pesticides and herbicides makes them ecologically more sound. This turns out to be an 
incredibly difficult claim to evaluate. In lieu of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, some 
organic farming operations rely on fish meal or guano, the latter often harvested on 
islands off Peru where the dry climate preserves the droppings of seabirds.21 
Furthermore, although chemical-free farming is usually portrayed as inherently better 
for soil and water quality, the no-till movement claims that herbicide use is justified 
because it can limit tilling, which releases carbon trapped in the soil and leads to topsoil 
erosion.22 An article in Slate published the same week as The Washington Post's article 
about the taste test acknowledges the myriad unknowns involved in evaluating the 
environmental impacts of eggs, but notes that there is one factor where the data is clear
—feed efficiency:
Data from Europe indicate that chickens raised in conventional cage 
systems—the much-maligned "battery" cages now being phased out in the 
European Union—are the most efficient layers: It takes them about 2 
kilograms of feed to produce 1 kilogram of eggs. Chickens raised in cage-
free or barn systems . . . require about 14 percent more food. Free-range 
birds, with access to the outdoors, require about 18 percent more than 
conventional caged birds. Organic chickens, whose feed is grown without 
chemical fertilizers or pesticides, need roughly 20 percent more food than 
birds kept in cages. 23
The main reasons for the difference, according to Hongwei Xi, director of the Egg 
Industry Center at Iowa State University, are 1) uncaged birds waddle around a lot more, 
expending more energy than caged birds and 2) it's easier to control the temperature in 
closed hen houses, so the chickens expend less energy keeping themselves warm. There 
are other factors working against the specialty eggs, too. The higher rates of mortality 
21 The current export of guano to wealthy nations where organic produce is in high demand reprises some 
aspects of the nineteenth century imperalist scramble for guano. Then, as now, it was valued as a 
nitrogen-rich fertilizer. The U.S. actually authorized citizens to forcibly occupy islands where guano 
was found. Although technically renewable, guano is a limited resource with some people predicting 
that Peru's supplies will be exhausted within the next decade or two. Simon Romero, “Peru Guards Its 
Guano as Demand Soars,” The New York Times 30 May 2008, Web (accessed 10 April 2011). 
22 Rattan Lal, et al, “Managing Soil Carbon,” Science 16 (April 2004): 393. 
23 Nina Shen Rastogi, “The Environmental Impact of Eggs,” Slate: The Green Lantern, 01 June 2010, 
Web (accessed 10 April 2011). 
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and injury uncaged chickens cause each other are a drain on efficiency. The weaker shells 
(documented by Cherian et al) mean more eggs are lost to breakage. Chicken waste is 
harder to collect and control in free-range coops, which can produce higher ammonia 
emissions (technically classified as an environmental toxin, but primarily of concern for 
people who work in or live near the hen houses).24 
The efficiency argument is what finally rattled me. My decision to purchase 
specialty eggs was based on the assumption that I was supporting a small improvement 
in chicken welfare at a minor personal cost with no other downside. The possibility that 
there might also be a higher environmental cost associated with organic eggs suddenly 
made the decision less clear. I could commit to buying only local, pastured eggs from the 
farmer's market, which are probably laid by less-miserable chickens. But that might also 
involve a higher environmental cost and would raise the personal costs—I'd have to go to 
the farmer's market more often (and be sure to get there before the eggs are sold out) 
and they would probably cost more. Or I could stop buying eggs entirely, even though 
there's no guarantee that whatever would take their place in my diet would be any better 
for animal welfare, my health, or the environment. Meanwhile, I would definitely be 
losing out on the vast range of culinary applications for which there really is no 
substitute. And that's how I ended up in the supermarket, buying conventional eggs and 
feeling weirdly ashamed.
In one sense, my discomfort with buying the regular eggs is diametrically 
opposed to Michael Pollan's claim that eating “with a fuller consciousness of all that is at 
stake” is deeply satisfying. However, both emotions reflect the significance invested in 
food  over and above rational calculations about what is better for the environment, or 
personal health, or the ultimate in culinary pleasure. If the choices advocated by the food 
revolution were rational—a matter of balancing costs and benefits with a clear answer—
there would be no reason to feel superior for making the “better” choice or ashamed 
24 Ibid. 
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about making the “worse” one. The rational actor doesn't feel bad for making the wrong 
choice, she just doesn't make it. 
I am not suggesting that the vast majority of American consumers who buy 
industrial eggs do so because they believe those eggs are environmentally superior. Nor 
am I convinced that by purchasing industrial eggs, I am making the right choice. I don't 
know how to balance competing concerns like animal welfare, personal pleasure, health, 
and environmental effects. I'm not sure I could evaluate everything “at stake” in my 
purchases even if I devoted every waking minute to trying. How should I weigh the 
hypothesized health benefits of quinoa against the fact that the growing Western market 
for it has made it too expensive for many of the Peruvians who grow it? Does the fact that 
the tomatoes from my garden don't have to be transported anywhere make up for the 
inefficiencies caused by my indifferent weeding, over-watering, and tendency to let half 
the crop rot on the vine when the growing season and academic year collide? Does 
anyone really benefit from me signing up for a CSA again this year and dutifully 
consuming bundle after bundle of kale? This dissertation does not seek to answer those 
questions. Instead, I have sought to explain the emergence of what Belasco describes as 
an “unprecedented array of restaurant and supermarket options” and a “well-educated, 
trend-conscious public.”25 
Not a Gestalt, Not New, Not Better 
The dominant explanation for the “food revolution” is a narrative of inevitable 
progress and democratization. As more Americans started vacationing in Paris and 
became more tolerant of European immigrants, they began drinking table wine and 
discovered that they liked it. Meanwhile, doctors and nutritionists began to suspect that 
dietary cholesterol and fat cause heart disease, so health-conscious people stopped 
eating lard and butter and started buying skinless chicken breasts and eating more 
25 Belasco, 2006: 6. 
333
vegetables and whole grains. Environmentally-concerned farmers and agricultural 
scientists began innovating or recuperating traditional methods of growing food that 
don't rely on oil-based pesticides and fertilizers, and more consumers began clamoring 
for organic and locally-grown produce with a smaller carbon footprint and improved 
sustainability. Immigrants from Asia and Latin American brought new flavors and 
recipes to a growing number of cities, enlivening and diversifying American palates and 
restaurant cuisine. 
The first hole in this narrative is the fact that the trends that make up the “food 
revolution” are not always compatible. The culinary enlightenment thesis relies on the 
presumption that they form a gestalt—that the increasing sophistication of Americans' 
taste goes along with increasing health-consciousness, a certain ethical sensibility, and a 
cosmopolitan embrace of culinary diversity. And while many consumers do take part in 
all four of the pillars of enlightened eating, the new trends that emerged in the 
mainstream simultaneously often work at cross purposes: the sudden trendiness of 
triple-cream cheese and low-fat or skim milk; artificially-sweetened “diet” products, but 
also “natural” foods; locally-grown produce, but also exotic, imported spices; ethically-
raised meat, but also vegetarian options like tofu. If the “food revolution” were the result 
of an enlightenment, there ought to be some consensus on what the “right” way to eat is. 
Instead, the only commonality seems to be that it is not the industrial, processed diet 
that prevailed until the 1970s.
The second hole is that none of the trends that emerged in the 1980s were really 
new, and not in the sense that there have been vegetarians since at least the sixth century 
BC. There was a serious flowering of interest and concern in eating better—again in 
multiple, contradictory ways, at the last turn of the century. French food, slimming diets, 
the Pure Foods movement, international foods, and ethnic foods were all popular with 
the urban professional class at the turn of the twentieth century. Furthermore, there's a 
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broad consensus that all of those trends declined in popularity after the Great 
Depression. Although some people continued to diet for weight-loss, eat whole grains, 
and explore the “ethnic food” available in enclave restaurants and markets, the 
mainstream trend was represented by the rise of the processed, industrial, meat & 
potatoes cuisine that people often still associate with American food and especially fast 
food joints selling burgers and fries. 
The third hole in the culinary enlightenment thesis is that the kinds of foods 
widely assumed to be better are not necessarily so. More expensive wine doesn't 
necessarily taste better. Eggs with darker yolks aren't necessarily healthier. Eating a low-
calorie diet and exercising won't necessarily make you thin. The kinds of foods we 
imagine to be authentic are often based on a romanticized notion of the past or beliefs 
about other people and places that are as much myth as they are reality. It is not the case 
that everyone who believes that food matters will come to the same conclusion about 
what kind of food is best. The most fundamental goal of this dissertation, then, is to show 
that what it means to eat “better” is a shifting construction. It's not that Americans in the 
1950s didn't care about food or didn't want to eat better, it's that what counts as eating 
“better” changes over time. 
In the course of my research and writing, I encountered and considered a wide 
array of different theories about why the particular trends that are part of the food 
revolution would have become mainstream in the 1980s. One had to do with 
postmodernism and the idea that the creation of culinary rules was an attempt to make 
up for the loss of older rules that would have restricted how we eat—rules based on 
tradition, religion, or simple economic restriction. Or that it might be a reflection of 
post-Fordist consumer capitalism and identity being ever more tied to how we shop. But 
the earlier history of these ideals already began to challenge that theory. Religious 
studies scholar Michelle Lelwica, in particular, argues that weight-loss dieting has 
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become a kind of religion for American women to substitute for the loss of “real” religion. 
However, the religiosity theory is undermined by popularity of the “food revolution” and 
the participation of many people who identify as religious—often articulating their 
engagement in practices like weight-loss dieting or the craft food movement or eating 
locally as an expression of their faith. Contrary to Lelwica's theory, religion actually 
figures very prominently in popular weight-loss narratives. 
What I was left with was the correspondence between the popularity of the pillars 
of the food revolution and the striking changes in American income structure. The idea 
that eating “better” was a response or form of compensation for class stagnation was 
reinforced by the pervasive anxiety about class in popular representations of food and 
mainstream discourse about the “food revolution.” The threat of food snobbery on the 
one hand and the risk of being a “rube” on the other suggest that food is a highly salient 
indication of class identity and form of distinguishing cultural capital.
Not Just Food
Although I think food is an especially powerful and attractive arena for class 
aspiration, I do not think it is the only place where class anxiety manifests as aspirational 
consumption. Two additional areas where taste, pleasure, and class distinction collide 
stand out in particular: clothing and home décor. Mass media texts about clothing, 
fashion, and home decorating have proliferated in the last three decades right along with 
food media. A wide range of incredibly popular television shows, films, magazines, 
books, and product lines like Sex and the City, America's Next Top Model, Project 
Runway, The Devil Wears Prada, Vera Wang's exclusive Kohl's line represent a 
dramatic increase in the popular interest in high fashion. Alternative clothiers like 
American Apparel, Urban Outfitters and the rise of thrift store chic and DIY parallel the 
interest in ethical, alternative, and craft foods. Celebrity fashions on “the red carpet” and 
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the “fashion weeks” hosted by many major urban centers have gotten increasing 
attention from traditional news media, lifestyle magazines, and blogs.  
Of eight major categories of household spending that Jerome Segal catalogs in 
Graceful Simplicity: Toward a Philosophy and Politics of Simple Living, only food and 
clothing declined throughout the twentieth century.26 According to Segal, “If one 
expected to find a powerful escalator of inflated desires, an escalator that makes people 
need for more and more, it would be in this area. But no such escalation has occurred.”27 
However, the fact that people are spending less in those areas does not necessarily mean 
they care less—that their desired have not been “inflated.” The proliferation of cultural 
texts and popular discourse about food and fashion suggest that instead, many people 
care far more than their mid-century counterparts about eating and dressing 
aspirationally. And yet, clothing purchases and home décor have not taken on quite the 
same moral significance as food. The mandate to “shop local” may sometimes encompass 
more than food, but so far, there are no New York Times columnists urging people to 
find out where their t-shirts come from and publishing manifestos titled Clothes Matter. 
If the only effect of aspirational eating was that some middle-class strivers like 
Michael Pollan and myself might stand around in supermarket aisles or farmer's markets 
feeling bad or good—but definitely feeling something—about their purchases, I might be 
able to dismiss the phenomenon as relatively benign, or maybe even positive. It might 
even seem like a bit of  resourcefulness: if you cannot expect to do better in material 
terms, why not strive for immaterial rewards? But like all forms of cultural capital, 
culinary capital isn't just a way for classes to express value-neutral taste preferences. As a 
new aesthetics of the middle class, aspirational eating helps reinforce class hierarchies.
Like the bourgeois ethics of sexuality, the bourgeois ethics of food can be deployed like a 
weapon to defend privilege and reproduce power. 
26 Jerome Segal, Graceful Simplicity; The Philosophy and Politics of the Alternative American Dream 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003: 62).
27 Ibid, 59. 
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Even if the moral stakes and implications of individual food choices are greater 
than other forms of consumption (which is debatable), that doesn’t mean that the 
disproportionately white, affluent food revolutionaries ought to assume that everyone 
will share their beliefs about how to balance the costs and benefits of eating industrially. 
If food revolutionaries really want more people to make the choice to eat what they think 
is “better” food, they’re going to have to work on making healthy, sustainable, and 
humane foods answer the masses’ needs and desires. They’re not going to get anywhere 
by declaring the masses ignorant for wanting cheap, convenient, reliable, good-tasting 
food or trying to convince them that what they should want is expensive, inconvenient, 
unfamiliar, or less immediately palate-pleasing food. 
I’m not actually sure it’s possible to create a food system that would satisfy both 
the desires of the “food revolution” and the needs of the working class, but if it is, it will 
require letting go of the narratives about sacrifice and virtue. As long as eating “better” is 
constructed as dependent on hard work and self-sacrifice and concerned primarily with 
personal consumption (e.g. feeling good about where you shop), the “food revolution” is 
going to continue to appeal primarily to the left-leaning elite and efforts to get other 
people to join them will be—rightly—portrayed as “elitist.” Until that changes, natural, 
local, sustainable foods will continue to serve primarily as markers of belonging to the 
progressive, urban, coastal elite rather than the seeds of any real revolution.
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